December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

CypherRant: Reasons why private cryptography should not be regulated.
by paul.elliott＠hrnowl.lonestar.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CypherRant: Reasons why private cryptography should not be regulated. Paul Elliott is solely responsible for this document. Please distribute widely. FBI director Freeh has been going around pushing his stupid plans for cryptography regulation. Usually, these plans take the form of some kind of mandatory key escrow. Mandatory key escrow schemes are requirements that encryption keys be given to government agencies with the promise that the keys will not be used without a warrant. Now let me give some reasons why Freeh's requests should be ignored. 1) It is unconstitutional! a) First amendment. Electronic communications are a form of speech and the cryptography regulations try to regulate this speech to a form the government understands. Congress shall make NO LAW ....or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; ... They really meant it! b) Second amendment. Cryptography is arms. Even U.S. government ITAR regulations admit this. Therefore cryptography is protected by Second amendment. c) Ninth & tenth amendments. Article I section 8 does not give congress the power to tell us what computer software we can run on our computers. Therefore that power remains with us, and we should be able to run whatever cryptography software we want the displeasure of congress not withstanding. d) The power to search, if a warrant exists, which is mentioned by the fourth amendment, does not grant the government the right to succeed in finding what the it is looking for. In other words the power to search, is not a power to guarantee a successful search. It is not a power to require citizens to run their lives in such a manner that any government search will be successful. For more information on this, see the following World Wide Web url: http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/avss.html Since all Senators and Congressmen take an oath to preserve and defend the constitution of the U.S., this should be the end of the argument. However, watching some of the stupid laws that have come out of congress in past years, tells me I should supplement the above with additional argument. I am not a lawyer and I am not trying to be one. I have no opinion as to whether private cryptography regulations will be found unconstitutional. There are a number of cases where out courts have made decisions which do great violence to the plain meaning of the text of our constitution. Knowing what the courts will actually do is the business of lawyers. Understanding the constitution so that one may know what the courts should do should be the business of every citizen. 2) The excellent NRA argument "when guns are outlawed only outlaws will have guns" applies with equal force to cryptography! Professional criminals will circumvent with ease any government regulations on cryptography. Billions of bytes travel the internet yearly. The techniques of steganography make it absolutely trivial for any motivated person to conceal any encrypted messages. The Big Brother cryptography regulations will affect only ordinary citizens. 3) Cryptography is already in use by legitimate business. Any government regulation of cryptography will probably cost huge amounts of money for software and hardware costs for existing systems to be changed to a form that the government approves. The existing ITAR regulations probably cost the U.S. economy large amounts of money because U.S. companies can not market cryptography software internationally. By discouraging private cryptography, the ITAR regulations probably enables a large amount of computer crime since it makes it difficult for people to protect themselves. The ITAR regulations have not and can not prevented strong cryptography from making it outside the U.S. How many tons of cocaine illegally enter the U.S. every year? Yet the government ITAR regulations propose to regulate the export of software that can fit in a shirt pocket, or travel by wire concealed with billions of bytes of data that leave the U.S. every year. It is time for the U.S. government to start living in the real world! According to an article in the August 17, 1995 Wall Street Journal, ITAR regulations have required Netscape to use inferior encryption methods in the international version of its World Wide WeB browser software. This inferior encryption method has actually been broken by a French Hacker! Because of its computational intensity, this weakness in the encryption method does not represent an immediate danger. However as more powerful computers continue to develop, this and similar vulnerabilities will present a danger for those who wish to use the internet for commerce. 4) These regulations make it impossible for an individual to have greater privacy than the U.S. government. The Adlrich Ames case makes it clear that the U.S. is incompetent to keep a secret. 5) The proposed regulations require the American people trust the government, but on the contrary, the government should be required to trust the American people. Recent news stories (Waco ect.) make it clear that it is common for government agents to lie to get a search warrants. Government should be viewed as George Washington did as "a fearful servant and a dangerous master". A recent poll conducted by the Americans Talk Issue Foundation said 76% of the people questioned responded that they rarely or never trust "government to do what is right". This mistrust is well founded. At the same time as administration sources were saying that key escrow schemes would remain voluntary, FBI, NSA, and DOJ experts were saying that the schemes must be made mandatory if they were to be at all effective. If the government is willing to lie to establish a key escrow key system, what makes us believe that the government will not lie when applying for warrants to use that system? 6) It is too humiliating to require a free people to participate in the establishment of their own surveillance prisons. This is what key escrow requires. Consider the words of our revolutionary heritage: Those who would sacrifice essential freedoms for temporary safety deserve neither. Benjamin Franklin If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen. Samuel Adams Do you think that these men would approve the government's key escrow requests? This information can also be found at the following url: http://www.efh.org/pgp/rant.html - -- Paul Elliott Telephone: 1-713-781-4543 Paul.Elliott(a)hrnowl.lonestar.org Address: 3987 South Gessner #224 Houston Texas 77063 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMDpEYfBUQYbUhJh5AQHMtgP9HbCfKge22z/4jFi2MKLXqWkYB4vkIFsJ 43J7zdoDIRbfOeoMBNCFOGeIHGQ5TGL1+VFVhRMrzTZEPs/dciqc81O0YlnhiiIR L7Lz06Jlzg2xLtaeaTQjrGewKTT9LeWXpqFSWtpe0xxAqaZ/11ompTAHm0A6NxhU r4QXaBaEzfg= =Axac -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: (Fwd) 1995 Nanotechnology Conference
by J. Kent Hastings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- On Tuesday, 22-Aug-95 11:00 PM, James A. Donald, (jamesd(a)echeque.com) wrote: >At 11:00 AM 8/21/95 -0800, J. Kent Hastings wrote: >>Doesn't quantum coherence require molecular precision if it >>is to work on 1024 bit PGP keys? If it works, such keys can >>be instantly factorized. It would be nice to follow that progress. >It requires molecular precision if it is to work on anything interesting: Cracking >1024 bit keys is a long way down the road...[praises other applications] Tim says that quantum codebreaking and nanotech ain't gonna happen, because of things he explained in the past on the list, now available in the archive. I found a great Web version of the cypherpunks archive at http: //www.hks.net/cpunks/index.html and will indeed catch up on the quantum coherence subject. RSA Data Security printed an article in their newsletter, by one of the inventors of working quantum cryptography, which stated that there is a risk of cracking RSA because of efficient hardware factorization. Why would they make this up about their own product? OK Tim, I'll catch up before making further comments on quantum codebreaking. Now about nanotech: The Moore(?) scale mentioned here says the processing power of hardware capacity doubles every 12 or 18 months for a given amount of money. In about 20 years only nanotech will be on the curve. Will hardware progress just come to a grinding halt then or what? What's going on here? I thought cpunx were pro-nanotechnology. Kent -- Check out Neil Schulman's new book, http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/jneil/ J. Kent Hastings -- zeus(a)pinsight.com -- http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The sorry state of non-US crypto
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:24 8/23/95, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >Try these URL's: > >Italy: ftp://ftp.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/ >UK: ftp://ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/ >Croatia: http://pgp.rasip.fer.hr/ >Germany: ftp://ftp.darmstadt.gmd.de/pub/crypto/ But how is the average non-US web surfer to supposed to find them, if even I (who at least knows about the various CP sites) can't even locate them without asking on the list? [Thanks for the listing, though :-] -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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MD5 in DOS
by nobody＠valhalla.phoenix.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cpunks, im looking for a md5 binary that will run on dos. can anyone give me a pointer? 10x

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True Names and Webs of Trust
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a comment on this business of whether we need certification of the True Names of people we deal with: I've dealt with "in person" maybe 60 to 100 of the people on this list (at one time or another). In no cases--not a single one--have I made elaborate checks to confirm that people are who they claim to be. A few driver's licenses have been flashed at meetings, but I didn't look closely. Maybe a passport was even displayed, but, again, I didn't look. And documents are readily forged. This has relevance to the thread Michael Froomkin raised, as well. To wit, none of the people I've met has been "certified." And yet it doesn't bother me. As Bill Stewart correctly claimed is my view, the "key is the identity." Or, more accurately, a _persistent personna_ is what matters. Thus, I don't need to "verify" that "Eric Hughes" is "really" Eric Hughes, and is not actually Fritz Doppelganger, assigned to Berkeley by the BND. I really don't care about the so-called "reality." (Sorry for all of the "quotes," but all of these terms are heavily laden with connotations which bear deconstructing.) My experiences are the norm, I think. Identity credentials are rarely checked, and most people don't care too much. (An important point is that in a cash economy, identity is almost irrelevant. It's only in non-cash, or "account-based," economy that True Names are demanded. Lots of interesting issues to discuss here, which I won't now.) The "web of trust" model is really the normal way people go about their business. I knew someone once introduced to me as "Hugh Daniel," and he eventually introduced me to someone calling himself "Eric Hughes," and so on. Introducers, webs of trust, etc. What their "real names" are makes little difference. (Besides, their Real Names were written on flat stones on the 3rd day after their births and placed in a safe place known only to the Great Bird.) I never use the web of trust model in PGP. I get so few PGP messages that it's enough that people I know give me their keys. So I concede that the web of trust model in the PGP world may or may not scale well. (In the sense of tens of thousands of folks establishing a "web of trust.") But the _basic_ idea of self-arranged transfers of keys and local networks of friends is right on. This is why I don't worry too much about the need for government-authenticated keys and True Names. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Denning questions/reverses her position?
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm too old for this! I never thought I would see the day that Dorothy Denning would terminate her star role as a shill for the Clinton/LEA encryption ban! from: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0%2C4%2C13000%2C00.html?nd Two supporters of Clinton administration's stance on encryption released a report today finding that encryption has not inhibited law enforcement efforts, with at least one author questioning her belief in the administration's position. The authors--Dorothy Denning, a Georgetown University computer science professor, and William Baugh Jr., vice president of Science Application International Corporation-- ______________________________________________________________________ "attila" 1024/C20B6905/23 D0 FA 7F 6A 8F 60 66 BC AF AE 56 98 C0 D7 B0 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBM+Eh5L04kQrCC2kFAQF9wwP+INGEAnc+1akKc+dP7re8fleX4PJrmsYU UKzxgBZAsWcZC7L5WkaOygckHznOc+a37iHzDFtt3sr86DP0D/4j675qJdt/O4B+ jbxXumJ8EXmTN9bOvXK8x9JRGjR9aWzjeaJKN3X+fH4Bjbw76FR9xIFkhhNvZqnM ahBzZyL2cZ4= =MlQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Applied Cryptography, Second Edition
by Bruce Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The second edition to APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY will be published in November. This is not just a correction, it is a major update. There are 50% more words in the second edition. The second edition will be published in both hardback and paperback. Wiley is jacking the price a bit, so I am offering a 15% pre-publication discount. Details will be forthcoming when I invent them. Attached is the table of contents. Bruce ************************************************************************** APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY - SECOND EDITION by Bruce Schneier Forward by Whitfield Diffie Preface Chapter 1: Foundations Terminology; Steganography; Substitution Ciphers and Transposition Ciphers; Simple XOR; One-Time Pads; Computer Algorithms; Large Numbers Part I: Cryptographic Protocols Chapter 2: Protocol Building Blocks Introduction to Protocols; Communications using Symmetric Cryptography; One-Way Functions; One-Way Hash Functions; Communications using Public-Key Cryptography; Digital Signatures; Digital Signatures with Encryption; Random and Pseudo-Random Sequence Generation Chapter 3: Basic Protocols Key Exchange; Authentication; Authentication and Key Exchange; Formal Analysis of Authentication and Key-Exchange Protocols; Multiple-Key Public-Key Cryptography; Secret Splitting; Secret Sharing; Cryptographic Protection of Databases Chapter 4: Intermediate Protocols Timestamping Services; Subliminal Channel; Undeniable Digital Signatures; Designated Confirmer Signatures; Proxy Signatures; Group Signatures; Fail-Stop Digital Signatures; Computing with Encrypted Data; Bit Commitment; Fair Coin Flips; Mental Poker; One-Way Accumulators; All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets; Key Escrow Chapter 5: Advanced Protocols Zero-Knowledge Proofs; Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity; Blind Signatures; Identity-Based Public-Key Cryptography; Oblivious Transfer; Oblivious Signatures; Simultaneous Contract Signing; Digital Certified Mail; Simultaneous Exchange of Secrets Chapter 6: Esoteric Protocols Secure Elections; Secure Multiparty Computation; Anonymous Message Broadcast; Digital Cash Part II: Cryptographic Techniques Chapter 7: Key Length Symmetric Key Length; Public-Key Key Length; Comparing Symmetric and Public-Key Key Length; Birthday Attacks against One-Way Hash Functions; How Long Should a Key Be?; Caveat Emptor Chapter 8: Key Management Generating Keys; Nonlinear Keyspaces; Transferring Keys; Verifying Keys; Using Keys; Updating Keys; Storing Keys; Backup Keys; Compromised Keys; Lifetime of Keys; Destroying Keys; Public-Key Key Management Chapter 9: Algorithm Types and Modes Electronic Codebook Mode; Block Replay; Cipher Block Chaining Mode; Stream Ciphers; Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers; Cipher-Feedback Mode; Synchronous Stream Ciphers; Output-Feedback Mode; Counter Mode; Other Block-Cipher Modes; Choosing a Cipher Mode; Interleaving; Block Ciphers vs. Stream Ciphers Chapter 10: Using Algorithms Choosing an Algorithm; Public-Key Cryptography vs. Symmetric Cryptography; Encrypting Communications Channels; Encrypting Data for Storage; Hardware Encryption vs. Software Encryption; Compression, Encoding, and Encryption; Detecting Encryption; Hiding Ciphertext in Ciphertext; Destroying Information Part III: Cryptographic Algorithms Chapter 11: Mathematical Background Information Theory; Complexity Theory; Number Theory; Factoring; Prime Number Generation; Discrete Logarithms in a Finite Field Chapter 12: Data Encryption Standard Background; Description of DES; Security of DES; Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis; The Real Design Criteria; DES Variants; How Secure is DES Today? Chapter 13: Other Block Algorithms Lucifer; Madryga; NewDES; FEAL-N; REDOC; Loki; Khufu and Khafre; RC2; IDEA; MMB; CA-1.1; Skipjack Chapter 14: Still Other Block Algorithms GOST; CAST; Blowfish; SAFER K-64; 3-Way; Crab; SXAL8/MBAL; RC5; Other Block Algorithms; Theory of Block Cipher Design; Using One-Way Hash Functions; Choosing a Block Algorithm Chapter 15: Combining Block Algorithms Double Encryption; Triple Encryption; Doubling the Block Length; Other Multiple Encryption Schemes; CDMF Key Shortening; Whitening; Cascading Multiple Block Algorithms; Combining Multiple Block Algorithms Chapter 16: Pseudo-Random-Sequence Generators and Stream Ciphers Linear Congruential Generators; Linear Feedback Shift Registers; LFSRs in Software; Design and Analysis of Stream Ciphers; Stream Ciphers using LFSRs; A5; Hughes XPD/KPD; Nanoteq; Rambutan; Additive Generators; Gifford; Algorithm M; PKZIP Chapter 17: Other Stream Ciphers and Real Random-Sequence Generators RC4; SEAL; Wake; Feedback with Carry Shift Registers; Stream Ciphers using FCSRs; Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers; Other Stream Ciphers; System-Theoretic Approach to Stream Cipher Design; Complexity-Theoretic Approach to Stream Cipher Design; Other Approaches to Stream Cipher Design; Cascading Multiple Stream Ciphers; Choosing a Stream Cipher; Generating Multiple Streams from a Single Pseudo- Random Sequence Generator; Real Random-Sequence Generators Chapter 18: One-Way Hash Functions Background; Snefru; N-HASH; MD4; MD5; MD2; Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA); RIPE-MD; Haval; Other One-Way Hash Functions; One-Way Hash Functions using Symmetric Block Algorithms; Using Public-key Algorithms; Choosing a One-Way Hash Function; Message Authentication Codes Chapter 19: Public-Key Algorithms Background; Knapsack Algorithms; RSA; Pohlig-Hellman; Rabin; ElGamal; McEliece; Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems; LUC; Finite Automaton Public-Key Cryptosystems Chapter 20: Public-Key Digital Signature Algorithms Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA); DSA Variants; GOST Digital Signature Algorithm; Discrete Logarithm Signature Schemes; Ong-Schnorr-Shamir; ESIGN; Cellular Automata; Other Public-Key Algorithms Chapter 21: Identification Schemes Feige-Fiat-Shamir; Guillou-Quisquater; Schnorr; Converting Identification Schemes to Signature Schemes Chapter 22: Key-Exchange Algorithms Diffie-Hellman; Station-to-Station Protocol; Shamir's Three- Pass Protocol; COMSET; Encrypted Key Exchange; Fortified Key Negotiation; Conference Key Distribution and Secret Broadcasting Chapter 23: Special Algorithms for Protocols Multiple-Key Public-Key Cryptography; Secret Sharing Algorithms; Subliminal Channel; Undeniable Digital Signatures; Designated Confirmer Signatures; Computing with Encrypted Data; Fair Coin Flips; One-Way Accumulators; All- or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets; Fair and Failsafe Cryptosystems; Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge; Blind Signatures; Oblivious Transfer; Secure Multiparty Computation; Probabilistic Encryption; Quantum Cryptography Part IV: The Real World Chapter 24: Example Implementations IBM Secret-Key Management Protocol; Mitrenet; ISDN; STU-III; Kerberos; KryptoKnight; Sesame; IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture; ISO Authentication Framework; Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM); Message Security Protocol; Pretty Good Privacy (PGP); Smart Cards; Public-Key Cryptography Standards; Universal Electronic Payment System; Clipper; Capstone; AT&T Model 3600 Telephone Security Device Chapter 25: Politics National Security Agency; National Computer Security Center; National Institute of Standards and Technology; RSA Data Security, Inc.; Public Key Partners; International Association for Cryptologic Research; RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation; Conditional Access for Europe; ISO/IEC 9979; Professional, Civil Liberties, and Industry Groups; Sci.Crypt; Cypherpunks; Patents; U.S. Export Rules; Foreign Import and Export of Cryptography; Legal Issues Afterward by Matt Blaze Source Code DES; LOKI91; IDEA; GOST; Blowfish; 3-Way; RC5; A5; SEAL; WAKE References

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