December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire
by Greg Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The truly frightening thing here is that Bill gates has come out more often on the strong crypto side than Netscape, Apple, IBM and just about everyone else. Why is this? Has Justice crapped on him once too often, and now he's looking for payback? At first I thought that it may be that Microsoft has big financial transaction plans. If this were true, they would probably get the leniency that banks and others get for crypto. So what is it? Here is my theory, if you will indulge me for a minute; It was a dark and stormy...uh middle of the afternoon in Redmond. Bill is at his desk reading the latest sales figures for Windows and Office 95. "600 million, hot shit! But I grow bored with commonplace software, I need new money schem..uh challenges". Somehow Bill finds his way into Building 666 on the Microsoft campus. The building is home to Microsoft's Security and Crypto division. He hails a young minion. "Here my son, what have you done for me today?" The young man gulps, "Uh well let me see Mr Gates...". Suddenly Bill notices the boy's shirt. It is black, on the front are printed the words; "This T-Shirt is a Munition". Under the words are a few lines of code. Because they are not Basic, Bill is confused. He blurts out,"Say that isn't Java is it!". "No Mr. Gates, it's Perl. This is the RSA code implemented in it." Bill says,"I see, carry on my boy". The young man scurries back to his office. Suddenly it strikes Gates like the first time he envisioned the DOS liscening scheme. "Munitions! Hot shit, weapons on a floppy I could make billions! I could arm the whole world with Microsoft weapons of software and dominate any governments who got in my way! Then I could have Larry Ellison and Marc Andressen and any other punks who made fun of me locked away". I'm sure it didn't happen just this way. It's quite possible that Bill gates never says "hot shit". ---------- > From: Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Holding Netscape's and Microsoft's Feet to the Fire > Date: Tuesday, October 22, 1996 8:59 PM > > At 4:11 PM -0700 10/22/96, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > >John Young wrote: > >> > >> 10-17-96, BuWi: > >> > >> "Apple, IBM, JavaSoft, Motorola, Netscape, Nortel, Novell, > >> RSA, and Silicon Graphics Announce PICA Crypto-Alliance" > >> > >> The PICA specification will also be designed to make the > >> task of developing differing domestic and exportable > >> security requirements much easier. [GAK alliance 2.] > > > > John, I think you are misreading the intent here. By making > >it easier to develop separate domestic and exportable > >versions of a product, we foil the government's attempt to > >force weak domestic encryption because it is too much work to > >maintain two different versions. > > Thwarting the True Intent of GAK by ensuring that domestic crypto is > completely unhampered, unhindered, unlimited, and unGAKked is terribly > important. A year or so ago, when Netscape folks issued assurances that the > "relative convenience" of having one "world version" would not be the > determining factor, and that Netscape would have two versions (times the > number of platforms they support), was an incredibly positive development. > > (And Bill Gates, of the Evil Microsoft, had already isssued scathing > denunciations of key escrow and mandatory crypto, so MS was already > effectively in our camp.) > > So, if PICA helps this (along with the Elites Alliance, a rival type), more > power to them. I wouldn't be surprised if the Feds try to exert pressure on > them to change this purpose that Jeff W. describes. Government will realize > that industry consortia are a way to "build consensus" on getting GAK built > in to even domestic products. (The renaming of Clipper/Tessera/etc. to key > escrow and then to "key recovery" is essential to this strategy....got to > convince U.S. software companies that Mr. Policeman is Our Friend...not an > easy sell.) > > But I wonder if the PICA Alliance will be allowed to pursue this "dual > strength strategy." Mightn't it be a violation of the ITARs merely to > _conspire_ to keep domestic crypto unhindered and strong? > > (:-} for the :-}-impaired.) > > Though this is preaching to the choir, it's imperative that Netscape, > Microsoft, and the Other Minor Players remain committed to _never_ > compromising the security of _domestic_ products....Europe and Asia will > have to take of themselves, as the true battle always has and always will > be about the U.S. government's desire to surveil us and tap our > communications at will. > > (Anyone who doubts this should reread the recent comments of Janet Reno, > Louis Freeh, Jamie Gorelick, and all the others talking about the need to > read the communications of criminals and suspected criminals. The real goal > is to head off crypto anarchy, as the summary by Black Unicorn made clear > just a day or two ago.) > > --Tim May > > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM > that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." > [NYT, 1996-10-02] > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > >

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Re: Stopping the buying of candidates
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 10/23/96 +0000, Matthew J. Miszewski wrote: > >> At 08:13 PM 10/22/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: >(snip) > >> Sure, you can't keep people from talking. However, one way to sabotage the >> usefulness of telling is to allow everybody else as well to make the same >> claim, with essentially no way for the candidates to tell who is REALLY >> giving the money. Make the lie just as credible as the truth, and the value >> of knowing the truth is destroyed. If nobody can trust anyone else's word, >> then no candidate could know who REALLY ought to be rewarded for a campaign >> contribution, breaking the circle of quid-pro-quo. > >Sorry, but this would depend upon equal access to a number of things. >Primarily, John Q. Public does not have sufficient real world access >to politicians to assert that he is the one who donated. Lobbyists, >OTOH, most certainly do. Secondly, access to the timing of donations >is something only the donor can know. > >"Wink, wink. Nudge, nudge, Senator. Look at your account balance >tomorrow. Never forget the National Association of Manufacturers was >there for you" (Obviously a completely random selection 8-) While I have worked through essentially none of the details, if the system can be implemented well enough, all this kind of information will be blinded into oblivion. Donations won't be tallied individually, and news of their arrival will be disguised, possibly by limiting the size that is credited to the candidate per day and thus in effect splitting up a donation to make it "arrive" over a period of a week or two. Only overall totals will be reported, possibly rounded to only two significant figures, and even then possibly only on a weekly basis. >> The candidate still gets the money, of course, and the contributor is still >> free to both donate and speak...separately. The thing that's been cut off >> is the association between the money and the speech...which is exactly what >> the problem is, isn't it? > >See above for why the connection is not. Try again. Rather than trying to prove that a system won't work, why not help develop one that will? >And the problem is >generally not money, but rather the delivery of votes. A candidate >will do whatever it takes to get elected. Often this means $$$ for >campaign expenses. More often it means vote delivery. But "vote delivery" can't be proven, or even demonstrated with a strong degree of assurance. >Get rid of the career politician and you get rid of the motivation >behind the pursuit of political money and vote delivery. I'd LOVE to "get rid of the career politician." And every other kind of politician, as well! > I hate to >actually advocate term limits, but a critical vote in Congress is >much harder to control when the rep is only interested in serving the >public because there is no chance of re-election. After all, it is >not donations that are the evil here, it is the control of gov't >action, right? What I consider wrong is that government affects way too large a fraction of our lives, without apparent Constitutional justification. If the government at all levels were only, say, 1/10th of its current size, there would be much less motivation for corruption. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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probability question for math-heads
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm too tired &/or busy to work this out, via Knuth --- maybe you can help, with some implications for the DES keysearch strategy. What is the expected distribution, in a "random" binary sequence -- with all the fuzziness that implies as to what _exactly_ is "random" -- of gaps between runs of same-bits. i.e. what is the expected distribution of sequence length between occurances of two (and only two) 1-bits in a row? how about sequences of 3 1-bits? ETc. We know that in a _truly_ random sequence, taken over a long enough period, there should be all possible values of "gaps". But what is reasonable to expect in a "random" sequence as to how those gaps are distributed? Is my question equivalent to Knuth's gap test? If anyone feels like proffering some education on this, if I find anything useful in my investigations I'll certainly credit the help! TIA, etc. -- and hey: doesn't Nickelodeon have a trademark on GAK?

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But first, something completely different... (fwd)
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this forward is on the edge, but notice the request for increased wiretap capability. Besides, it is funny. --Lucky ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 23 Oct 96 11:10:26 PDT From: Bruce Erickson <be1(a)ElSegundoCA.NCR.COM> To: ca-firearms(a)lists.best.com Subject: But first, something completely different... Motorcycle gangs, Banditos and Hell's Angeles, in Scandanavia have been fighting for a couple years. A previous story in this paper described how Hell's Angles broke into a Danish prison to throw a hand grenade into the cell of the Banditos' president. Our friends who want to ban mouse guns don't know what trouble is possible. It is possible to get anti-tank missiles on the black-market. [story] "Nordic summit on Biker Violence" Saskis Sissons "The Eurpoean" 10-16 October 1996 Denmark's justice minister justice has called a summit to discuss a joint Nordic campaign against the biker gangs whose violent confrontations are posing an increasing danger to the public throught the region. Bjorn Westh, who is said to be shocked and furious at the latest violence which left 2 people dead and 19 ingured after a rocket attack in Copenhagen, will meet his cunterparts from Sweden, Norway and Finland to consider strategies against the gangs. A justice ministry spokeswoman said: "It will ve an exchange of ideas between the ministers. It's a very serious situation in Denmark at the moment abd these levels of violence could easily spread to other parts of Scandanivia. Westh is looking into the possibility of a total ban on the gangs but his priority is to secure the safety of civilians." Westh's initiative follows a meeting on 7 Octobe bwtewen Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Tasmussen and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, who promised their countries would fight the bikers together. Calls for concerted national and regional action against the escalating gang warfare have been mounting. Only last week 1000 staged a demonstration outside the Hell's Angles compound at Titagade in Copenhagen's Norrebro district. A few days later were awakened in the early morning by an anti-tank rocket exploding in the bikers' clubhouse. [btw: this is the second missile attack on the HAs this year. the first was in the late spring] After months of prevarication the Danes have resolved to take tough action against the gangs. Parliament is this week rushing through legislation which will prevent members of the feuding Hell's Angles and Banditos meeting at their clubhouses in populated areas, and a national task force has been set up to combat the gangs. Commander Per Larsen, who is heading the new unit, said: "The new legislation is good news for us and we are pleased with the initiatives of the prime minuster and justiice ministers. But we would like to see parliament giving us further powers to bug and phone-tap suspects and to search houses secretly." The feud, which began in 1994, has claimed 9 lives and injured 50 people throughout the region. [end story] Diane: "We need stronger tank missile controls. Ban the sale of cheap easily concealed tank missiles. Require licensing and training classes. Store them at missile clubs" Tanya: "There is already total prohibition on the possession of tank missiles by private citizens and murder is still illegal." Diane: "Be quiet, this is a fund raising event."

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Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P (fwd)
by cypher＠cyberstation.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A cryptogram Montgolfiering aka P Information = P * log_base_infinity P What does it mean? First of all, I apologize for taking so much of many reader's time on the subject of whether the EUREKA algorithm is a "SOFTWARE" OTP or not. As I have restated over and over and over again, time after time, after time, it is a PRNG, it is a stream cipher, so we will leave it there. We are taking the OTP question off the table, but I am sure that the list eupatrids will continue to beat that horse forever. Accordingly, henceforth Eureka will be referred to as a stream cipher, a PRNG stream, and we will joust on their muddied pedantric playing field! I also want to apologize once more to all of the readers for having to go down into the gutter where PM insists on duking it out, but he leaves me no choice. I told you that I would fight no more with him, forever; but my word is obviously not as good as Chief Joseph's. He is wounding me by spreading his mendacious misrepresentations to the point that I must respond. He is also threatening me, with his malevolent baseness. That is the reason that he wrote that one message as private mail, not so that you readers would not have to suffer through more of his, and yes my, garbage. It is patently evident that he wrote that message so that he could threaten me and you readers would not know about it, and that is the only reason that I went public with it back to you. Then he tries to cover up his abhorrent conduct by trying to make you believe that he was trying to SAVE YOU from suffering as a labor of love. That is the only message that he has sent privately, and he did it so that you would not find out what he had done. I am sure that most of you can see through crass deception, you are smarter than that. And by the by way, thanks, to the many of you that have written in support, even if most of you do not want to take on the powers to be by expressing your feelings in public - keep it up, I will be most discreet. It takes a sick mind to do things like that. I further believe that Perry may be libeling me by asserting that Adam has already cracked my algorithm. Although I have now told him 22 times that is a falsehood, he insists on repeating it, even after it has been denied by Adam. That is a factoidal jactitation as evidenced below. One writer today told me that Adam, John Pettitt and Paul Bradley had cracked both my algorithms in one day, and that the new one was worse than the old one, and that Perry Metzger had personally confirmed it. At least, unlike some readers, he had part of the message right, the part about two algorithms. The current algorithm web page has now been visited by over 4,500 people and all of them know that Perry is engaged in some sort of propaganda campaign to spread disinformation for some purpose because the algorithm has almost nothing, just a tiny fragment, to do with what has been posted previously. And as all of you readers tuned in at that time know, you were told that that was not the algorithm and never has been. I question whether Perry may have a pecuniary interest in these affairs? Does Perry have an insider, or other position, or interest in one or more of the RSA interest? Does he have any interest in PGP, Inc., though I rather doubt that? I am making no allegations, I am only asking the question of why he would deliberately set out on a campaign of disinformation without arming himself with the truth, it is so easy all he has to do is go to the web site and see for himself. Instead, he ignores that and engages in propaganda. Why? At least Hal Finney had the intellectual, and moral honesty to disclose that he was now a part of the PGP Inc, team. In any event to clear up any misunderstanding, let us examine what my ALLEGED algorithm was, and compare it to the actual algorithm. > Adam > | > The algorithm is: > | > > | > for ( ; ; ) { > | > for (i=0; i<63; i++) { > | > a[i] = (a[i] + b[i]) % c[i]; > | > d = (d + a[i]) & 255; > | > *data++ ^= d; /* xor with data */ > | > } > | > } > | > > > As I have told Perry and Paul, both several times, at the time it was first reported and later, and indirectly to all of you several times, the above algorithm is not the algorithm posted at: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html All anyone would have to do to determine that is to take a few seconds and look. Yet Perry and Paul, did not do that, instead they spread the malevolent message around that they have broken the algorithm. In Paul's case, it may just be confusion resulting from Perry's incessant jabberwocky. To those of you who might want to know the truth, I have been forced into the position of taking your time to disclose the algorithm here, The algorithm to follow, is the only one that has ever existed, as most readers should know but do not because of nazi like propaganda. In a highly abbreviated form, only to show how stupid this argument about which algorithm is which, the actual algorithm is: A highly condensed version of the Eureka Algorithm: Given a key, user, message, etal specific parameter set derived from a truly random key, in this instance, 256 bytes long, 10^616 entropy, then : All of the parameters below, vary with each generator key, except where the variance is limited by range factors - for instance, there are only 49 to 79 possible Juncture Values, JV values, so that number must be one of those corresponding values. Starting values derived from the key, as modified by message number and other variables. That is slightly in excess of 2^54 possibilities for the initial D1, D2, D3, and D4 values, the differential variables. D1 = 1,691 D2 = 1,194 D3 = 3,564 D4 = 483 JV = 34 (I) A(I) B(I) C(I) 0 11908 7109 17581 1 2252 11863 16589 .................................. ................................. 51 14544 9349 17964 52 15759 11836 17021 And the three tables: DISP, Displacement Table - a table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DIFF, Diffusion Table - a second independent table of the values 0 through 4095, randomly scrambled, by the hardware sourced truly random key. DETR, Determinate Table, a third independent table of 16 sets of the ASCII values, 0 through 255. EXKEY is an 8192 byte key expanded from the 256 byte key, thus only 2^2048 bits of entropy, at the most. IN PSEUDO CODE, the algorithm for medium level security, level 5, is: LEV5 SECURITY I=0 DO DO JV=JV+1 IF JV=53 THEN JV=0 REM JV<53 is for Level 5, it ranges from 49 to 79. A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2)<<8 D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I))=BUF(DIFF(I)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D3)))) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1))<<8 D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+1))=BUF(DIFF(I+1)) XOR (F+(DETR(DISP(D4)))) REMARK SWAP D1 AND D4, and D2 AND D3 so that the REMARK SELECTION COUNTERS ARE NEVER CONGRUENTIAL, EVEN REMARK FOR TWO SUCCESSIVE SELECTIONS SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 REMARK SWAP VALUES IN BOTH THE DISPLACEMENT TABLE AND REMARK THE DETERMINATE TABLE TO INSURE THAT THE TABLES REMARK CONSTANTLY MUTATING - THEY ARE NEVER STATIC REMARK CANNOT CHANGE THE DIFFUSION TABLE UNTIL REMARK DIFFUSION HAS BEEN COMPLETE FOR 8192 BYTES SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REM REM - A NEAR DUPLICATE BUTTERFLY SECTION TO INSURE THAT REM - EVEN AND ODD CHARACTERS CANNOT BE BLOCKED REM DO JV = JV + 1 IF JV = 53 THEN JV=0 A(JV)=(A(JV)+B(JV)) MOD C(JV) WHILE (A(JV) AND 16384) = 1 D1=(D1+A(JV)) AND 4095 D2=DISP((D2+D1) AND 4095) F=DETR(D2) D3=(D3+D2) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+2))=BUF(DIFF(I+2)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D3))<<8)+F) D1=(D1+D3) AND 4095 F=DETR(DISP(D1)) D4=(D4+D1) AND 4095 BUF(DIFF(I+3))=BUF(DIFF(I+3)) XOR ((DETR(DISP(D4))<<8)+F) REMARK SWAP AS BEFORE EXCEPT USE DIFFERENT D VALUES SWAP D1,D4 SWAP D2,D3 SWAP DETR(D1),DETR(D3) SWAP DISP(D2),DISP(D4) REMARK CANNOT SWAP DIFFUSION TABLE VALUES BUT WE CAN REMARK MUTATE THE KEY SOME MORE, SO THAT WE CAN REMARK EVENTUALLY RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE SWAP EXKEY(D2),EXKEY(D3) I = I + 4 WHILE I < 4096 REMARK IF JV<16 THEN RESCRAMBLE THE DIFFUSION TABLE REMARK THIS WILL HAPPEN APPROXIMATELY 30% OF THE TIME LONG IF JV < 16 I=0,M=4096 DO SEL=(SEL+EXKEY(I+2300)) MOD M SWAP DIFF(I),DIFF(I+SEL) I=I+1 M=M-1 WHILE I<4095 END IF Now I ask a candid world. Is that the same algorithm as the one Perry says that Adam broke, the first one above? Is it the same one that Paul claims to have broken as detailed in his message? Both claim that they are one and the same. Are they? You can see the answer know the answer to that. This is just an example of how the haughty eyed will use their malevolence to intimidate the rest of you. I belive that Perry is deliberately distorting the truth, as this proves. Paul on the other hand, may only be confused by Metzger's montgolfiering. The above algorithm has been condensed considerably to show that it is not the one that Perry and Paul are referring to at all. If you are going to analyze it in any depth, go to the web site and work with the full algorithm, that is URL: www.netprivacy.com/algo.html If you have questions from the brief description set out above, visit the web site and I believe that your questions will be cleared up. There are also almost 200 megabytes of raw encryptor stream output at the site, you do not need known plain text, it is there for all to see. What is the key that generated the text, or what is the next 100 characters of encryptor stream for messages 1 through 6? Bet you cannot figure it out! How about the cryptogram? Montgolfiering aka P Information = P log_base_infinity P Most of you have it figured out, n'est pas? With every best wish, Don Wood > >

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U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 03:50:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: U.S. crypto-czar appointment -- "Crypto Imperalism" in HotWired http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/ HotWired, The Netizen Global Network Crypto Imperialism by Declan McCullagh, Kenneth Neil Cukier, and Brock N. Meeks Washington, DC, 23 October The US offensive for international controls on strong encryption will soon become a fusillade. In the next week, the Clinton administration is set to create the position of a roving ambassador whose job will be to marshal international support for a controlling new US crypto policy, the Netizen has learned. The crypto-czar will lobby foreign governments to change their laws to comply with the US regulations announced on 1 October, which temporarily allow businesses to export slightly stronger data-scrambling applications if they pledge to develop a "key recovery" system. In such a system, a still-undefined "trusted third party" would hold the unscrambling key to any encryption, and could be forced to give it over to law enforcement officials with a warrant. The catch, of course, is that such a system permits continued government access to encrypted communications. But for that plan to work, an international "key recovery" framework must be established. "What we need to do very clearly is to spend a lot of time with other countries," William Reinsch, the US Department of Commerce's undersecretary for export administration, told The Netizen. Reinsch said the newly annointed crypto ambassador would be responsible for helping these countries move "in the same direction" as the US by "helping facilitate that process and helping to reach any agreements that need to be reached between us and them." Reinsch said the position would defy the label "crypto-czar," because the position isn't "a czar in the policy sense.... We don't envision this person as one who would be giving a lot of speeches on the subject and operating as a kind of public defender of the process." Rather, the person would work within "a context which is largely private, not public," Reinsch said. The president can confer the rank of ambassador on a political appointee for up to six months without Senate confirmation, the State Department said. And with ambassadorial rank, the czar will be able to speak for the president. The administration is currently considering a "short list" of candidates "in the low single digits," drawn from current government employees and private citizens, Reinsch said. If a current government employee is chosen, he or she would be at the ambassadorial level, he said, and the crypto duties would simply become an additional responsibility. If chosen from the private sector, it will be someone with "significant stature," Reinsch said. That person would have "a close association with the administration and the president and would be viewed by the other countries as a senior representative who could speak for the president with some confidence," Reinsch said. If a private citizen is chosen, they would "do it for free and we'd pick up the travel I guess." The announcement should come "fairly quickly," he said. "I would hope next week we could ice this one." This bypasses the ongoing public debate in Congress over lifting crypto export controls through legislation - Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Montana) has pledged to keep fighting next year - and in the OECD, says Marc Rotenberg, the director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. "This is backdooring the backdoor." While others - notably Clint Brooks and Mike Nelson - have played the role of crypto spokesperson before, this move represents a redoubling of the administration's plans to impose its will internationally. Yet international observers say the United States may find its plans thwarted in the global arena, where many governments - already uneasy about America imposing its hegemony on regional politics - will likely resist another cryptocrat, even if the person comes with an ambassador's honorific before his or her name. "Europe would consider that unacceptable and arrogant, no question," says Simon Davies, director of Privacy International and a fellow at the London School of Economics. "There would certainly be a backlash, and it would cause immense suspicion. This whole business has become extremely sleazy, and the Americans appear to have taken it all very personally. I would be very surprised if it was taken seriously here." Viktor Mayer-Schvnberger at the University of Vienna Law School, an expert on international crypto policy, said that "if the US ups the ante and brings in a sort of a quasi-diplomatic person to push European countries further, I think we'll see tremendous arm-twisting." "It may backfire," says Mayer-Schvnberger. "The US put tremendous pressure on Europe and that is going to increase if the US government makes such a bold move as to appoint someone to do nothing but lobby for key escrow." Many countries, he said, "have been very apprehensive of the US coming in as the 'big guy' and telling the world what is good and what is bad" regarding encryption. ###

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ecash press release
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 11:40:27 +1000 (EST) From: Andreas Furche <afurche(a)cs.newcastle.edu.au> To: Tom Wills <twills(a)commerce.net> cc: e-payments(a)commerce.net Subject: ecash press release MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-e-payments(a)python.commerce.net Precedence: bulk +--------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: e-payments(a)commerce.net +--------------------------------------------------+ For General Release 24 October 1996 ADVANCE BANK FIRST TO PROVIDE DIGICASH'S ECASH(tm) SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA Advance Bank and DigiCash Pty Ltd today announced that Advance will be the first bank in the Asia-Pacific region to issue electronic cash on the Internet. Advance will issue ecash denominated in Australian dollars in a move that will greatly benefit Internet commerce in Australia by making secure payments on the network a reality. The system will be piloted with Advance Bank and BankSA customers and merchants. Other licensees of the ecash system include Mark Twain Bank (USA), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Merita Bank/EUnet (Finland) and Posten (Sweden). Currently, shopping on the Internet usually requires the sending of credit card details over computer networks but credit card transactions are relatively expensive and therefore are not efficient for low value purchases. DigiCash's patented ecash system allows payment of amounts as low as one cent, and all payments are made with the security technology currently used by large financial institutions for international money transfers. "This launch in Australia represents an important collaboration between the premier electronic cash company and the leading Internet bank in a country that is very advanced in Internet usage," said Dr. David Chaum, inventor of electronic cash and founder of DigiCash. He added "Internet users have come to understand the unique ability of the ecash electronic cash system to empower them, using their own computers, to protect their own privacy. And leading banks in the region, and globally, are beginning to observe this and see the strategic importance of operating their own electronic cash systems." "Advance Bank is reinforcing its position as Australia's leading Internet bank with this move. Our customers can already use Internet Banking to access statements of accounts, transfer money between accounts and pay bills. Now, Internet Banking will be complemented by electronic cash, realising the concept of the virtual ATM on the Internet," said David Brown, Advance's head of Public Affairs. Ecash is the only Internet payment system that creates actual electronic cash. This concept increases security and reduces transaction costs. It gives more control to the user of the system and provides consumer privacy. It also helps the merchant, as payments are authenticated and finalised at the time of purchase, avoiding uncertainty and delays in payment. The system is a great opportunity for merchants selling low cost goods, information and services online. Andreas Furche, Managing Director of DigiCash Pty Ltd, said: "This is particularly good news for companies wanting to sell digital goods such as information, software, or database access. These merchants can set up shops that automatically provide services and collect money. "Since even low value payments are possible, newspapers could, for example, sell digital versions of their different sections separately, so that the user could choose to buy only the business and the sport sections, or even single articles at a time," he said. Advance Bank and DigiCash Pty Ltd expect to make ecash available to users of Advance Bank's Internet Banking system by Christmas. Advance Bank has prepared an information kit for merchants and companies interested in selling their goods and services for electronic cash over the Internet. This can be obtained from Advance's web site at: www.advance.com.au/advance/ecash/ Further Information: David Brown Advance Bank Head of Public Affairs Telephone: 02 9236 1050 Andreas Furche Managing Director DigiCash Pty Ltd Telephone: 02 9375 2316 DIGICASH BACKGROUND - www.digicash.com History and Mission Since beginning operation in April 1990, DigiCash's mission and primary activity has been: to develop and license payment technology products - chip card, software only, and hybrid-- that both show the true capability of technology to protect the interests of all participants and are competitive in the market. Founder Dr David Chaum, Chairman of DigiCash, received his Ph. D. in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley. He taught at New York University Graduate School of Business Administration and at the University of California, and headed the Cryptography Group at CWI, the Dutch nationally- funded centre for research in mathematics and computer science, before taking his current position. He has published over 45 original technical articles on cryptography and also founded the International Association for Cryptologic Research. DigiCash Products Blue: smart card technology for EMV 7 prepaid with dynamic public key Conforms to joint Europay, Mastercard, Visa specifications; multiple applications, including loyalty and closed systems; superior data integrity in case of malicious/accidental interference/interruption; requires only the smallest and most proven chips, e.g. SC-24 or ST601; mask technology licensing. Cafe: smart card and card-accepting electronic wallet project Consortium of 12 other members founded and chaired by Dr. Chaum of DigiCash; simulation, mask and first readers developed by DigiCash; technology trial at the EC headquarters building in participation with related open special interest group and partially funded by the EC. DyniCash highway-speed road-toll collection system using smart cards Chip card inserts into battery-powered dashboard unit; reflected backscatter microwave technology by industry leader Amtech; prepaid mode has user privacy; open and/or closed pricing schemes; tested extensively in Japan; non-exclusive licensing of the payment technology. Ecash* software only electronic cash system for Internet/email Users download software that can make and receive payments; protects users' money like travellers cheques and privacy like coins; now operational after testing by over twenty thousand users world-wide; Macintosh, MS-Windows and X- Windows; any WWW browser; currently Mark Twain Bank issues ecash* in US dollars and Merita/EUnet issues digital Finnish marks; Deutsche Bank has licensed ecash* to issue electronic Deutsche Mark. Posten has announced their license and intention to issue Swedish Kroner. Facility Card: complete facility management, smart- card/reader system Cash replacement, access control, and time/attendance system; now in schools, hospitals, industry, offices, recreation; interfaces to vending, point-of-sale, access control, copiers, phones, gaming; downloadable 7 upgradeable readers work on-line and/or off-line; over 100k cards in use in the Netherlands; Mars Electronics International will launch it globally later this year. How does ecash* work? Using ecash* is like using a virtual ATM (Automatic Teller Machine). When you connect over the Internet and authenticate your ownership of the account, you can withdraw money electronically. Instead of giving you bank notes, you are given digital cash which your software can store on your PC's hard disk. When you want to make a payment, you simply confirm the amount, payee and description of goods. Then with a mouse click you tell your ecash* software to transfer cash of the correct value from your PC direct to the payee. Merchants (ranging from casual participants in the global Internet bazaar to mega-retailers) can then deposit the digital cash into their accounts. Behind the user interface, your computer actually creates 'serial' numbers for the electronic cash based on a random 'seed'. Then it hides them in special encryption 'envelopes', sends them to the electronic bank for 'signature' and, when they are returned, removes the 'envelopes' (retaining the bank's validating digital signature on the 'serial' numbers). This way, when the bank eventually receives your cash, it cannot recognise them as coming from any particular withdrawal or account' because all cash are hidden from the bank during the withdrawal process. Therefore the bank cannot know when or where you shop, who you pay or what you buy. The serial number of each signed coin is unique, so that the bank can be sure that it never accepts the same coin twice. If you wish to identify the recipient of any of your payments, you may reveal the unique coin number and use your ecash* software to prove that you created it and set the bank to confirm who deposited it. Your software can also re-create the serial numbers and 'envelopes' from the 'seed' that you wrote down when installing your account, thereby allowing all your cash to be re-created if your PC fails. How safe is Ecash*? Security is fundamental to electronic cash. The cryptographic coding that protects every 5 cent ecash payment is the same as that routinely relied upon for authenticating requests to move huge sums between banks and even for national security. But in principle ecash goes beyond such communications security to achieve true multiparty security; no one (buyer, seller, bank) can cheat anyone else, no matter how they might modify their own software. Even if two parties collude, they cannot cheat the third. Replacing paper and cash with ecash* would make life harder for criminals. Because the payer's computer chooses the 'serial' numbers of the cash as mentioned above), users can identify receivers of their ecash*. Moreover, the privacy which ecash offers would be essential to widespread acceptance of any electronic payment system. -- Andreas Furche Level 29 Chifley Towers Managing Director 2 Chifley Square DigiCash Pty. Ltd. Sydney 2000, Australia e-mail: andreas(a)digicash.com ph +61 2 375 2316 mobile (0419) 385 569 (NEW number!) fax +61 2 375 2121 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This message was sent by e-payments(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Your Inquiry
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr. Mr. Random Nerd: We receive numerous inquires and apologize for the delay in response. So here it is...the long awaited reply.......

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In-Line Skating Safety and Courtesy
by WEB Tech #5 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message: You have to do something about your products users. Some sort of responsible behaviour training. Here is a rant I made some months ago to a bicycle specific mailing list. (btw, my hand is still in pain) I am now convinced that there must be something about either cycling specific shoes, clipless pedal cleats, or perhaps the little mirror I have on my helmet that attracts users of inline skates so strongly that they crash into me. I used to think that it was a property of the bicycle, until last night. I went for an evening ride, and stopped to listen to some bagpipe players practicing in a local park last night. My bike was 10 feet away, leaning against a tree. I was standing off the path, on a place where the paving had been widened to accommodate a manhole. A skater was skating backwards, and ran into me, knocking me over. I jammed several fingers landing (officially hyperextention of a long list of Latin words). My hand is now in a brace, and since I already have chronic tendinitis, it may well be the better part of a year before it returns to its normal level of pain. I have no idea who the skater is, he picked himself up, and sprinted off, before I had a chance to get up myself, let alone time to offer my speculations on his parentage, and level of intelligence. (I suppose he was displaying some intelligence, for if I knew who he was, I would bring a charge of battery against him, in addition to a civil action that would include the maker of the skates. Not knowing who it was, or what brand of skates he wore makes such actions much more difficult.) I had to ride the remaining three miles home with my left (small favor, at least I can still write) arm on my lap. What particularly gets me about the clown last night, is that he was being spectacturaly irresponsible. This is a fairly popular park, and this was a busy time for a weekday. He shouldn't have been skating at speed on the path, let alone not facing the direction of travel. While I would have preferred that he instead have hit a brick wall, I at least had comparable mass to him, and still have reasonable bone strength, even if my tendons are in poor shape. Had he hit one of the parks frailer users, the result could have included a broken hip, or worse. (it is popular with seniors, who often take their evening constutional 4 abreast across the path.) I don't ride thru it normally (I'm not gonna take out someones grandmother), and in fact had walked my bike to listen to the pipers. When I have complained about problem interactions with skaters before, it was suggested that part of the problem was that I was using the bike path, as they aren't safe for bicyles any more. Well on Sunday, I came up behind two skaters on the road, in single file, climbing a hill. I made the usual "passing left" cry, and started to pass. The second skater was headphone equipped, and thus apparently didn't hear me. He started to pass the lead skater as my front wheel pulled alongside. His skate struck my wheel, luckily at ground level. That is when he became aware of my presence. We both managed to remain upright, and I swerved further out into the traffic lane (I had checked for oncoming cars before starting to pass. The skater didn't). Again, no apology was offered by the skater, I suggested that wearing headphones weren't a good idea on the street, he made an obscene reply. At this point, I am very tempted to switch from my current long wheelbase, fairly low bottom bracket recumbent bike, to a short wheelbase recumbent with a high bottom bracket (a design that places the pedals and chainwheels at the very front of the bike about 25 to 30 inches off the ground), and equip it with an extra "chainring", a 14" carbide tipped one from that well known bike parts maker Black & Decker. The electric bell that I have mounted inside the bar is clearly inaudible, even at times to those that aren't blocking out the world. I have heard speculation on a "lower pitch" air horn that operates off a water bottle filled with compressed air. (the message they convey is _LARGE TRUCK_ not bicycle). (of course that wouldn't have helped with the incident that prompted me to dictate this rant. Some of your users have clearly taken too many falls without a helmet. Others just don't have a clue about rules of the road. I repeatedly have problems with skaters that make sudden U turns without looking, nor was this the first time I have had a problem with a skater skating in the direction they did not face. (I was riding, they were oncoming, I was able to evade by putting my bike into the drainage ditch beside the path). SECOND Message: I just read your "asphalt bites" safety tips. NOT ONCE DOES IT MENTION OTHER VEHICLES AND RULES OF THE ROAD. It talks about saving the riders skin, but not that of the other users of the space they inflict themselves on. No mention is made about operating at night, etc. You don't suggest a mirror, and the "quiz" that tells people to ditch the headphones isn't mentioned on the page. This is truly irresponsible, and I hope some jury suitably penalizes you for your stupid actions. Since I wish to retain my anonymity, please send the reply to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, and I will see it. No, I don't want an apology, I want notice that the web page, and product packaging has been updated, stressing that inline skaters need to learn to a: share, b: be aware of other traffic (don't U turn into the path of another user, look before making any sudden change of direction or lane) c: don't come to a sudden stop in the middle of a mixed use "bike" path because a friend was coming the other direction, and you stopped to chat, d: operate "predictably" so if nothing else the other users can take steps to avoid you. e: ditch the tunes, f: have at least one set of eyes facing the direction you are travelling (yes, you can ride backwards, but you have to have someone spotting for you for the whole time) g: stay out of the lane that is for oncoming traffic -- if the path is narrow (like most rail trails) this means ride in single file. REPLY FROM ROLLERBLADE INC. Dear Mr. Random Nerd: Thank you for your e-mail message concerning in-line skating safety and more specifically, the "rules of the road". Public trails are used for many types of sporting activities (walking, biking, skating etc.). What the issue becomes is that all of us must learn to be courteous to other types of users, much like on public roadways which are utilized by cars, trucks, and motorcycles where everyone must adhere to a common set of rules. Regarding your issue with Rollerblade Inc., we feel that your anger towards us is misdirected. A good analogy to help me illustrate the issue for you would be this: if a person walking down the road throws a McDonalds wrapper on the ground, is McDonalds littering? It is up to us all to be skating (and biking) ambassadors who educate those who are beginners about the "rules of the road (trails)". Just as there are problems with uncourteous skaters, there are also uncourteous bikers out there who choose not to follow these rules. Rollerblade recognized early on the importance of safety education in creating this sport. We helped to create and, along with numerous other in-line skate manufacturers, heavily support an industry wide organization called the IISA (International In-Line Skating Association). The IISA has several programs like the Instructor Certification Program, and the National Skate Patrol that are aimed at educating skaters. National Skate Patrol members are much like National Ski Patrol members with obvious differences based on the specific activity. Members skate local parks and trails to be of assistance to skaters and to educate beginning skaters about safety and "the rules". The IISA also publishes "Rules of the Road" which gives tips to skaters about how to legally, and courteously skate. The IISA also helps to promote our "Asphalt Bites" Campaign which details the importance of always wearing protective gear while in-line skating. In addition to the efforts above, all your comments listed in points "a" through "g" are covered in the "Rules of the Road" on page 4 of our Owners Handbook that comes with each pair of Rollerblade skates. I have listed them below for your reference... 1. Always wear protective gear: helmet, wrist guards, knee & elbow pads 2. Take a lesson or learn in-line skating basics, such as controlling speed, turning, braking, stopping before you skate 3. Stay alert. Always skate under control. 4. Stay away from water, oil, debris, sand and uneven or broken pavement 5. Avoid areas with heavy traffic 6. Observe all traffic regulations 7. Skate on the right of the path. When you pass a walker, biker or another skater, move to the left. 8. Never allow yourself to be towed by a motorized vehicle or bicycle. 9. Avoid wearing headphones or anything that makes it hard to hear 10. Never wear anything that blocks your vision, and never skate at night or any time it is hard to see. I hope you come to find that we are as concerned as you about people enjoying public places and the outdoors. In most states, skates and bikes are wheeled vehicles that are subject to the same rules as motorists. Educating people to use public places takes an effort on everyones part. If you would like us to send a copy of our owners manual or any other safety information, please email us with your address. Thanks again...Skate (bike) the World!!! Webtech5 Rollerblade Consumer Service

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Re: NSA Report: Anyone seen this?
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just got off the phone with the NSA. "There are so many places in the NSA that deal with cryptology we haven't been able to find the document yet. We'll call you back once we locate it and let you know if it can be released or not. We've been getting phone calls about the document. Did you read about it on the Internet?" -Declan >--- begin forwarded text > > >Mime-Version: 1.0 >Date: Wed, 23 Oct 1996 16:50:18 -0700 >From: Somebody >Subject: NSA Report >To: rah(a)shipwright.com > > I don't recall seeing this report mentioned in any e$pam items, and > thought you might be interested. Thanks for all your work on the e$ > lists. > ><Somebody's .sig> > >______________________________ Forward Header >__________________________________ >Subject: 21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >Author: "Ledig; Robert" <LEDIGRO(a)ffhsj.com> at internet >Date: 10/17/96 2:51 PM > > > >21st Century Banking Alert No. 96-10-17 >October 17, 1996 > >National Security Agency Report Raises >Systemic Security Issues Related to Anonymous Electronic Money > > > A recent report prepared by the Cryptology Division of the National >Security Agency's Office of Information Security Research and Technology >discusses the potential for security failures in certain electronic cash >systems and their likely consequences. While demonstrating concern over the >attributes of non-traceable electronic money, the report points out methods >that may be used to minimize security breaches and losses, including >limiting the number of coins that can be affected by a single compromise, >requiring traceability for large transactions or large numbers of >transactions in a given period, and the creation of a mechanism to restore >traceability under certain circumstances. The report contains an excellent >summary of basic electronic money cryptographic tools, electronic cash >protocols, authentication and signature techniques and related security >issues. > > > >Copyright 1996. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > All rights reserved. >21st Century Banking Alert is a trademark and servicemark > of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson. > > > >--- end forwarded text > > > >----------------- >Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) >e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson >The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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