December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NOISE] The Doors
by Vipul Ved Prakash 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Doors was not only about freedom and love, but about crypto too! Notice these lines from the song "Five to One" Old [cipher] gets old and young get stronger May take a week baby, may take longer [to crack] they've [clinton] got the guns and we've got the numbers gonna win we will take 'em over, com'on. :) - Vipul -- Vipul Ved Prakash | - Electronic Security & Crypto vipul(a)pobox.com | - Internet & Intranets 91 11 2247802 | - Web Development & PERL 198 Madhuban IP Extension | - Linux & Open Systems Delhi, INDIA 110 092 | - (Networked) Multimedia

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by Jon Lebkowsky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:06 PM 9/2/96 -0700, James A. Donald wrote: >At 06:52 AM 9/3/96 -0500, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >> "Uncompromising" is not an "element of legislative influence," at least not >> on this planet. >Therefore the correct strategy is simply to attack any politician who shows >any interest in legislating on our issues. > >We have no friends on Capitol hill, and if we did have friends, it would >still be necessary to denounce them as enemies. As I said, on *this* planet. -- Jon Lebkowsky http://www.well.com/~jonl jonl(a)hotwired.com

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SRP (from the cutting-room floor)
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

JAM> Rather than divert messages, then, I propose that for each input JAM> message there is a 10% chance that a piece of cover traffic is JAM> generated. AB> The way that this kind of attack is frustrated is that dummy messages AB> are created as cover traffic by the remailer, and that at some points AB> messages can be swallowed by a remailer as junk messages. Automatic decoy traffic was in my draft, but was not in the slimmed-down document I posted to CP. This was mainly because Lance Cottrell and I agreed on that bit, and thought it could be passed over. Unlike JAM, I was in favour of decoy traffic being _inversely_ related to genuine traffic. AB> You can still do a spamming attack by recognizing the destination, AB> rather than the message: Diversion was intended to make that harder too. Eve's messages won't all go straight where she wants them. They should turn up after some of them completed the diversion, but I suggested that would sometimes be too late to track it further through the chain. As for "messages can be swallowed by a remailer as junk messages", there's a catch for the unwary in that. See below. TCM> Note that merely fiddling around with probabilities of transmission, such TCM> as described above, will not be enough. This just adds a layer of noise, TCM> which will disappear under a correlation analysis. Kelsey wrote on 28th June about correlating messages at the points of entry & exit from the remailer network. I don't know what an attacker gains by correlating _inside_ the net. Here are the bits I omitted before. DECOY MESSAGES The sending of decoy messages by users is recommended, and serves to hide statistical correlations between your sending a message and somebody receiving one. This practice should continue. It is also desirable that a remailer be able to originate decoy messages itself. Advantages include better traffic load following. The remailer knows when traffic is light and can generate more decoys. This could be important at times of low traffic such as public holidays. It would be especially important during a denial-of-service attack. When an attacker prevents messages from reaching the remailer (in the hope of isolating a small number of target messages) a locally-produced set of decoys, immune from the denial-of-service, could be crucial. DESTINATION Addressing all automatic decoys ultimately to "nobody" would ensure that they circulate in the network and then disappear. Nonconservation of message number should prove annoying to an eavesdropper. (An implementation detail on this will be mentioned later.) Addressing some of them outside the network, to test newsgroups for instance might also be useful - confusing an attacker looking at the point of exit. NUMBER A possible means of matching the traffic would be to use an exponential- along the lines of those in thermodynamics. decoys = max ( D.exp(-kT) , E ) The "max" operator here ensures that every time a batch of messages is sent a minimum number of decoys will be included. Values for the constants can doubtless be suggested by remailer operators familiar with the traffic load. ..... SILENT SPAMMING Re-encryption as discussed here will not do any good if remailers allow "silent spamming". To exploit this feature the attacker addresses his messages to "nobody" (or "null" in Mixmaster jargon). These mails fill the message pool, sweeping out all the target messages, but when they come to be sent they disappear. They do not show on the net, they do not need to be recognised and eliminated from the search. All the attacker sees leaving the spammed host is undiluted target mail. Obviously the remailer should detect messages of this type and process them without storing them in the message pool. Any message that will not be delivered to a remote host comes into this category, including those to most local accounts. I briefly examined the source of 2.0.3 (from ftp://utopia.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/remailer on 11 July 1996) and could not find code to deal with this attack. [Cottrell tells me this is on the to-do list.] -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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PKS RFC Project
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For anyone who is interested in contributing to our experimental RFC for public key servers, I set up a little mailing list for discussion. pks-rfc(a)charon.gti.net To subscribe, send a message to pks-rfc-request(a)charon.gti.net with "subscribe" in the subject field. mark - -- Mark Rogaski | Why read when you can just sit and | Member GTI System Admin | stare at things? | Programmers Local wendigo(a)gti.net | Any expressed opinions are my own | # 0xfffe wendigo(a)pobox.com | unless they can get me in trouble. | APL-CPIO -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMiyToBz4pZwIaHjdAQGxTQf+Pvz6tFzbncPkbj2QX6awMjVZiYcAknQx /n6JWGFpImCs+/WZJOqesUMWUXA2/Iwg1un2djZ5n8xsQKvcRzHrKwo3C8ZV9ECn KuDJe/y2ZeU5sOSvqyyDATUxSUstj4CwhTES5/OD2NcuIKkVPW/h4Gtoo5ZuPp3D wWdHjsuZ2tAZACvICpNvq3wHu2bW4Skv4p/BQeJFfRtGst/blmHrprFjjnlIXIUs yF2S60DilGjIkcAtljGbI0VgH3O8Ra2HM4pTx/bDh86YTx8SKuOiZ6KbJwZl81yt uEwkhdKrfQkp5M3FgfS1k1sIWjIm3K5u1osIqcTrTem5a1eivXqx/w== =EvkN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by hack5＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

their is a new mailing list for all you hackers just email your name or handle and e-mail address and youll be subscribed send information to hack5(a)juno.com

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Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This post may be fwd'd to the CP list if it does not show up there from my sending it.] Bill Stewart typed: > While nobody's called Esther Dyson a Communist here yet, there are > people on the board I disagree with - Mitch Kapor, in particular, has shown who is no longer on the board > signs of being a (gasp!) Democrat! My initial reaction to the EFF's first Democrat v. Republican is largely irrelevant here, though more relevant when you get into infrastructure, universal access, and intellectual property issues - stuff that EFF has touched on here and there, but which is not at the heart of our mission. There are other democrats on our board and staff, as well as Republicans. Even Kapor, however, is very strongly for competition, for entrepreneurs, for markets, and ergo differs from a lot of Democrats in that regard. And no one at EFF that I know of is an extreme liberal or conservative on social issues (both extremes are very censorious - the right of "ungodly" things, and the left of "un-p.c." things). So, again, I'd like to suggest that political party affiliation is approaching meaninglessness. The political axis that counts isn't l. vs. r., but civil libertarian v. authoritarian. No one at EFF is an authoritarian. > year or two was that they were doing some very good things > (the Steve Jackson defense), That was quite a bit more than a year or two ago. :) > and also had people making speeches about > the need to provide everybody with access to the Information SuperHighway. > Getting the S.266 anti-crypto-pro-wiretapping bill killed a few years > ago was what convinced me to join them, though their compromise positions > on some of the other anti-freedom bills since then have not helped > my mixed views of the organization. There were no compromise positions. We have 100% opposed implementation of such legislation. In the case of the Digital Telephony Bill (the later version of S.266, drafted by the FBI), we were simply unable to stop it, and instead had to try to strip as much FBI wish list out of it as possible and insert privacy protections. That's not a compromise, that's emergency action. We did everything we could. We are too, for numerous reasons. > Maybe. If it's a good position, it will recognize that anonymity > is a mixed blessing; there are people who use it creatively and > responsibly, like Black Unicorn and Lucky Green, and there are > spammers who abuse it to the detriment of society, like the slimeball > who used my remailer to post hatemail to the gay newsgroups with > somebody else's name attached to the bottom. On the other hand, > free speech is also a mixed blessing; there _are_ things I wish people Such a position is likely to be the one EFF takes if it takes one, which is probable. EFF in generally does not issue extremist position statements, but is careful to examine the risks as well as the benefits, and look for pro-liberty solutions to those risks. > had the good taste not to say, but I'm not going to get in Voltaire's > way while he defends to the death their right to say them... Just as an aside, in case anyone's interested, what Voltaire actually said was, "I never approved either the errors of his book, or the trivial truths he so vigorously laid down. I have, however, stoutly taken his side when absurd men have condemned him for these same truths." The "defend to the death his right to say it" paraphrase is an embellishment. :) -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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Re: Voting Monarchist?
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri, err, Dr. Vulis, or is that Dr. Nuri?, Relax! The modern cure for hydrophobia is a great deal less painful than what it was in the past >Harry Brone is a fucking statist. If he weren't, he wouldn't be running >for president. Anyone who doesn't advocate killing all kings, presidents, >and prime ministers is a fucking statist and should be beaten to a pulp >with a rattan stick.

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Re: The Esther Dyson Flap
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:42 AM 9/3/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >However, as I said, if the top spokesman at EFF gives indication of having >views pretty much 180 degrees out of phase with our views, it's likely >we'll speak up and oppose her (or him), and perhaps even suggest that other >EFF board members look into the matter. "Free speech" is not even an issue. Everyone please take a deep breath. Slow down. Reread Esther's comments. Count to 10. Notice that nowhere does she call for state action to outlaw anonymity. She explicitly predicted a place for anonymity in her CFP'95 talk (is it on the Net anywhere?). We may disagree with her predictions of the future scope of anonymity or with her concerns about the risks of the practice but she has never called for State action. She is discussing the problems she perceives with it. That's all. Poor Esther, Forbes swatted her last week for her prediction that the Net kills copyright and now some of us are swatting her for her prediction that many of the future Net transactions will be non-anonymous. She may be wrong in this prediction but so what. Remember she is from the soft left. She is not a macho-flash radical libertarian like many of us. Save the 155 MM howitzers for the armed opposition not for our allies. DCF

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The Vincennes shootdown
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FACT #1 The U.S.S. Vincennes was under attack by gunboats of Iraq's Republican guard at the time of the unfortunate incident. (All bets are off) FACT #2 Intelligence believed the Republicican guard had it's own version of the "Kamikazi." Fact #3 If I was still a sneaky-ass airwarrior given the mission to take out a vastly superior vehicle like an Aegis class cruiser I would do one of the following: a) set my transponder to the I.D. of a commercial jet, and do my best to fly like it's profile. b) turn my transponder off and "ride tail" (stay directly under and behind the commercial jet, hiding in it's radar sig) till I was within range. Brian

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Forwarded Mail
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From nobody(a)REPLAY.COM Tue Sep 3 12:58:21 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Tue, 03 Sep 96 13:17:51 EDT for dlv Received: from [194.109.9.44] by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA23053 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Tue, 3 Sep 96 12:58:21 -0400 Received: (from replay@localhost) by basement.replay.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id SAA01776 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Tue, 3 Sep 1996 18:58:19 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 18:58:19 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <199609031658.SAA01776(a)basement.replay.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited Xcomm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting Xcomm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)REPLAY.COM> Subject: KILL ALL RUSSIAN IMIGRANTS Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Kill all "libertarians" From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Date: Mon, 02 Sep 96 15:48:31 EDT Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From nobody(a)REPLAY.COM Mon Sep 2 12:26:36 1996 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Mon, 02 Sep 96 15:42:57 EDT for dlv Received: from basement.replay.com by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA18013 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Mon, 2 Sep 96 12:26:36 -0400 Received: (from replay@localhost) by basement.replay.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id SAA11752 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Mon, 2 Sep 1996 18:26:28 +0200 (MET DST) Date: Mon, 2 Sep 1996 18:26:28 +0200 (MET DST) Message-Id: <199609021626.SAA11752(a)basement.replay.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited Xcomm: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting Xcomm: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)REPLAY.COM> Subject: All russians are scum. No exceptions. Return-Path: <cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Sen. Leahy's "impeccable cyberspace credentials" From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Comments: Dole/Kemp '96! Date: Mon, 02 Sep 96 01:19:37 EDT Organization: Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com jonathon <grafolog(a)netcom.com> writes: > On Sun, 1 Sep 1996, James A. Donald wrote: > > > > I agree with what you are saying but not all polititions are that bad. > > > You make it sound as if their are no politisions are for freedom of the > > > net. > > So who is the exception? > > Harry Browne Libertarian Party Candidate. Harry Browne is a fucking statist. All politicians are scum. No exceptions. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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