December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CTCP
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If Maude X (the author of CTCP) is still on the list, can they contact me, as I've been playing with it in the last few days and have added new features and increased the RNG security somewhat. If they're not around I'll release an updated 'unofficial' version in a week or two. Mark

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[NOISE] Re: BlackNet in "Hardware"
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I recollect that the Amiga had some gizmo--I think it was called > "MagicSack" or something like that--that let it run Macintosh programs, > sort of. It never really caught on, at least as an alternative to real > Macs. And I think something similar was available for DOS. This was all > several years back, before the Amiga faded out. > > Amiga users and former Amiga users can probably tell us more. > > --Tim May The Amiga 2000 had two sets of slots - one for amiga-specific cards, and one for PC cards. Some of these slots lined up, and you could slip in a 'Bridgeboard' which carried an Intel processor. It could access the PC slots, the amiga IO, and had it's own disk partitions. There were mechanisms for the two processors to exchange data as well. I *think* there was a similar MAC product as well, or at least a board which could carry MAC ROMs, and used the Amiga 68000 processor. So the answer is: yes, the Amiga could do that. It also had long filenames, thousands of colors, true preemptive multitasking, stereo sound, a DSP coprocessor,and many other neat features years before they were available on other consumer systems, as well as display quality and features still unavailable on any system even near its pricepoint. But - Commodore's marketing department couldn't sell ice in the Sahara. I'll stop now, or I'll start mourning for TOPS-20 as well... Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Hack DigiCash: Payee Anonymity
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >This is for a "WorldCurrency Access Interest Account", which I don't >think is what is used for ecash. For ecash the account opening fee is >$11 and the per-month fee is $5. I don't see any reference to required >account minimums. Aha. That's where I got the $11 figure from. I suppose I should try actually _reading_ all the fine print :) IANAL, but then I never claimed to be. I'll be writing to Mark Twain's contact ("ftrotter(a)marktwain.com") and try to figure out just what the deal is. Dave - ----- David E. Smith, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0c92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ Sorry, the full signature is being interrogated by news.admin.net-abuse.misc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMI5y7AwyfvCScyE5AQEn7wQAoUT/6fBZcUSM5eT7HYnY0Tx5Q35Q4aeB a2lTJWnMRta5i16qCtKF/0OiK/9bfs0i3FQqUMpireXp7YZn5n0D83mr+AWuJZBc +0170zWpsVZElAoZU8ZPV06PDQwuraH2pmdBMt9Kfabi4w4BGbqJ3E4rYvhx95dj hWnAp+6RzJg= =IM+h -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: textbooks
by koontz＠MasPar.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IP/FP and PC1 describe how to get from input bytes to L, R, C and D Blocks: The Initial Permutation The Initial Permuation (IP) is a description of how a byte wide interface is connected to a 64 bit block comprised of two 32 bit blocks (L and R). Consider a byte wide interface with the bits numbered 1-8. The event numbered bits go to the L Block and the odd numbered bits go to the R block. Note that the bit order is big endian, where bit 1 is most significant and bit 8 is least least significant. The input block is typically loaded as 8 successive byte loads: Port MSB7 Input (LR) Left Bit Bit Block (64 bits) Block (32 bits) 2------6-------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 4------4-------60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 6------2-------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 8------0-------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Right Block (32 bits) 1------7-------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3------5-------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5------3-------61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 7------1-------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Final Permutation The Final Permutation (IP-1) provides the inverse, it standarizes the output of the R16L16 output block to a byte wide interface. The Output block is ordered Right then Left to allow complementary operation for subsequent decryption. Were one to perform an IP followed by IP-1 without any intervening round iteration operations, one would end up with odd and even bits swapped: Right Output (R16L16) Standard Port Block (32 bits) Block (64 bits) Bit Bit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8---------6--------2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16---------4--------4 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24---------2--------6 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32---------0--------8 Left Block (32 bits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40---------7--------1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48---------5--------3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56---------3--------5 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64---------1--------7 Output Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 >From FIPS Pub 46-2: Final Permuation IP-1: Output Byte 40 8 48 16 56 24 64 32 1 39 7 47 15 55 23 63 31 2 38 6 46 14 54 22 62 30 3 37 5 45 13 53 21 61 29 4 36 4 44 12 52 20 60 28 5 35 3 43 11 51 19 59 27 6 34 2 42 10 50 18 58 26 7 33 1 41 9 49 17 57 25 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Port Bit 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 MSB7 Bits In the simplest hardware implementation of DES, the Left and Right blocks are comprised in hardware of four 8 bit register each. Each 8 bit register can be serially loaded (IP), serially unloaded (IP-1), or parallel output and parallel loaded (round interation). DES is an encryption algorithm originally required to be implemented in hardware, specified in 1977 - predating 16 or 32 bit microprocessor peripherals. Permuted Choice 1 PC1 performs a similar function loading the C and D 28 bit registers (comprised of three 8 bit bidirectional shift register and 1 4 bit bidirectional shift register, all with parallel outputs). The C and D registers can be serially loaded (shifting right), or serially shifted left or right in a closed ring for encryption or decryption. Port MSB7 Bits Bits Input (CD) C Block, 64 bits Block (28 bits) 1--------7------57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 MS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2--------6------58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 3--------5------59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4--------4------60 52 44 36 ----------- (C(28)) 25 26 27 28 D Block (28 bits) 7--------1------63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 6--------2------62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 5--------3------61 53 45 37 29 21 33 5 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4-------(D(25)--------------28 20 12 4 25 26 27 28 8--------0------64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 LS (parity) Input Byte 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Note that bit 4 is used as input for both C and D. This implies that C(28) output is used as the serial input to D(25). The least significant bit is used for odd parity.

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crypto and law enforcement
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In June, four people were arrested for allegedly producing the illegal newspaper "radikal" in Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany. One of the main reasons for imprisonment was that they refused to decrypt the disks found with them. The Attorney at the Federal Supreme Court now claims that three disks have been partially decrypted, but does not reveal the texts to the defense counsel because that could be "a danger to the investigations". The fact that the accused did not help in decryption is seen as an indicator for danger of collusion, so they will remain imprisonned on remand. It seems that these four people will face several years of imprisonment mainly because one of them chose a weak passphrase.

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by leonardr＠aladdinsys.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 PM 10/24/95, Marshall Clow wrote: >> http://www.uccs.edu/~abusby/mac_u-g/RemoveIt.sit.bin >> I also just checked this out, and I as the engineer currently responsible for StuffIt (and having worked on it for a number of years), I can tell you that the thing simply won't work as documented. I'll even explain why... StuffIt actually encrypts data (it doesn't just password protect it), but it does so using a COMPLETELY RANDOM key and then that random key is encrypted using the password that the user entered (user key) and then stored in the MKey resource. We do this so that the same file encrypted with the same "user key" doesn't generate the same data (and therefore aid in easier breaking). So by replacing an archive's MKey resource, only means that you can manipulate an encrypted archive (delete things, etc.) BUT it still won't decrypt your data, since the original encryption key is not present. If you know the person who wrote or posted the information, please feel free to forward my message along to him. Thanks, Leonard Rosenthol ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Leonard Rosenthol Internet: leonardr(a)aladdinsys.com Director of Advanced Technology AppleLink: MACgician Aladdin Systems, Inc. America Online: MACgician

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arg
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Frissell: "The average seasoned citizen pays a higher percentage of his income for medical expenses today than he did in 1964 before the passage of Medicaid." Do you set aside a quiet hour every day to think up this crap?

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Re: Quick commercial package question
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:05 AM 10/25/95, Leonard Rosenthol wrote: >At 10:57 PM 10/24/95, Marshall Clow wrote: >>> http://www.uccs.edu/~abusby/mac_u-g/RemoveIt.sit.bin <...> > If you know the person who wrote or posted the information, please >feel free to forward my message along to him. I don't know the person, but I posted your note--and, BTW, thanks for responding--to alt.hackintosh, where the above web page proffering this pseudo-crack is regularly mentioned; I know that "abusby" monitors the group (and maintains a big hacking BBS), so hopefully he'll pull the crack from circulation. Cheers. And thanks, also, for all of your very excellent work. Ted

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Re: Mark Twain Bank (was: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal)
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those interested in the first bank to back Ecash: Mark Twain Bank opened to serve the wealthy suburbs of Saint Louis (Ladue and Town & Country) a few years ago. It was meant to be a public "private bank" for sophisticated customers. A few years ago when the rules were eased, it started offering accounts and CDs denominated in 25 foreign currencies. These accounts were meant for international investors and business types in the area. They were discovered by "hard money" newsletters and became popular with that crowd. They have been the cheapest place to get foreign currency accounts in the US. Initially, the bank didn't realize that this sort of "hedge" market existed but have since exploited it fairly well. These accounts are FDIC insured up to $100,000.00 in $US equivalents. Obviously, exchange losses are not covered by FDIC insurance. The Ecash trial involves opening a World Currency Access Account which *is* FDIC insured and using it to fund your Ecash account which is *not* insured. They are treating the Ecash Mint part of their operations and the various customer Ecash accounts as investment accounts (hence the investor sophistication disclosure questions on the application form). Unanswered questions --- What will the SEC say? Mark Twain seems to be carrying on the fine old tradition of Saint Louis banks being a bit independent and out in front of the crowd. Other examples include Southwest Bank always leading the nation on Prime Rate changes and the Saint Louis Federal Reserve Bank (the only FRB to publish a hard money newsletter). I may wait for the Swedish Postal Bank to start offering its Ecash accounts just cause I like foreign climes. DCF "The Revolution will *not* be FDIC insured BTW."

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Welcome to cypherpunks
by Majordomo＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Welcome to the cypherpunks mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe cypherpunks cypherpunks(a)toad.com Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: About cypherpunks ----------------- I. Administrivia (please read, boring though it may be) The cypherpunks list is a forum for discussing personal defenses for privacy in the digital domain. It is a high volume mailing list. If you don't know how to do something, like unsubscribe, send mail to majordomo(a)toad.com and the software robot which answers that address will send you back instructions on how to do what you want. If you don't know the majordomo syntax, an empty message to this address will get you a help file, as will a command 'help' in the body. Even with all this automated help, you may still encounter problems. If you get really stuck, please feel free to contact me directly at the address I use for mailing list management: cypherpunks-owner(a)toad.com Please use this address for all mailing list management issues. Hint: if you try to unsubscribe yourself from a different account than you signed up for, it likely won't work. Log back into your old account and try again. If you no longer have access to that account, mail me at the list management address above. For other questions, my list management address is not the best place, since I don't read it every day. To reach me otherwise, send mail to eric(a)remailer.net This address is appropriate for emergencies (and wanting to get off the list is never an emergency), such as the list continuously spewing articles. Please don't send me mail to my regular mailbox asking to be removed; I'll just send you back a form letter. Do not mail to the whole list asking to be removed. It's rude. The -request address is made exactly for this purpose. To post to the whole list, send mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com If your mail bounces repeatedly, you will be removed from the list. Nothing personal, but I have to look at all the bounce messages. There is no digest version available. There is an announcements list which is moderated and has low volume. Announcements for physical cypherpunks meetings, new software and important developments will be posted there. Mail to cypherpunks-announce-request(a)toad.com if you want to be added or removed to the announce list. All announcements also go out to the full cypherpunks list, so there is no need to subscribe to both. II. About cypherpunks The cypherpunks list is not designed for beginners, although they are welcome. If you are totally new to crypto, please get and read the crypto FAQ referenced below. This document is a good introduction, although not short. Crypto is a subtle field and a good understanding will not come without some study. Please, as a courtesy to all, do some reading to make sure that your question is not already frequently asked. There are other forums to use on the subject of cryptography. The Usenet group sci.crypt deals with technical cryptography; cypherpunks deals with technical details but slants the discussion toward their social implications. The Usenet group talk.politics.crypto, as is says, is for political theorizing, and cypherpunks gets its share of that, but cypherpunks is all pro-crypto; the debates on this list are about how to best get crypto out there. The Usenet group alt.security.pgp is a pgp-specific group, and questions about pgp as such are likely better asked there than here. Ditto for alt.security.ripem. The cypherpunks list has its very own net.loon, a fellow named L. Detweiler. The history is too long for here, but he thinks that cypherpunks are evil incarnate. If you see a densely worded rant featuring characteristic words such as "medusa", "pseudospoofing", "treachery", "poison", or "black lies", it's probably him, no matter what the From: line says. The policy is to ignore these postings. Replies have never, ever, not even once resulted in anything constructive and usually create huge flamewars on the list. Please, please, don't feed the animals. III. Resources. A. The sci.crypt FAQ anonymous ftp to rtfm.mit.edu:pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt The cryptography FAQ is good online intro to crypto. Very much worth reading. Last I looked, it was in ten parts. B. cypherpunks ftp site anonymous ftp to ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany. There is a glossary there that all new members should download and read. Also recommended for all users are Hal Finney's instructions on how to use the anonymous remailer system; the remailer sources are there for the perl-literate. C. Bruce Schneier's _Applied Cryptography_, published by Wiley This is required reading for any serious technical cypherpunk. An excellent overview of the field, it describes many of the basic algorithms and protocols with their mathematical descriptions. Some of the stuff at the edges of the scope of the book is a little incomplete, so short descriptions in here should lead to library research for the latest papers, or to the list for the current thinking. All in all, a solid and valuable book. It's even got the cypherpunks-request address. IV. Famous last words My preferred email address for list maintenance topics only is hughes(a)toad.com. All other mail, including emergency mail, should go to hughes(a)ah.com, where I read mail much more regularly. Enjoy and deploy. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were more of it. Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy must create it for themselves and not expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant them privacy out of beneficence. Cypherpunks know that people have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers, envelopes, closed doors, and couriers. Cypherpunks do not seek to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or their opinions. The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption. To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy. But to encrypt with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will learn how best to defend it. Cypherpunks are therefore devoted to cryptography. Cypherpunks wish to learn about it, to teach it, to implement it, and to make more of it. Cypherpunks know that cryptographic protocols make social structures. Cypherpunks know how to attack a system and how to defend it. Cypherpunks know just how hard it is to make good cryptosystems. Cypherpunks love to practice. They love to play with public key cryptography. They love to play with anonymous and pseudonymous mail forwarding and delivery. They love to play with DC-nets. They love to play with secure communications of all kinds. Cypherpunks write code. They know that someone has to write code to defend privacy, and since it's their privacy, they're going to write it. Cypherpunks publish their code so that their fellow cypherpunks may practice and play with it. Cypherpunks realize that security is not built in a day and are patient with incremental progress. Cypherpunks don't care if you don't like the software they write. Cypherpunks know that software can't be destroyed. Cypherpunks know that a widely dispersed system can't be shut down. Cypherpunks will make the networks safe for privacy. [Last updated Mon Feb 21 13:18:25 1994]

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