December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Modified Token Posting Scheme
by ed.falk＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How about this simple policy scheme: 1) posts from known list members forwarded to list automatically 2) posts with "approval cookie" also forwarded automatically 3) otherwise, forwarded only after approval by moderator, whose charter only permits spam filtering. People who don't want to use their own name in a post, and also don't want to be bothered with creating a cookie are the only ones whose posts are delayed.

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Re: Sandy and I will run a cypherpunks "moderation" experim
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 6 Jan 97 at 1:21, Dale Thorn wrote: > Ross Wright wrote: > > On or About 5 Jan 97 at 22:38, Black Unicorn wrote: > > > Excellent until the flames list is eliminated. > > > Yes I want to read this list, flames and all. I guess I'm just > > used to it by now. I don't filter it myself (except manually) so > > I don't want to trust someone I don't know to do it. > > Just one other thing, Ross. Don't assume that the stated purpose > and the real purpose are one and the same. Shit, I learned that in the service of my great country. Who's sig-line talks about liberty being taken away little bits at a time? As I said before freedom of speech has a price other than the blood of patriots. That price is the tolerance of IDEAS! Any fucking ideas that happen to come the fuck up!!!!! I'm gonna tolerate who-the-hell-ever I want to! There are not any grey areas when it comes to free speech. You censor one because of bad manners or downright bad taste, then you censor all. And fuck all you guys who *plonked* me over my last flame war with T.M., cause you just missed a great post! (I learned that in film school: you have to like your own work). So my question is: is there going to be a maximum number of times I can say fuck in a good post? Like a 3-fuck limit? Or will you take out the magic marker and draw through them? Ross

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Crytpo IMPORTATION rules
by Remy NONNENMACHER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone point me on some ressources about rules for IMPORTING crypto code in US and rules on USING crypto in the US ? (keys len, authorizations needed, etc....). What i search is what i can and can't do. (Context is a private company, using private lines worldwide). TIA.

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Spam Trading
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone is unhappy with the spam they receive on CypherPunks, I am willing to trade some of my spam from other conferences. Send Me: 1 "Jimmy Gilmore is a cocksucker." I Will Send You: 1,000 "Merry Xmas" Send Me: 1 "Timmy May is a cocksucker." I Will Send You: 1,000 "Happy New Year" Send Me: 1 "Help! I ran that file from fuck(a)yourself.up" I Will Send You: 1,000 "Welcome to the Conference" Send Me: 1 "unsribrive" I Will Send You: 1,000 "Sorry You're Leaving" I can only offer you these amazing deals because one of the conferences I subscribe to is OCD-L (Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder List). No need to 'ACT NOW', I'll have plenty of "Merry Xmas" and "Happy New Years" messages continuing to trickle in from the Procrasinators Support list.

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TCM_log
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NYT reports on Net spying, and cites 527 Tim May postings to 32 groups. The "highly regarded privacy and cryptography advocate was less shocked than bemused" by the log. Cypherpunks is named as logged by god's eye. ----- TCM_log

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Re: High-tech tracking by police raises legal outcry
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On prohibitions against surveillance countermeasures: Here's a provocative distinction in "compromising emanations" (TEMPEST) from the Commerce Control List of the EAR: "List of Items Controlled 5A002.d Equipment designed or modified to suppress the compromising emanations of information-bearing signals; Note: 5A002.d does not control equipment specially designed to suppress emanations for reasons of health and safety." Wonder how much dangerous EMR the regs allow to keep the snoops happy. Reminds me of the brain-cancer-crypto NSA imposed on cellular phone intentional radiators.

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Re: John Gilmore, 58, dead of AIDS
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 5 Jan 1997, Paul Pomes wrote: > |Somebody said it was a lie, but has anybody really SEEN this queer lately? > > Why do you care so much about Mr Gilmore's sexual orientation? Could there > be some internal conflict about your own that you'd like to share with us? > It would make a nice change from your usual rantings. > We care about his sexual orientation because it supports the proposition that MOST of the problem people currently on UseNet are "confirmed" homosexuals. Here is a list of three of the biggest problem people, and they are ALL problem people. J.D. Falk Peter Berger John Gilmore Of course, tale and Chris lewis have not been confirmed as homosexuals, so the percentage of "homos per.problem humanoids" will decline. > /pbp > -- > Fire mission ... battery one round ... rifle company in the open. Fire for > effect. (6 105mm rounds later) Add four hundred, left two hundred, > battalion six rounds. Fire for effect. > -- Lt Allen Bell, Chorwan Valley, Korea 1951 > > Nonetheless, the inordinately high percentage of homosexuals in the newsgroup administration is probably explained by the same social factors as the extremely high number of jews in the medical and legal professions and the high number of blacks in sports.

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SPI_nRx
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

01-04-97: "Commerce Official Sees Little Chance of Encryption Bill" Reinsch said it's unlikely Congress will pass legislation to change new encryption export policy. He defended new export policy and said that Supreme Court ultimately will decide constitutionality of regulations. And another spin on DoD's defensive IW. ----- SPI_nRx

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 6 Jan 97 6:49:24 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++++++++ 1:06:21 99.99% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #*####***#*# :44 99.98% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++-++++++* 36:39 99.95% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com -----------+ 2:15:55 99.95% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++++++* 49:01 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ** +****+*** 3:49 99.93% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +++++++++++ 1:07:31 99.93% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #** *# #**#* :50 99.76% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net **+++*+++*+ 29:19 99.75% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#+#+*#+ ### 1:23 99.69% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com .-*+-+-+_.- 14:53:49 99.51% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .- _-------+ 6:37:01 99.49% replay remailer(a)replay.com -** +.-*+* * 1:16:47 99.13% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ----+- - --* 3:03:51 97.27% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -- ------- 5:42:33 96.37% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Double crypt strength
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am curious as to the strength of Un*x crypt when used upon itself. I was thinking of was to obfuscate passwords and a few came to mind (obviously not original): 1. Use a hashed passphrase. 2. Encrypt your original password and then used that as your password. (Or triple, quadruple, ad inifinitum...) Re #1: I know that a good hash will take a pass phrase and reduce it to a statistically random sequence. I'm not intending to use the hash for verfication, but for two reasons: 1. Get a nice random jumble 2. Come out with something shorter than I came in with. Re #2: This I thought might help spoil a dictionary attack. Granted, if the attacker knows that you are doing this, it only adds one step in his process, but if he doesn't it turns his attack into plain brute force. Plus, for Un*x users, it's right there on the command line and only adds a few seconds to the entire procees of changing passwords. The added benefit with both of these is that the user does not have to remember some cryptic string, but can remember his normal password/phrase. By this, it is obviously not a commercial-use scheme, but one for individual users. (If everyone used the same algorithm, it'd be kinda pointless, right?) So with everyone (hashing down/reencrypting) their (passphrases/passwords) with different algorithms, all attacks are reduced to brute force. Either that, or the attacker has to figure out what algorithm the user used, still making a dictionary attack that much harder. So what are the comments on a system like this? Obviously, they are not original ideas, but I would like to know what has been said about them. Rick Osborne / osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com / Northrop Grumman Corporation ------------------------------------------------------------------------- What the hell, it's only 4 month's grant - I can live in a cardboard box, and catch pigeons for food. After all, I've got raytracing to do!

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