December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the "Great Society". I *love* this list. Absolutely love it. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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PGP as disinformation
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sergey Goldgaber wrote: >This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity. >The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves >great popularity. Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers >will help make this solution more effective. > Has this list not considered the very real possibility that PGP is itself a rogue program released by the intelligence apparatus to detour we cyberpunks? As I have been arguing, the obvious is often false. While certain statists on this list are arguing in vain that I lack expertise in cryptographic matters, the truth is apposite this. Ask not for whom Bell toils, Dr. Roberts -- --

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:55 PM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it >makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, >whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest >welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative >act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration >camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > >Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that >is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take >what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > >In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal >freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist >Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from >productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which >in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People >who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the >"Great Society". Which is yet another of the many reasons I can espouse an "extreme" solution to the problem, but one that I can honestly claim to not consider "extreme" at all! The way I see it, the lives of these thugs are not sufficiently valuable to lose sleep over their loss, when to keep them around means the kinds of abuse society has suffered for many generations. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert Hettinga wrote: > At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. > Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the > two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. > Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it > makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, > whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest > welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative > act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration > camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that > is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take > what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal > freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist > Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from > productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which > in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People > who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the > "Great Society". Bob, It humbles me to realize that I had completely overlooked this example of the evil forces lurking in the background (and under the bed) being involved in the duplicity of even using the bleeding heart liberals to imprison and slowly bleed us of both our wealth and our freedom. If you wish to devote more of your time to exposing these types of dark undercurrents to those on the CypherPunks list, then Dale and I would be more than happy to run the eca$h lists for a while, to free up your time. (What are friends for, eh?) -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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No Subject
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise's abysmal grammar, atrocious spelling and feeble responses clearly identify him as a product of the American education system. ___ ./_ -\. q| o O |p -oOOO--~U~--OOOo- Timmy C[rook] Mayonnaise

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I want to see your paper " A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices".
by Yu-Hyun Kim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sir, Would you send me the full paper "A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices"? Yu-Hyun Kim yhkim(a)dingo.etri.re.kr

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INFO: Pro-CODE hearing (photo, audio, & text) available online!
by Shabbir Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================================================== _ _ __| | ___ _ __ ___ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ ___| |_ / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __| | (_| | __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | | __/ |_ \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_| \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__| |___/ Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet _________________________________________________________________________ Update No.2 http://democracy.net/ March 20, 1997 _________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing - Upcoming Events - Volunteering for democracy.net - About democracy.net ___________________________________________________________________________ DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March 19th, 1997. Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts. The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377, the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user community. Some statistics from the event. * 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the event. * 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio throughout the 3 hour event. The actual Senate hearing room (Russell 253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing). * Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing. The audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy groups, and Congressional staff. * Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker. The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21. Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond, Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for their help and support of this effort. Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/ democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit http://democracy.net/about/ for more details. ______________________________________________________________________________ UPCOMING EVENTS * April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus * April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet Policy issues. * Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list. democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues. ____________________________________________________________________________ VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the hearing. If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the results to webmaster(a)democracy.net. To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page. Please note the following beginning and ending times: -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and, -whenever a question and answer section begins. Mail them to us at webmaster(a)democracy.net with the start and stop times of each section. Thanks! ____________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive, PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet. More information about the project can be found at http://democracy.net/about/ To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit http://democracy.net/ _____________________________________________________________________________ end Update No.2 03.20.97 =============================================================================

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Re: BXA on Crypto Plans
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:42:22 -0500 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: BXA on Crypto Plans > Reply-to: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Excerpt of BXA head William Reinsch statement on Goodlatte's > SAFEncryption Bill HR 695 on March 20, 1997: > > [...] > To that end, > we will shortly submit legislation intended to do the following: > > Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose any > type or strength of encryption. > > Explicitly state that participation in the key management > infrastructure is voluntary. > I think we should ponder the validity of the underlying assumption here - that there will be *one* PKI system, and (speculating here) (i) the government sets what it's requirements are, and (ii) they will include compromising one's private keys. > > Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business > of providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to > obtain government recognition, allowing them to market the > trustworthiness implied by government approval. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This is a joke, right? Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Disclaimer: I do not represent my employer.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 24 Mar 97 6:48:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net --###*+***## 18:54 100.00% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #####+***### 1:55 99.99% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #########+# 3:23 99.94% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+*++*+++-++ 23:55 99.92% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +*++++++++++ 35:54 99.91% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----_-.----- 5:07:09 99.89% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 2:47:00 99.89% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + - +++*+*** 35:59 99.69% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* #+#*#*+## 16:00 99.61% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++.+ ++ +++ 44:28 99.26% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*_ -**-** 4:29:56 99.15% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** **** * ** 21:53 99.05% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 4:36:01 98.56% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net * - +-+ 44:40 97.15% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com _ _. +- 51:47:04 88.89% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -_..- . 21:51:10 65.36% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++-+*+++ 35:43 46.02% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++ 52:19 26.11% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Security of SSL proxies
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann) writes: > A number of vendors are now selling SSL proxies which implement secure > tunnelling for web browsers using a non-crippled SSL implementation running on > the client machine. Has anyone considered the total security level provided > by one of these systems? I can see three problems with this approach: > > 1. The security stops a few feet short of the browser, making a MITM attack > possible (see below). > > 2. Security and authentication is handled by the proxy and not the browser. > This means that the browser (and browser user) never get to see the usual > indicators that their connection is secure (or "secure" for non-US users). > > 3. If you use a proxy like this to protect traffic for an entire company, the > proxy provides the same type of target as a GAK key center: An attack which > compromises this compromises security for the entire company. [problems with this approach deleted] > Peter. I'm a little confused by your use of the term 'SSL proxy'. Netscape defined an extension to HTTP to allow SSL traffic through a firewall: the encrypted request is prepended (in clear) with the actual destination IP address and port. The firewall proxy then opens a TCP/IP channel to the actual destination/port, and blindly relays packets between the actual destination and the browser until one side or the other shuts down the link. The proxy does no encryption or decryption - in fact, it requires no crypto code at all. (BTW: this what setting the 'security proxy' field in Netscape is all about). The scheme has some drawbacks - there is no provision for chaining proxies. - the server can't determine the source browser's IP - it only sees the proxy's IP address. This makes it more difficult to filter requests based on source ID. - the proxy has no idea of the actual URL requested - proxies which want to filter or log requests based on URL can't do so. Or are you talking about something entirely different? Peter Trei (yes, I've implemented the above) trei(a)process.com

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