December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NAVAHO
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As most all on this list are aware, the U.S. Army made frequent and successful use of our indigenous people (often Navaho) for battle field communications during WW II. Now obviously Navaho is a widely recognized language and even our 'oppressive" government wouldn't dare tell such speakers, who might be under investigation for some alledged criminal activity, that were engaging in international communications that they could not use this or a similar form of communciation because LE might not be able to interpret its meaning. What would be the legal status of communicating with a language, too complex for easy human use, which required a computer to structure and translate between other human languages? What would be the ITAR implication of exporting such linguistic software? What about speaking or writing riddles or other 'indirect' coding in which the true meaning of spoken or written communication is other than the appearent (literature, especially mysteries have them)? Could export of software designed to create/interpret such riddles or 'hidden' meanings come under ITAR regulation? -- Steve PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: Your editorial in the 10/14 PCWeek
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:37 PM 10/16/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >>A) This is not a change in the law. There is no law regarding export of >>encryption software. >>Congress has never passed any such law. These are State Department >>regulations, and presidential decrees. These regulations, which have the >>force of law to you and me, were never debated or voted upon by our >>elected representatives. They can be changed tomorrow the same way. In >>fact, they can be changed and the public need not even be notified. > >Actually, as Greg Broiles pointed out in an article (on the Cypherpunks >list) several weeks ago, Congress deliberately chooses to delegate much >regulatory authority to other agencies. There just is not enough time or >expertise for them to pass specific laws covering the number and size of >trashcans in the national parks, the type of equipment to be used on Navy >ships, and so on. The State Department--and soon to be transferred to >Commerce--has the regulatory authority to decide which exports are covered >by the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations, the ITARs. These >rules effectively have the full force of law, as many tens of thousands of >laws not specifically passed by Congress have. I think this is more than a little misleading. While I don't recall the specific note from Greg Broiles you mention, as I recall from other sources so-called "government regulations" were not considered binding on ordinary citizens before the 1930's. The examples you gave ("number and size of trashcans in the national parks [public property], and type of equipment to be used on Navy ships...") are both issues of controlling the activities government employees and departments, not ordinary citizens! It's hard for me to imagine how anyone could consider this distinction sufficiently ignorable as to provide examples as if they were interchangeable. It seems pretty obvious that governments should be able to control their own employees and departments, at least while they're on the job, in the same way that essentially every other employer does. Yet, it is equally obvious that ordinary citizens aren't in the same position as government employees, and there is no reason to assume that the former are to be bound by rules which had applied only to the latter. For just one example, government employees can resign; citizens cannot. It will be claimed that citizens do have to obey the rules: Yes, but they're called "laws," they are passed by legislators who are voted in or out of office by the citizens. (And laws apply to government employees too, or at least they should...) Laws are also publicly debated before they are passed, generally. On the whole, I would say that there is an excellent reason for this healthy distinction between "laws" and "regulations." You stated that it would be difficult for Congress to debate a large number of rules, and you cited "national parks" and the Navy as examples. It wouldn't be easy for Congress to handle this. My answer is, yes, delegation of these matters is reasonable precisely because they are NOT binding on ordinary citizens. And further, I'd point out that assuming you have respect for freedom, you have every reason to fear allowing things with the force of laws to be passed as "easily" as regulations. Some people who say they are REAL LAWYERS (TM) will probably claim, as if on schedule, that I am re-writing the law. No, I am well aware that the SC may have, at some point, have disagreed. Rather, I think we should treat the Supreme Court, on this issue as well as many others, as we would a schizophrenic person that we happen to meet on a city street: We don't think his mumbling is making any sense, but we are well aware of the danger of provoking him so we hold our tongues while in his earshot. Nevertheless, we don't for a minute adopt the opinion that anything we've heard is somehow more worthy of belief, simply because we felt uncomfortable about expressing our opposition for a moment, which is analogous to the SC being able to temporarily enforce its opinion. I certainly sympathize with the REAL LAWYERS (TM). They are, in effect, chained 24 hours per day (so to speak) to that schizophrenic, and can never get away, so they've decided to make a virtue (and, in fact, a business) out of a necessity by adjusting their beliefs to correspond, continuously, to the ravings of that madman. Naturally, they pride themselves on being able to slowly, gently, carefuly change the opinions of that madman, and they succeed occasionally at this task. >(It is true that the ITARs may well end up being overturned by the courts, >as the Bernstein and Junger cases proceed, but this could happen to laws >passed by Congress, and does.) >Also--and I am not an expert on this--some of the basis of the ITARs is >closely related to the "Munitions Act," which was, I am almost certain, an >actual Act of Congress, some decades back. OTOH, one of the big complaints we have against ITAR is that it seems to be constantly re-interpreted. While I certainly won't claim that this is never true of Congress-made laws, it tends to be more difficult to pass a law, and once passed, to sneak a new interpretation in. Somehow, I don't think that it would have been possible to stretch a "Munitions Act" into a rule which would prohibit the export of a a Web-browser like Netscape that happens to have a hole in it for crypto. > >Certainly Congress knows full well what the ITARs are about, and could >change them if it thought the State Department or Commerce Department were >overstepping their bounds. (As it may do, some day. Not this term, >obviously. "Pro-Code" got tabled, so Congress effectively spoke.) > >(Understand that I am not arguing in favor of the ITARs, nor their >application to crypto, just taking issue with Marshall's opening point that >the ITARs are not real laws. I mostly believed they were real laws before, >but Greg Broiles' analysis several weeks ago cinched it for me.) How did I miss that miraculous revelation? B^) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Carl Ellison <cme(a)acm.org> > >> >Steve Shear <azur(a)netcom.com> writes: > > > >[much cut] > >> > >> I've been charged with developing an Internet service which needs to assure > >> its clients of anonymity. However, we fear some clients may abuse the > >> service and we wish to prevent the abusers from re-enrollment if > >> terminated for misbehavior. (In your example, it would be the person(s) > >> trying to discover the service host via flood). > >> > >> My thought was to base enrollment on some sort of 'blinding' of their > >> certified signature (e.g., from Verisign) which produces a unique result > >> for each signature but prevents the service from reconstructing the > >> signature itself (and thereby reveal the client's identity). I'm calling > >> this negative authentication. > > The mistake is to think of using ID certificates (like those from Verisign) > in the first place. They don't mean anything. > > You want an authorization certificate, such as produced by SPKI. You need > to know what a key is authorized to do, not what name is associated with > the key. (Sorry about quoting so much, but I liked Steve Shear's succinct problem statement.) I don't see how authorization certificates solve this problem. How would you determine if someone was qualified to receive an authorization certificate? And what would you do to make them stop using the service if they abuse it, and to stop them from getting new authorization certificates? Thanks, Hal

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SPA's Press Release
by Sean Sutherland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Oct 16 17:11:03 1996 After researching the SPA's lawsuit for awhile, I figured I might as well post the SPA's press release regarding their lawsuit against C2 to see if it'll spur some more discussion on it. If it weren't for the seriousness of the matter, I would almost be amused by the SPA's lawsuit. Their term, "contributory infringement" is almost like suing the bartender because a customer got into a wreck while drunk. Note the "should have nown." Here's their specification for this, copied from http://www.spa.org/piracy/risk.htm. "Anyone who knows or should have known that he or she is assisting, inducing or materially contributing to infringement of any of the exclusive rights by another person is liable for contributor infringement. " ie - posting of serial numbers posting of cracker utilities linking to FTP sites were software may be unlawfully obtained informing others of FTP sites were software may be unlawfully obtained aiding others in locating or using unauthorized software supporting sites upon which the above information may be obtained allowing sites where the above information may be obtained to exist on a server Then there's their Vicarious Liability for Infringement by Another Person, outlined by: "Anyone who has the authority and ability to control another person who infringes any of the exclusive rights and who derives a financial benefit therefrom, is vicariously liable for the infringement of another person." ie - ISPs who have warez or pirate sites on their system ISPs who have pirates for customers sys admins for newsgroups or IRC where pirate activity takes place It's interesting to note that this web page is entitled "Theories of Copyright Infringement", and the only listing (which I didn't copy) which references a law (section 501(a) of the Copyright Act, to be exact) is direct infringement - -- the kind we all know and love. I'm curious, do the Contributory Infringment and the Vicarious Liability for Infringment By Another Person claims have any legal basis, or are they just the inane rantings they appear to be? In a fair world, this wouldn't stand up in court...but unfortunately, with juries today...you get the point. Anyway, here's their press release, again a direct cut from http://www.spa.org/piracy/releases/netpir.htm. - ---------- SPA Files Copyright Suits Against ISPs and End Users Internet Anti-Piracy Campaign Launched (Oct.10, 1996 --Washington, D.C.) -- The Software Publishers Association (SPA) announced today that it has filed five civil lawsuits for copyright infringement occurring on the Internet. Three of the lawsuits were filed against Internet service providers (ISPs), and the remaining two were filed against individual end users. Additionally, SPA launched its Internet Anti-Piracy Campaign, which includes education and enforcement components, in an effort to educate and work cooperatively with ISPs regarding copyright infringement. ISP lawsuits were filed on Oct. 7 and 8 against Community ConneXion of Oakland, Calif.; GeoCities of Beverly Hills, Calif.; and Tripod Inc. of Williamstown, Mass. The SPA members named as plaintiffs in all three suits were Adobe Systems Inc., Claris Corp. and Traveling Software Inc. In each case, SPA first contacted the ISP and requested that the infringing material be removed, but the ISP failed to respond and cooperate. SPA also filed suit against Jeffrey Workman of Auburn, W. V., and Patricia Kropff of Scottsdale, Pa, on behalf of Adobe Systems Inc., Claris Corp., Corel Corp., Datastorm Technologies Inc. and Novell, Inc. In each of these instances, SPA received reports of alleged copyright infringement on certain Web sites, and with the assistance of the ISPs, tracked the individuals responsible for posting the infringing material. "These lawsuits send a clear signal to ISPs and end users that neither direct nor contributory copyright infringement will be tolerated. The Internet does not provide a safe haven for these types of activities," said Ken Wasch, SPA president. SPA's Internet Anti-Piracy Campaign (IAPC), which is outlined at http://www.spa.org/piracy/iapc.htm, contains information explaining why ISPs may be liable for copyright infringement, the risks involved and seven warning signs that infringing activity may be taking place on the ISP's server. Additionally, ISPs may sign an ISP Code of Conduct to show they have adopted the operating practices encouraged under the copyright law. Upon receiving a report of alleged copyright infringement on the Internet, SPA confirms the unlawful activity and sends a letter to the ISP servicing the infringing user. In most cases, the ISP cooperates and remedies the situation. If the infringing user can be identified -- as alleged in the Workman and Kropff cases -- SPA may then choose to seek action against the end user. If the ISP is unwilling to stop the unlawful activity, SPA may choose to file suit against the ISP. "Our intentions are to work cooperatively with ISPs. A key element of the IAPC is the ISP Education Program devoted to alerting ISPs to their potential liability and providing them with the tools and guidance to protect themselves," said Joshua Bauchner, SPA's Litigation Coordinator. "The IAPC maintains SPA's traditional balance between education and enforcement. We first make contact in an effort to amicably resolve the matter, and only when absolutely necessary do we turn to litigation." An integral part of the cooperative effort between SPA and ISPs is the ISP Code of Conduct. This simple agreement asks that ISPs protect themselves from liability by stopping pirate activity on their systems. In return, SPA will attempt to contact the ISP if it receives a piracy report concerning it -- before initiating other action. Piracy has taken many forms on the Internet. These include making unauthorized copies of software available for download, the posting of serial numbers, cracker and hacker utilities and links to pirate FTP sites. Although many believe piracy is limited to "warez" or illegal copies of software, it extends beyond that narrow definition. Under the law, anyone who knows -- or should have known -- of the infringement and who assists, encourages or induces the infringement is liable for indirect infringement. In each of the actions SPA filed, at least two of the above infringements were present. For additional information please visit the Internet Anti-Piracy Campaign site at http://www.spa.org/piracy/iapc.htm. The ISP Education Program information is available at http://www.spa.org/piracy/ispinfo.htm. To report a case of piracy please contact SPA's hotline at (800) 388-7478, piracy(a)spa.org or complete an on-line intake form at http://www.spa.org/piracy/pirreprt.htm. SPA is the leading trade association of the desktop software industry, representing the leading publishers as well as many start-up firms in the business, home office, consumer, education and entertainment markets. Its 1,200 members account for 85 percent of the sales of the U.S. packaged software industry. SPA press releases are available through fax on demand at (800) 637-6823. - ---end bs - --- Sean Sutherland | GCS/C d- s+:+ a--- C+++ V--- P L E- W++ N++ PGP Key ID: E43E6489 | K- w o O-(++) M-- V PS+ PE++ Y++ PGP++(+) http://pobox.com/~seans | t--- 5+++ X++ Rb++ DI+ D+ G e- h! !r y In UNIX, no one can hear you scream. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMmVdeVZoKRrkPmSJAQHVQQf+O07bjV9CDzKPTzOcSpKNlmtUqE0dUD9R gM1nce4LkG+6xszwt81srAwEmMdFtxe2gF0udB95n1okI5ZYYf9YAqpStXKScdZZ QYb8LpaBoxQFlN1t66m6Hy5VXyx/EKjLYYWGWdvLxKIcxMqvvbx7wym3CHdj0iFq 1chg6s6MVFegFXT7l2EEOlHSkloz4/0fl8v63yXUZDyqd0H6PV05JsfC9vkGWVV1 yXC51nKq29ps5LB8Cm61intpfnDOYtq+ZN1EO91+9CDttDyLgJM1/HMA6HnbgGG8 CVc52Kw0JtahXi7cxKNmSuI1F9YEq00bNTqTqARzKAvha+5mWRZ8Iw== =AuZp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Netscape Show - Security API
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was at the Netscape show and attended the Security API. Looks pretty impresive. The slides for this should be available a week from now on www.develop.netscape.com (?) for those interested. This will be available in Netscape 4.0 Everything is a plug in module, and you can even replace the crappy DES and crippled RSA mods with stronger ones and even write a PGP signature checker/signed/encryptor, etc for both server and browser. Very cool stuff. PGP was actually mentioned! Catch is this: the international version is again crippled, however it is interesting to note that they got a module loadable crypto API to pass ITAR. They did this by having the international versions check modules for signatures that say "US Export Allowed" :) Possibilities around this (not that I am advocating any, just restating what was said): export the USA version (of course breaking the ITAR), modifying the code that checks the signature and allow it to load any module, making a DIFF file between versions and exporting that (would this be legal?) They mentioned (someone asked) that the signature authentification methods that check a module are part of the same API, but hinted that they couldn't be overridden. This could of course be tested, and hopefully they can be disabled. :) But time will tell. There was also some talk of expiring signatures - not sure if it was regarding modules or mail or key certificates. If module signatures expire every six months that would make an interesting situation. In the USA, you can write any module to do anything! Would be cool to have a Netscape Mail PGP set of modules!!! This could indeed solve the problem of having software that's secure and yet also easy to use. What sucks is that someone in England couldn't write their own plug in modules to get better crypto for use in the international versions. Perfectly legal in the point of view of international laws and ITAR, but crippled! Netscape says they won't sign non-USA produced crypto modules for the international versions -- or at least that was the message they gave. The folks at Netscape said that the US Government (NSA wasn't mentioned) did not want the situation to exist that someone from outside could build stronger crypto and have it be imported to the USA... Looks like we have an Iron (Crypto) Curtain situation here. In the end the USA suffers since we are only one country, but I won't start ranting on that here since it's been discussed to death already. :) Several folks from outside the USA, one guy from England actually did express concerns at this problem. Some of the authentification methods they were showing were smart cards and such, and one of the comapnies there was giving eval models out! Litronic had a couple of models - one a serial port one (9600 only with 512 bit RSA, also 768 bit, 1024 bit models will be due out in mid '97) the other plugs right into the keyboard grabbing your keystrokes before they reach the application! If you need eval models for your company to do development call'em at 714-545-6649 or go to contact them at litronic.com, whatever. :) The serial port model is likely to be the most useful since it (should?) work on PC's (Running Linux too!), Suns, Macs, and even C64's. :) Not sure if the API for this is software or an RS232 protocol, if the latter, these will work with pretty much anything. Not sure how trustworthy they are, after all you can't disassemble the smart cards and check their properties to make sure there are no holes, but possibly a dual method would work. That is, send a message to the card, have it sign or encrypt the message with the private key, take that signature/encrypted message, and also ask the user to type in a second passphrase (or use the same hashed differently) that's handled on the local machine. If the user has both, even if the card is crippled, you are secure, and even if someone finds the card they won't be able to use it. (I won't go into rubber hose key recovery here or any other details, see Tim C. May's excellent Cyphernomicon if you need background info on that.) Over all, the message I got from this is that Netscape is doing the right thing, they are for strong crypto - but are forced to abide by the ITARs. They are for voluntary key escrow for companies, NOT mandatory key escrow. They'd like to provide strong crypto functionality to all and would if not for the ITARs. ============================================================================= + ^ + | Ray Arachelian |FL| KAOS KERAUNOS KYBERNETOS |==/|\== \|/ |sunder(a)brainlink.com|UL|__Nothing_is_true,_all_is_permitted!_|=/\|/\= <--+-->| ------------------ |CG|What part of 'Congress shall make no |=\/|\/= /|\ | "A toast to Odin, |KA| law abridging the freedom of speech'|==\|/== + v + |God of screwdrivers"|AK| do you not understand? |======= ===================http://www.brainlink.COM/~sunder/========================= If the Macintosh is a woman... Then Windows is a Transvestite! ActiveX! ActiveX! Format Hard drive? Just say yes!

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[NEWS]
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SECURE INTERNET COMMERCE IS FOCUS OF SEVERAL PROJECTS Visa Europe is testing a payment card designed for secure use in commerce across the Internet, and hopes to bring it to market early in 1998. "We are launching a pilot of our new card for secure electronic commerce with 38 banks around Europe in 16 countries," Steve Schapp, executive vice-president marketing of Visa Europe said. "We expect Internet commerce to range from between $7 billion and $32 billion a year by 2000 world-wide, extending Visa payment service into a new environment," Schapp said. In a related story, a group of Singapore scientists said they had invented a secure system for financial transactions on the Internet. The system would allow individuals and businesses to deal directly with banks via the worldwide computer network, said Lam Kwok Yan, spokesman for a group of researchers at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He said the new system, developed by the NUS team in collaboration with several banks, used smartcard technology which allowed the transmission of hidden digital signatures. The system, which uses Microsoft's Windows 95 operating system, should be ready for use by sponsoring banks by March 1997. Sponsors include Singapore's four large banks -- Development Bank of Singapore, Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp., Overseas Union Bank, United Overseas Bank -- as well as Singapore Telecommunications and Citicorp's Citibank. -- Reuter, 10/22/96 --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: OTP
by Paul Bradley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Where do these idiots come from and why do they end up on this mailing list? I have asked myself the same question many a time when reading your inane and witless postings > > > Can you explain to me how your one time pad algorithm is any better than > > > encryption something with, say, RC4 or any other cipher using a key that > > > is the same length as the seed for your PRNG? > > > > Well for a start there is no possible cryptanalytic (rather than > > brute force) attack on a one time pad, the system can be > > mathematically proven to be secure with a very simple bit of > > statistics. The proof is intuitive, if there is equal or greater entropy in the pad as there is in the message and the pad is used in a proper OPT fashion (never repeating) there is no way to determine the correct decryption, as simple as that doctor fuckup. As for when I said brute force, fault admitted, I was probably thinking about a stream cipher or something, as you know as well as me (or probably don`t as you know nothing about cryptography) there is no concept of a brute force attack on an OTP as there are many correct decryptions for different pads. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> At 08:13 PM 10/22/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: (snip) > Sure, you can't keep people from talking. However, one way to sabotage the > usefulness of telling is to allow everybody else as well to make the same > claim, with essentially no way for the candidates to tell who is REALLY > giving the money. Make the lie just as credible as the truth, and the value > of knowing the truth is destroyed. If nobody can trust anyone else's word, > then no candidate could know who REALLY ought to be rewarded for a campaign > contribution, breaking the circle of quid-pro-quo. Sorry, but this would depend upon equal access to a number of things. Primarily, John Q. Public does not have sufficient real world access to politicians to assert that he is the one who donated. Lobbyists, OTOH, most certainly do. Secondly, access to the timing of donations is something only the donor can know. "Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) > The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still > free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off > is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what > the problem is, isn't it? See above for why the connection is not. And the problem is generally not money, but rather the delivery of votes. A candidate will do whatever it takes to get elected. Often this means $$$ for campaign expenses. More often it means vote delivery. Get rid of the career politician and you get rid of the motivation behind the pursuit of political money and vote delivery. I hate to actually advocate term limits, but a critical vote in Congress is much harder to control when the rep is only interested in serving the public because there is no chance of re-election. After all, it is not donations that are the evil here, it is the control of gov't action, right? (Much of this could all be solved by electing better people as our representatives. Determined will can make a big difference) > Jim Bell > jimbell(a)pacifier.com ++++==============---------------------------- Matthew J. Miszewski |The information revolution has changed wealth: |intellectual capital is now far more important mjmiski(a)execpc.com |than money. -Walter Wriston ----------------------------==============++++

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Chinese Gold Bar Mystery
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.iacr.org/~iacr/china/china.html Cryptograms on Gold bars from China The following mystery was brought to IACR by the curator of a museum in the US. I don't have the complete story, but it seems that seven gold bars were allegedly issued to a General Wang in Shanghai, China, in 1933. These gold bars appear to represent metal certificates related to a bank deposit with a U.S. Bank. The gold bars themselves have pictures, Chinese writing, some form of script writing, and cryptograms in latin letters. Not surprisingly, there is a dispute concerning the validity of the claim for the deposit. It may help to resolve the dispute if someone can decipher the cryptograms on the bars. Nobody has yet put for the a theory as to their meaning. I am also unable to recognize the script writing. The Chinese writing has been translated, and discusses a transaction in excess of $300,000,000. It also refers to these gold bars which weigh a total of 1.8 kilograms. To assist in your investigation, I have compiled the cryptograms and their arrangements. Below are images of the bars, available in two sizes. The ones shown here are about 20K each, and clicking on any of them will download a larger version (about 200K). The gold bars were photographed against a blue or green background that appears around some edges. Unfortunately, neither I nor IACR can provide any further information regarding this. If you are seriously interested in trying to solve the mystery, I advise you to contact one of the following individuals: Bin J. Tao 15475 Rochlen St. Hacienda Heights, CA 91745 USA Telephone and fax: (818) 333-6125 Peter Bisno Law Offices of Bisno and Samberg 201 South Lake Avenue Suite 411 Pasadena, CA 91101-3016 USA Telephone: (818) 585-8899 Fax: (818) 585-1899 [14 images of golden cryptograms; some appear to show a bearded, pony-tailed cryptoanarchist] prepared by Kevin McCurley -----

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Re: ANother Timmy May clone
by Ryan Russell/SYBASE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I love it..... no repentance for posting useless flames.. But he apologizes for it being posted twice. Ryan ---------- Previous Message ---------- To: cypherpunks cc: From: dlv @ bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) @ smtp Date: 10/22/96 10:46:36 PM Subject: Re: ANother Timmy May clone stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com writes: > This is the second time you've posted this. > It's an amusing product, if you like snake-oil, and more people would > have read your article if it didn't include gratuitous insults, > especially in the title. > > At 07:30 PM 10/20/96 -0400, you wrote: > >Timmy-May-style pseudo-crypto: ... I'm responding to the list since others may noticed the same: I did not post this article twice. I was surprised to see that it came back from toad.com to me twice. Some glitch much have caused is to be duplicated. Hasn't happened to any other articles... Sorry about that. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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