December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SynData/Schneier Attack Network Associates
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Right to Privacy for Sale in Cyberspace; SynData Technologies Inc. Speaks Out Against Key Recovery Cedar Grove, N.J. -- SynData Technologies Inc., a provider of encryption software solutions, released a statement today condemning Network Associates Inc. for supporting the government's key recovery program. Network Associates recently purchased Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGP had historically been opposed to key recovery. "It is time to seriously consider the threat that Network Associates poses to the individual's constitutional right to privacy," said David Romanoff, CEO of SynData Technologies Inc. "While Network Associates claims to protect privacy in cyberspace, they have actually traded our right to privacy for a shot at increased revenues overseas by supporting the key recovery program. The slippery slope has begun right under our noses. It's time to challenge both the government and companies who support the government's key recovery program before it is too late." "The government's key recovery program is a complete violation of the individual's right to privacy and, in fact, compromises of the system are already taking place. This shows that key escrow is an untenable policy," said Bruce Schneier, one of the world's leading authorities on encryption and author of the book "Applied Cryptography". "SynData is paving the way for other software developers by taking a stand in opposition to the government and companies like Network Associates."

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Re: Security of Encrypted Magic Folders
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sounds like a crock. See the Snake-Oil FAQ. This (mis)information is so full of nonsense I wouldn't touch the product with rubber gloves. At 07:51 PM 12/4/97 -0800, Alex Woolfson wrote: > >Hello, all! Back reading the list after a long hiatus. Glad it's still as >good as ever. Anyway, thought I'd appeal to the collective brain trust as >this question is over my head. Please "cc" me directly since I'm on the >filtered cypherpunk list. > >I just downloaded Encrypted Magic Folders--a program that hides Windows 95 >folders and then encrypts them to prevent a disk utility from revealing >their content. In their help file, they try to answer the question "How >Secure is it?"--and, of course, they say *very*, but I can't tell if this is >so or if they're just blowing smoke. Particularly, their claim that key >size doesn't matter. (My mom taught me size always matters... ) If >someone with a stronger cryptography background than me could take a look at >this and let me know, I would greatly appreciate it. > >Thanks! > >Alex > > >* How Secure is it? > > EMF's encryption offers good protection and excellent speed. It > hasn't been broken yet. It is, as far as we know, exportable. THERE > IS NO BACKDOOR. Should you forget your password there is nothing we > can do to decrypt your encrypted files. > > Quite a few people ask us how big EMF's key size is. They've learned > from other encryption programs that the bigger the key the stronger > the encryption. This really doesn't apply to EMF. > > We developed our own encryption instead of using a standard because > we wanted EMF to be able to decrypt at the byte level. In this way > we only need to decrypt/encrypt the data your programs require and > not the entire file. > > In theory, because we decrypt at the byte level, the biggest key we > could use would be 8 bits - which is a joke. So instead of > decrypting every hunk of data using the same key, as most other > encryption programs do, we developed an algorithm to vary the key > based on the data's location within the file. In this way we get > both high security and high speed. We are trying to patent EMF's > encryption method. > > Having said all that, truth is, most encryption isn't "cracked" by > breaking the algorithm, it's done by guessing the password. Brute > guessing of passwords tends to level the playing field tremendously. > We actually have an advantage because we aren't an established > standard. Because we're small and relatively obscure chances are no > one will take the effort to write a password guessing program (which > incidentally would violate copyright and intellectual property laws.) > Even if someone were to go thru all this effort we could easily > change the encryption method for the next update. > > If we used an established encryption method like DES or Blowfish then > your files would probably have to be fully decrypted when opened, > would exist on disk as unencrypted while you're using them, and then > would need to be encrypted when closed. This has multiple > disadvantages. First, if your computer shuts down while you have > "encrypted" files open, then those files would be unencrypted. This > doesn't happen with EMF as your encrypted files are always encrypted > as stored on disk. The second disadvantage is that it slows things > down tremendously. As an example, let's say you retrieve your email > and your email program needs to add today's message to the end of > your 3MB email file. If we used a standard encryption method > requiring the decryption of the file before use then the entire 3 MB > file would have to be decrypted, your 300 byte message added to the > end and then the entire file encrypted again. With EMF, no > decryption would need to take place, and the only data needing > encryption would be the 300 byte message. MUCH faster. Around > 20,000 times faster in this example! > > If you still think you'd like to see us use a standard encryption > method like DES or Blowfish, or have any other suggestions, let us > know and we will consider your input in future updates > > >

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > X-No-Archive: yes > :This puts all other claimed forgeries from a mail2news gateway, that you > :have taken an issue with, and used as a basis to form your claims against > :UCE-baiting, and such, as suspect. > > > Sure it does in your mind and I'm sure in the mind of the anon-asshole. Call someone an "asshole" all you like, but when you have to qualify that and call him a "black asshole", "gay asshole", "Jewish asshole", or "anon asshole", it only demonstrates your personal prejudice and bigotry. Your arguments are so weak that you must resort to ad hominem argumentation to divert attention from the facts. Repeating your unproven accusations over and over does not make them true. > All of that aside, the point is it has stopped since the remailers blocked the > address. Note btw, that the anon asshole is still claiming databasix does > this and databasix does that and yet databasix hasn't been connected to the > net since august. Are you claiming that all the DataBasix personnel no longer have access to the Internet simply because the databasix.com domain is down? Considering how lax Netcom is with their servers, any abuse you might allege could easily have come from someone with a Netcom account. You might as well reconnect databasix.com to the net because having it down is not a credible alibi -- not when most of the players involved have Netcom accounts, and a few even have shell accounts from which they could have run Perl scripts. > The issue now is as it was then. An asshole, posting anonymously, apparently > in an attempt to cause troubles for remailers at my expense is still at it. > > He OBVIOUSLY wants remailers shut down. I obviously don't. Your cute little conspiracy theory does not exactly square with the account of one of the remailer operators that you along with fellow DataBasix staffers Belinda Bryan and William J. McClatchie (aka "Wotan") harassed. Reread his message exposing your anti-remailer activities: http://infinity.nus.sg/cypherpunks/dir.archive-97.11.13-97.11.19/0432.html > End of story as far as I am concerned. Not as long as you want to keep it alive by claiming that you are a "victim" of some grand forgery, "UCE-baiting", "cyber stalking" scheme. Sam is right in doubting your claims that most of the things you allege happened to you even occurred. He pointed out that the one flimsy piece of evidence you've been able to produce more recently than February of 1997 originated from YOUR OWN DOMAIN! --

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Superdistribution development/release
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yet Another Watermark... Anyone wanna take bets on how long before it's broken, or at least easily pirated? Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text From: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> To: "dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu" <dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu> Cc: "Peter Cassidy" <pcassidy(a)triarche.com>, "Brad Cox" <bcox(a)gmu.edu> Date: Thu, 04 Dec 97 12:58:05 +1300 Priority: Normal MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Superdistribution development/release Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: "Blair Anderson" <blair(a)technologist.com> Silver Bullet for Digital Publishing Arrives TragoeS Announces General Availability of RigthsMarket(TM) PR Newswire - December 02, 1997 16:10 TRGO. %ENT %MLM V%PRN P%PRN CALGARY, Dec. 2 /CNW-PRN/ - RightsMarket hits the bull's-eye business opportunity of the 21st century - electronic commerce through digital publishing on the Internet for the $71.3 billion (US) publishing industry (Value-Line, April 11/May 20/May 30, 1997). ``RightsMarket harnesses powerful economic forces that will show people the money in digital document publishing on the Internet,'' stated Lindsay Moir, President of TragoeS Inc., during the company's news conference November 18th at COMDEX `97, Las Vegas. ``With RightsMarket suppliers of digital documents will be paid and 99% of the revenue loss due to piracy will be eliminated.'' TragoeS has successfully implemented the Superdistribution paradigm in RightsMarket. Superdistribution tracks usage rather than possession and is recognised as the best approach to selling digital property (digital versions of text, data, knowledge, pictures, music, videos, etc.) on the Internet. Pricing of RightsMarket is $50,000 (US) plus integration, support fees, and annual license renewal fees. Unique RightsMarket features include: Persistent Cryptographic Wrappers (RightsWrapper) - No matter where the digital document (financial newsletter, educational test, minutes from a court proceeding, sensitive health care records, etc.) goes, no matter how it gets there, whether it is used and then subsequently redistributed, etc. the document is always encrypted. It is never left decrypted and exposed even while it is being viewed. Rights Marketing `back office' (RightsServer) - Allows marketers to set the terms and conditions of use for the digital property. Features include support for the newly announced international Digital Object Identifier (DOI) publishing standard. Fault Tolerant Middleware (RightsConnection) - Provides a secure link to the `back office' from the user's desktop. As well, there is no requirement to be connected full time to the Internet in order to view the digital document. Metering and Enforcement (RightsClient) - Provides decryption services, meters use, and sends usage information to the RightsServer via secure middleware. Acrobat(TM) Trusted Tool plug-ins - Makes Acrobat, the world's most popular digital publishing tool from Adobe Systems Incorporated(C), ready for prime time digital document economic transactions on the Internet. With a plug-in for the Exchange and Reader, customers can encrypt documents and have a trusted player for viewing content. Shane Hayes, TragoeS' Vice President, Customer Implementation will be presenting at The Digital Object Identifier (DOI) Technology Forum Wednesday, December 10, 1997 in New York City. The DOI is an important emerging international standard for identification of published material online. It forms the foundation layer of a set of technologies that will enable commerce in published material on the Internet so that copyright is protected, content creators can be compensated for their work, and consumers can benefit from technology that is sophisticated, yet seamless and easy to use. The International DOI Foundation (IDF), a non-profit organization established to administer the DOI standard, is looking to technology vendors to implement the necessary technology components and integrate them into secure electronic publishing solutions for the IDF's constituency: the worldwide publishing industry and beyond. In April 1998 in Washington, DC, TragoeS Inc. will participate in a three day conference sponsored by the Library of Congress, the Association of American Publishers (AAP), and the University of Virginia. The conference is titled ``Exploring the New Media - The Paradigm Shift in Publishing: >From Book to Bytes''. TragoeS Vice President, Marketing and Sales, Fred Yee, will sit on a panel discussing `Solutions to Copyright Protection in Cyberspace'. TragoeS Inc., established in 1993, is a Canadian high technology company specializing in software products and services that support financial transactions. Its product, RightsMarket is the solution for the protection, metering and payment of digital intellectual property. TragoeS is a public company reporting in Alberta and Ontario and is listed on the Canadian Dealing Network (CDN TRGO). The Canadian Dealing Network or other regulatory authorities have neither approved nor disapproved of the information contained herein. SOURCE: TragoeS Inc. /CONTACT: Lindsay Moir, President, TragoeS Inc., (403) 571-1835, Fax: (403) 571-1838, Email: moirl(at)tragoes.com, Website: www.tragoes.com, www.rightsmarket.com or Mr. Peter Taylor, Investor Relations, (416) 368-0121, Fax: (416) 368-9175/ (TRGO.) Blair Anderson (Blair(a)technologist.com) International Consultant in Electronic Commerce, Encryption and Electronic Rights Management "Techno Junk and Grey Matter" (HTTP://WWW.NOW.CO.NZ [moving servers, currently inactive]) 50 Wainoni Road, Christchurch, New Zealand phone 64 3 3894065 fax 64 3 3894065 Member Digital Commerce Society of Boston ---------------------------- Caught in the Net for 25 years ---------------------------- For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: 'Off' the parking pigs! (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Wed, 03 Dec 1997 14:56:10 -0600 > From: TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> > Subject: Re: 'Off' the parking pigs! > In the jury's humble opinion, the prosecution didn't prove its case. > This is no problem for the government. They have the deep pockets > required to prosecute as many times as needed to refine their attempts > to manipulate the minds of the jurors, or to get lucky and have a few > members of a split jury vote to convict because they don't want to > blow their trip to the Stones' concert. No the police only get one shot. If they try to prosecute the individual on the same charge *after* a jury has rendered a verdict then that is double jeopardy. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Please Beta test my communications cryptography product.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- I have produced a program that, like PGP, provides digital signatures and communications encryption. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/Kong.htm This is the first beta. Please beta test this product. The important difference between it and other products that provide digital signatures and encryption is that it is not certificate based. Instead it is signature based. This eliminates the steep initial learning and management curves of existing products. The user does not need use and manage specialized certificates except for specialized purposes The big complexity and user hostility in existing products is creating and managing certificates. Perhaps more importantly, it also eliminates the threat we saw in England, the threat of the government giving itself a monopoly in certificate distribution, potentially creating the Number-Of-The-Beast system, where you need a government certificate to log on to dirty picture sites, to buy, to sell, to put up web pages. The key feature of the proposed product is that any digitally signed document can be stored in the database, and itself performs the functions of a certificate, just as a normal handwritten signature does. The user usually does not need to check a document against a certificate to see if it was signed by the "real" John Doe. Instead he normally checks one document against another to see if they were both signed by the same John Doe. And similarly when he encrypts a document, he does not need to use a certificate to encrypt a message to the one real John Doe, he merely encrypts a message to the same John Doe who signed the letter he is replying to. At present people have to deal with certificate management problems regardless of whether they really need certificates. For example the most common usage of PGP is to check that two signatures that purport to be by the same person are in fact by the same person. Unfortunately you cannot check one signature against another directly using PGP or any of the other existing products. Instead you have to check both signatures against a public key certificate, even if the authentication information in that certificate is irrelevant to your purpose, which it usually is, which means that you have to download the certificate from somewhere, and the person signing it had to upload it somewhere. As PGP always checks a document against the certificate, rather than against any other document the user happens to feel is relevant to the question, the person signing the document needs to get his certificate properly signed by some widely trusted third party, which is too much trouble or too complicated for many people. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG z8/j/L3kF7oCmOp/iF2oh/pwgP/mATjOTUdv1uGy DlPh9Op11Z1CtFuByebVsk8yJo4WuUMuFk4S/TMp --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/

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free ACM publications
by VaX#n8 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks readers may be interested in the ACM digital library, which is open free to the public until the end of this year, at which it becomes a rather expensive members-only luxury. Many complete articles are available online in PDF format. Reviews and abstracts will remain free. A search for "encryption", "cryptanalysis" or "cryptography" in the title and abstract reveals some interesting papers. As usual, use but don't abuse; I don't want to regret telling everyone about this, particularly since I haven't started reading yet myself. Information wants to be free: http://www.acm.org/dl -- VaX#n8, Junglist

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Smartcard demo canceled
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I won't be able to make it to tomorrow's meeting. Therefore, my smart card demo has been canceled. Sorry about that, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

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Re: Whoever thinks the "word" is censored, post the 'word' fool
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :My only guess is that the posting person thinks that Replay censors more > :than one word, and that giveing the word away would tell Replay which > :filter to lift. If I had found something like that, I'd pass the info > :around privately to a bunch of friends first, and make sure that I was not > :the only one expereienceing the prob. > > Some have asked him to email it privately as well, seems he's not done that > either. I'm curious -- how would you know whether he's done so or not? I don't recall you making that invitation to him. Do you even accept incoming e-mail from remailers? > :Or, he could just be trolling. :) > > Doubt it. It really sounds like he believes the word is being censored. Maybe it's time for Alex to join this thread and either say "no, we don't filter on any words at the Replay remailer", or else "yes, here's a list of the words we consider to be objectionable, so please omit them from your posts through the Replay remailer". I'm half expecting that his posts aren't showing up either because he's screwed something up in the message to the remailer (like misspelling the word "Newsgroups" in the header, for example), because the posting gateway is flaky, or because some Net Nazi has taken it upon himself to indiscriminately forge cancels to posts he doesn't like. But some definitive word, one way or the other, would go a long way towards clarifying this situation. I see no rational reason for covertly blocking posts based on content. *IF* he didn't want something posted, then an announcement that the Replay remailer rejects posts containing certain words or phrases would make life simpler for all concerned. And to whoever created the subject line for this message, I'm tempted to either post the word "fool", or say that it's a lousy "Mr. T" impression. :)

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"24 hour cybercops"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> Subject: SNET: Re: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:59:23 -0900 - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List It has been said that it takes a thief to catch one. Ergo, it must take a murderer to catch one. In both cases Janet Reno fits right into this program described below. H. Ayre - ---------- > From: Das GOAT <DasGOAT(a)aol.com> > To: CTRL(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > Subject: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 > Date: Friday, December 12, 1997 2:54 AM > > HIGH TECH COPS TO PROWL THE NET 24 HRS A DAY > > by Marcia Stepanek, Examiner Washington Bureau > San Francisco Examiner, Dec 11, 1997 > > WASHINGTON -- Top law-enforcement officials from the world's industrial > powers have announced plans to field cyber-SWAT teams to help catch criminals > who use the Internet and other computer technology to commit crimes. > <snip> > At the heart of the pact is a plan in which law enforcement officers with > computer expertise will be available 24 hours a day to assist investigations > of Internet crimes ranging from child pornography to fraud and money > laundering. > In addition, the nations [including the US, under Janet Reno] agreed to > form special police units to track Internet crime and criminals. > They also agreed to review police staffing levels to ensure that law > enforcement is adequately equipped to detect, prevent and punish computer > crimes. > US Attorney General Janet Reno initiated the meeting on computer crime, > the first-ever international gathering of justice ministers from the so-called > G-8 nations, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, germany, France, > italy, Japan and Russia. > > To subsribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SUBSCIBE CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > Om - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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