December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SSL challenge -- broken !
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 04:39 PM 8/16/95 -0500, you wrote: >>> I haven't seen any news stories about this on the wire >>> services. Someone would have to write a story about it first before >>> people would know... >> >>I've suggested this to a few reporters I know.. > >It's worth suggesting this _carefully_ so the spin's right. >For instance "Oh, no, Netscape lets Hackers suck all the money >out of your credit cards" would be bad :-) On the other hand, >"The US Government's Evil Plans to block encryption are limiting >Netscape's export products to an encryption system already broken >by a French university. This means you can send credit card numbers >safely to American web sites, but not to foreign ones - like the >airline or hotel reservations you were making for your vacation, >or those Irish handcrafts or bottle of Scotch you were ordering, >or that Hong Kong magazine you were subscribing to, or the CD from >that band in Budapest that had the great sound samples out there. >And when you were donating to that Amazon rainforest conservation >group, the NSA's arbitrary export rules may have just helped the >Colombian drug cartels rip off your credit card." Thats pretty much the spin on page B3 of the WSJ. I'll type it in when I get the chance. Dietrich J. Kappe | Red Planet http://www.redweb.com/ Red Planet, L.L.C.| "Chess Space" /chess 1-800-RED 0 WEB | "MS Access Products" /cobre Web Publishing | E-mail: RedPlanet(a)redweb.com

1 0

Re: Another SSL breakage...
by Damien.Doligez＠inria.fr 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk >on Tue, 15 Aug 1995 10:43:15 +0200 I recieved this from David Byers ><davby(a)ida.liu.se>: > >> Eureka! >> >> Encrypted Master Key: 7ef0961fa6 Then David beat me by about two hours. My program found the result at 12:23 +0200 on the same day. I was not at work (aug 15 is a holiday in France), so I saw it a few hours later, and I wrote my announcement yesterday. I will happily redirect all the journalists to David... -- Damien

1 0

Re: Out of state gambling
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 AM 8/17/95, Anonymous wrote: >Hello C-Punks: > >(nb This is posted anonymously because I had this idea the implementation >of which would be (probably) illegal. I'm not sure whether putting my It's being done. Many of us have talked about the implications of this. Writing about it is not against the law in the U.S., at this time. A little matter of the First Amendment, don't you know. See for example the Cypherpunks Web site archives, http://www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html, or grep/search for "gambling" in my Cyphernomicon FAQ (in my ftp directory at Netcom: ftp.netcom.com, /pub/tc/tcmay/CP-FAQ, and in a couple of Web sites, including http://www.swiss.ai.mit.edu/6095/articles/cyphernomicon/CP-FAQ) My point? Not a bad idea, but also not one you should have any fear of discussing publically (unless you believe certain conspiracy theories!). I've been talking and writing about the implications of this stuff since late 1987, and have not yet been "disappeared." I don't happen to like a lot of what's going on in Washington, but I doubt that Louis Freeh or Dorothy Denning are going to silence or threaten me! >name to the idea would be a good idea for the reason that I can't be >sure that I wouldn't be implicated under the overbroad "conspiracy" or >"Rico" powers which are oh so popular as a way of putting people away >for thought crimes. This message will in any case have appeared via I'm not a fan of RICO either, but we need to be careful not to impute to RICO things which just don't happen. So far as I know, no "thought crimes" have been prosecuted under RICO. Prosecutors--and I am not one, but I watch them all day on t.v.!--have certain procedures they have to follow. They just don't have the time, budget, and mandate to try to prosecute writers and speakers, especially when the words and speech are clearly protected under the First Amendment. The _potential_ prosecution of Phil Zimmermann--and I say "potential" because at the time I'm writing this, no indictment has been made--is not because Phil was writing inflammatory stuff, but is related to the circumstances surrounding the appearance of PGP 1.0 in foreign countries. These would be ITAR issues, not "thoughtcrime." Or at least this is what most people believe is the issue, as the Grand Jury has not said anything publically. (By the way, I'm not being critical of Anonymous here. I, too, have used the term "thoughtcrime," as shorthand for what I think are the implications of certain trends in the U.S. and elsewhere. Criminalizing "hate speech" fits the Orwellian definition, in my opinion. But we all have to be careful not to use this metaphor too broadly.) >a couple of foreign remailers on it's way. I am proud of the idea, but >I appreciate those of you who know who I am keeping quiet about it, as >I'm just being prudent, and extra cautious. > >The idea.....Out of state gambling, Internet style - lets give them a >taste of whats to come. As you note, the Internet Casino does this (they claim), becoming operational "soon." Also, various sports books are accessible in offshore locations, such as Costa Rica. Phone calls. And the idea of betting on events and outcomes is already extant. Lloyd's of London used to take such bets. But more germane to the Internet, there are several groups working on "idea futures." Robin Hanson, at Caltech, is working on this. And a Web page exists with various odds on different situations, such as "Windows '95 will be delayed 3 months" and "Strong crypto will be banned by April 1996." Try a Web search on "bet" and "gambling." I did one on "bet" and got a hit on "Proposition Wagering": http://www.netaxs.com/people/sportbet/prop.htm. (I couldn't get into it, so your mileage may vary.) >The aim in writing this short missive to cpunks is to encourage >someone who is more able legally to help this idea happen. It'll only happen when someone makes it happen. Thinking about it can also be useful, as the actual programmers may not have the same focus, but actual examples carry more weight. We saw betting schemes on the Extropians list, a couple of years ago. Fairly primitive, but an example. >Any comments on the practical and legal issues (such as exactly what >laws I'm violating) or on getting publicity for such a scheme? This >might be easier than we think, as the media [at least the WSJ] is well >aware of the bookie's superior accuracy & lower cost. First, don't worry too much about remaining anonymous. Discussing an idea, even building a system, is not the same as operating it. Folks publically discuss and build remailers, but operating them is another matter. (Yes, folks here also operate remailers....). Second, check out the "idea futures," "proposition wagering," and "betting" references. Third, build on what these folks are doing. Or do it differently, but only if your approach is superior. Good luck! --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Over 350 RSA/Perl 'Munitions T-shirts' Shipped
by Ferreira, Ben 296-4158 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 15 Aug 1995 14:17:36 -0600 From: Don Henson <dhenson(a)itsnet.com> To: libernet(a)Dartmouth.EDU Subject: Over 350 'Munitions T-shirts' Shipped We have thus far shipped over 350 of the RSA/Perl Munition T-shirts. Orders are still pouring in. Don't be left out. Order your's today. Now you can wear a TSHIRT that has been classified as a MUNITION by the US Goverment. That's right! The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) makes exporting cyrptographic materials illegal. ITAR further defines export as providing cryptographic information to a non-US/Canadian citizen even if you are inside the US at the time. Providing information is further defined as telling or showing information to a non-US/Canadian citizen. The Munitions Tshirt has a Perl implementation of the RSA algorithm (the one used by PGP) printed on the front along with a bar-code of the same algorithm. What all the above means is that if you wear the Munitions Tshirt where a non-US/Canadian citizen can see it, even if it is inside the US, you have just exported cryptographic material (which is already freely available outside the US) and have become a criminal in the eyes of the US Government. Now you too can become an international arms dealer for the price of a tshirt (US$15.95 - US$19.95, depending on size) and the guts to wear it. If you are a non-US/Canadian citizen, you can still own a Munitons Tshirt by ordering the tshirt from a source that is outside the US. The email response to a request for info (see next paragraph) includes full instructions for ordering the tshirt no matter where you live. For more information on how to own this classic example of civil disobedience, just send email to dhenson(a)itsnet.com with the subject of 'SHIRT'. (You don't have to be a US/Canadian citizen to request the info.) Or, if you have WWW access, just point your Web browser to: http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html By the way, 25% of the profits from the sale of the tshirt (in the US/Canada) goes to the PHIL ZIMMERMANN LEGAL DEFENSE FUND to help defend the author of PGP from harassment and possible prosecution by the Fedgoons. And if you get arrested for wearing the Munitions Tshirt, we'll refund your purchase price. :-) Get your Munitions Tshirt now. Who knows how long they'll stay in production! Don Henson, Managing Director (PGP Key ID = 0X03002DC9) West El Paso Information Network (WEPIN) Check out The WEPIN Store at URL: http://colossus.net/wepinsto/wshome.html -- ------------------------------------------------------ | A L B E R T A Advanced Computing | | R E S E A R C H & Engineering Dept. | | C O U N C I L | | | | Mailing Address J u l i a n B r o m w i c h | | 3rd Floor Junior Research Officer | | 6815 - 8th Street NE bromwich(a)skyler.arc.ab.ca | | Calgary, Alberta | | Canada T2E 7H7 | ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ | R A D S S | | Technologies | | | | Mailing Address J u l i a n B r o m w i c h | | Alberta Pool Software Specialist | | Box 2700 JBromwich(a)awp.com | | 505 Second Street SW | | Calgary, Alberta Ph: (403) 290-5491 | | Canada T2P 2P5 Fax: (403) 290-5550 | ------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Message from a nobody...
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm kind of a nobody..... I can't write elaborate code. I can't even crack keys, unless it's plug & play cracking. But I do know SOMETHING important was done here. And once it's been done, it only gets easier each time. Congratulations to all of you! Love Always, Carol Anne Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - WWW Page Creation ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Carol Anne Braddock <--now running linux 1.0.9 for your pleasure carolann(a)censored.org __ __ ____ ___ ___ ____ carolab(a)primenet.com /__)/__) / / / / /_ /\ / /_ / carolb(a)spring.com / / \ / / / / /__ / \/ /___ / ------------------------------------------------------------------------- A great place to start My Cyber Doc...

1 0

Breaking RC4-40 for less
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since messages sent with netscape are fairly standard for the first so many bytes, why not make a 2^30 element table, store it on a few gigabytes of disk space, use a hash table on the message, and find the keys to one in every 1,000 messages about 1 time per second. If this code is being used to send millions of credit transactions per day, we should be able decode thousands of credit card numbers per day for a one-time cost of about $5,00. The $10,000 estimate of the cost of computing time is far too high for a production-based attack on the netscape codes. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

1 0

Re: Netsacpe's Offical Response
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In this case he had to use roughly > $10,000 worth of computing power (ballpark figure for having access to > 120 workstations and a few parallel supecomputers for 8 days) to break > a single message. Hmm, I don't know about anyone else around here, but my workstation is idle 99% of the time. I could almost certainly get access to all the spare CPU cycles on 120 workstations for free, and I suspect that a lot of people (particularly hackers) could do so as well. There's no need to spend $ 10,000 on renting them. Mark

1 0

Netsacpe's Offical Response
by Glenn Powers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Originally From shank(a)netscape.com Thu Aug 17 11:42:39 1995 Received: from lydia.bradley.edu (root(a)lydia.bradley.edu [136.176.5.15]) by spectrum.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.9) with ESMTP id LAA02511 for <gpowers(a)spectrum.bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 11:42:36 -0500 Received: from bradley.bradley.edu (daemon(a)bradley.bradley.edu [136.176.5.10]) by lydia.bradley.edu (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id KAA02851 for <gpowers(a)lydia.bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:21 -0500 Received: (from daemon@localhost) by bradley.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) id KAA01320 for gpowers(a)lydia.bradley.edu; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:18 -0500 Received: from neon.netscape.com (neon.netscape.com [198.93.92.10]) by bradley.bradley.edu (8.6.12/8.6.12) with ESMTP id KAA01310 for <gpowers(a)bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 10:39:12 -0500 Received: from [198.93.94.118] (Shank.mcom.com [198.93.94.118]) by neon.netscape.com (950215.SGI.8.6.10/8.6.9) with SMTP id IAA26102 for <gpowers(a)bradley.edu>; Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:38:34 -0700 X-Sender: shank(a)pop.mcom.com Message-Id: <v02110107ac5914142373(a)[198.93.94.118]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Thu, 17 Aug 1995 08:44:45 -0700 X-PH: V4.1@bradley To: gpowers(a)bradley.edu From: shank(a)netscape.com (Peter Shank) Subject: Netscape security Glen, We're sending this response to the press and interested parties; it may also get posted on home.netscape.com. Best regards... -Peter Late Tuesday evening a person from France posted a news article to the hacker community claiming success at decrypting a single encrypted message that had been posted as a challenge on the Internet sometime on or before July 14, 1994. His response to the challenge is described in an email that has been forwarded widely across the Internet. What this person did is decrypt one encrypted message that used RC4-40 for encryption. He used 120 workstations and two parallel supercomputers for 8 days to do so. As many have documented, a single RC4-40 encrypted message takes 64 MIPS-years of processing power to break, and this roughly corresponds to the amount of computing power that was used to decrypt the message. Important points to understand: 1. He broke a single encrypted message. For him to break another message (even from the same client to the same server seconds later) would require *another* 8 days of 120 workstations and a few parallel supercomputers. The work that goes into breaking a single message can't be leveraged against other messages encrypted with other encryption keys. 2. The standard way to determine the level of security of any encryption scheme is to compare the cost of breaking it versus the value of the information that can be gained. In this case he had to use roughly $10,000 worth of computing power (ballpark figure for having access to 120 workstations and a few parallel supecomputers for 8 days) to break a single message. Assuming the message is protecting something of less value than $10,000, then this information can be protected with only RC4-40 security. For information of greater value, currently available RC4-128 security should be used. 3. Inside the US, software can support a range of stronger encryption options, including RC4-128, which is 2^88 times harder to break. Meaning that the compute power required to decrypt such a message would be more than 1,000,000,000,000 (trillion) times greater than that which was used to decrypt the RC4-40 message. This means that with forseeable computer technology this is practically impossible. So in conclusion, we think RC4-40 is strong enough to protect consumer-level credit-card transactions -- since the cost of breaking the message is sufficiently high to make it not worth the computer time required to do so -- and that our customers should use higher levels of security, particularly RC4-128, whenever possible. This level of security has been available in the U.S. versions of our products since last April. Because of export controls it has not been available outside the U.S. We would appreciate your support in lobbying the U.S. government to lift the export controls on encryption. If you'd like to help us lobby the government send email to export(a)netscape.com. Finally, we'd like to reiterate that all this person has done is decrypt one single RC4-40 message. RC4 the algorithm and products which use the algorithm remain as secure as always.

3 2

Re: First known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks
by Marcel van der Peijl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Anyway, if anyone knows of an earlier transaction of cyberbucks for physical > goods than this (at 15:00 GMT 17th August 1995), then please let me know. As far as I know, the first transaction took place when I (while testing) bought a postcard from GlobalX, the first ecash store to open besides our own (and mine). It is stored in the 'DigiCash museum' next to early prototypes of all kinds of smartcards, emulators, wallets etc. This must have been around October last year (or August? Can't make out the postmark). Hundreds of cards were shipped by several shops, and stickers, lotteries, etc. Check the 'physical objects' section on http://www.digicash.com/shops/categorical.html Maybe you should restrict the 'first known' claim to 'first known purchase of physical goods with cyberbucks traded at the ECM'. Sorry! // Marcel van der Peijl, DigiCash bv, http://www.digicash.com/~bigmac/ // The hottest instruction on a P90? JMP $ @ 2.633A or 52C (with fan)

2 1

Denver area meeting, SUNDAY, 8/20, 2 pm
by adwestro＠ouray.cudenver.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This one is on SUNDAY, 2 pm, at the Tivoli Food Court (at least initially). Send email for directions, etc. Alan Westrope <awestrop(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu> __________/|-, <adwestro(a)ouray.cudenver.edu> (_) \|-' 2.6.2 public key: finger / servers PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Exon blows goats...but I suspect you already knew that. iQCVAwUBMDOBpVRRFMq4NZY5AQEnVAP8CLg9z5AwjIw0ouJtxPPr6CUytFOeVPrt cMrEm8MRUt0ay0S4F+TGMq1npcF8pxdU0jwWk9EBj+1XvTOKVpEED+kp8shafsVj qlWGplAVUHMTF19H1VAByoz7j3VGMB2zmdNDm2ifDMNzR5Di81o7CeyvQT0sZ6zt 5XGWmHkoX3g= =GD3W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0