December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ To: cypherpunks ## Date: 01/21/98 ## Subject: Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium ] >Subject: Re: (eternity) Eternity as a secure filesystem/backup medium >From: Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk> >Date: 1998/01/18 >1. communications crypto used by the author in submitting > the document is broken This is only a threat if the authorities have a good idea who submitted the data, and want to prove it. Otherwise, you end up with billions of encrypted documents, each encrypted with a moderately weak cipher. (Even assuming that the cipher turns out to have only 40 bits of strength, this is too expensive to do for more than a handful of documents.) >2. the eternity architecture contains encrypted documents to > frustrate attempts to locate documents, and to hide the > contents of documents from individual servers Again, this won't be too economical unless the eternity service is rarely used. >3. communications crypto used to request and deliver > documents is broken thus revealing the readers identity >So it is useful to design upgrade paths for ciphers into the >protocols where possible. Definitely--this is always a good idea, right? >Other approaches we could take are to use very conservative >cipher key sizes and protocols combining multiple ciphers in >ways which gives us the security of the best of the ciphers. >For example: > R = random, C = 5DES( R ) || blowfish-484( M xor R ) >Where 5DES is say E-D-E-D-E with 5 independent DES keys. >Constructs to combine in strong ways hash functions, macs, >symmetric and asymmetric ciphers would be useful. Is there >much research in this area? Yes. Massey and Maurer did a Journal of Cryptography paper titled ``The Importance of Being First,'' which says that in any chain of encryptions with different ciphers and independent keys, such as E_1(E_2(E_3(data))), the whole thing is provably as strong as the first cipher used on the data (E_3, in my example above). This is really obvious, when you reflect that an attacker can always try to break data encrypted with E_3 by superencrypting it with E_1 and E_2, and then mounting his attack on E_1(E_2(E_3(data))). Of course, if keys aren't independent among the three ciphers, then you don't get any guarantee of this kind. The other thing to note is that if you're just generating keystream sequences, as you would with RC4 or SEAL, then all ciphers are ``first.'' Rivest and Sherman also did some work on randomized encryption, of the kind you discuss, in the Crypto '82 proceedings. Your construction is very similar to one of theirs. Let M = message and R = a message-sized random number, then in E_1(R), E_2(R XOR M) both E_1 and E_2 must be broken to learn M. (Imagine this isn't the case, then either E_1 or E_2 wasn't broken. If you didn't break E_2 but broke E_1, then you only learn R, which is useless to you--it's random and uncorrelated with M. If you broke E_2 but not E_1, you would have a message encrypted with a one-time pad.) This generalizes nicely to E_1(R1), E_2(R2), ..., E_N(RN), E_{N+1}(R1 XOR R2 XOR ... XOR M). If those random numbers are really random, then if any one of those ciphers resists your attacks, the message can't be recovered. Now, you can also do this with things that approximate random functions, which they also discuss. Thus, you might use: f_1(),f_2(), ..., f_n() are N independently-keyed different cryptographic functions that approximate random functions. The funny thing is, if you instantiate this intelligently, you get a message encrypted by N different stream ciphers, perhaps with a random parameter per message thrown in during keying of those ciphers. Thus, suppose s_1(K1) = RC4(K1) s_2(K2) = 3DES-OFB(K2) s_3(K3) = SHA1-Counter-Mode(K3) s_4(K4) = Blowfish-OFB(K4) s_5(K5) = SAFER-SK128(K5). and that these keys are different per message and are all independent. Then, you get the result that M XOR s_1(K1) XOR S_2(k2) XOR ... XOR s_5(k5). leaves no way to recover M unless all five s_i() can be guessed. Note that, in practice, this isn't likely to be useful unless you've done the same kind of thing for symmetric key distribution, random number generation, etc. Otherwise, your attacker in 2050 will bypass the symmetric encryption entirely and factor your RSA modulus, or guess all the entropy sources used for your PRNG, or whatever else you can think of. The good news, though, is that active attacks (like chosen input attacks) and many side-channel attacks (e.g., timing attacks) turn out not to be possible if you are trying to mount them after the encryption has been carried out. >Adam - --John Kelsey, kelsey(a)counterpane.com / kelsey(a)plnet.net NEW PGP print = 5D91 6F57 2646 83F9 6D7F 9C87 886D 88AF -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNMeCqSZv+/Ry/LrBAQGxpgQAloxNjdZMf6l/7U520ZSIVuk7lFZcu0+J 5tUyQgHtS4EAplC1OBnYc8B3pzCir6VCXinmNbClgalXhrRFfmV7vTQLZySaVv/+ 0T44TFkJ0Ldu4cTsA2ertL0jcCXiBp38mhVK2IFbPtN+04B+een8jrUYtzx/qIj5 ztBpBb4yil8= =wBTR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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17 Dec '03

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Re: On the LAM--Local Area Mixes (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 10:30:26 -0800 > Original-From: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart(a)pobox.com> > Subject: Re: On the LAM--Local Area Mixes > the year before the Supreme Court issued the Exclusionary Rule, > the New York City police didn't bother getting any search warrants, > because the Constitutional requirement that they do so didn't have > any real enforcement mechanism. Are police considered an extension of the judicial or the executive arm of the government? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Returned mail: User unknown
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The original message was received at Fri, 23 Jan 1998 03:24:38 -0500 (EST) from ts26-15.homenet.ohio-state.edu [140.254.114.54] ----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors ----- <eureka-unsubscribe(a)eureka.abc-web.com> ----- Transcript of session follows ----- ... while talking to eureka.abc-web.com.: >>> RCPT To:<eureka-unsubscribe(a)eureka.abc-web.com> <<< 553 sorry, your envelope sender is in my badmailfrom list (#5.7.1) 550 <eureka-unsubscribe(a)eureka.abc-web.com>... User unknown Reporting-MTA: dns; chemistry.mps.ohio-state.edu Received-From-MTA: DNS; ts26-15.homenet.ohio-state.edu Arrival-Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 03:24:38 -0500 (EST) Final-Recipient: RFC822; eureka-unsubscribe(a)eureka.abc-web.com Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; eureka.abc-web.com Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 553 sorry, your envelope sender is in my badmailfrom list (#5.7.1) Last-Attempt-Date: Fri, 23 Jan 1998 03:24:40 -0500 (EST) To: eureka-unsubscribe(a)eureka.abc-web.com Subject: (no subject) From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed, 07 Jan 1998 00:04:05 -0800

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Financial Cryptography '98 Preliminary Program
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Resent-Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 23:41:27 -0400 X-Authentication-Warning: online.offshore.com.ai: list set sender to fc98-request(a)offshore.com.ai using -f Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 04:25:40 +0100 (MET) From: Ray Hirschfeld <R.Hirschfeld(a)cwi.nl> To: R.Hirschfeld(a)cwi.nl Subject: Financial Cryptography '98 Preliminary Program Resent-From: fc98(a)offshore.com.ai X-Mailing-List: <fc98(a)offshore.com.ai> archive/latest X-Loop: fc98(a)offshore.com.ai Precedence: list Resent-Sender: fc98-request(a)offshore.com.ai Financial Cryptography '98 Second International Conference February 23-25, 1998, Anguilla, BWI CONFERENCE PROGRAM General Information: Financial Cryptography '98 (FC98) is a conference on the security of digital financial transactions. Meetings alternate between the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies and other locations. This second meeting will be held in Anguilla on February 23-25, 1998. FC98 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers were solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general. Program Committee: Matt Blaze, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA Antoon Bosselaers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Yves Carlier, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, Switzerland Walter Effross, Washington College of Law, American U., Washington DC, USA Matthew Franklin (Co-Chair), AT&T Laboratories--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld (Chair), Unipay Technologies, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Alain Mayer, Bell Laboratories/Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Moni Naor, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel Frank Trotter, Mark Twain Ecash/Mercantile Bank, St. Louis, MO, USA Doug Tygar, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Moti Yung, CertCo LLC (formerly: Bankers Trust E-Commerce), New York, NY, USA Conference Program for FC98: Monday 23 February 1998 800 -- 820 Breakfast 820 -- 830 Welcome 830 -- 905 Micropayments via Efficient Coin-Flipping Richard J. Lipton (Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA) Rafail Ostrovsky (Bellcore, Morristown, NJ, USA) 905 -- 940 X-Cash: Executable Digital Cash Markus Jakobsson (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) Ari Juels (RSA Laboratories, Bedford, MA, USA) 940 -- 1015 Billing Without Paper...Or Billing Without Billers? Caveat Biller: 3rd Party Concentrators Could Come Between You and Your Customers Richard K. Crone (CyberCash, Reston, VA, USA) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 A Platform for Privately Defined Currencies, Loyalty Credits, and Play Money David P. Maher (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Assessment of Threats for Smart Card Based Electronic Cash Kazuo J. Ezawa, Gregory Napiorkowski (Mondex International, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 Using a High-Performance, Programmable Secure Coprocessor Sean W. Smith, Elaine R. Palmer, Steve Weingart (IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA) 1230 -- 1330 Lunch 1800 -- 1930 Cocktail Reception (at Mariners Hotel) Tuesday 24 February 1998 800 -- 830 Breakfast 830 -- 905 Secure Group Barter: Multi-Party Fair Exchange with Semi-Trusted Neutral Parties Matt Franklin (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) Gene Tsudik (USC Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA) 905 -- 940 A Payment Scheme Using Vouchers Ernest Foo, Colin Boyd (Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia) 940 -- 1015 A Formal Specification of Requirements for Payment Transactions in the SET Protocol Catherine Meadows, Paul Syverson (Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, USA) 1015 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 On Assurance Structures for WWW Commerce Markus Jakobsson (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 1120 -- 1230 Panel Discussion Certificate Revocation: Mechanics and Meaning Barb Fox (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA), moderator Joan Feigenbaum (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) Paul Kocher (Valicert, Palo Alto, CA, USA) Michael Myers (Verisign, Mountain View, CA, USA) Ron Rivest (MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 1230 -- 1330 Lunch 2000 -- 2200 Rump Session Wednesday 25 February 1998 800 -- 830 Breakfast 830 -- 930 Invited Speaker Private Signatures and E-commerce David Chaum (DigiCash, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 930 -- 1005 Group Blind Digital Signatures: A Scalable Solution to Electronic Cash Anna Lysyanskaya, Zulfikar Ramzan (MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA) 1005 -- 1045 Coffee Break 1045 -- 1120 Curbing Junk E-Mail via Secure Classification Eran Gabber, Markus Jakobsson, Yossi Matias, Alain Mayer (Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) 1120 -- 1155 Publicly Verifiable Lotteries: Applications of Delaying Functions David M. Goldschlag (Divx, Herndon, VA, USA) Stuart G. Stubblebine (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1155 -- 1230 Security of Digital Watermarks Lesley R. Matheson, Stephen G. Mitchell, Talal G. Shamoon, Robert E. Tarjan, Francis X. Zane (STAR Lab, InterTrust Technologies, Sunnyvale, CA, USA) 1230 -- 1330 Lunch 1330 -- 1405 Security in the Java Electronic Commerce Framework Surya Koneru, Ted Goldstein (JavaSoft, Palo Alto, CA, USA) 1405 -- 1440 Beyond Identity: Warranty-Based Digital Signature Transactions Yair Frankel, David W. Kravitz, Charles T. Montgomery, Moti Yung (CertCo, New York, NY, USA) 1440 -- 1515 Compliance Checking in the PolicyMaker Trust Management System Matt Blaze, Joan Feigenbaum, Martin Strauss (AT&T Labs--Research, Florham Park, NJ, USA) 1515 -- 1545 Coffee Break 1545 -- 1620 An Efficient Fair Off-Line Electronic Cash System with Extensions to Checks and Wallets with Observers Aymeric de Solages, Jacque Traore (France Telecom--CNET, Caen, France) 1620 -- 1655 An Efficient Untraceable Electronic Money System Based on Partially Blind Signatures of the Discrete Logarithm Problem Shingo Mayazaki, Kouichi Sakurai (Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan) 1655 -- 1700 Closing The conference schedule and additional information is available at the URL http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC98/. Breakfast and lunch are provided at the conference. The conference organizers have left time open for corporate sponsored events, for networking, and for recreational activities on the resort island of Anguilla. Participants are encouraged to bring their families. Workshop: A 40-hour workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC98, to be held during the week following the conference. For more information on the workshop, please see the URL http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~iang/fc98/workshop.html. For workshop registration, see the URL http://fc98.ai/. Special Attraction: On Thursday, February 26, 1998, there will be a total eclipse of the sun. The narrow zone of 100% totality will pass just south of Anguilla. A boat excursion to the center of the eclipse zone is planned, for an optimal view of the eclipse. The excursion is included in the conference registration; additional tickets can be purchased for accompanying persons. Venue: The Inter-Island Hotel is a small 14-room guest house with a large, comfortable 150-seat conference facility and additional space for a small 10-booth exhibition. The Inter-Island is on Road Bay, near Sandy Ground Village, in the South Hill section of Anguilla. The conference, workshop, and exhibition will have TCP/IP internet access. Shuttle service to the conference will be available. Air Transportation and Hotels: Air travel to Anguilla is typically done through San Juan for US flights, or St. Maarten/Martin for flights from Europe and the US. There are also connections via Antigua. Anguillan import duties are not imposed on hardware or software which will leave the island again. There are no other taxes--or cryptography import/export restrictions--on Anguilla. Hotels range from spartan to luxurious, and more information about hotels on Anguilla can be obtained from your travel agent, or at the URL http://fc98.ai/. A block reservation has been made at Mariners, and this is the recommended hotel except for those seeking budget accomodations. General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright, Boston, MA, USA email: rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI email: vince(a)offshore.com.ai Exhibits and Sponsorship Manager: Blanc Weber, Seattle, WA, USA email: blancw(a)cnw.com Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA email: iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Registration: You can register and pay for conference admission via the World Wide Web at the URL http://fc98.ai/. The cost of the FC98 Conference is US$1,000. There are reduced rates of US$250 and US$100 for full-time academics and students. Booths for the exhibition start at US$5,000 and include two conference tickets. For more information about exhibit space, contact Blanc Weber, blancw(a)cnw.com. Sponsorship opportunities for FC98 are still available. The cost of the workshop is US$5000, and includes meals but not lodging. You can register for the workshop, which runs the week after the conference, at the URL http://fc98.ai/. Financial Cryptography '98 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. It is sponsored by: RSA Data Security Inc. <http://www.rsa.com> C2NET, Inc. <http://www.c2.net> Hansa Bank & Trust Company Limited, Anguilla <http://www.hansa.net/> Sicherheit und Privat- International Bank <mailto:spbank@schloss.li> Offshore Information Services <http://www.offshore.com.ai/> e$ <http://www.shipwright.com> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Cybersitter censors code
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>--------------- Forwarded Message -------------- >From: rpj(a)ise.canberra.edu.au (Ross Johnson) > >Well, I just spent several hours tracking something down that I think >is SO braindead that it must be called evil. I hope this will save >someone else some hassle. > >There's an NT box on my desk that someone else uses every now and then. >This machine is otherwise used as my programming box and backup server. > >All of a sudden, my programming files were being corrupted in odd >places. I thought "hmm, my copy must be corrupt". So I refreshed the >files. No change. "hmm, the code depot copy must be corrupt".. Checked >from other machines. No problem there. Viewed the file from a web based >change browser in Internet Explorer. Same corruption in the file. >Telnet'd to the server machine and just cat'd the file to the terminal. >Same problem. > >What's going on? > >The lines that were corrupted were of the form >#define one 1 /* foo menu */ >#define two 2 /* bar baz */ > >What I always saw ON THIS MACHINE ONLY was: >#define one 1 /* foo */ ># fine two 2 /* bar baz */ > >Can you guess what was happening? > >Turns out, someone had inadvertly installed this piece of garbage >called CyberSitter, which purports to protect you from nasty internet >content. Turns out that it does this by patching the TCP drivers and >watching the data flow over EVERY TCP STREAM. Can you spot the offense >word in my example? It's "NUDE". Seems that cybersitter doesn't care if >there are other characters in between. So it blanks out "nu */ #de" >without blanking out the punctuation and line breaks. Very strange and >stupid. > >It also didn't like the method name "RefreshItems" in another file, >since there is obviously a swear word embedded in there. Sheesh. > >It's so bad it's almost funny. Hope this brightens your day as much as >it brighted mine :-). ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu ""The tragedy of Galois is that he could have contributed so much more to mathematics if he'd only spent more time on his marksmanship."

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Re: Misty???
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back wrote: > Tim May wrote: > | I wouldn't call Misty "snake oil." But it's also been thoroughly taken > | apart and shown to be weak. Importantly, it was submitted by Mitsubishi for > | peer review. > > Could you provide a pointer to the analysis paper? Adam, you should know better than to ask. Everyone knows you can't trust a bigot to do cryptography. Tim "Chop Chop" May's opinions about Misty are based not on the strength of the cipher, but on the ethnicity of the creator. On Thu, 11 Sep 1997 22:09:15, Tim May wrote: > At 9:30 PM -0700 9/11/97, Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: > >Does anybody know MITSUBISHI MISTY algorithm ? > >If you know it,Please send e-mail to me. > > > > You want me play Misty for you? You send me $2500, I play Misty. > > Like you do, I take much money, chop chop. > > (Now shut the fuck up and get the hell off our list with your demands for > money to explain your bullshit one time pad scheme.)

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Communicator 5.0 to be GPL'ed
by Jrbl Pookah 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's something I came across on one of my other lists. I looked at the URL, and it looked good. Anybody able to confirm/deny? And what kind of implications do y'all think this'll have for Netscape's security? (What if improved security code comes to Netscape from bodies /outside/ the US?) ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 22 Jan 1998 10:33:21 -0800 (PST) From: <snip...snip> Subject: Communicator 5.0 to be GPL'ed Yes its true !! http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/980122/ca_netscap_3.html woo hoo!! Dex- ----End Forwarded Message--- -- Joseph Blaylock Castle Computers, Inc. JOAT,MODF blaylock(a)castlec.com (513)469-0888 YMMV -- "Everything is perfect, but there is a lot of room for improvement." ---Shunryu Suzuki

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State of the Union Address
by bubbabill＠whitehouse.gov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hear that the State of the Union next Monday has a section on Internet - networks - critical infrastructure protection et al. Anyone have any details?

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Cybersitter censors code
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Turns out, someone had inadvertly installed this piece of garbage >>called CyberSitter, which purports to protect you from nasty internet >>content. Turns out that it does this by patching the TCP drivers and >>watching the data flow over EVERY TCP STREAM. Can you spot the offense >>word in my example? It's "NUDE". Seems that cybersitter doesn't care if >>there are other characters in between. So it blanks out "nu */ #de" >>without blanking out the punctuation and line breaks. Very strange and >>stupid. Find out who it is and fire his ass for sabotage of the company computer systems.

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