December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: e$: The Book-Entry/Certificate Distinction
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:02 AM 8/23/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Actually, what you've just described is general commercial paper, not >just a bond. Anything that lists a sum certain in money to be paid on >a date certain (with various other parameters, too, like a place) is >negotiable commercial paper. Checks, notes, and other instruments are >all commercial paper. They are not, by the way, certificates in the >sense that I suspect you mean. I really don't know. If a digital personal debt certificate isn't a bond, but is a subset of commercial paper, we may be quibbling about definitions, like Tim was saying. So, let's look at this for a second. First, a check is a kind of certificate pointing to a book entry in a bank somewhere, payable upon demand. A note or commercial paper is a promise to pay money plus interest, cash included, at a certain time in the future. So's a bond, but the duration is longer. It's easy to see how they're all certificates, though they can be held at a clearinghouse and thus be be book-entries. Clear as mud, I guess... I'll try better next time when I've gotten more running room. We agree that it's a fixed income instrument of some kind, right? Certainly it's not completely anonymous, but your pseudonymous key can borrow money if its reputation is clean enough. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: DES & RC4-48 Challenges
by dan＠milliways.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 22 Aug 1995 00:43:20 EDT you wrote: >The forms of differential cryptanalysis that I'm aware of require The >cracker to adaptively atack the encrypting or decrypting device. I >therefore do not believe that they are especially applicable to >financial transactions schemes, most of which change keys quite >frequently. > >JWS According to Biham and Shamir's Differential Cryptanalysis of DES, "An interesting feature of the new attack is that it can be applied with the same complexity and success probability even if the key is frequently changed and thus the collected ciphertexts are derived from many different keys. The attack can be carried out incrementally, and one of the keys can be computed in real time while it is still valid. this is particularly important in attacks on bank authentication schemes, in which the opponent needs only one opportunity to forge a multi-million dollar wire transfer, but has to act quickly before the next key changeover invalidates his message. This is the first published attack which is capable of breaking the full DES in less than the complexity of the exhuastive search of 2^55 keys." (7-8) The problem with this attack, of course, is generation and analysis of all the required chosen plaintexts. The analysis phase eats up 2^37 time looking at 2^36 ciphertexts from a universal set of 2^47 chosen plaintexts. Brute-forcing SSL has a worst-case time complexity on the order of 2^40. It appears that complexity for breaking 16-round DES is on the order of 2^37, according to Biham and Shamir. (87) Is there any published source code available for this type of attack? The book itself doesn't contain any code, just lots of proofs. Since 2^40 > 2^37, I think a group effort would be capable of mounting this attack. Dan ****************************************************************************** "I think, therefore I am" - Descartes Dan Bailey "I don't think, therefore I'm a moustache." - Sartre dan(a)milliways.org Worcester Polytechnic Institute and The Restaurant at the End of the Universe ******************************************************************************

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Re: (Fwd) 1995 Nanotechnology Conference
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:00 AM 8/23/95, J. Kent Hastings wrote: >Tim says that quantum codebreaking and nanotech ain't gonna happen, >because of things he explained in the past on the list, now available in >the archive. I found a great Web version of the cypherpunks archive at http: >//www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html and will indeed catch up on the >quantum coherence subject. I didn't mean to sound so dismissive, just that we've been around and around on this one, and it's very, very, very far off. Some interesting philosophical interests, but no evidence that the "instant factorization" will ever be feasible. >RSA Data Security printed an article in their newsletter, by one of the >inventors of working quantum cryptography, which stated that there is >a risk of cracking RSA because of efficient hardware factorization. Why >would they make this up about their own product? OK Tim, I'll catch up >before making further comments on quantum codebreaking. They put this stuff in their newsletters because they have to fill space, it's a sexy topic, and it's been in the news. But they won't keep running the same article every few months, which is my main point. >Now about nanotech: The Moore(?) scale mentioned here says the >processing power of hardware capacity doubles every 12 or 18 months for >a given amount of money. In about 20 years only nanotech will be on the >curve. Will hardware progress just come to a grinding halt then or what? >What's going on here? I thought cpunx were pro-nanotechnology. Well, though this will sound like name-dropping, I know both Gordon Moore of Intel and Eric Drexler of nanotechnology fame. In fact, I used to go to Ted Kaehler's "Assembler Multitudes" nanotech discussion group in Palo Alto, every month for a couple of years. So, I follow nanotech pretty closely. And it's as far off now as it was in 1985 when I first met Eric. (Well, not technically, but essentially.) Moore's Law is an observation of past behavior, not a law of nature. Gordon thought the curve would "slow down" around 1980 or so. It didn't, for various reasons. But many of us expect it will. Consider that a new wafer fab capable of building these "Moore's Law" devices has increased in price from about $50 million a couple of decades ago to about $1.5 billion today. Lots of reasons for this, which I won't go into here (yes, discussions may be found in the archives!). If this "Barrett's Law" trend continues, the cost of a new wafer fab will equal the GNP sometime around 2020. Before anyone (Kent?) mentions table-top nanotech factories, ha! Anyway, there are discussion groups for nanotech. Plenty of places to discuss the progress and lack of progress. Not even the simplest logic device has ever been built out of molecular gears and whatnot, and the claim that biotech will be the route to nanotech is of course only speculation. This is why I think nanotech discussion is inappropriate for this list. More specifically, why I think vague promises about what nanotech may someday mean are far afield from any real issues. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Personal: Any relation to Dan Farkas?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Personal Henry, I just saw your name and wondered if you're any relation to Dan Farkas, a mathematician (last I heard) who attended the same university I did in the late 1960s. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Certificates/Anonymity/Policy/True Names
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael Froomkin writes: [...hypothetical screwups by CA leading to lawsuits snipped...] > Since (in the absence of any rules given the newness of the > technology) it is very likely that a rich CA would get nuisance > suits every time a deal in which it particiapted went sour, the > absence of rules will either raise costs CAs have to charge (e.g. > to buy insurance) or will keep rich folk out of the industry (which > isn't good either, since you want CAs to buy security and to last). > Thus the need for clear liability rules. What about when the CA signing key is stolen, factored, or otherwise falls into the wrong hands, thereby possibly making every signature made by the CA worthless, or at least questionable? I assume liability will be based on the CA's efforts to ensure the integrity of the signatures it makes (and therefore the confidentiality of the secret key components), but what constitutes due diligence? As we all know, security measures cover a very wide range and can reach ridiculous proportions on both ends of the spectrum... How much security will be 'enough' from a legal standpoint...? andrew

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NEW ON THE NET
by goldencareers.com＠renoir.webservices.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"><FONT COLOR="#00FFFF" SIZE=3> NEW ON THE NET. How would you like to have been part of the first group to join Amway in the 60s or purchased stock from a small company called Wal-Mart in the 70s or had invested in a small computer chip maker called Intel of the 80s. Anybody that made these decisions above are sitting pretty good at the moment Here in the 90s a new company, was launched on the net, This young company has positioned itself to be among the major players for years to come. This is not a get rich scheme. This is simply a new company, with fresh ideas, a new company that people are going to hear a lot about. If you would care to become a part of all the excitement, and learn more, just simply send e-mail to sales(a)scarlett.org Please put MORE INFO. in the subject field.You will have info. vary soon. THIS IS TRULY A COMPANY AHEAD OF IT'S TIME. Thank You For Your Time. </FONT><FONT COLOR="#000000" SIZE=3>

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Re: e$: The Book-Entry/Certificate Distinction
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:53 PM 8/23/95, Robert Hettinga wrote: >At 10:02 AM 8/23/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > >>Actually, what you've just described is general commercial paper, not >>just a bond. Anything that lists a sum certain in money to be paid on >>a date certain (with various other parameters, too, like a place) is >>negotiable commercial paper. Checks, notes, and other instruments are >>all commercial paper. They are not, by the way, certificates in the >>sense that I suspect you mean. > >I really don't know. If a digital personal debt certificate isn't a bond, >but is a subset of commercial paper, we may be quibbling about definitions, >like Tim was saying. Whoah, there! I wasn't saying we were "quibbling" about definitions, I was saying that different people have different names for things and different interpretations, and that it behooves us to figure out what the real definitions are, the standard names, and not invent new names when existing names will do. And that one benefit of class libraries for the "things" of commerce, finance, crypto, etc., may be make it clearer what is being described. Just my two "aptical bearer-verified physico-tokens." --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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