December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Defeating untrustworthy remailers?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's another idea (don't laugh): to set up a system where mailing lists and newsgroups have public keys that you can encrypt directly to. Advantage for anonymous mail is that if a remailer is untrustowrthy, there's still some security in the final remailing of the document. Furthermore, non-encrypted mail is less at risk of tampering. And some newsgroups or lists could requires a signed message from an approved key before posting. - --Mutant Rob - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMRg29CoZzwIn1bdtAQE5YwF/cL8OewFzwKdgErFteLAGj+6pgvczaix/ cMzkh4UfH6rjyIC3d6L+xcrmK1fz5v/I =GzsY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 06 Feb 1996 15:43:12 -0800 > From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> > Subject: Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I > wrong? > > [Part 1] > I've been following the concepts of digital cash and encryption, since > I read the article in the August 1992 issue of Scientific American on > "encrypted signatures." While I've only followed the Digitaliberty area > for a few weeks, I can already see a number of points that do (and > should!) strongly concern the average savvy individual: > > 1. How can we translate the freedom afforded by the Internet to > ordinary life? > By realizing that freedom is freedom, the medium is irrelevant. > 2. How can we keep the government from banning encryption, digital > cash, and other systems that will improve our freedom? > By making shure they don't have the authority to make the decision in the first place. > A few months ago, I had a truly and quite literally "revolutionary" > idea, and I jokingly called it "Assassination Politics": I speculated on > the question of whether an organization could be set up to _legally_ > announce either that it would be awarding a cash prize to somebody who > correctly "predicted" the death of one of a list of violators of > rights, usually either government employees, officeholders, or > appointees. It could ask for anonymous contributions from the public, > and individuals would be able send those contributions using digital > cash. > If the intent is to motivate others to kill or otherwise harm others simply because you don't agree with them or their actions is reprehensible and moraly or ethicaly undefensible. > > On the contrary; my speculation assumed that the "victim" is a > government employee, presumably one who is not merely taking a paycheck > of stolen tax dollars, but also is guilty of extra violations of rights > beyond this. (Government agents responsible for the Ruby Ridge incident > and Waco come to mind.) In receiving such money and in his various > acts, he violates the "Non-aggression Principle" (NAP) and thus, > presumably, any acts against him are not the initiation of force under > libertarian principles. > Every citizen of this country is a 'government employee' in one sense or another. By resorting to violence you are no better than the ones you proport to protect us against. Jim Choate ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: "PGP-Scape"? (was Re: Our "New Order")
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- cp(a)proust.suba.com (Alex Strasheim) wrote: >> There's also less worry about secure transactions, since if >> everything's encrypted it's harder to tell if a transaction is taking >> place, viewing porno or subversive or religious, literature, or if >> you're just reading something mundane. > >I think I must be missing something here. Aren't you describing an SSL >web server? Different algorithms, but basically the same idea? No. SSL doesn't encrypt everything, just certain transactions (or am I wrong about this?) Something that keeps everything encrypted and anonymous. >Netscape 2.0 is out for real -- everyone can now pick their certs. GAK >just got harder. As opposed to the imaginary beta? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMRcCsyoZzwIn1bdtAQEZYAF6Aql41weD0Dz+7aQbQ+OFyXeb8fPgoO9n o/muL79oNXntntKcqmaqSHWsxz/VuTX1 =69yF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Likely application for high-bandwidth proxies (fwd)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu >This makes it harder for transitory proxies, but not for fairly permanent ones, I suspect. An outfit like C2 could presumably register with a corporate credit card. Its proxy then carries connections paid-as-you-go with e$, or paid in chunks in advance with a check. ------------------- That could work with a known amount of charge, which the person would pay to the proxy (or some portion of it). A very interesting idea. But how about the larger idea of anonymnity (such as through an organization with anonymous account access) with _general_ access to a corporate credit card? You'd need to either A. have knowledge of the users (what I'd call semi-anonymous) or B. get the price of what the person is purchasing at the time and subtract it from their account. The latter seems possible with the FV system, so long as it records enough info to distinguish who's using what so the appropriate account can be charged for it (the system would allow a yes answer only if the account had enough money to pay for it). One would need to know in any case at each point when a given account charged something. This might work via not telling the user the CC/FV number is (which one would want to do in any case) and logging which account used something when. One could use multiple credit cards (with multiple fees, unfortunately) and rotate them around from account to account every day or so (whatever the finest grain distinguishable by the card report was). I wonder how much info gets reported back on corporate credit cards to the corporation issuing them. Any information or suggestions? In general, the problem is finding out what nym is charging what. Another way to do it, but an unpopular one, would be to have a required deposit equal to the credit limit available on the card. This limit could be checked on a regular basis (a phone call, hopefully automatable, to the credit card issuer) and adjusted appropriately. -Allen

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:05 PM 2/6/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"ravage(a)ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 6-FEB-1996 22:50:35.24 > >>What is described is not self-defence by any stretch of the imagination. It >is a pre-meditated act which causes any plea of self-defence to fail. >------------------ > If someone has comitted serious enough violations of rights in the >past, then I would call killing that person justified. First, it prevents any >future violations of rights by that person. Second, it serves to discourage >people if they know they can get killed if they do so. (I realize that >capital punishment by governments doesn't appear to do much good, but the >people in question- government agents, etcetera- are generally a bit different >than the gang members who so regularly ignore prison sentences and the death >penalty.) Third, and getting away from the self-defense argument, it is >justice. The job of a government, if it has one, is to defend individual >liberties. It is given privileges in order to enforce that. The abuse of such >privileges should be met by death. (Yes, I would be in favor of changing >current laws to remove sovereign immunity and institute a death penalty for >governmental rights violations. Unfortunately, among the people subject to such >a law are the ones making the laws.) Thank you for such a well-written defense of my philosophy. Clearly, the government is now out of effective control of the citizenry; it is hard for me to understand how anybody could fail to see this. The system I describe, while it may appear to some to be extreme, is a sincere attempt to return control to the populace. >------------------------ > >>How many people have to decide that another should be killed for it to be >ethical? In short, how many people does it take to decide it is a legitimate >act to take your own life? >---------------------- > Why should "how many people" make a difference? If I violate someone's >rights enough to justify such a course of action, then I should be dead even if >everyone except the victim is cheering. Yes, I realize that Jim Bell's system >does depend on a group of people. But so, in the end, do all such systems- >whether they call themselves governments or anarcho-capitalist societies. If >the Christian Coalition got too many people with guns in the latter, they'd >rule. > Any further discussion would appear to belong in private email; I >suspect that Jim Bell would appreciate a cc. > -Allen Yes, please. Frankly, Allen, it's a pleasure to see people really UNDERSTAND what I'm talking about! You obviously do, better than mos t.

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POTP gets good press
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Sun Observer -- "An Independent Journal Devoted to the Sun and Compatible Markets" -- ran an article in the Feb 96 issue entitled "New technology eliminates need for keys to encrypt e-mail messages". Byline: Bob Harvey. About the author: "Bob Harvey is vice president of the Internet Security Corp., a Lexington, Mass.-based network security solutions provider." Content: includes diagrams entitled "Link Level Encryption" in which sender transmits keys to receiver, and "Packet Level Encryption" in which sender transmits key sto certificate authority which transmits them to multiple receivers, and "Synchronized Random Key Generation (SRKG)" a la "Power One Time Pad" in which no keys are transmitted and multiple recievers magically decipher messages via built-in encryption devices. Am I right in thinking this is utter unmitigated bullsh snake oil? Does anybody have any other dirt on this Bob Harvey guy and his Internet Security Corp? What is his relationship with the POTP folks? An Alta Vista search revealed several Bob Harveys, but none who matched with "Internet Security". I'm Cc'ing this to the editor in chief of The Sun Observer. If he doesn't know about the cypherpunks he might want to request some explanation... Regards, Bryce "Toys, Tools and Technologies" the Niche New Signal Consulting -- C++, Java, HTML, Ecash Bryce PGP sig follows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.01 iQCVAwUBMRkD8/WZSllhfG25AQESBgP8CmmKb0+VMqs14FNQ2YoAllXcaqAtc09Y 99KljeM0gHpm19x14Tj011bngS59EyUCDvoFaY6HtOmOPNqR2SpQxoHp9IBWNJmS dGEGwuqCLEB2gxMwgtjrwCNWyJmXk6Wp8UTRPcoG/woXWBCkyllbc62dV/RbILva OeKJR5FpQ9Y= =YT6V -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund
by Philip L. Dubois 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- * MESSAGE FROM ZIMMERMANN DEFENSE TEAM FOR IMMEDIATE WIDE DISTRIBUTION WITHOUT MODIFICATION I write on behalf of Philip Zimmermann and his legal defense team for two reasons: to offer thanks and to make an announcement. First, we offer our thanks to all the generous souls who donated money and services to the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund. Without you, we could not have mounted the defense that we did, and we would not have achieved the result that we did. Your contributions were made from a commitment to the causes of privacy and justice, and we are grateful. The announcement: as you may know, I am the only lawyer who was not working pro bono, i.e., without expectation of being paid. Three of our lawyers-- Ken Bass in D.C., Eben Moglen in New York, and Curt Karnow in San Francisco-- devoted hundreds of hours of time and substantial expenses for which they've not been paid. Tom Nolan in Palo Alto and Bob Corn-Revere in D.C. also spent a great deal of time on this case for which they were not paid. And, of course, Joe Burton in San Francisco toiled in obscurity on behalf of the other person who was also targeted by the federal investigation. I agreed up front not to bill for all my time, and judging from the rate of current contributions, it now appears that the Defense Fund will cover the fees and costs that I billed. I would like to see these other lawyers receive some compensation for their efforts. Accordingly, all donations to the Zimmermann Legal Defense Fund mailed, authorized, or generally "made" (as opposed to "received") after midnight local time on 14 February 1996 will be distributed among these other lawyers to defray their costs and, if possible, to compensate them for a little of their time. I make this announcement because people contributing to the Fund have a right to know that Mr. Zimmermann's actual defense costs are now covered and that additional donations will go to lawyers who agreed to work for free and who were absolutely essential to the defense. Again, my thanks. Philip L. Dubois Counsel for Philip Zimmermann Philip L. Dubois, P.C. 2305 Broadway Boulder, CO 80304-4106 voice: 303-444-3885 fax: 303-444-1051 email: dubois(a)dubois.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMRgCUbZ7C+AHeDONAQGJAAP+N82RobbmbRVljdE7t0tGEcfCeHN+pqwF +j31GjZU3qDNBtgXw30yTJSKOOjkg9fBRicNIQPsLarkTGDTYWUk2JSNcUVgNZiO /AjM/BnIjwms81DuGR1KivlMlw6lnhK46ncT4ijx5tMj2b8QaHiwkkwxznY3FTXi bNlo5J06cFA= =D12f -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Anti-US-censorship ammunition
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I received the following addresses from my request for non-US bomb-making material sites. (I'll post who gave them to me if he gives me permission). They should be useful as arguments against anyone who claims the US should shut off such information. -Allen http://www.mi.aau.dk/~clement/thb_title.html http://home.ptd.net/~wa2joc/terror.hb http://www.tvnorge.no/~thomasm/terror.htm http://www.cis.ksu.edu/~psiber/fortress/ter5ror/main.html

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BLU_ink
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2-6-96. FinTim: "Secret identities. Two systems to combat potential signature fraud in cyberspace." On digital signatures by public-key cryptography and by a "biometric token" system by PenOp of the UK. BLU_ink

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CDA = death of crypto
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CDA means that virtually all underground or 'illegal' traffic will be distributed via encryption. As soon as the loony right and fundo Christians realise this, they *will* call for legislation against encryption, and if the CDA is any benchmark, they will easily win. My 0.2 cents worth for the day.

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