December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

TEMPEST and Public key programs
by blaster＠rd.relcom.msk.su 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Victor, I have a long > (58K) document about this which I'll be glad to send you, just ask. Please, send this paper direct to me. > any information. Victor, could your friend in the KGB arrange for such > an experiment?? Exuse me please, but I don`t see this man about two week! I also can`t ask this man about all (I like fredom :( ). As security men saw: "if smaller know then better sleep". > Victor seems to be saying that his friend is saying that DES is a > "group" (if I remember my terms correctly), which somebody was > supposed to have proven wasn't the case. Although, strictly speaking, > a "group" was supposed to be f=des, where Victor just says it's "very > like DES." DES is`t group - f() only like to DES (I think, that computing dificult of f() like des() one). > But multiple encryptions as Victor describes are not used. Rather > alternating encryptions and DEcryptions. For example triple DES > dese(k1, desd(k2, dese(k3, plaintext))) where "dese" is DES > encryption and "desd" is DES decryption. What does your friend in > the KGB have to say about that, Victor? If triple-DES reduces to > any reasonable transformation of (some) 56-bit key then it's almost > as easy to break as single-DES which we now know only requires 3 hours > on a $1 million specialized machine. I`ll ask he about this. > Of more interest here, Victor, is what your KGB friend says about the > IDEA cipher, RSA Public Key encryption, and the MD5 message digest, > all of which are used in PGP. We would also like to know if the KGB > has found any weaknesses in PGP or if they've even had occasion to try > to find any. He made same program (LanCrypto). That why, I hear only bad words from he. :) You can read about this program in cypherpunks. >From other KGB-men, I hear, that prophesor Sidelnicov (the well known cryptoanalisist from Russia) saw, that PGP has some weak places: - random number is`t "good" random number. - md5 has hole (but here man lapse into salence:( ). - PGP for DOS don`t have any anti-overloking tools. BTW: LanCrypto play on last weakness: thay wrote litle resident DOS program. This program crack PGP and than pgp sign (and check) only part of message. LanCrypto public this resalt in buziness newspaper and show program on the big computer-show. I think this is rough market, but it work well (as all, that KGB made:))!!! Now I know 3 powerful public-key Russian programs. All wrote by exKGB man: - "LanCrypto" has vary fast algorithm, litle sign and several tools for anti- intruding. - "Exelence" has number of anti-intruding tools and powerful cryptographic algorithms. This pakage also has inteligance hardware keys for prevent introding. - "Blitc". The central bank try to use this program, but boys from LanCrypto find rough hole in hash function of this program and compromite this firm. Now I contact with LanCrypto and Elias (autors of "Exelence"). I hope to use thouse programs in my Computer Security Center. If you want I try to write about this programs. --- Victor A. Borisov aka blaster; Relcom R&D; Email: blaster(a)rd.relcom.msk.su; Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510; === Don`t panic! ===

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double encryption keys
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops, please excuse that post, it went to the wrong mailing list. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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No Subject
by John Farmer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

signoff cypherpunks

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Re: PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re shredding documents: the best thing I ever found was to tear papers into strips about an inch wide and feed them to an ordinary household blender which is about 3/4 full of water. Turns the paper into mush. Flush the mush and that's that. NOt recommended for hiding evidence of crimes; the perfect crime is an illusion fostered by the media. -gg

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Re: Paper Shredders
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RE fire: you can still read ashes, it's commonly done. Now as an addendum to my previous about the use of blenders: for larger amounts, the kitchen sink disposall with lots of water running... for really large amounts, soak in a large container full of water for a few days to let it get soft, then mush it up with either an electric cement mixer or a 1/2" electric drill with paint mixing attachment. The key to these operations is lots of water so the paper will essentially be a suspended solid that easily tumbles and shreds. Too much paper in the mix will lead to a soggy mat that won't break up easily. -gg

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Photocopying mnoney
by rees＠cs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. Could anyone tell me an Online source of information that explains stuff about how money is scanned by machines, etc? Please send e-mail. Thaks. ---Dave (rees(a)cs.bu.edu)

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What is the maximum # of bits a key could ever need to be?
by Robert J Woodhead 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This occurred to me this morning in the inner sanctum of inspired cogitation, aka the shower. "What is the maximum # of bit a public-key would ever need to be, given no breakthroughs in factoring?" I came up with an answer, but it depends on some numbers that I don't have handy; perhaps other people on the list can fill in the blanks. First, we need an equation that tell us how difficult it is, in # of operations, to factor a number of N bits. eg: N_ops(N) = # of operations it will take. Then all we need to do is find the N for which N_ops(N) is greater than U_Duration * U_Particles * (1 / P_time) Where U_Duration is the expected duration of the universe, U_Particles is the number of particles in the universe (I am assuming that every particle can be used as a processor; the programming I leave as an exercise to the alert reader), and P_Time is the Planck time (damned if I can remember it) in seconds, which ought to be a good upper bound for clock speed on the Universal CPU. A most likely useless number, but it would be interesting to know what it comes out to. Best, R

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Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >... Tim continues ... >> >>Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns >>and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun. >> > >I don't know if there is a Cypherpunk's cause. I doubt there's a movement, >but that's separate from my holding a belief that crypto and nyms and >digital cash and privacy and emergent social structures are crucial to a >preferable form of human survival. > I would have to disagree somewhat with this statement. I think that there are a loose set of opinions and goals shared between most of us. We may have out paranoids (personally, I always got a kick out of LD's rants... some of them even put us back "on track" when we were straying (as have many of Tim's posts)). Most of us share ideas, mostly relating to wanting widespread use and acceptance of strong cryptography. There are many differing opinions here, but this reflects the fact that we are not some kind of genetic experiment gone bad ;-) writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >With the net, we have a wonderous tool and opportunity. But the world isn't >a safe place. Every time I put a finger or toe into the lovely pacific >ocean I'm keenly aware of quickly entering the food chain at a much lower >point. These are times of challenge, to develop new tools and fresh >perspectives. But many elements of human nature remain the same. > Very true. writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >I thank the Cypherpunks for writing code. I don't (anymore): I write words, >make videos and build organizations. We do need the code. We also need to >push at the edges of our understanding of social dynamics. > I agree... Code is good, but one of the most important resources we have are people who can explain just what it is that we are doing here to the "outside" world, and to reaise the level of the public's awarness, if not understanding. writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >And S.Boxx >clearly illustrated that puerile visciousness, wounded animal frenzy, and >pathetic behavior are also here in this new world. One of the brave ones, >s/he isn't. And Cypherpunks' creations even protect the likes of S.Boxx. >Reminiscent of Voltaire, yes? > Strangely ironic, we hate what we protect. I think it's important to note that there will always be people like S.Boxx out there... lunatic ravings and patheticly malformed logic. There are also a great deal of good things that have come out of the remailers and spoofing (not so much spoofing, but posts to places like alt.whistlblowing, et al. through the remailers and anon.penet.fi) I think that the good outweighs the bad in this instance, at least. > >James Dinkelacker (True name) >-- >................................ >Jamie Dinkelacker Palo Alto CA (almost a true name) >Jamie(a)netcom.com 415.941.4782 > > Truly, -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons email: nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | Finger nate(a)monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key | #include <std.disclaimer> | Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden +--------+ Always remember "Brazil"

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Mail delivery question
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a somewhat dumb question about mail delivery. This has a CP connection because it relates to a remailer enhancement I am working on. When I receive mail from cypherpunks, this is a typical set of headers for an incoming message: From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Wed Oct 20 23:57:11 1993 Received: from nova.unix.portal.com by jobe.shell.portal.com (4.1/1.34) id AA14713; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:57:11 PDT Received: by nova.unix.portal.com (5.65b/4.1 1.505) id AA18779; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:57:09 -0700 Received: by toad.com id AA20355; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:47:55 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA20115; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:21 PDT Return-Path: <jamie(a)netcom.com> Received: from netcom.netcom.com ([192.100.81.100]) by toad.com id AA20111; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:19 PDT Received: from netcom3.netcom.com by netcom.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom) id AA27104; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:51 -0700 Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:51 -0700 Message-Id: <9310210643.AA27104(a)netcom.netcom.com> X-Mailer: Eudora To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: jamie(a)netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker) Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious Status: RO Now, my question is, when this mail is delivered to the Unix system which I use, how does the local software know to deliver it to hfinney? My name does not seem to appear in the header at all. In particular, the "To:" address is not hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, as I would have expected, but rather cypherpunks(a)toad.com. I suppose there is some other information that is passed along with the message when it is delivered to portal.com, information which tells my user name. It would be nice if this information were available to scripts which would process the incoming mail. Could someone explain how this delivery process works? Thanks - Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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PGP vs PEM discussion
by Brad Huntting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perhaps someone on cypherpunks can help with this... To: pem-dev(a)tis.com Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view? From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey(a)mitre.org> Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500 Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate the PGP point of view for public key management and compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view? Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion? I am seeking such a person for a presentation and panel discussion at an international conference. I need names ASAP! Please feel free to forward this message to appropriate newsgroups. Regards, -Rob- SHIREY(a)MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397 Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202 7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia 22102-3481 USA

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