December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Zimmermann & Johnson at Sept. RMIUG
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I have been told that noted Colorado crypto experts Phil Zimmermann > and Mike Johnson, along with Phil's attorney, Phil Dubois, will be > panelists at the September meeting of the Rocky Mountain Internet > Users Group. The meeting will be on Tues. 9/13, 7-9 pm at NCAR in > the Sovereign Republic of Boulder. Duane Thompson tells me that cookies will be served starting at 6:30pm, so the early comers get more than the good seats. :-) I'm not sure if I'm REALLY a crypto expert, but I plan to be there. :-) ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________|

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Ecash beta test
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I assume we all signed up for the e$ beta test. Has anyone received a reply yet? -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP public key by finger

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t-shirts & general info
by Ari Y. Benbasat 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey there... I was interested in the availabilty of your "Cypherpunk Criminal" shirts and in some general information about your organization... Any information which you could provide me with is greatly appreciated... thanks ari ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ari Y. Benbasat | What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, Pigsfly(a)unixg.ubc.ca | how infinite in faculty, in form and moving how Engineering Physics UBC | express and admirable, in action how like an angel, Court Jester in Training | in apprehension how like a god! ERTW | - Hamlet II ii 305-8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Finger for World Wide Web Homepage URL and PGP 2.6 Public Key. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Ecash beta test
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 PM 8/14/94 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >I assume we all signed up for the e$ beta test. Has anyone received a reply >yet? heh- eh. maybe he's only gonna use Real Players, not us lowly enthusiasts and wannabes. Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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No Subject
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have noticed something... Soda's remailer has the IRRITATING feature of putting shit like bombing buildings, drugs, et al at the bottom of anon posts/mail. If an anon user is found, then he or she can get into some deep trouble not by way of his posts, but by way of Soda's text. I wish they had an option to turn that off. :( ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 8 lines: :: Response-Key: the-clipper-key ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%ER&2?(E<U9BY9>FM47+YB;N!KCVBZ*?%]&G%@*BG(UF+U@^A!7^NX> M]\AX5?P,\*3R!E`X5/N.B&F[D*0CM5[LY%`=Q[@5:63N\9D+)>FAC5Y`4M\9 $:]I)O``` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Seeking Clipper/Telephone Cost Estimates
by hanson＠hss.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been invited to revise my 3700 word article "Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?" (which appeared in the CPSR Sourcebook on Cryptography, July 1993) into a 2000 word Viewpoint article in CACM (the Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery), to appear as soon as I'm ready. As a first year grad student, I haven't been keeping much track of Clipper & Digital-Telephony stuff, and am now struggling to catch up. If any cypherpunks could help, I'd be appreciative. For example, my paper last year included the sentence The current government contractor claims it will offer the wiretap chips for about $26 each in lots of 10,000 [2], over twice the $10 each a competing private developer claims it would charge [11] for a chip with comparable functionality, minus wiretap support. as part of an attempt to estimate the direct costs imposed by the "clipper" chip. I recall seeing that they are now offering these wiretap chips for $15 each, but can't seem to find the source for that. I'm also told the clipper chips are big VSLI chips, and too big to fit into cellular phones which are the main current potential market for encryption chips. Can anyone offer more technically savvy and up to date estimates of any of the added costs such wiretap chips impose over other encryption chips? The current Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony Bill appears on the surface to be a big step in the direction of this proposal from my paper: Regarding phone company support for wiretaps, it seems clear that if wiretaps are in fact cost-effective, there must be some price per wiretap so that police would be willing to pay for wiretaps, and phone companies would be willing to support them. As long as the current law requiring police to pay phone company "expenses" is interpreted liberally enough, the market should provide wiretaps, if they are valuable. But there are big differences in reality. In this new bill, 1) the money to pay phone companies comes out of a different pot, so police in the field can't really make tradeoffs between paying more for wiretaps vs. more for other forms of investigation, and 2) instead of a volentary transaction to ensure that costs are more than benefits, "costs" reimbursed are estimated by some unclear legal process. What do folks think of the following analogy? We don't object to police being able to pay willing informants, but we would certainly object to requiring everyone to be an informant, even if we were paid court-determined "costs" for our efforts. Of better yet, consider that we don't require companies that make guns, cars, or computers to sell to the police at some court-determined "cost". Robin Hanson hanson(a)hss.caltech.edu 818-683-9153 2433 Oswego St., Pasadena, CA 91107 FAX: 818-405-9841 818-395-4093 Div. Hum. & Soc. Sci. 228-77 Caltech, Pasadena, CA 91125

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Tommy Tag Lines
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 14 Aug 1994, Tommy the Tourist wrote: > Soda's remailer has the IRRITATING feature of putting shit like > bombing buildings, drugs, et al at the bottom of anon posts/mail. > That is to intentionaly trip NSA programs what look for particular words and weed out the amount of work actual agents have to sort through for Internet intelegence work. The intent is to make them less effective. there was some suggestion in some security group to compile a list of potential words the NSA would look for and have everyone take 7-8 and put them in your sig file and have EVERY one of your posts have to be sorted through exponetialy increasing the ammount of work NSA agents have to do manually. > If an anon user is found, then he or she can get into some deep > trouble not by way of his posts, but by way of Soda's text. I think it's pretty clear that they are apended to the end of the post and are nothing to do with the anon-poster; like at the end it says: please don't throw knives. ----- end transmission FBI Iran Iraq Nuclear North Korea NSA Pakistan PGP PLO TNT ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 8 lines: :: Response-Key: the-clipper-key ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```%E^&2?(E<U9BPG1]W7L'=FKH_PCWGTI51X:SR3Z5/`U_68V(^,ZOM-+ M(LG/F+A!R=C$:>/X$3CAA.:G<H2CI6*/H_3E+&^NZ$L19^:%SA;7_`X_7%*D $$.;&L``` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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MD5?
by Michael Handler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is anyone out there working with MD5 for any application? I was recoding it for VoicePGP when I ran into a bizarre bug. If you've coded/played with coding MD5, please mail me, 'cause for the life of me I can't figure this one out. PS What happened to the list? ------------------------------------------------------------------ ------ Michael Brandt Handler -- Philadelphia, PA -- <grendel(a)netaxs.com> \bi/ PGP v2.6 public key available -- 1984: We're Behind Schedule \/

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Will pay nexusbucks for reliability testing of remailers
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will pay nexusbucks for reports on remailer reliability in terms of lossage. (I.e. 15 messages sent through remailer X on this day, 14 messages returned withint 3 days) Umm.. 16 NexusBucks per two weeks, for a remailer report every week, listing every remailer using the :: and Anon-To commands which support pgp. The listing should be in an easily-parseable format. Mail me if you are interested. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-841-0909 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Re: Tommy Tag Lines
by Ben Goren 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 14 Aug 1994, Tommy the Tourist wrote: > On Sun, 14 Aug 1994, Tommy the Tourist wrote: > > Soda's remailer has the IRRITATING feature of putting shit like > > bombing buildings, drugs, et al at the bottom of anon posts/mail. > > That is to intentionaly trip NSA programs what look for particular words > and weed out the amount of work actual agents have to sort through for > Internet intelegence work. > [. . .] > ----- > end transmission > FBI Iran Iraq Nuclear North Korea NSA Pakistan PGP PLO TNT Remember that note that Bruce Schneier sent some time ago about the software the NSA was willing to make available for a price? The NSA is more than capable enough to ignore NSA fodder, I would think. If you want to write something that'll get looked at by a human, you'll have to write the kind of thing that's likely to make you the target of an investigation: "Tim, the supplier screwed up--the .5 Kg Pu shipment ain't gonna happen. Though I guess you know that from reading the papers. I think I can find some from Sergei's friend, but he's getting worried that Mossad might be onto him. Found a sweed deal on 50 mg of *very* high grade U235. Too bad we can't use it with our detonator." Don't expect people to do that in numbers. Besides, what terrorist savvy enough to use the 'net is going to be ignorant of PGP? Or not be paranoid enough to find out about it? b& -- Ben.Goren(a)asu.edu, Arizona State University School of Music net.proselytizing (write for info): The battle is over; Clipper is dead. But the war against Government Access to Keys (GAK) goes on. Finger ben(a)tux.music.asu.edu for PGP 2.6 public key ID 0xCFF23BD5.

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