December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Laptop TEMPEST
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FCC RF/EMC testing is well nigh useless for TEMPEST protection. Compliance engineering firms have some equipment which might be useful for TEMPEST experimentation, but the actual specs for Class B (Class A is basically anything that won't kill you) are pretty worthless for this application. I imagine there may be some other "dual use" technologies through for testing TEMPEST equipment. Perhaps some medical equipment has stringent stray emanation specs? I believe the equipment you'd really want is the real "TS" (technical surveillance) gear, which is 1) not available on the open market and 2) expensive. The paper seems to have involved an AM radio and an obsolete piece of British TS kit; van Eck used a modified TV. Any HAM could probably build a suitable receiver, the real problem is knowing how much attenuation is necessary to defeat the real TS gear. This is why I am fundamentally impressed by the obfuscation techniques from the paper, rather than just straight shielding. -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/

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re: Drivers Licenses
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: >> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> >> >> A couple of times through the washer and dryer and that >> lamination seperates. Any cop that has worked traffic >> has seen plenty of DL's in this shape (heh should have >> seen my old DL when I truned it in to get it renewed <g>). > > I rather doubt that. I have had a Texas drivers license > since I was 16, I'm now 38. I have washed them innumerable > times and I have never had the lamination break or > otherwise degrade. The lamination is quite heavy. I did > have one crack at the seam one time because of a bad > lamination and was specificaly instructed by the officer > who wrote me a speeding ticket to get it replaced. I did > so immediately. "Yes SIR!" > The law here is that if the license is damaged, you move, > or otherwise make the information invalid you have 30 > days to correct it. "Yes SIR!" > I suspect quite strongly that had I shown up at the > court house to pay that ticket with the same damaged > license (required to be shown at the time of payment) > they would not have accepted the payment and might have > asked to to discuss the situation with one of the > officers they so thoughtfuly have placed about the room. "Yes SIR!" > Texas takes counterfeiting of licenses quite seriously. "Yes SIR!" > My suggestion would be don't try such juvenile tricks here, "No, SIR!" > the DPS have seen it before "Yes SIR!" > and won't be pleasant people to deal with unless you're > a juvenile. "No SIR!" This is one of the things I love so about Texas and Texans. Despite inexplicable rumors and propaganda about independence and rugged frontier indivuality, Texans are as fucking obedient to authority as the most lock-stepped fucking Germans. The People's Republic of Texas is on the leading edge of Big Brother statism. Sales tax fully as high as New York's, fingerprints at driver license renewal time, roadblocks to fish for people who have been indulging in adult beverages or who have outstanding warrants, and some of the most dumb-fuck, clueless, fuckwit people behind badges in the known universe. Texans will give anyone their SS number at any time for any reason. Many print it on their checks. Texas is without doubt the Rube State. The only reason it isn't on the bleeding foreskin of Big Brother technology is that there aren't enough clues in the state to rub together to make a spark. When you run into anyone halfway sharp or better in Texas, it's a cinch they are a refugee from the unforgiving North.

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Online Credit Card Transactions for $39.95!!
by yourfriend8950＠psynet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lease to own your merchant account equipment, software, and shopping cart system for only $39.95 per month! WE GUARANTEE APPROVAL no matter what your credit status may be! The benefits include: * 2% Discount Rate * No Monthly Minimum Billing Fee * No Statement Fee if No Sales Made for the Month * Money Available in 3 Business Days * Windows-Based or Macintosh Compatible Credit Card Processing Software (Available) * Shopping Cart System To Take Orders Securely Right On-Line (Available) * Checks By Fax/Email/Phone software. Please call us at 912-236-6676 for more information. Please fill out the form below and fax to 970-927-0964. ======================================================= Merchant Account Application Legal Business Name: ____ State: __________________ DBA: ____________________ Business Address: _______ Suite: __________________ City State Zip: _________ Describe Business: ______ Business Hours: _________ Percent Mail Order: _____ Percent Phone Orders: ___ Percent Trade Show: _____ Locations: ______________ Year Started: ___________ Fed Tax ID: _____________ State Tax ID: ___________ Principal Contact: ______ Title: __________________ Phone No: _______________ Fax No: _________________ Est Card Sales Month: ___ Average Ticket: _________ Type of Business: _______ State Incorporated: _____ Age of Business: ________ Date Acquired: __________ OWNER PRINCIPAL INFORMATION: President Owner: ________ Title: __________________ Ownership: ______________ Residence Address: ______ City State Zip: _________ Own Rent: _______________ Since: __________________ Home Phone: _____________ Previous Address: _______ DOB: ____________________ CO OWNER INFORMATION: Co-Owner: _______________ Title: __________________ Percent Owned: __________ Residence Address: ______ City State Zip: _________ Since: __________________ Own Rent: _______________ BUSINESS TYPE: Type of Building: _______ Found EMS By: ___________ CREDIT INFO: Rank Your Credit: _______ Prior Bankrupt: _________ Year: ___________________ TERMINAL: Prefer PC Software or Terminal?: ___ Terms/Lease or Purchase?: __________________ REFERENCES: BUSINESS REFERENCES: (Please list three)

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re: Drivers Licenses (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 9 Feb 1998 09:25:55 +0100 (CET) > From: Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> > Subject: re: Drivers Licenses (fwd) > On Sun, 8 Feb 1998, Jim Choate wrote: > > I have a proposal. Lucky is supposed to be in Austin for the CFP conference. > > If he is agreeable, he could ask to examine a Tx. d.l. We could leave it up > > to his opinion as to whether these would be easy to alter. > > Why me? Convenience. You seemed like the right person who would be in the right place with the right technical skills to ask for indipendent opinion. You obviously don't feel comfortable with it. I apologize for the intrusion. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Driver Licenses (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 9 Feb 1998 09:00:12 +0100 (CET) > From: Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> > Subject: Re: Driver Licenses > The clerk at my local 7/11 assured me the information captured would not > be forwarded to a central site. Yet. It appears the stores are installing > these systems to protect themselves against police sting "test buys", in > which the authorities take persons just days shy of their 21st birthday, > put theater makeup and/or a gray beard and wig on them and thus entrap > store clerks into selling controlled substances to minors. > > As any fool can predict, the information captured will not remain local > for long. After all, the system is ideal for monitoring gun^H^H^H alcohol > purchases of parolees, tracking down deadbeat dads, etc. I have worked doing technical support for McDonalds in two of my past jobs. I assure you that when they dump the stores records each night they are dumping this as well. They dump gas sales from the automated machines as a matter of course. The real question is who besides Southland Corp. subsidies are they selling this info to? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Laptop TEMPEST (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Laptop TEMPEST > From: Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> > Date: 09 Feb 1998 02:34:15 -0500 > FCC RF/EMC testing is well nigh useless for TEMPEST protection. I disagree, it would give you a gross baseline on the total emissions between monitors and laptops. That field strenght measurement would at least allow you to calculate radiuses of equal strength to calculate approximately how far the emissions are from each class of device for equal probabilities of detection. One of the specific goals is to measure how effective the device is at effecting other co-located devices (such as seeing ghost images on other monitors or causing static in paging equipment). I suspect one could do it with a spectrum analyzer or a grid dip meter. > I imagine there may be some other "dual use" technologies through for > testing TEMPEST equipment. Perhaps some medical equipment has stringent > stray emanation specs? We're not trying to bring the individual vertical retraces out of the chaff...we're trying to calculate the total comparitive emission strengths. If that isn't high enough then trying to get individual componants of that field will be useless. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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EPIC World Crypto Survey
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, February 9, 1998, p. D10: U.S. Losing Battle on Control of Data Encryption, Study Says By Jeri Clausing Washington -- The Clinton Administration is losing its battle to increase international controls over how reliably computer data can be scrambled to insure privacy, according to a report to be released Monday by an independent research group. ... The Electronic Privacy Information Center <http://www.epic.org> says that its survey of 243 governments showed that the United States is virtually the only democratic, industrialized nation seeling domestic regulation of strong encryption. That finding directly contradicts the Clinton Administration's assertions in Congressional hearings that it has the support of most nations on this issue. ... William Reinsch, the Under Secretary for export administration in the United States Commerce Department, denied that the study contradicted the Administration's assertions. "All the Administration has ever said is that there are more countries that go farther than we do," Mr. Reinsch said. "The study confirms that."

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Airport security cracked by flaw [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > X-within-URL: http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9802/08/security.reut/index.html > REPORT: COMPUTER DESIGN FLAW OPENS AIRPORTS TO TERRORISM > > graphic February 8, 1998 > Web posted at: 1:25 p.m. EST (1825 GMT) > > NEW YORK (Reuters) -- The computer security systems that control > access to 40 airports worldwide through electronic badges have a > design flaw that could make them vulnerable to terrorism, The New > York Times reported Sunday. > > A California computer security consulting firm, MSB Associates, > found the flaw in December in a routine audit of a large California > financial services software company, the identity of which was not > disclosed, according to the newspaper. > > Government buildings, including that of the CIA, and prisons and > industries with sensitive military, drug or financial information or > material also use the system and are also vulnerable to attack, the > Times report said. [text deleted] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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CYBERsitter caught mail-bombing (fwd)
by Ken Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 23:25:04 -0500 From: bennett(a)peacefire.org To: peacefire-broadcast(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: CYBERsitter caught mail-bombing CYBERsitter has been caught in the act of mail-bombing someone who wrote a letter to Brian Milburn, the CEO of CYBERsitter, complaining about their product. Spefically, a lady names Sarah Salls sent the following letter to Brian Milburn at bmilburn(a)solidoak.com: http://peacefire.org/archives/SOS.letters/asherah.2.bm.2.4.98.txt She was writing to CYBERsitter regarding their harassment of Peacefire and their blocking of anti-censorship sites, which is described in more detail at: http://www.peacefire.org/censorware/CYBERsitter/ CYBERsitter replied by flooding her account with over 446 junk messages. While the attack was in progress, Ms. Salls had her ISP's postmaster monitor the incoming attack and shut it off. Naturally, her ISP, Valinet.com, kept copies of the mail logs for that day and has passed them on as evidence to their lawyers. A complaint was also forwarded to MCI's security department, which handles network abuse and illegal denial-of-service attacks that are perpetrated by their customers, which include lower-end network users like CYBERsitter: http://peacefire.org/archives/SOS.letters/valinet.2.mci.2.5.98.txt C-Net's NEWS.com picked up on the story and interviewed Sarah Salls, her ISP, me, and Brian Milburn from Solid Oak Software. Their story is at: http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,18937,00.html (Note that the C-Net article compares the act of mail flooding with conventional spam, and says that a bill is being considered in Congress that would outlaw what CYBERsitter did. This is not quite true; flooding a person's account with 500 junk messages is a denial-of-service attack, which is already illegal, and it usually gets you in a lot more trouble than spamming would.) Far from denying the accusations, Brian Milburn gave C-Net the following quote: "Certain people aren't going to get the hint. Maybe if they get the email 500 times, they'll get it through their heads... If they send it to my private email account, they're going to get what they get." No kidding, Brian! bennett(a)peacefire.org (615) 421 6284 http://www.peacefire.org/ ---

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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