December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

(Long) RFC: Public Key Finger: A preliminary proposal for a distributed key publishing system
by Geoff Dale 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The original (html) document may be obtained at: http://www.fqa.com/geoff/pkf.htm - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Version 0.2, Draft Public Key Finger (aka the People's Key Front) A preliminary proposal for a distributed key publishing system - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wouldn't it be nice if distributing your public key(s) was as easy as publishing your e-mail address? As a matter of fact, it would be nice if you didn't even have to do anything more than giving out your e-mail address. Keyfinger is a way to make this possible. Requirements: Simplicity Components must be easy to understand, use, integrate, set-up and maintain. Scalability The system must be designed to be distributed and scale to accommodate large users like Netcom and AOL. To this end keyfinger uses the convention of connecting to keys.host.domain.com, allowing the administrator to use various methods to handle request traffic. Flexibility The system should be designed to allow interim solutions and phased deployment. Because of the fact that this system will not be deployed all at once, interim methods will be designed into the protocol. Security Ideally the fetching of keys should be across secure links, signed by the key-server, to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. The individual keys should be self-certifying if signed by a known trusted entity (such as the ISP). Protocol: Client opens a socket connection to host (keys.host.domain.com or host.domain.com or domain.com) on designated port (a default port should be determined). Sends and inquiry string (user(a)host.domain.com) then the Host returns the contents of the .keyplan file. If the connection fails, the client may try to connect using http with a URL of form (http://host.domain.com/~user/.keyplan) Other supported methods may be finger and DNS lookup. Components: keyfinger Program for fetching the key. E-mail programs could incorporate this to allow automated key lookups within the mail authoring and authorization process. Various search engines could use this to allow key searches. Usage: keyfinger user[@host][.domain.com][@keyserver.domain.com][:port] ex: keyfinger geoff1(a)home.net Host and domain are resolved in the standard manner, a default port is tbd. The optional usage is to add an actual keyserver which could be used for a more traditional key-server system. keyfingerd Program (daemon) run on isp's key server. Would automatically serve up .keyplan files from user's home directories. Some versions may access a local key database instead. 'Nym servers and e-mail gateways would require this kind of service. The keyfinger server would be responsible for keeping the keyplan entries up to date. keyfinger-proxy Program (daemon) running on firewall to allow keyfinger to run through firewalls. Allows keyfinger-ing of foreign systems from within the firewall, but not the reverse. key-setup Program that provides a gui interface to aid in the account setup. Should be able to work with .keyplan files and key databases. Authentication required to change key info required. .keyplan File in the user's home directory that contains the key information. User's on ISP's that don't provide keyfinger service could publish their .keyplan files in the top level of their web directory (/~/public_html or whatever). The contents would be a multipart mime document containing available keys with key-type (and size) information, perhaps in preference order. Allowable mime parts would also include key-revocation certificates. Note: It is a question as to how strictly these allowable types should be enforced. To allow extension of new key types enforce mime-type: key/... but not subtype (eg - key/pgp ). content-handler Java content-handler for dealing with .keyplan files. Actually a content handler could be written for each key mime-type. The java code could actually use http to do retrieval. protocol-handler Java protocol-handler for dealing with "keyfinger:" URLs. This would essentially be an implementation of the keyfinger component. Usage: keyfinger:user[@host][.domain.com][:port] Action Items In no particular order: * IETF Format Draft * Write reference code * Need port designation * Need mime-types for keys and the .keyplan file. Important Dates * 96-09-07 First Publication to the Coderpunks list. * 96-09-14 Presented to SF Bay Cypherpunks Physical Meeting. - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page Maintained by Geoff Dale Last Modified: September 15, 1996 _____________________________________________ Geoff Dale - geoff1(a)home.net Paraphrasing Larry Niven: - -- Just think of it as economics in action -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjxVrv1Xc5SjvRJ5AQEUoAQAnU193QKDiV5wW+Iv+ozfZfEH7cyi/cz3 LqduEO3BGkmW4Xfz/bXCwIwwSph1LEcePt6v0Wv+QUGOTXR/CZqjtxTzr3uCTHvP 0Zd76ZlfLD+JI3NSFniXsAXEeGeYLnQJqSHAa9cGUCYPh3/pgwfBuwNC+ZTgYkJo ghLkuxHXrLE= =4icU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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[Noise] Shopkeepers Preventing Riot Redistribution
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Sep 15 09:26:45 1996 EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU wrote: ... >... the "redistribution" from > producers ("rich") to welfare drones ("poor") during the Rodney King > riots > would have been nicely prevented by some shopkeepers with automatic > weapons. Indeed, it was. In a beautiful-to-me scene which Miami's WSVN, Channel 7 (our big-hair station) called "chilling," Korean-American shopkeepers, perched atop their building with semi-automatic firearms, kept one block safe while the rest of the neighborhood burned without police protection. Upon being informed that this was a biased interpretation of legitimate actions by the merchants, which _I_ found heartwarming, they said that chilling was "just a word." JMR -- "'Media bias' is just 2 words." Regards, Jim Ray -- DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy "As govt.s grow arithmetically, corruption grows exponentially." -- Ray's Law of official corruption. Defeat the Duopoly! Stop the Browne out. Harry Browne for President. Jo Jorgensen for Vice-president. http://www.HarryBrowne96.org/ http://www.twr.com/stbo ___________________________________________________________________ PGP id.E9BD6D35 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 I will generate a new (and bigger) PGP key-pair on election night. <mailto:liberty@gate.net> http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray ___________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMjwEGm1lp8bpvW01AQExZQQAm6mj+Oi+4+sd72j79f+S3vYxy2rKY6TR OTwDChBPe9pgswg1wAR7uRVwXN1UlsB2NqHTsQhuU9/D+Te9ncZdpqowoyVZRqUG /1NSA8NA9WMOEjW0OoyXCw6EIYOxBvwDqTpxokF4RfLBlVzyYVJVnvnSXMDzkJ4O gh922BlaqRg= =DLRS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Remailers can't afford to be choosy"
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Umm.... freedom of the press is freedom for he who owns the press. > >The remailer operators own the presses; why shouldn't they use whatever means > >they see fit to determine how they can be used? I encourage people not to > >discriminate on the basis of the political orientation of what's going > >through... but spam isn't political speech. (I agree that the government > >should not be in the business of determining what is spam and what is > >political speech - all speech should be protected - but remailer operators > >are not governments.) The point here, I think, that we are failing to see is that the remailers are run on private machines and bandwidth, when you use a remailer you are a guest on someone else property, your mail is using their bandwidth etc. They can determine how they like how they are used, I just hope most of us will have the strength of conscience to refrain from using remailers which censor or restrict their throughput, I agree that spam is a different question but we do have our own way of dealing with this, just mailbomb the senders, if they are commercial they are likely to leave an address or telephone number on the spam even if the email address is anonymized, we have ways ;-) <haha evil nazi grin forms on face> Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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New type2.list/pubring.mix
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

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Re: China joins Singapore, Germany, ....
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Mon Sep 16 04:22:40 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Mon, 16 Sep 96 07:19:49 EDT for dlv Received: from relay-4.mail.demon.net by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA11172 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Mon, 16 Sep 96 04:22:40 -0400 Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-4.mail.demon.net id ak07550; 15 Sep 96 13:11 GMT Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net id aa23307; 15 Sep 96 11:02 BST Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP id AA842732056 ; Sat, 14 Sep 96 20:14:16 +0000 Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 20:14:14 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: China joins Singapore, Germany, .... Priority: normal X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) Message-Id: <842781740.23307.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > > Nazi POWs were Nazis and deserved to be killed. Likewise, American soldiers > are murderous scum. I wish Saddam Hussein the best of luck in killing every > American he can get. > > P.S. Please do not cc: me. Fuck you. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Internet Drivers' Licenses
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Mon Sep 16 04:17:55 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Mon, 16 Sep 96 07:19:56 EDT for dlv Received: from relay-4.mail.demon.net by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA10926 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Mon, 16 Sep 96 04:17:55 -0400 Received: from post.demon.co.uk ([(null)]) by relay-4.mail.demon.net id ak19657; 15 Sep 96 11:16 GMT Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk ([158.152.120.223]) by relay-3.mail.demon.net id aa23377; 15 Sep 96 11:02 BST Received: from fatmans.demon.co.uk by fatmans.demon.co.uk with SMTP id AA842732060 ; Sat, 14 Sep 96 20:14:20 +0000 Comments: Authenticated sender is <paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> From: paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk To: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> Date: Sat, 14 Sep 1996 20:14:14 +0000 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Internet Drivers' Licenses Priority: normal X-Mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v2.31) Message-Id: <842781757.23377.0(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk> > This is the kind of project cypherpunks would do if they were writing code, > instead of lies and personal attacks, the way Tim May (fart) does. Is a Tim May reference compulsory in all of your postings you stupid little man? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Http://www.fatmans.demon.co.uk/crypt/ "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey" -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQCNAjH9j+cAAAEEAMBvREiQR0ot9dFCO0TiSCSunAYLv2g1Bc6I3bz8FzKXNH53 6mieJf/W4rD+CxJpT0q9RQaaoRtkHJLwbjfK2il3D7mEahMAyqvF/xRJNqkXfhM3 sRJM0Jh43l+W0M5vwokbEbk25/bxWWGspTsLD3YHbzKnG6pOcL5OPIRbv66xAAUR tCdQYXVsIEJyYWRsZXkgPHBhdWxAZmF0bWFucy5kZW1vbi5jby51az6JAJUDBRAy NwfvNkCBjDT0xHEBATQPA/9TORmN/UjNecj03q4anpvdyCLiez5sKuNbnYK50RiP Jj4QpWWvST3smyQ0A86DrZY/re056MXwQmARESx0rFZxdnD0oORICl5r8dJLIy3b j8rbA5olXwZwKz73/X5s13v/pvHYX4cIsbVK8NHXqh5llSKt6TBAuGgkIGF29z5k C4kAlQMFEDI3B9mdtf/umVkv7QEBcRYD/1FBteLqsUmr81euxqqnnrpLlyHb58B/ 9sdATuua4uSjX46hXDZ264YozspNrzSB4NEdrmXOWVX3fiE0ga6XkSSkIeF23V90 En37Z0BdbFzgF00FRYTFyTq8eezQrdg/+rBPUsZUmG5wpq3e12FKHQsX01i+1mB2 YmqqwCV5e95eiQCVAgUQMh8uSb5OPIRbv66xAQEqJwP/fxQyiCasjFcbDpsFfsYp put5cCC/9pOx6X3DlbKShPMpUOS+A9HsTEmJQN8Iawv1nSwPdtc2cR/GhW6ilVjW LSloGdMVLabm9pGpZZMkRaZlXFUkOv7VhfgsUiL+vIDryBCAwUZCzQiWycjt/cPi mUqFH41Z7NkyO8ZFdi5GGX0= =CMZA -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 16 Sep 96 6:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *#**##*#***# 1:16 100.00% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca *****++***** 17:07 99.99% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+++---++++ 2:04:26 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++++++++--+ 1:01:22 99.98% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu + -++*++++++ 41:18 99.84% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com ----------- 3:38:09 99.82% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -+ ++----+ 1:24:30 99.74% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * **+ ++*+ * 33:26 99.37% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ------.--.- 13:13:34 99.13% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *###-#*##### 3:35 98.87% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com -- - --+ 2:53:19 98.74% replay remailer(a)replay.com ****+* ***** 4:45 98.13% winsock winsock(a)c2.org --- -+--++ 1:20:34 97.83% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ******** * 5:06 88.34% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com * 24:33 4.73% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: SPL -- Suspicious Persons List
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:04 PM 9/15/96 -0400, Phill <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> wrote: >> Work for the competition, or start your own company. >Easy enough for you or me who can charge the minimum wage rate >for an hour for a period more like a minute. In this part of California, most yard work is done by small companies run by guys named Jose or Pablo, who can charge maybe 2-3x minimum at most before the competition undercuts them. And they have to worry about blacklists also - "business licenses" and "immigration papers". >... >Being opposed to government slavery isn't enough. Coorporate slavery >is just as bad. Unless people are enfranchised ecconmically as >well as politically the political liberties don't matter much. It's not corporate slavery when you don't have to work for them. >I am on an SPL that is run by an organisation called the "Ecconomic >League". It is an organisation run by the UK Conservative party >which keeps lists of "unsafe" employees. Of course the list is (Just because I don't believe in the concept of "corporate slavery" doesn't mean I don't think corporations can be offensive. This sucks...) Out of curiousity, I thought the UK had Data Privacy Laws or some sort of Database Cops - does that not apply to applications like this? # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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Re: Workers Paradise. /Political rant.
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Asgaard wrote: : .... But suppose the population problem could : be fixed. Then, with technology escalating towards singularity, : machines doing almost all labor, there could certainly exist a : system where the 'dumb' and 'lazy' could be fed and housed properly : without anybody complaining. I'm always fascinated when people trot out this notion of technology giving us a maintenance free world that provides all our needs. Like Rifkin's "End of Work." I'm sorry but I just don't see how the problems of food and shelter are solved simply because we've automated the production of bank statements. All the really effective automation has involved symbolic activities, not the basic stuff of life, like food and shelter. : P.S. Mac Donalds could easily be replaced by a bot. Very unlikely. Despite the incredible degree of mechanization that happens in food production, *most* of it requires people in the loop. Part of it is health concerns -- you're far more likely to poison a significant portion of the population if you don't keep active human involvement in food production. But there's also a lot having to do with the structure of the work. You *can't* send a robot tractor into the fields and expect it to treat your corn right. And milking machines, well .... I did a lot with fault tolerance and industrial robotics in a previous life. Robots work fine in highly structured environments. Their value decreases dramatically as you remove structure. In unstructured environments they're either useless or just plain dangerous. Even the so called "industrialized" farms are wildly unstructured compared to a factory floor. And there's little reason to assume that 'biological units' (plants and animals produced for food) in a fully structured factory-like setting will yield all the products necessary for an adequate food supply. It seems that whenever we develop a "complete" model of what people need to survive and subject a few people to it, we discover that something fatal has been left out. : But to force people into menial service jobs just to literally : survive is not to my taste. No, give them minimal shelter for : nothing and from there on let the market anarcho-capitalistic : struggle begin, for obtaining a higher than minimum material : standard or reputational standing. I suspect that the Real World will always require a large portion of the available labor pool to do work that supports the production of food and shelter. The support has gotten pretty indirect in modern industrialized countries, I admit. Rick. smith(a)sctc.com

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Re: IBM_gak
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> 9-13-96. BuWi: > > "Revolutionary Intranet security product to be > demonstrated at Interop DotCom " > > DSN's NetFortress fully automates hardware-based > authentication, encryption and key exchange into a > plug and play solution. It completely eliminates the > possibility of IP spoofing, eavesdropping and > break-ins. "After installing it, I couldn't even tell > which service a given packet was from - everything but > the packet header itself was rendered undecipherable > as it traversed the Internet." DSN Technology was > founded by Dr. Aharon Friedman and Andy Savas. Thanks, John, for forwarding. I spoke with the DSN folks today. They developed NetFortress in the U.S. and have recently found a substantial overseas market for it. "That's definitely a problem for us. We're actively lobbying senators to pass procode, to get it out of committee." Since of course multinationals would be unwilling to use DSN stuff under current export-control regime. -Declan

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