December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Sovreign Right of Lawful Access
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:11 PM 1/28/97 -0600, Mike McNally wrote: >Somebody wrote: >> >> This morning at the RSA keynote, David Aaron, the US Crypto >> ambassador quoted the "Sovreign Right of Lawful Access" as >> something that goverments were determined to preserve. > >Speaking as a private indiwidual, and not as a drone in the employ >of IBM (don't get me started on the "but wait, key recovery *isn't* >the same as key escrow" hoo-ha), that dude scared the piss out of >me. I think that terminology is odd. They're getting desperate. "Soverign Right of Lawful Access" doesn't state HOW DIFFICULT that "access" is to be. Interpreted broadly, that would outlaw any encryption even if it only impeded that access a tiny bit! Or under an alternative interpretation, the mere fact that it is hypothetically possible to decrypt a message means that nothing (other than mathematical improbability) stands in the way of doing the decrypt. Also, it didn't say SECRET ACCESS, although experience tells us that they (the thugs) probably assume this. I've long pointed out that ordinary search warrants require informing people who are being searched, even if they're not home and assuming the thugs didn't trash the place the way they frequently like to. I see no reason to believe that the advent of telephone technology in the late 1800's should have retroactively re-written the US Constitution to make secret searches okay. Technically, the Bill of Rights prohibits "unreasonable searches and siezures," and doesn't specifically mention the secrecy issue, but since (am I correct in this, Real Lawyers <tm>?) the practice up until that time required people searched to be informed of searches, a change in policy that wiretaps could be secret sounds more like taking advantage of a technological windfall, not "discovering" that the Constitution allowed something that had always before been prohibited. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the >rich/powerful This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. In an attack, they would scatter, but the parents would know that the children would die if a successful action were taken against the tyrant. Also, the tyrant could put an open bounty on anyone caught trying to harm him. Just bring the decapitated head of the assassin along with a VHS cassette of the attempted action for a big reward. By layering the defenses, it becomes increasingly difficult for anyone to get through. Obviously the castles walls are the first line of defense, so a reward is given for anyone caught using any entrance to the fortress except those that are provided. The household is told that their participation will result in the extermination of their families. They are then told that if they know of an impending action and fail to report it or attempt to stop it, they are considered party it those actions. A human shield of innocents is "given the privaledge to live in the fortress with our great leader" so that actions by concerned parties is limited further. A standing bounty is placed on the head of the assassin, who so ever brings in the head of the assassin and all children parented by that person after the assination will be given a reward of some set sum. Probably 110%. A bounty is set on security breaches, this bounty would probably be 110% of the death mark on the tyrant. A series of more conventional boobytraps are layed in normally inaccessable areas, the layers of these either being prisoners who have unknowningly been condemned to die, the tyrant himself, or some other disposable or trustable deployment device. The most common of these would probably be a mine field between the two outer most walls of the fortress, and maybe a funnel-gun parimeter inside of that. An inner sanctum with self contained air, water, and food is maintained for the tyrant and h[is/er] closest relatives/advisors. This sanctum would be accessed by biometrics and only used in a percieved emergency. All dissent is declared illegal with capitol punishment for the mere discussion of the impending death of the tyrant, exceptions to this would be persons in the direct company of the tyrant with the tyrants full awareness, and permission.

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Re: DES challenge status?
by Anil Das 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ben Byer wrote: >=20 > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >=20 > What exactly is the status of RSA's DES contest? I understand that at > least two of the smaller contests have already been cracked, but I > haven't seen much beyond theoretical discussion on the list on the > topic of the DES contest. >=20 =09Two? The only publicized solution so far is the RC5/32/12/5 solution from Ian Goldberg at Berkeley (and independently from Germano Caronni at ETH Z=FCrich). =09Are you saying that you know that the 48 bit RC5 contest is solved already, or are you just counting Ian's and Germano's solutions separately? -- Anil Das

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Best Computer School?
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Rick Osborne <osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com> writes: The only thing I didn't have that the next MIT applicant had was money. I made the mistake of letting them know that I was dirt poor and would need full aid/grants/etc, and to quote "The Great Escape" it was "Zzzt! To the Russian front!" Just to set the record straight, MIT's admissions is need-blind. Lots of things go into our admissions decisions, but whether or not an applicant needs financial aid is not one of them. Admissions and financial aid are handled out of separate offices, and the people making the admissions decisions don't even see the financial aid requests. One exception: We are experimenting with the possibility of considering the amount of aid needed in the case of a few international applicants, but even here this is only a minor consideration for a small number of applicants. For domestic applicants, financial aid plays no role at all in the admissions decision. -- Hal Abelson

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Re: Sovreign Right of Lawful Access
by Mike McNally 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jim bell wrote: > > I see no reason to believe that the advent of telephone technology > in the late 1800's should have retroactively re-written the US > Constitution ... This point, unfortunately, seems to be lost in the woods. At the panel discussions in this conference, so many people used phrases like "... law enforcement doing what they need to do..." on *both* sides of the GAK fence. "Need" to do? Well, they might "need" to do lots of things under their own view of reality, but that doesn't mean it's reasonable to negotiate towards that position. Why is it that just because one party shows up with a wacked-out agenda that the "honorable" thing to do is work towards a consensus solution? -- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Mike McNally -- Egregiously Pointy -- Tivoli Systems, "IBM" -- Austin mailto:m5@tivoli.com mailto:m101@io.com http://www.io.com/~m101 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

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Re: FBI=LIE
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/washpol/fbi-lab.html > Login cypherpunks, password cypherpunks. > WASHINGTON -- For decades the FBI's reputation as a crime-fighting > agency has rested heavily on its high-tech forensic laboratory, which > could solve baffling crimes from a speck of blood, a sliver of paint > or the thinnest filament of human hair. > But an investigation by the Justice Department's inspector > general has put the FBI laboratory, and the way the agency has > used it, under the glare of public scrutiny. The findings, which were > turned over to FBI officials last week, are threatening to shatter the > image of an agency on the cutting edge of scientific sleuthing. The L.A. Times today (Wed) ran an article telling about three top lab people working on the OKC bombing case, and how they were moved or scuttled due to discrepancies. This was a new development. You'll note also that although Fujisaki (sp?) in the 2nd O.J. trial did not permit it to be introduced (to my knowledge), there was evidence that a high-up FBI lab person who testified in the first trial falsified or seriously distorted certain facts to help the prosecution. This may yet be pursued like the Fuhrman thing.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sean Roach wrote: > At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no > >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that > >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the > >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks > >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the > >rich/powerful > This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line > could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body > guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge > that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten > children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. [snippo] In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb?

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aga wrote: > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > aga wrote: > > > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > > > > > But seriously, I was just telling the folks over the weekend, if I > > > > > > had my hand on the button, a lot of people would die very quickly. > > > > > > As in The Day The Earth Stood Still, a single act of aggression would > > > > > > suffice to be immediately terminated. > > > No trial, huh? > > Good question. The law we have right now already assumes that there > > are situations where a criminal will not go peacefully, if at all. > > In some countries (years ago?) such as England, bobbies were known > > to not carry firearms for ordinary street duty. Am I right? But > > here in the USA, that would be unthinkable. > > So my proposal doesn't eliminate the responsibility portion of law > > enforcement. I'd say, if a target were eliminated thru negligence, > > malfeasance, or other wrongdoing under "color of law" or whatever, > > let the courts handle that as they do now. > Just who is doing the eliminating? > > My suggestion would give the law enforcers the ability to dispense > > the first level of justice expeditiously, which they cannot accomplish > > now due to all of the red tape and the corrupt legal system (lawyers > > specialize in getting chronic offenders off, particularly "traffic" > > offenses). By transferring a major portion of the bureaucracy to > > the pencil pushers, we can free up the street cops to do what they > > do best, namely bust or eliminate criminals. > Cops can never be trusted to "dispense justice," and half of the > cops are themselves criminals in what they do. Most cops steal > evidence and lie like crazy in Court. All they want is a conviction, > and it mattters not how it is obtained. All true. But I'm not suggesting the creation of anything new here. Cops already carry guns and kill people. All I'm suggesting is that they be empowered to kill when: 1) The crime is aggression against another person or persons; 2) The evidence is so solid (recorded?) that the officer (who risks being prosecuted if he kills unjustifiably) can carry out the enforcement without undue apprehension; 3) These things are reviewed by the elected representatives of the people, to make sure there's no hanky-panky going on. > > I dare say that the downside of this is much less pleasant than the > > virtual anarchy (in the bad sense) we suffer now. If the police get > > out of control, A.P. will arrive just in time to plug a few of those > > holes, so to speak. Ideally, future robotics should be able to > > provide something like Gort (sp?) to take the place of human officers, > > given advances in the kind of pattern matching needed to deter > > aggression and the like. Those who don't make it past the robots, > > well, the rest of us can learn to behave, and we'll be much better > > off when we do. > > I would trust robots more than humanoids. The Gort (sp?) robot is a perfect example, and I don't think it's all that many years away.

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Re: The Politics of Export Restrictions
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:44 PM 1/29/97 -0800, Rick Hornbeck wrote: >Is it possible the unreasonable crypto export restrictions are simply being >imposed at this time for the purpose of making Al Gore look good when he >runs for President in 2000? I suppose it's plausible, but it's an opportunity open to both candidates, and more plausibly (because of lack of collaboration) to the Republicans - e.g., Dan Quayle and the "Crypto Freedom For Americans" platform, promising to rescue Silicon Valley from those evil regulatory Democrats. If I were an evil politician trying to set up a trick like you suggest, I think I'd want a scheme that my opponent(s) couldn't hijack and use against me. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > "In an interview Tuesday, [David L.] Aaron [the Feds' Crypto Ambassador] disputed the {snip} > "When I talk to other governments," he said, "they still don't feel... ===(mis)quoted, paraphrased, and enhanced from current news reports=== The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Speaking to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco, David Aaron said that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies because of the business disadvantage vis a vis foreign firms. Aaron alleges that U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to allow 'moderately strong' 56-bit encryption, to be exported, under controlled circumstances, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growthe industry" In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." Independent experts strongly disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push for further reform of the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," Burns said in a satellite conference. Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. Germany, Australia, Japan and Canada all are advancing competing cryptography capabilities, according to Rotenberg. Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

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