December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NRC crypto breifing
by Decius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Did the NRC discuss the State Department's GROSS FAILURE to prosecute Phil Zimmermann? (PGP) is military strength, and it's out there!" -- Audience member at NRC crypto briefing Dr. Herb Lin <hlin(a)nas.edu> of the National Research Council's Computer Science and Tecommunications Board gave a briefing this afternoon to address the Council's recent report, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. The briefing was sponsored by the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. One of the most striking aspects of the briefing was the diversity of perspectives on the issue. Most of our discussions on cryptography have been with people in the cypherpunk community; this was the first time we had ever come face to face with people on the other side of the fence. It is quite obvious that there is much emotional intensity here and we do not feel that this issue is going to go away soon. However, the NRC seems to be a voice of reason. We are faced a policy problem: the developing information society is vulnerable to security threats. Cryptography can be a powerful tool to thwart these threats, but it is also a dangerous weapon in the hands of criminals. As a result of concentration on the above issues, the cryptography debate has often been framed as a conflict between privacy rights and law enforcement. The NRC feels that the current policy on cryptography discourages its use by the private sector. Lin states that cryptography is a very valuable tool for crime prevention and thus benefits Law Enforcement. Policy makers should promote cryptography because it can help legitimate businesses better secure themselves against would-be attackers. However, cryptography also assists criminals in circumventing surveillance. So there are both positive and negative impacts for Law Enforcement, but Dr. Lin notes an important statement made in the NRC report: "The benefits of the widespread use of cryptography far outweigh the risks." Dr. Lin and the NRC believe that there will be an explosion of interest in computer security in the coming years, and that government should provide guidance and technical input, both to industry and law enforcement. The upcoming debate can (and should) be carried out on an unclassified basis. He said that open standards should be promoted in an effort to reach consensus between government and industry interests. Interested parties should be encouraged to study and understand the algorithms employed by their cryptosystems so that market forces may drive crypto policy to that which best fulfills the needs of US industry. NRC promotes the growth and leadership in the private sector and encourages all organizations to invest in information security. In addition, the NRC supports the use of link-level encryption in public networks, especially the cellular network. In this mode, LEOs can still access plaintext, but it is much more difficult for unauthorized listeners to get it. It should be noted that Cryptography is just one part of a comprehensive information security program. While it is useful to prevent eavesdropping, provide user authentication, and ensure data integrity, it is not particularly effective in overcoming the problems of insecure operating systems, and corruptible employees. One of the more controversial points in the report is the recommendation for domestic cryptography policy. The NRC recommends that no restrictions be placed on the use of domestic cryptography, and that the market should be allowed to choose the best systems. This was met with incredulty by many members of the audience, particularly those representing the government. They seemed to feel that "the people" should not be allowed to make this decision and that many important aspects of cryptography policy are not necessarily reflected in market interests. While NRC recognizes Law Enforcement's growing problem in adapting to new technologies, Dr. Lin said that the FBI could provide not one example of a class three wiretap that had been thwarted by means of encryption. Access to encrypted files seemed to be a bigger issue for LEOs. This takes us naturally to the topic of key escrow. NRC cautions that key escrow is an unproven technology. Of particular concern is the integrity of escrow agents: how it is to be evaluated, and what level of integrity is sufficient in any particular instance? Who is liable if keys are incorrectly disclosed? What are the liability issues if the key escrow system fails to provide LEOs with access? There just isn't enough information at this time to make these judgments. Many audience members commented that the administration had rushed into key escrow without forethought or open discourse. The NRC discourages the hurried passage of new legislation without clear, thorough discussion of the issues involved by those who will be most directly affected by the law. Furthermore, any government supported cryptography system must provide additional value to the end users. The Clipper system does not do this. Dr. Lin mentioned that data recovery might be of significant value to most users. If encryption systems are too strong then users will have a bigger problem with lost keys than they ever had with stolen intellectual property. The NRC recommends that the US government act as a test market for key recovery rather than pushing it out to the public before it is fully developed. The NRC also recommends that Congress consider criminalizing the criminal use of cryptography. This issue has already been discussed at length in academic fora, and the general consensus is that this concept is much easier said than done. We feel that such a policy is not likely to be a serious deterrent unless the additional penalty outweighs the benefits of secure crypto. It is also worth noting that if crypto is the default in system people shouldn't be charged with additional crimes for not turning it off. As for export issues, the NRC recommends that the government allow export of 56-bit DES without special approval, effective immediately. The recommendation also suggested that the allowable key length should be increased over time in order to keep up with improvements in cryptanalysis and computing power. They feel that export controls should be lessened but not fully removed. Law Enforcement needs time to develop the skills and technology necessary to deal with new situations. We would take issue with the NRC's assertion that 56 bit DES is "good enough for most commercial applications," and that algorithms be designed to preclude multiple encryption. It certainly depends on the threat model involved. DES would be an improvement over plaintext networks, but it is certainly not strong enough to defend against industrial espionage efforts. We feel that strong cryptography should be exportable now to defend against such attacks. We feel that legitimate law enforcement interests can get access to the information they require in most cases without even having to employ cryptanalysis, especially if systems are secured at the link level as the NRC recommends. We would also point to the reality that wiretapping is not often used by Law Enforcement, and we don't feel that they have justified any increase in it's use. The NRC briefing was very helpful in understanding the meaning of the report and highlighted many important issues. NRC will have a number of briefings in major cities all over the US, in hopes that this will spark more debate over these issues. Attendance at this briefing was much smaller than we had expected. We would encourage anyone who is interested in cryptography to attend a future briefing. It is a very good opportunity to hear and meet people on all sides of this issue. We would also encourage the cyber-rights crowd to seriously consider the NRC's recommendations. It seems to be a realistic look at these issues, and there is plenty of room here to defend fundamental civil liberties. Tom Cross and Jeremy Mineweaser Electronic Frontiers Georgia

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Protecting Your Data With Crypto
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have put the November UNIX Review article Peter cited in his letter to the editor, "Protecting Your Data With Cryptography," at: http://jya.com/protect.htm ---------- Peter Allan wrote: > >[ I refer to the article starting on p55 > of the Nov 1996 Unix Review. ] > >-----letter to Ed start here------ > >Andrew, > >Congratulations on a welcome crypto article in UR. > >This is an important topic for security, networks, >web-based commerce etc and is only going to increase in >importance as people realise data is money. > >The article did raise my eyebrows a few times though >with some wild statements - about the speed of brute-force >attacks on DES, and about USG 'key escrow' proposals, >patents and key certification. > >Also there are absolutely crucial issues not touched on, >probably for lack of space. Details matter, and if you're >contemplating another article on the subject I'd be happy >to write it [subject to my boss' approval] or review it >before publication. The field moves fast at times, and >it would be good to keep an eye on the subject in a fairly >regular column. > >Strangely, your author didn't mention ftp.ox.ac.uk, >an ftp site for many good crypto tools, which >(as a UK site) is not subject to US export restrictions. > > > -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Re: Censorship on cypherpunks
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri "Too Hot for Cypherpunks" Vulis writes: > Does saying "The list owner should not kick people off the list for speech" > violate the list owner's right to free speech? That depends on whether plug- > pulling (and mailbombing and ping-storming and other obnoxious behavior) > is speech. The entire, highly recursive question of free speech versus censorship relies almost entirely on the assumption that human beings can be controlled. The observation that certain behavior is obnoxious arises from an inability to control one's own environment at a basic level. Issues such as this have nothing to do with mailing lists or net.protocol, except as vehicles of expression for human conditioning which is already present. Until the fly can be tolerated, removing the shit will only serve to turn one's attention to a new annoyance. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet In a dark alley, a pickpocket tried to snatch Nasrudin's purse. There was a violent struggle, but eventually Nasrudin got the thief pinned on the ground. At this moment, a charitable woman passing called out: "You bully, let the little man up and give him a chance!" "Madam," panted Nasrudin, "you ignore the trouble which I have had getting him down."

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Group order for "Secret Power" ... (San Francisco Bay Area only)
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm looking for 19 other people interested in "Secret Power" (Craig Potton Publishers has indicated that there is a discount for 20 or more copies). If you are in the San Francisco Bay Area, please contact me by phone or E-Mail. As usual with these things, I would prefer to see you in person and have a cash or check committed. Also remember that the shipping is quite steep (for the faster methods) ... The US price uses US$0.71 per NZ$1.00. US PRICE 1 Copy NZ$27.50 per copy US$19.53 NZ$19.00 for shipping via air US$13.49 NZ$12.50 for shipping via economy US$ 8.88 NZ$10.00 for shipping via sea US$ 7.10 20 Copies (per copy) NZ$24.75 per copy (10% discount) US$17.57 NZ$ 9.50 for shipping via air US$ 6.75 NZ$ 7.25 for shipping via economy US$ 5.15 NZ$ 5.90 for shipping via sea US$ 4.19 ---- Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707 Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua(a)chromatic.com

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Censorship on cypherpunks
by Will French 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Except it's not very effective, is it, since he's still posting flames? In any case, it's an admission on John Gilmore's part that libertarianism can't work without some measure of authoritarianism; the only argument is over _just how much_ authoritarianism we need. I'm quite upset about this. Up to now I was able to tell people that "there is at least one mailing list on the net that functions in a completely open manner". No more. Will French <wfrench(a)interport.net>

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black high heal shoes?
by Lile Elam 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I had the strangest dream this morning. I drempt that I had forgotton to vote! As I was heading for the poles, I saw Dole heading into the poles wearing a man's coal grey/black suit and womens' black high heal shoes. It was pretty bazzar.... I wonder what it means? It was pretty scary... Turns out I was too late getting to the poles to vote and I awoke in a panic thinking I had missed it all. I turned to my sleeping babe and after I awoke him, he assured me that voting happens tomorrow. Whew! -lile

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Re: Dr. Vulis is not on cypherpunks any more
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Well put! I tired a long time ago of Dr. Vulis and several others on this > list. Rather than bitch about it or resort to the same big brother > gestapo-censor bullshit we profess to abhor I simply utilized the extensive > filtering capability of Eudora. > > I don't need "big brother" or big "cypherpunk" censoring my mail for me. > We have become what we fear the most. How prophetic and pathetic. Absolutely, John, if you, and those who support your actions, claim to be libertarians you need to take a good hard look at what you have done. This is a distinctly "big cypherpunkish" move and really cannot be condoned even bearing in mind the inane and wearisome behaviour of Dr. Vulis. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Q.E.D. - MONTGOLFIERING, SPOOFS +
by cypher＠cyberstation.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recognize that the vast majority of list readers are sensible human beings trying to better the profession they love and serve the interests they represent. As such, readers of this thread do not need me, or a claque of snivelers, to determine the probity of the impartations being made. You are capable of determining that for yourselves. This posting is not meant to in any way denigrate your important work or to challenge the efforts being made by the vast majority of you to be objective, civil, fair and to examine the facts and determine the truth to the best of your abilities. Accordingly, most of the commentary included in this posting is directed toward the hallucinating thralldom of a dozen or so self proclaimed cryptographic jackadandies who beneath their public veneer are simply a flock of flaccid jackanapes. As proof of that thesis, look at the transpirations of the past few weeks. Preamble: In law school, potential attorneys are drilled in the three prong postulate: 1. If you can argue the facts, argue the facts, the evidence. 2. If you cannot argue the facts, then argue the law, Shannon and Sneider. 3. If you cannot argue the facts, or the law, then attack the opposition, the people presenting the facts. Another statement parable is "if you do not like the message attack the messenger." This stratagem can be applied not only to the courtroom but to any affray. Evidence: 1. The cabal of pedants has looked at the IPG web site in detail, as evinced by their frequent citing of materials that were not theretofore set out in any of the postings made to this list. Where did they get it? Obviously from the web site. 2. They quickly discerned that they could not possibly argue the facts as proved by the fact that not a single one of them have deigned to do so. They quickly realized that algorithm was unassailable from their extremely limited low level of competence. Actually, it cannot be attacked from any level of competence as close analysis of same will reveal. I bet none of that eau de vie crowd has ever cracked real ciphertext in their life. They live in a self hypnotic fantasy mirage world. Obviously, they are incapable of breaking real encryption systems. Oh, they have posited all kinds of crackbrain scheme for breaking systems under some silly hypothetical scenario - most of which have been forseen and solved decades ago by people who are real professional cryptographers. I could pose a theory of broad jumping from New York to London too. All I would have to do is to jump two feet high and be traveling at a velocity of roughly 63,360,000 feet per second, only about .067 c, and I COULD make it. Some of the self presumed cryptographic jackadandies' hairbrain schemes are even more obtuse than that. 3. Unable to attack the algorithm because of their gross impotence, they started citing their law. They attacked my position that the stream cipher was an OTP, citing Shannon as proof that was not the case. In essence invoking the oracular doctrine of Shannon infallibility. They skim over Shannon, read Schneier and then get on their pulpit and preach their version of the Gospel and to all of us mere mortals because they are totally incapable of solving real life applications of cryptography. They spout meaningless turkey gobbleddegook instead of actually doing it. As noted before, their information = P log_base_infinity P, and as is equally evident, their disinformation = P log_base_0 P I acknowledged the truly unique contribution that Shannon has made to cryptography, communications and related fields and the coessential redound on Schneier for the codification of cryptography. However, my position is that Shannon mathematically proved in absolutism only the limitations that we must work within, not what can be done within those delimiters. Accordingly, I argued that the disputation was a matter of semantics. I agreed that the algorithm did not have infinite entropy but it was still an OTP because it fulfilled the other basic tenants of an OTP in all respects saving entropy. I further asserted that the entropy question was immaterial because the entropy of the algorithm was far greater than any possible practical need, by tens of thousands of orders of magnitude. Such rationale fell on parti pris deaf erudite ears. 4. As a result, I realized that from my vantage point such an argument was counter productive at the very best. As a result, I took the OTP issue off the table by agreeing, as I had stated on numerous occasions, that the algorithm produced noncommunicative stream ciphers, PRNG streams that manifested remarkable random like properties, though they certainly are not random. 5. Deprived of their dogmatic dictums with respect to IT, those detractors, like all disconcerted confuters since the dawn of human controversy, turned to the use of sophomoric fustigation. They imagine themselves as a clique of cryptographic superdupers; but in this case they were overwhelmed by the strength of the algorithm, which pricked their hyper-inflate egos. That in turn, led to their futile efforts to try to strike back and cudgel the source of their foil as they vented their acute frustrations. In this case, since many of them are obviously very bright and articulate, their resultant falderal is very adroit and humorous. Even though being the butt of their lampoonery, I nonetheless was highly amused, got some good laughs, found it entertaining and was flattered by the expended efforts of the author(s). Although I recognize that it was not intended to be so, I found it to be exemplary raillery. Levity can help all of us to keep serious matters in perspective and I applaud the authors for their jocose entertainment. Keep it up, not only is it fun, it also helps everyone to see through the smoke screens in order to discern the real underlying truths. 6. Note that during the whole discourse and postings made to this thread, not a single individual has critiqued the algorithm itself. Not many of them will even own up to having looked at the algorithm, much less having attempted to analyze it and assess its strengths or weaknesses. Get real. How many readers really believe that all of those fast cryptographic guns would ignore the real, very simple, algorithm in unison if they stood a ghost of a chance of cracking it? Any talk of a mediocre pecunary reward for breaking the algorithm is giddy poppycock and everyone knows it. They would much rather have the satisfaction and pride that they were the one that gigged me, the only rub being that that is patently impossible . Each individual in that elitist cabal obviously salivates at the opportunity to crack the algorithm and throw it back in my face since my postings have raised seemingly heretic controversy. It should be clear to all readers of this thread, that with a possible exception or two, those detractors have looked at the algorithm and realize it far exceeds their meager cryptanalytic abilities. Accordingly, it is transpicuous that they have resorted to trying to use their turkey flapdoodle to cloud the issue since they have nothing of substance to reason upon. They could not crack their way out of a wet Kleenex with an unlimited number of gigaton thermo nuclear weapons. Perry Metzger and others have even used inculcative factoids to try to claim that the algorithm had been broken. What they were referring to of course was the algorithm that was posted a few months ago. As several then cypherpunks know, that first algorithm was posted to try to get some of the list sharpshooters committed. I believed that those intellectual cowards would leap at the opportunity to display their prowess if confronted by weakness; while on the other hand, that same small flock of turkeys would inevitably run for cover, flapping their wings, and spluttering out puny excuses and their turkey gobbledygook if confronted by strength, just as they are now doing. I wanted to show up gross hypocrisy for what it is, pure spineless cowardice by that gashouse, in more ways than one, gang. As a result, I posted that first algorithm with the intention to answer back with the real algorithm fairly quickly. However, a few cypherpunk confidants recommended that IPG provide the capability for the users to generate all their own keys in order to erase that stigma against the algorithm. In addition, some of them also urged me to prove some of the statistical contentions that I was making instead of just stating them. Accordingly, I decided to do those two things and to reconstruct the web site accordingly. Further, one very helpful cypherpunk gave me a number of references which required me to go to the University of Texas in Austin in order to research them. In doing that, and as result of that research and testing, I changed the algorithm slightly; most importantly, from using a linear congruential generator as the method of providing the algorithm seed, to a nonlinear congruential generator method.. That is, I added two lines to the seed generator engine, to wit: DO (ADDED) JV = JV+1 IF JV = 53 THEN JV = 0 A[JV]=( A[JV] + B[JV] ) MOD C[JV] WHILE ( A[JV] AND 16384 ) = 1 (ADDED) or in effect (WHILE A[JV] > 16383 ) Copyright 1996 by Donald R. Wood. All rights reserved. NOTE: The 53 is a variable. All this took time, and before we could completely regroup, 5 months had passed into history. That does not negate what I was trying to establish though. That is, that the alleged highly puissant sharp shooters are in reality just a bunch of impuissant intellectual cowards feeding everyobne cryptographic pablum. They leap like wilding pit bulldogs at perceived weakness and like all fraudlent impostors completely, and very conveniently, languish from rational reality when they face strength. They fancy themselves as a school of great white sharks plying the waters of cryptography but in reality, they are merely little batty harmless blowfish pumping themselves, and each other, up with "write bites" of pompous flattery, self and group veneration, and other fawning, obsequious giddiness. Having set out my view of the derogators, the remainder of this posting, excepting the one obvious paragraph, is intended for all readers. I trust that most readers will not be diverted, or dissuaded, by the myopic view of traducers. Computer software, is becoming infecte with obsessive compulsive technical interests that are attempting to lead us down the primrose path to intricacy and complexity that will eventually result in much lower productivity and fewer users. Microsoft Office is a perfect paradigm of such sophistry being used to deceive - it does not increase productivity at all, au contraire, in the words of Scott McNealy it serves as a serious impediment to real productivity - what does 23 fonts, 45 colors and all kinds of other unnecessary paraphernalia add to content, understanding and ultimately productivity. Misplaced appeal to aesthetics has all but supplanted the much more important goal of making us, and the interests we serve, more efficient and more productive. Such a course, if not corrected, will eventually lead to, among other things, our World Wide Web becoming a Gordian tangle in terms of usage by the vast majority of technically impaired users. I am not alone in raising this issue of everything becoming too complex and too complicated for potential users. My very weak voice is merely being added to the far more weighty enunciations of McNealy, Ellison, Andreessen, Jobs, and other industry illuminaries. Nowhere, is that usage gap between the technophiles and the technophobes more pronounced than it is in the use of encryption. If we do not keep it simple and easy to use, we will impose defacto standards that only the technically exceptional, such as readers of this, will be able to use. That is an important part of what the IPG EUREKA algorithm and system is about: Making it simple and easy for neophytes to use, and work with. Certainly EUREKA is not a panacea for all encryption needs. For example, it is obviously NOT the best solution for the problems relating to conducting commerce over the Internet. Further, without question, RSA, PGP, ENTRUST, and other encryption systems fill very important exigencies. Where EUREKA shines is in three important strategic user applications: 1. To set up a permanent line of Internet/intranet communication privacy between two, or a group of, individuals. As a result, pass phrases, session encryption keys, and other work impediments of that genre can be eliminated. While applicable to everyone, this is especially true of newbies, computer novices, technophobes, and other non-techies. It is easy to make it transparent to clerks, secretaries, attorneys, accountants, brokers, insurance agents, administrators, law enforcement personnel, and others to whom the computer is merely a necessary implement used to perform their job. EUREKA is much faster, more secure, easier to use, and more flexible than other systems for this application. As such, it is ideal for business intranets, or mixed Internet - intranet systems. It is also ideal for private use by two individuals or a small group of friends and family. 2. To protect your private hard disk files, programs or data, from compromise by hackers and interlopers. In this application it is unsurpassed because differential analysis, and other attacks that can be made to evolving files is rendered impossible and it is extremely fast. It is simply the best product available for this application, though it has some limitations in terms of partial file access and reencryption that will be relieved in the months ahead. 3. For the mass distribution of proprietary content over the Internet. Using authentication codes, similar to military codes of the day, a manufacturer can easily encrypt and transmit software products of all types to an unlimited number of users. Where do we go from here? As you read this, many companies and individuals have purchased, are purchasing, copies for test and evaluation under the newly announced limited moneyback guarantee offer set out in our web site at: netprivacy.com As set out, we are temporarily offering PC compatible systems: 1. For encrypting and protecting your hard disk files from hackers and interlopers for $19.50 2. The same as 1 plus encryption of e-mail and other files for transmission on Internet for $29.50 3. A six pack, six of the number 2 package above for trial use by corporate intranet users for $99.50 All prices include S&H but NOT state taxes where applicable. Our unconditional money back guarantee also includes guaranteed free updates, currently being developed by independent software developers, through December 31, 1997. I realize that there are many Sancho Panza minds out there, who mistakenly think they speak for all list members, and will then go and say that no one will bother with the product. They have already been proved wrong. They are not by any means Rozinantes, they are mere inferior Rozins, Playtyrs at best, Kyrie Eleison kryson. In addition, Coderpunks, Cypherpunks, and other Internet users have committed themselves to helping IPG to improve the EUREKA system, to make it even easier to use, to significantly increase the performance ( by at least an order of decimal magnitude), to develop it on other platforms, and the other things that must be done if it is to achieve its potential. Some of these product revisions and enhancements should be available late this year and others next year. Stay tuned for the results of these efforts. Such efforts are in response to our offer set out at: netprivacy.com/mlmplan.html Therein, as you may know, we explain how we intend to develop and market the IPG products using Internet. As described, instead of establishing an inhouse organization to do those things, as well as system testing & evaluation and system engineering, we plan to use independent developers and agents over Internet. That way, effort will be rewarded on a competitive merit basis. We believe this will be the wave of the future.. Exceptional talent, working out of their own homes, located in the place of their choice. These people will be creating product that will be marketed by other creative people working from their place of choice. Find out how you can participate at. netprivacy.com/mlmplan.html IPG will NOT COMPETE with its software developers or its marketing agents. If you can build a better mousetrap, or invigorate the marketing effort, you will be rewarded commensurably. Even if it is not a better mousetrap, you will still receive pecuniary participation for your efforts. There is a huge upside potential with very little downside risk, except for your time. Others have got in on the ground floor of opportunities like this, here is your chance. This offer is of course currently limited to U.S. and Canadian citizens. The software development kit has been reduced down from $395.00 to $39.50 on a limited offer basis. We anticipate that we will withdraw these limited offers on December 31, 1996. See for yourself. Prove it to yourself. Also, remember, the algorithm is available at: http://netprivacy.com/algo.html We would be very proud to work with you in a synergistic effort to improve ourselves and to produce products for the cryptographicand other markets. Contact us oprivately if you are interested, With kindest regards, Don Wood, > =================================================================== > > Donald R. Wood > ipgsales(a)cyberstation.net > > =================================================================== > > Some people are more certain of their own opinions than they are of > facts presented by those they disagree with - Aristotle > > --------------------- Quod Erat Demonstrandum --------------------- linear congruential generator as the method of providing the algorithm seed, to a nonlinear congruential generator method. That is, I added two lines to the seed generator engine, to wit: DO (ADDED) JV = JV+1 IF JV = 53 THEN JV = 0 A[JV]=( A[JV] + B[JV] ) MOD C[JV] WHILE ( A[JV] AND 16384 ) = 1 (ADDED) or in effect (WHILE A[JV] > 16383 ) Copyright 1996 by Donald R. Wood. All rights reserved. NOTE: The 53 is a variable. Running statistical tests on the encryptor stream with the two lines included versus excluding the two lines, revealed that using them was much stronger from every vantage point. There is sound mathematical reasons why that is true, which succinctly as possible is because it generates a more even distribution of the seed values, ( 0,..,16383 ), with the addition of the two lines. I had experimented with the modified form before I posted the first algorithm but had tentatively rejected it because it decreased overall performance and did not seem to be necessary - I simply did not recognize its importance at that time. However, subsequent testing caused me to change my mind because the standard deviations, Chi Squares, 1st differences and each and every one of the other statistical tests proved that the addition of the two lines produced more random like resultants. In addition the revised algorithm, with the two added lines, makes it impossible to block the algorithm output stream in the absence of the specific As, Bs and Cs used. All this took time, and before we could completely regroup, 5 months had passed into history. That does not negate what I was trying to establish though. That is, that the alleged highly puissant sharp shooters are in reality just a bunch of impuissant intellectual cowards. They leap like wilding pit bulldogs at perceived weakness and like all impostors completely, and very conveniently, languish from rational reality when they face strength. They fancy themselves as a school of great white sharks plying the waters of cryptography but in reality, they are merely little batty harmless blowfish pumping themselves, and each other, up with "write bites" of pompous flattery, self and group veneration, and other fawning, obsequious giddiness. Having set out my view of the derogators, the rainder of this posting, is intended for all readers. I trust that such readers will not be diverted, or dissuaded, by the myopic view of traducers. Computer software, is becoming infected with obsessive interests that are attempting to lead us down the primrose path to intricacy and complexity that will eventually result in much lower productivity and fewer users. Microsoft Office is a perfect paradigm of such sophistry being used to deceive - it does not increase productivity at all, au contraire, in the words of Scott McNealy it serves as a serious impediment to real productivity - what does 23 fonts, 45 colors and all kinds of other unnecessary paraphernalia add to content, understanding and ultimately productivity. Misplaced appeal to aesthetics has all but supplanted the much more important goal of making us, and the interests we serve, more efficient and more productive. Such a course, if not corrected, will eventually lead to, among other things, our World Wide Web becoming a Gordian tangle in terms of usage by the vast majority of technically impaired users. I am not alone in raising this issue of everything becoming too complex and too complicated for potential users. My very weak voice is merely being added to the far more weighty enunciations of McNealy, Ellison, Andreessen, Jobs, and other illuminaries of our industry. Nowhere, is that usage gap between the technophiles and the technophobes more pronounced than it is in the use of encryption. If we do not keep it simple and easy to use, we will impose defacto standards that only the technically exceptional, such as readers of this, will be able to use. That is an important part of what the IPG EUREKA algorithm and system is about: Making it simple and easy for neophytes to use, and work with. Certainly EUREKA is not a panacea for all encryption needs. For example, it is obviously NOT the best solution for the problems relating to conducting commerce over the Internet. Further, without question, RSA, PGP, ENTRUST, and other encryption systems fill very important exigencies. Where EUREKA shines is in three important strategic user applications: 1. To set up a permanent line of Internet/intranet communication privacy between two, or a group of, individuals. As a result, pass phrases, session encryption keys, and other work impediments of that genre can be eliminated. While applicable to everyone, this is especially true of newbies, computer novices, technophobes, and other non-techies. It is easy to make it transparent to clerks, secretaries, attorneys, accountants, brokers, insurance agents, administrators, law enforcement personnel, and others to whom the computer is merely a necessary implement used to perform their job. EUREKA is much faster, more secure, easier to use, and more flexible than other systems for this application. As such, it is ideal for business intranets, or mixed Internet - intranet systems. It is also ideal for private use by two individuals or a small group of friends and family. 2. To protect your private hard disk files, programs or data, from compromise by hackers and interlopers. In this application it is unsurpassed because differential analysis, and other attacks that can be made to evolving files is rendered impossible and it is extremely fast. It is simply the best product available for this application. 3. For the mass distribution of proprietary content over the Internet. Using authentication codes, similar to military codes of the day, a manufacturer can easily encrypt and transmit software products of all types to an unlimited number of users. Where do we go from here? As you read this, many companies and individuals have purchased, are purchasing, copies for test and evaluation under the newly announced limited moneyback guarantee offer set out in our web site at: netprivacy.com As set out, we are temporarily offering PC compatible systems: 1. For encrypting and protecting your hard disk files from hackers and interlopers for $19.50 2. The same as 1 plus encryption of e-mail and other files for transmission on Internet for $29.50 3. A six pack, six of the number 2 package above for trial use by corporate intranet users for $99.50 rant way than _any_ government has ever in history behaved

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Re: Censorship on cypherpunks
by Will French 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It's only authoritarianism if the government is involved. > Clearly, the government isn't involved in this matter. Until now, I'd considered the list as a model of a libertarian society, with the listowner as the government. My point is that if a mailing list (where physical force is generally not a factor) can't be run without arbitrary sanctions against members, how could anyone ever hope for a whole society, with a real, gun-toting government, to run that way? Will French <wfrench(a)interport.net>

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ASIO encryption ?
by Benjamin Grosman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear All, Does anyone happen to know what encryption methods, algorithms, or procedures ASIO (Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation) uses? Any information regarding ASIO's methods, cryptographic or otherwise, would be appreciated. Yours Sincerely, Benjamin Grosman

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