December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Persistent Institutions" (Re: Timed-Release Crypto)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the last of these articles I plan to forward. This one mentions the "persistent institutions" idea (based on timed-release crypto mediated by mutually suspicious agents) I have mentioned at times. (I need to do a major piece on this, as my comments are mainly scattered in various places.) Dave Deltorto was asking about hardware failure of the host machines as a practical concern and this is what I was initially responding to. --Tim >Date: Wed, 17 Feb 93 12:16:30 -0800 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Re: Timed-Release Crypto > >Dave Deltorto writes (about my idea for timed-release crypto): > >>Well, yes, Tim, but what about the MTBF rating fo disk drives and or other >>storage media? Any such message would also be relying on the turst that the >>disk it's stored on, the mail system and or the organization it was sent to >>for storgae are still going to be around. Now, if there were dedicated places > >Loss of hardware over the years due to unreliability is unlikely to be the >main issue, for several reasons: > >1. Modern MTBFs for large disk drives are approaching 100,000 hours, or >well over 10 years. The drives are likelier to be voluntarily retired >first. And newer drives, including archival optical drives, are even more >reliable (the drives may crash, but optical media survive). For the drives >that _do_ fail, backup strategies exist, as with all storage of critical >files. To wit, if your point is correct, then the failures of some disk >drives at banks, insurance companies, etc., should be producing some >fraction of "unrecoverable losses" each year. That they are not, because of >robust backup and redundant storage methods, is evidence that crypto time >vaults will also be reasonably secure. (Granted, you wouldn't want to trust >your $100,000 deposit for 20 years on Joe Random's aging Amiga 1000.) > >2. A relatively large file by today's standards, e.g., 10 megabytes, will >be a very small file by the standards of 10 years from now. The upshot is >that new and more reliable storage methods (and transmission methods) will >make storage of such small files quite trivial. (And remember that since >the pieces are encrypted, physical duplication for backups, redundant >storage, etc., is not a compromise of security.) > >3. The most reputatable crypto time vaults will of course be careful not to >lose client files, especially not for such mundane reasons as disk drive >failures. > >4. M-out-of-n voting strategies are likely in any case, to deal with >collusion of some of the nodes. That is, a file will be split into pieces >such that any 8 out of 12 pieces, for example, are sufficient to recover >the original file. (Encryption is a separate issue, though obviously >related.) > >5. The files are likely to be moved around a lot, anyway, making hardware >failures manageable on an instantaneous basis (that is, bad nodes, etc., >can be compensated for when the time comes to reroute the files). Thus, a >critical file does not just get "parked" at one site for 30 years. > >>where such t-r crypto msgs could be stored, such as a digital "bank" (where >>they would no doubt charge a storage fee, possibly necessitating that each >>such msg would be able to "peel off" digicredits from itself every year to >>guarantee paying for it's own upkeep in case you were no longer aropund to >>sign checks), the question of whether or not it would BE there in 30 years >>might be moot, but that's a whole 'nother discussion. > >"Persistent institutions" is what I call these systems or trusts that last >for many decades. If such systems can be built, using some of the ideas >discussed here in this group, then interesting new financial and political >structures are possible. Imagine an anonymous, distributed trust that has >$10 billion in crypto-assets and a "goal" of funding nanotech or cryonics >research. (Lots of complicated stuff yet to be considered in enough detail >on how such "goals" might be stored, acted on, etc. For the sake of >simplicity, think of it as a kind of Howard Hughes Medical Foundation, >which once owned the Hughes Corporation, but which is not located in any >one single country....) > >>Still, I find your idea very compelling and full of merit. > >Thanks. Lots more work is needed. > >-Tim May > > >-- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. >Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available. > > .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Edward, didn't you get the message......stop haggling over righteousness & get back to WORK! :>) Blanc

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Hello
by Peter Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:: Request Remailing-To: dacey(a)crl.com Hi.....drop me a line when you get this. c-ya

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*&^%#@! Old-timers... NOT.
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > I've found that posting comments about early work generates > ill-tempered "you old-timers have no respect for the enthusiasm of > newbies" posts. (Well, a slight exaggeration, perhaps.) Let me be the first to comment that anyone who says this is a fool, and is too arrogant to realize the value of an informed opinion. Unless the post takes the tone of "If you were around as long as I was", or something similiar, an informed, experienced, opinion is always appreciated -- at least by me. Hey, I don't know everything (don't let that leak out... *smirk*), so I'm happy to learn from those who know more than I do. Everyone learned from someone, and it's their net.obligation to pass on that knowledge. It's the way the net works, with everyone helping someone less experienced. It worked for me, and I'm happy to share information with people who know less than I do. All I ask for is patience and a genuine interest in learning what I have to teach. I try to show that same interest when dealing with those who know more than I. --Jeff

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Re: Hello
by r6788＠hopi.dtcc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! Did you want me to call you or just send you e-mail??? >Hi.....drop me a line when you get this. c-ya ;>

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Announce: Secure HTTP Draft Specification (fwd)
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From commercenet-request(a)commerce.NET Sat Jun 11 02:32:46 1994 > Date: Sat, 11 Jun 94 01:17:50 PDT > From: wtwong(a)eitech.eit.com (William Tao-Yang Wong) > Message-Id: <9406110817.AA22886(a)eit.COM> > To: commercenet(a)ibs.eit.COM, network-wg(a)ibs.eit.COM > Cc: heathman(a)commerce.net > Subject: Announce: Secure HTTP Draft Specification > > A draft specification for Secure HTTP has been released. You may retrieve it > via any of the following methods: > > WWW: http://www.commerce.net/information/standards/drafts/shttp.txt > Email: shttp-info(a)commerce.net (Automatic response) > Anonymous FTP: ftp.commerce.net/pub/standards/drafts/shttp.txt > > > William > Secure HTTP (S-HTTP) provides secure communication mechanisms between an HTTP client-server pair. Our design intent is to provide a flexi- ble protocol that supports multiple operation modes and cryptographic algorithms and formats through option negotiation between the tran- saction parties. 1.1. Summary of Features Secure HTTP has been designed to enable incorporation of various cryptographic message format standards into Web clients and servers, including, but not limited to, PKCS-7, PEM, and PGP. S-HTTP supports interoperation among a variety of implementations, and is backward compatible with HTTP. ...

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crypto in the NY Times
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The magazine section of tomorrow's N.Y. Times has a good story on cypherpunks, Clipper, crypto, etc. Whit Diffie adorns the cover.

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Cypherpunks mail database does exist
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several times people have made comments about there not being an archive of old mail, or that it was not practical to index it. For the record, again, there is a database, it is indexed, and it is fast. Eric Johnson has put one together as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src Please don't think that you used to be safe doing something illegal on this list and that you no longer are. That would be foolish. -- Vince

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Protocol Wanted!!
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a simple problem. Late one night, Bob discovers a clever new method of factoring large products of distinct odd primes. Bob may now perform such factorizations in only a few hours for numbers up to 1024 bits on his trusty old 486. Bob spent a lot of time coding and testing his new algorithm, and wishes to recover some of his expenses by factoring a few RSA keys for well-to-do clients. Bob wants to do this without disclosing his identity, so a certain evil three-letter agency will not cover him with rubber hose marks trying to learn how his algorithm works. Alice is the CEO of a company who suspects PGP-encrypted mail is being used by an employee to transfer trade secrets to a foreign competitor. Alice would pay any amount of money to read this mail and confirm her suspicions. Alice is a potential client for Bob. Now for the hard part... How does Bob make Alice, and other potential clients, aware of the service he wishes to offer? How do Bob and Alice conduct business anonymously while making absolutely sure that neither is spoofing the other? Alice needs to know Bob isn't lying about being able to factor. Bob needs to know Alice has the means to pay him before he cracks a key. Bob and Alice need to exchange a factored key for money with no chance that either will back out at the last moment and try to steal from the other. How much work should Bob expect to come his way if he charges $10 a bit for his factoring service? $100 a bit? $1000 a bit? Comments anyone? -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just read an interesting product announcement: "The RF-5151DE digital encryption option is designed for all RF-5000 FALCOM Series HF-SSB radio systems. The module provides an embedded voice-data encryption system which can be programmed with up to six of 1 X 10^52 key codes. The encryption algorithm is driven by a pseudo-random key generator possessing a key stream length requiring millions of years for recursion. [Harris RF Communications Group, Rochester, NY, (716) 244-5830.] This was in one of those military hardware magazines. Does this sound like a piece of military gear? Is this key length adequate for that? If it were approved for the protection of classified information, which was never mentioned one way or the other, would a detail like the key length be allowed to be disclosed publicly?

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