December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Why am I wrong?
by Decius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am posting this pondering to cypherpunks in hopes that it will be refuted. Although these ideas are obviously in opposition to those held by Denning and the law enforcement community, they are also in opposition to those held by the Cypherpunks. This idea is bothering me because I cannot refute it, although it goes in opposition to many people whom I respect greatly. Please tell me why I am wrong about this. (Sorry for the US-centric perspective, but I think the arguments here apply regardless of what your system of government may be.) Crypto-Absolutism decius(a)ninja.techwood.org One of the largest problems in the debate over public access to cryptography is the fact that both sides of the issue hold absolute beliefs. They are unwilling to compromise, and often seem unwilling to decide on a solution which is anything but a total win for their side. Many of those who are opposed to cryptography have proposed what they claim is a compromise, when in reality these suggestions often change the issues instead of addressing them. However, in all conflicts there is a middle ground. The answer to the whole crypto debate may be in finding it. Nothing ever works in absolutes. On one side of the debate we find the law enforcement community. This group is totally opposed to the concept of public access to cryptography. Although they claim this to be false, the reality is that these people think its ok for anyone to keep a secret, as long as no one is keeping secrets from them. This belief is founded upon the principle that the law is absolute. They believe that the law is always right and always good. As Jim Kallstrom, assistant FBI director, put it, "unless you're a criminal, you have nothing to fear from the government." However, history has proven this philosophy to be totally flawed, time after time after time. The law is often very wrong, and even our lofty constitutional values do not prevent bad laws. When the law is wrong, the law's enforcer is the criminal. That is the definition of natural law, the philosophy upon which our system of government is based. People MUST have the right to dissent. People must have the right to oppose bad laws, and in many cases people must have the capability to violate bad laws with impunity. It is necessary for the survival and health of our society. If people's right to dissent is taken away and bad laws are passed, we move immediately into war. Peace is the definition of a healthy society. Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that if people can commit crimes with impunity that they will. If murder became legal, I do not think you would see much of an increase in the murder rate. As Socrates would say, if people know the what is good and what is bad, they will always choose the good, because the good is what is most desirable. That is why law enforcement is very restricted in the Constitution. The "compromise" the law enforcement community has suggested, key-escrow, is not a compromise at all, because it makes it impossible for people to keep secrets from the government. It removes the people's right to dissent, presumably the very right cryptography allows us to protect. The law enforcement community is wrong. On the other hand, we have the crypto-anarchists. They believe that the existence of anonymous transactions will naturally lend itself to a situation where everyone is anonymous, no transaction can be tracked, no communications can be monitored, and basically, no government can possibly control the transactions and interactions of its citizens. They support the broad use of military grade cryptography and anominity. Let no message be crackable or traceable. This, also, is an absolute belief and it is also flawed. We have governments for a reason, we came together and founded societies for protection, and if we tore apart our current social structure and created an anarchy, people would immediately form small societies for their own fiscal protection. Creating an anarchy is a massive step backward in social development, not a step forward. Furthermore, PEOPLE WANT TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS. No totally anonymous society will ever exist in the real world. In fact, many BBSs have tossed out anominity, although it works quite well in some communities. The right to anominity is very important. As I said before, it is important to allow people to express their ideas without fear of persecution for their beliefs. However, people want to be accountable for many of the things they do. People want recognition, and you cannot receive recognition for the actions of your anonymous identity. If people really wanted to be totally anonymous all the time, we would all be running around the shopping mall with ski masks and fistfuls of small unmarked bills. Not only is the idea of crypto-anarchy wrong, but it provides those who oppose cryptography an easy concept to attack. As Denning said, "Although May limply asserts that anarchy does not mean lawlessness and social disorder, the absence of government would lead to exactly these states of chaos. I do not want to live in an anarchistic society -- if such could be called a society at all -- and I doubt many would." The crypto-anarchists are also wrong. So who is right?? The concept I propose here is bound to be controversial, but I propose it because it must be considered. Lotus is right. Currently the internet is ripe for abuse by totalitarian governments everywhere. How wonderful the net must be to an insane dictator. One carefully placed packet sniffer and he can automatically monitor the conversations of thousands of people, censoring posts he doesn't like, and identifying email addresses of thought criminals. Although PGP, ssh, and similar tools provide a solution for some, traffic analysis makes those who speak privately stand out like a sore thumb that needs further investigation. Eric Huges said at Summercon that if cryptography is going to work, it needs to be just like Dolby noise reduction. Its there, its always on, people don't need to know what it does, but it makes things better. (No one stands out like a sore thumb.) Although doing this with military grade encryption would be the cryto-anarchist's dream, what if we did it with partially escrowed keys? The system would have to be designed such that the non-escrowed part could be increased with advances in technology. However, a system like this would stop the wide spread mass monitoring described above. Furthermore, it would allow the government to tap a conversation if it was willing to put forth the resources (which will add some visibility to an illegal tap). The system would also require one additional aspect. It must be impossible to automatically identify messages that have partially escrowed keys and messages that are not escrowed. Thus, the right of dissent is preserved. Although most software would only support escrowed keys. Through such a system the net will become a great deal more secure from tapping and monitoring. Tapping is possible with a lot of work, however it is not assured. Government remains the arm of society, yet it can be subverted and destroyed if necessary. Such a system brings us to the central question here. Does the government have the right to tap conversations, or do the people have a right to keep secrets from the government? I think the answer is both. In the end, it's very difficult to actually hurt someone with an email message. But, nothing ever works in absolutes. -- */^\* Tom Cross AKA Decius 615 AKA The White Ninja */^\* Decius(a)montag33.residence.gatech.edu -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzA6oXIAAAEEAJ6ZWl7AwF9rDZhREQ2b9aPxJKL7dxQNx6QQ0pB5o9olvNtG tIjA47KxWmZAx47m2JEWRgAIaiDHx00dEza5GX4FuFHL7wSXW7qOtqj7CmVLEg4e 0F/Mx0z7Q/aNsn34JrZUWbMLKkAOOB9sJARRynPRVNokAS30ampImlrLbQDFAAUT tCZEZWNpdXMgNmk1IDxkZWNpdXNAbmluamEudGVjaHdvb2Qub3JnPg== =0qgN -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Houston C'punks meeting
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone in the Houston area would like to have a meeting this weekend or in the near future, let me know. Dan Harmon

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Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I wrong?
by lunaslide＠loop.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<snip about crypto-anarchists taking a no compromise position> > ><sigh> Well, I suppose that if there is anyone who is most opposed to the >opinion you expressed in the paragraph above, it is myself. > >I believe: > >1. Governments will no longer be "necessary," if they ever were. > >2. Protection will no longer depend on having a "government." > >3. Anonymous networking technology will protect our rights, to the extent >they can be protected. > >4. Your statement, "...anarchy is a massive step backward..." is absolutely >incorrect. > That's fine that you believe the things, but for acceptance by others you will have to provide support for your position. I, personally, would like to see your premises so that I may evualuate your claims. You may indeed be correct in your assessment. Jeff Conn lunaslide On the meridian of time there is no injustice, only the poetry of motion creating the illusion of truth and drama. Henry Miller -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBvAzD3EHEAAAEDAMVwZzXozPjX18mCenA5fJsdWZXcrhJCxPR+SoVCmR7d4ZVU mwITzPTHo/GyLvJrWyk5YdhheczyY2VSawaMrCN/nWA7K9lwAylbKyPxqBhRYJ3C 2wi2uD5LY2wypNOQyQARAQABtB5KZWZmIENvbm4gPGx1bmFzbGlkZUBsb29wLmNv bT6JAHUDBRAw+1bqS2NsMqTTkMkBAQkTAwCersFbCyk8O0MbGlNcZDAe24CLEWQ0 0C5EHni33W76UsG1bybcLsuMH6HVwLF7IqZivnzc7wkujYPQvCqn8HEYYTld8V9V Cou4dOvA8kV7rHvAn/LuLx7DRruLFrRoPSk= =OIT9 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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INCHOATE CYPHERPUNK JOBS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Friends of mine are working on projects that would call for C'punk types. If anything sounds interesting, let me know and I will pass your name (and resume) along. 1. Design, build and maintain an ISP in Costa Rica. Later, you would design and program a financial application (I can say no more). Knowledge of crypto, networks, databases, etc. required. 2. Design, build and maintain a LAN with high bandwidth connection to the Internet in Hawaii. This would be in a high-tech, high-security residential enclave for wealthy telecommuting entrepreneurs, writers, semi-retired CEOs and other information professionals. 3. Design, build and maintain an international Internet gambling-related service business probably located outside of the US (Saipan?). In each of the above businesses, developement money is readily available, but the principals are currently finishing up other projects. S a n d y P.S. Bay Area C'punks can get the inside skinny from me at my party on Saturday. Have YOU RSVPed yet? ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: "PGP-Scape"? (was Re: Our "New Order")
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:58 PM 2/6/96 -0800, Tom Weinstein wrote: >Deranged Mutant wrote: >> >> No. SSL doesn't encrypt everything, just certain transactions (or am I >> wrong about this?) Something that keeps everything encrypted and >> anonymous. > >SSL encrypts everything that goes across an SSL connection. > > I think the confusion is that most sites don't run anything but transactions over the SSL link for speed reasons. Anything the the user and/or webmaster *choose* to send over an SSL pipe is protected (assuming non export versions). John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 "Technology is a way of organizing the universe so that man doesn't have to experience it." - Max Frisch

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Re: Why am I wrong?
by lunaslide＠loop.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I don't think that I am stating a position of cypher-anarchy, but >>advocating a position of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth >>Amendment. > >Don't forget the other side of the conversation. While the government >cannot (notice I did not say they might not try) effectively control >communication, there are other points at which control may be exerted: These exceptions are noted. > >1) communications *with* the government (IRS, Social Security, etc). I would want the govt. to understand what I am sending them and I would want to understand what they are sending me. Hell, they can have my public key too ;-) But I don't see how they could exercise control simply because I am communicating with them. They cannot come blow my door down or even slap my hand if they know I use encryption in all of my other transmissions. Perhaps I do not understand your point. They can perhaps control the communication between them and me, but not between me and everyone else. >2) communications using someone else's equipment/network (university, > employer, etc) Employers nor universities have any jurisdiction over whether you use encryption in your transmissions while using their networks unless it specifically does not allow it when you first agree to have an account with them. Even in that case, they would be hard pressed to enforce it on a university wide basis. I would hope that employers would be smart enough to encourage the use of encryption for their employees, even if they are personal messages. It would decrease their competitions chances to intercept and decode the important, sensitive info because it would be immersed in even more, unimportant info that is encrypted as well. The govt. has control over the universities in that they are the ones who fund them. If the govt. denied funds to a given college because they did not regulate the type of encryption, or alieviate the encryption use entirely, what reasoning would they give to the schools board and the public for restricting something that is not against the law and is, in fact, protected by a constituional amendment. It would not fly with the voters. >3) communications with anyone (Internet merchant, etc) who says "this > is not what <MasterCard|Visa|AmEx> approves..." I don't quite understand your meaning. I am a merchant and I encourage my customers to use PGP when they send information over the internet, whether to me or to anyone else. I explain to them the reasons for this, assisted by Mr. Zimmermann's excellent analogy of the postcard/envelope difference. Most are business people and readily accept the reasoning and are willing to incorperate it into their dealings. To respond to this point, I would need to understand it better. What is not what Mastercard, et al approves? The encryption? >Each of these may have compelling reasons for complying with what the >government wants even if it is not law. IMNSHO "law" is just a means >for exacting retribution/revenge - if you have to resort to it, you >have already lost. > Indeed, there would be some impact from what point out, however, it would not be enough pressure to suppress the encryption movement unless it became painfully, and obviously, unconstitutional. Law is optimally there for us to redress grievences. There will be skirmishes on the legal front for the next 5 or 6 years, as far as I can see, but eventually the Surpreme Court will set enough precidents that procecutors will be left with little power. I don't think this is an optomistic view, but a realistic one based on the current events and on decisions in related matters by the court in the past. Comments? Bring 'em on! :-) Respectfully, Jeff Conn PS Yeah for Zimmermann and crew! lunaslide On the meridian of time there is no injustice, only the poetry of motion creating the illusion of truth and drama. Henry Miller -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBvAzD3EHEAAAEDAMVwZzXozPjX18mCenA5fJsdWZXcrhJCxPR+SoVCmR7d4ZVU mwITzPTHo/GyLvJrWyk5YdhheczyY2VSawaMrCN/nWA7K9lwAylbKyPxqBhRYJ3C 2wi2uD5LY2wypNOQyQARAQABtB5KZWZmIENvbm4gPGx1bmFzbGlkZUBsb29wLmNv bT6JAHUDBRAw+1bqS2NsMqTTkMkBAQkTAwCersFbCyk8O0MbGlNcZDAe24CLEWQ0 0C5EHni33W76UsG1bybcLsuMH6HVwLF7IqZivnzc7wkujYPQvCqn8HEYYTld8V9V Cou4dOvA8kV7rHvAn/LuLx7DRruLFrRoPSk= =OIT9 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: PGP's "only for your eyes"
by cmca＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com] [Subject: Re: PGP's "only for your eyes"] Usuario Acceso2 <acceso2(a)diatel.upm.es> wrote: Maybe some of you already know about this. Whe reading PGP's "Only for your eyes" messages, the program creates a temporary file containing the plaintext in the directory where the cyphertext file is. So, don't worry about this option, it's quite useless. The manual points out that you shouldn't rely on it. Its main purpose is simply to prevent accidentally or automatically leaving the plaintext lying around, not to actually securely guarantee that behaviour. After all, you could always cut-and-paste the text, or (since you have the PGP source) alter PGP to ignore the flag. The real problem is not what it does, but what people *think* it might do. I take that back. When I check the manual, it doesn't say that it is insecure. It really ought to. At least one of the books about PGP does though, I know I've read it somewhere other than email. Chris McAuliffe <cmca(a)alpha.c2.org> (No, not that one.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBMRfm+oHskC9sh/+lAQHgygQAs4gsA3DWORL06++EpiQahmDOj6JZJKaD CTkljTcGA1WoY6LNEwGrEMBSs1NoaY6JT+KgxAeP/HOxTJDKwRkAdU+/psjMT9t6 rqERq6HerBKIBqUj/nOsbhnigA2U+e3gto9Fpvs5gld6oQvbyn3M56PWXrm9dbBX N2KqJ8BcQTE= =eRZ2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Strong Crypto Weak
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Strong Encryption Weak, Say Crypto Gurus Washington, D.C., U.S.A., 6 February 1996 -- Strong encryption is weak, reports a group of prominent cryptographers and computer scientists. Their report, released yesterday, is expected to play an important role in coming debates over US policy on exports of software that includes encryption capabilities. Current US policy generally limits exports to encryption using 40-bit keys. On a case-by-case basis, the US has allowed export of software with 56-bit digital encryption standard (DES) encryption. Recently, two French graduate students cracked the 40-bit encryption Netscape was using. The trick took several days, using idle time on the school's computers. The seven experts who wrote the new paper -- "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security" -- say the achievement by the students at the Ecole Polytechnique was trivial. "Anyone with a modicum of computer expertise and a few hundred dollars would be able to attack 40-bit encryption much faster," they write. They add that using a field programmable gate array (FPGA) chip, costing about $400 mounted on a card, "would on average recover a 40-bit key in five hours." "A more determined commercial predator," says the paper, "prepared to spend $10,000 for a set-up" using 25 FPGA chips, "can find 40-bit keys in an average of 12 minutes." Moving to a 56-bit DES system doesn't solve the problem, says the paper. "Calculations show that DES is inadequate against a corporate or government attacker committing serious resources. The bottom line is that DES is cheaper and easier to break than many believe." And it is getting easier to crack DES code, says the paper. "At present, it would take a year and a half for someone using $10,000 worth of FPGA technology to search out a DES key. In ten years time, an investment of this size would allow one to find a DES key in less than a week." A serious attack against DES, on the order of $300,000, "could find a DES key in an average of 19 days using off-the-shelf technology and in only three hours using a custom developed chip," say the cryptoanalysts. That's the sort of money a business, or a criminal organization, might be willing to spend to find trade secrets or dip into a flow of financial transactions. A government intelligence agency willing to spend $300 million "could recover DES keys in 12 seconds each," says the paper. "The investment required is large, but not unheard of in the intelligence community. It is less than the cost of the Glomar Explorer, built to salvage a single Russian submarine, and far less than the cost of many spy satellites." What's the proper key length for protection against criminal operations or a prying government? The analysts "strongly recommend a minimum key-length of 90 bits for symmetric cryptosystems." That's far stronger than anything the US government has ever contemplated allowing for export. The paper was written by some of the most prestigious individuals in the field: Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, Ronald Rivest, Bruce Schneier, Tsutomu Shimomura, Eric Thompson, and Michael Wiener. Blaze, at AT&T Research, recently demonstrated weaknesses in the government's "Clipper Chip" key escrow system. Diffie, at Sun Microsystems, was a co-creator of public key cryptography. Rivest, at MIT, was one of the inventors of the RSA public-key system and one of the founders of RSA Data Security Inc. Schneier, president of Counterpane Systems, is the author of a leading textbook, Applied Cryptography. Shimomura, at the San Diego Supercomputer Center, last year tracked down outlaw hacker Kevin Mitnick. Thompson heads AccessData's crypto team, which has regular clients that include the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. Wiener, at Bell-Northern Research, wrote an influential 1993 article, "Efficient DES Key Search," which describes how to build a machine to attack DES by brute computational force. The paper grew out of a one-day meeting in Chicago last November, which was supported by the Business Software Alliance. The paper is available on the BSA World Wide Web site, http://www.bsa.org/. --

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EIA and TIA Paper on Crypto Policy
by Mark Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The February 2nd edition of "Washington TELECOM Week" reports that the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) and the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) have jointly submitted to the Whitehouse a paper that warns the administration about the folly of continuing the "virtual embargo" that is in place for all exports of encryption controlled by the State Department. The paper warns that the nation will take a heavy hit if export restrictions are not "significantly eased." According to the groups, stringent export controls on encryption software and products are a blow to both the economy and national security. The member companies of the two large groups have concluded that it is "no longer in the national interest to use export control policy as a tool to impede data security products." According to the paper, even the new policy leads to a number of injurious consequences, including the loss of sales and the loss of efficiency. It emphasizes that there is a growing need for data security products containing encryption in the private sector, both in the US and overseas. The export controls, said the paper, "lead to increased risk of penetration from hackers, commercial competitors, terrorists and others." Hence, they call for the development of cheap, easy-to-use encryption for a wide variety of potential applications, or "the U.S. Government and industry both will suffer." ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |So, I went walking through the street. |Mark Aldrich | |I saw you strung up in a tree. |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |A woman knelt there, said to me, |maldrich(a)grci.com | |Hold your tongue, man, hold your tongue. |MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Fax Fools US Espionage
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Foolproof" Encrypted Fax System Derby, England, 6 February 1996 -- Wordcraft, the Derby-based software house, has announced that its proposals for a "foolproof" secure fax transmission system will be considered by the International Telecommunications Union's meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, next week. According to Mike Lake, the company's managing director, Wordcraft has been working closely with a number of other companies, notably Chantilly (another UK firm) on the proposals, which will be considered alongside a competing set from French and German companies. Lake told Newsbytes that the Wordcraft system is known as Automatic Fax Services (AFS) and consists of four elements: authentication, message confirmation, integrated encryption, and a certificate of receipt. The authentication element of AFS revolves the generation of the fax device's serial number and unique transaction number for each fax transmission. Message confirmation is generated by the distant fax device, while the certificate of receipt is printed after confirmation is received. "Existing fax transmission reports are just that -- a note of transmission. AGS creates a new document, a certificate of receipt, which proves that a fax was transmitted," Lake said. The encryption system, meanwhile, uses a proprietary, but open systems standard of encryption, using a one-time passkey, which is transmitted by the sending fax device in a secure manner. "This contrasts with the French/German system which is based on RSA's private and public key system. That system is flawed, since it relies on the US Government licensing a manufacturer to use the algorithm, something that the Government is unlikely to do with, for example, a Japanese fax manufacturer," Lake explained. According to Lake, even if the ITU Study Group 8 approves the French/German secure fax system next week, no major fax vendor is likely to implement such a system on their fax machines if the US Government is allowed to licence each fax machine for use. "The AFS system is secure, yet does not need the permission of anybody to use it. In that sense, it's a more global system," he said. So what does Wordcraft get out of the proposed standard? According to Lake, the company is offering a series of C language routines for inclusion in the firmware of fax machines, and fax software drivers. These routines, he said, allow driver programs to be coded very easily. It is the modest licence fees for this software with which Wordcraft is hoping to recoup its investment. --

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