December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: TLA abuse (?) [non-crypto, mostly]
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David K. Merriman <merriman(a)amaonline.com> wrote: >Officer (sorry, don't recall his rank) Hughes says *he* thinks the models >could conceivably be 18; a judge they showed it to said _she_ thought >(personal opinion) younger. Hence, the forwarding to FBI for quasi-official >determination. Child pornography is illegal, however I don't believe that pictures of nekkid children are always considered to be child pornography (however much small-minded twirps want you to believe that they are). I know several "fundamentalists" who decry what our society has sunk to with images such as David's posted on the net for all to see. I take the opposing view, decrying the idiocy of declaring parts of our own bodies to be obscene. Unfortunately I don't see victory any time soon. Clay *************************************************************************** Clay Olbon II * Clay.Olbon(a)dynetics.com Systems Engineer * PGP262 public key on web page Dynetics, Inc. * http://www.msen.com/~olbon/olbon.html ***************************************************************** TANSTAAFL

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Gorelick testifies before Senate, unveils new executive order
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 17 Jul 1996 15:54:24 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu Subject: Gorelick testifies before Senate, unveils new executive order Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick testified yesterday before Sen. Sam Nunn's cyberscare hearing (take #3), where she ranted about the evils of the Net and unveiled an executive order signed by the president on Monday. Gorelick, the administration's newly-annointed chief Net fearmonger, said: "The executive order is on Federal Information Infrastructure protection... It creates a committee to draft policy and recommend legislation. The order cites two types of threats: physical and cyber." The infrastructure she's talking about isn't government computers; she means the private sector. "Because this infrastructure is privately owned, this [executive order] emphasizes and recognizes the importance of cooperation." That is, cooperation with the fear of government regulation hanging over your head. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which will have an industry advisory panel, has one year to report back with recommendations. Sen. Patrick Leahy testified: "Armed with a modem and a computer, a criminal can wreak havoc on our computers from anywhere in the world. There are no borders in cyberspace... Existing criminal statutes provide a good framework for prosecuting [some] computer offenses... We have to assume we have to update our criminal code." Clinton's executive order also creates a "Infrastructure Protection Task Force," effective immediately, with reps from the FBI, DOD, and NSA. At yesterday's Senate permanent subcommittee on investigations hearing, Gorelick ducked Sen. Nunn's questions about the limits of the task force's authority. But the executive order says the group must: (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, revent, halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service... (v) coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation. "Critical infrastructures" include telecommunications facilities and the Net. -Declan PS: For background, check out: http://www.netizen.com/netizen/96/29/campaign_dispatch0a.html Critical infrastructures: 1. telecommunications; 2. electrical power systems; 3. gas and oil storage and transportation; 4. banking and finance; 5. transportation; 6. water supply systems; 7. emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue); and 8. continuity of government. EXECUTIVE ORDER - - - - - - - CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures ("cyber threats"). Because many of these critical infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector, it is essential that the government and private sector work together to develop a strategy for protecting them and assuring their continued operation. NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Establishment. There is hereby established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection ("Commission"). (a) Chair. A qualified individual from outside the Federal Government shall be appointed by the President to serve as Chair of the Commission. The Commission Chair shall be employed on a full-time basis. (b) Members. The head of each of the following executive branch departments and agencies shall nominate not more than two full-time members of the Commission: (i) Department of the Treasury; (ii) Department of Justice; (iii) Department of Defense; (iv) Department of Commerce; (v) Department of Transportation; (vi) Department of Energy; (vii) Central Intelligence Agency; (viii) Federal Emergency Management Agency; (ix) Federal Bureau of Investigation; (x) National Security Agency. One of the nominees of each agency may be an individual from outside the Federal Government who shall be employed by the agency on a full-time basis. Each nominee must be approved by the Steering Committee. Sec. 2. The Principals Committee. The Commission shall report to the President through a Principals Committee ("Principals Committee"), which shall review any reports or recommendations before submission tot he President. The Principals Committee shall comprise the: (i) Secretary of the Treasury; (ii) Secretary of Defense; (iii) Attorney General; (iv) Secretary of Commerce; (v) Secretary of Transportation; (vi) Secretary of Energy; (vii) Director of Central Intelligence; (viii) Director of the Office of Management and Budget; (ix) Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; (x) Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; (xi) Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. Sec. 3. The Steering Committee of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. A Steering Committee ("Steering Committee") shall oversee the work of the Commission on behalf of the Principals Committee. The Steering Committee shall comprise four members appointed by the President. One of the members shall be the Chair of the Commission and one shall be an employee of the Executive Office of the President. The Steering Committee will receive regular reports on the progress of the Commission's work and approve the submission of reports to the Principals Committee. Sec. 4. Mission. The Commission shall: (a) within 30 days of this order, produce a statement of its mission objectives, which will elaborate the general objectives set forth in this order, and a detailed schedule for addressing each mission objective, for approval by the Steering Committee; (b) identify and consult with: (i) elements of the public and private sectors that conduct, support or contribute to infrastructure assurance; (ii) owners and operators of the critical infrastructures; and (iii) other elements of the public and private sectors, including the Congress, that have an interest in critical infrastructure assurance issues and that may have differing perspectives on these issues; (c) assess the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities of, and threats to, critical infrastructures; (d) determine what legal and policy issues are raised by efforts to protect critical infrastrucutres and assess how these issues should be addressed; (e) recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats and assuring their continued operation; (f) propose any statutory or regulatory changes necessary to effect its recommendations; and (g) produce reports and recommendations to the Steering Committee as they become available; it shall not limit itself to producing one final report. Sec. 5. Advisory Committee to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. (a) The Commission shall receive advice from an advisory committee ("Advisory Committee") composed of no more than ten individuals appointed by the President from the private sector who are knowledgeable about critical infrastructures. The Advisory Committee shall advise the Commission on the subjects of the Commission's mission in whatever manner the Advisory Committee, the Commission Chair, and the Steering Committee deem appropriate. (b) A Chair shall be designated by the President from among the members of the Advisory Committee. (c) The Advisory Committee shall be established in compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App.). The Department of Defense shall perform the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act for the Advisory Committee, except that of reporting to the Congress, in accordance with the guidelines and procedures established by the Administrator of General Services. Sec. 6. Administration. (a) All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Commission and provide such assistance, information, and advice to the Commission as it may request, to the extent permitted by law. (b) The Commission and the Advisory Committee may hold open and closed hearings, conduct inquiries, and establish subcommittees, as necessary. (c) Members of the Advisory Committee shall serve without compensation for their work on the Advisory Committee. While engaged in the work of the Advisory Committee, members may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the government service. (d) To the extent permitted by law, and subject to the availability of appropriations, the Department of Defense shall provide the Commission and the Advisory Committee with administrative services, staff, other support services, and such funds as may be necessary for the performance of its functions and shall reimburse the executive branch components that provide representatives to the Commission for the compensation of those representatives. (e) In order to augment the expertise of the Commission, the Department of Defense may, at the Commission's request, contract for the services of nongovernmental consultants who may prepare analyses, reports, background papers, and other materials for consideration by the Commission. In addition, at the Commission's request, executive departments and agencies shall request that existing Federal advisory committees consider and provide advice on issue sof critical infrastructure protection, to the extent permitted by law. (f) The Commission, the Principals Committee, the Steering Committee, and the Advisory Committee shall terminate 1 year from the date of this order, unless extended by the President prior to this date. Sec. 7. Interim Coordinating Mission. (a) While the Commission is conducting its analysis and until the President has an opportunity to consider and act on its recommendations, there is a need to increase coordination of existing infrastructure protection efforts in order to better address, and prevent, crises that would have a debilitating regional or national impact. There is hereby established an Infrastructure Protection Task Force ("IPTF") within the Department of Justice, chaired by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to undertake this interim coordinating mission. (b) The IPTF will not supplant any existing programs or organizations. (c) The Steering Committee shall oversee the work of the IPTF. (d) The IPTF shall include at least one full-time member each from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency. It shall also receive part-time assistance from other executive branch departments and agencies. Members shall be designated by their departments or agencies on the basis of their expertise in the protection of critical infrastructures. IPTF members' compensation shall be paid by their parent agency or department. (e) The IPTF's function is to identify and coordinate existing expertise, inside and outside of the Federal Government, to: (i) provide, or facilitate and coordinate the provision of, expert guidance to critical infrastructures to detect, revent, halt, or confine an attack and to recover and restore service; (ii) issue threat and warning notices in the event advance information is obtained about a threat; (iii) provide training and education on methods of reducing vulnerabilities and responding to attacks on critical infrastructures; (iv) conduct after-action analysis to determine possible future threats, targets, or methods of attack; and (v) coordinate with the pertinent law enforcement authorities during or after an attack to facilitate any resulting criminal investigation. (f) All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the IPTF and provide such assistance, information, and advice as the IPTF may request, to the extent permitted by law. (g) All executive departments and agencies shall share with the IPTF information about threats and warning of attacks, and about actual attacks on critical infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law. (h) The IPTF shall terminate no later than 180 days after the termination of the Commission, unless extended by the President prior to that date. Sec. 8. General. (a) This order is not intended to change any existing statutes or Executive orders. (b) This order is not intended to create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. (signed) William J. Clinton THE WHITE HOUSE July 15, 1996

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overseas PGPfone and Netscape
by Jean-Paul Kroepfli 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've seen some threads about (1) the new PGPfone, (2) the new US-version of Netscape and leakage. So my question: [Important] Do you know some non-US URL with the latest version of PGPfone for Win? (I monitored the usual European repositories quasi day to day, but it was always the old version) [Less important] Ibid. for the new US-Netscape (with full 128-SSL) (I suppose there is a copyright problem for such a -hum- mirroring) Best regards, Jean-Paul ~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~-~- Jean-Paul et Micheline Kroepfli (our son: Nicolas and daughter: Celine) eMail: JeanPaul.Kroepfli(a)utopia.fnet.fr Also Compuserve and MSNetwork Phone: +33 81 55 52 59 (F) PostMail: F-25640 Breconchaux (France) or: +41 21 843 27 36 (CH) or: CP 138, CH-1337 Vallorbe Fax: +33 81 55 52 62 (Switzerland) Zephyr(r) : InterNet Communication and Commerce, Security and Cryptography consulting PGP Fingerprint : 19 FB 67 EA 20 70 53 89 AF B2 5C 7F 02 1F CA 8F "The InterNet is the most open standard since air for breathing"

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Re: ABC News on internet telephony
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:12 AM 7/19/96 -0500, snow wrote: > It is my understanding that billing is one of the biggest headaches >and expenses for a phone company. Going to a flat rate would solve a >decent amount of that wouldn't it? I've heard it claimed that billing and customer service is half of their costs, at least. If that's the case, then "flat rate" billing can't be far behind. Prodded by "free" Internet phone, they can't avoid it for much longer. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Netscape
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:27 PM 7/20/96 -0700, Tom Weinstein wrote: > Why not consider what the consequences will be? Do you seriously > believe that this will make the government stop enforcing ITAR? Yes: Widespread politically motivated disobedience forces the state to either demonize the disobedient, (as with drug users) or give up enforcement. This is a standard and effective method of forcing the repeal of laws, a method which has had a long record of success for several hundred years. The states cohesion derives from its legitimacy, and threats to legitimacy and cohesion are treated very seriously by government officials. Threatening the states legitimacy is arguably more effective in influencing government behavior than blowing up federal office buildings. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: [Noise] was Re: Giving 6 year old kids Uzi's
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:31 AM 7/20/96 -0400, Brad Dolan wrote: >> Would you just hand out guns to all teenagers? > >My twelve-year-old daughter asked for and received a .22 for her birthday. >Her four and six year old siblings enjoy shooting it, under close >supervision. I learned how to shoot very young. My father taught me, as well as enrolling me in NRA competitions around age 14. They still have high school rifle teams where I used to live as well. But then the culture is quite different towards guns in Alaska than it is here... (For one, people do not view them as toys and/or possessed by evil spirits or the like...) >Rural America has a very different culture than urban America and urban >America's recent attempts to impose its values (like hoplophobia) on us >really chafes. I bet the "National Curfew" crap that Clinton is trying to push is not going down well either. He seems to think that the problems of a small fraction of the country apply to the whole country... (But it makes for good sound bites.) --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon "Microsoft -- Nothing but NT promises."

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Re: Responding to Pre-dawn Unannounced Ninja Raids
by Llywarch Hen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:15 PM 7/21/96 +0000, you wrote: >Again, I am not crusading against guns and armed self-defense, but >I am indeed saying that simply having a firearm at home does not insure >safety and security. You have to go beyind having a gun and get a dog >and/or a metal door. A good fence is also a plus, although may not >always be possible. I'd certainly agree with that, but would like to add that an unloaded gun is of no use and a gun in the nightstand or in the trunk of your car is also of no use. For all cases other than home intrusion, the gun has to be worn -- I recommend a shoulder holster. In the case of home intrusion, one can hope that the intruder has no desire to be successful and permits you to get the drop on him. Perhaps he'll slam the refrigerator door allowing you to fumble around under your pillow for your weapon. I know of people who have walked out of museums with paintings trailing alarm wires -- so let's hope our intruder is an amateur and best of all is scared off by some phony security signs, fake alarm wires, etc. In these parts most guns seemed to be used by the temporarily depressed teenaged children of gun owners. One kid managed to live as a vegetable having successfully removed the source of his unhappiness -- his brain. Tough luck. Pretty hard to aim properly when you are upset. Lesson: keep your cool. Now for street wear I strongly recommend a variety of loads. Probably my favorite is a reversed semi-wadcutter. This puppy is extremely inaccurate since it starts tumbling as it leaves the barrel. At extremely close ranges it'll tear up some flesh and further out it'll walk nastily through outer clothing completely wrecking it for formal wear and continue through enough skin to be damaging. Low on kinetic energy, it will however transfer its entire momentum where it counts. A semi-automatic will not properly feed these, so you gotta be traditional if you are of the big clip persuasion. A few observations: since our hog leg is shoulder-holstered we will need a coat. Now if you want to take a piss, court-houses, airports and a few other public buildings are out. We would feel foolish being tackled and thrown to the floor while hunting for the restroom even if we slipped past security. So here we are, sweating and chafing with a gun and a coat and a urinary tract infection. Feel safe yet? -- Llywarch Hen

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[NOISE] Re: Firewall Penetration
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:29 PM 7/19/96 +0800, Jerome Tan wrote: >Is it possible to penetrate a firewall? Yes, but it requires alot of time and money. (As well as a nice car and a six figure income.) I recommend taking the firewall out to a nice restaurant, feeding it dinner, taking it out for drinks and then back to your house or apartment. If everything works, you should be able to penetrate said firewall. But she will not return your calls in the morning... --- |"Computers are Voodoo -- You just have to know where to stick the pins."| |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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A Snake-Oil FAQ
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've written a short "Snake Oil FAQ" below. It's incomplete and needs some work (adding a few definitions, rewording, aesthetic formatting, etc.), so think of it as a 'beta' FAQ (please don't post it on web pages, though I don't mind if it's distributed among anyone interested in criticizing or contributing). Comments and suggestions would be appreciated. Note that the aim is to write something accessible to 'newbies'. (Jeremy Barrett contributed to this, BTW) Snake-Oil Warning Signs Encryption Software to Avoid (Revision 0.1) Introduction ====================================================================== Good cryptography is an excellent and necessary tool for almost anyone. However, there are a multitude of choices for what products to use. Many good cryptographic products are available, both commercial and free. However there are also some extremely bad cryptographic products (known in the field as "Snake Oil"), which not only fail do their job of providing security, but are based on, and add to, the many misconceptions and misunderstandings surrounding cryptogra phy and security. It is extremely important that users of cryptography actively question the product they are considering using, to insure the security and integrity of their data-- be it personal or business informat ion. In order to make a more informed decision, it is necessary to understand some of the "red flags" to watch out for, and what they mean. For a variety of reasons, this document is general in scope and does not mention specific products or algorithms as being "good" or "Snake Oil". Some Common Snake-Oil Warning Signs ====================================================================== The following are some of the "red flags" one should watch for when looking at an encryption product: Technobabble ------------ The vendor's descrption of the product may contain a lot of hard-to-follow use of technical terms to describe how the product works. If this appears to be confusing nonsesense, it may very well be (even to someone familiar with the terminology). Technobabble is a good means of confusing a potential user and masking the fact that the vendor doesn't understand anything either. A sign of technobabble is a descrption which drops a lot of technical terms for how the system works without actually explaining how it works. New Type of Cryptography? ------------------------- Beware of any vendor who claims to have invented a "new type of cryptography". Avoid software which claims to use 'new paradigms' of computing such as cellular automata, neural nets, genetic algorithms, chaos theory, etc. Just because software uses to different mehtod of computation doesn't make it more secure. Anything that claims to have invented a new public key cryptosystem without publishing the details or underlying mathematical principles is highly suspect. Proprietary Algorithms ---------------------- Avoid software which uses "proprietary" or "secret" algorithms. Security through obscurity is not considered a safe means of protecting your data. If the vendor does not feel confident that the method used can withstand years of scrutiny by the academic community, neither should you. Beware of specially modified versions of well-known algorithms. This may unintentionally weaken the cipher. The use of a trusted algorithm, along with technical notes explaining the implementation (if not availablity of the source code for the product) are a sign of good faith on the part of the vendor that you can take apart and test the implementation yourself. Old Ciphers Never Die... ------------------------ Beware of something that sounds like a sophisticated nineteenth- century or even World War II scheme, or something based on a mechanical system. If the product's authors sound like they are entirely unfamiliar with the state of the art, that's a good warning sign. Experienced Security Experts ---------------------------- Beware of any product claiming that "experienced security experts" have analyzed it, but it won't say who (especially if the scheme has not been published in a reputable journal). Unbreakability -------------- Some vendors will claim their software is "unbreakable". This is marketing hype, and a common sign of snake-oil. Avoid any vendor that makes unrealistic claims. No algorithm is unbreakable. Even the best algorithms are breakable using "brute force" (trying every possible key), but if the key size is large enough, this is impractical even with vast amounts of computing power. Be wary of marketing gimmicks related to "if you can crack our software" contests. One-Time-Pads ------------- A snake-oil vendor may claim the system uses a one-time-pad (OTP), which is theoretically unbreakable. A OTP system is not an algorithm. It involves generating a random key at least the size of the message and garbling the message with it. When the message is decrypted, the key is destroyed. Only one message is encrypted with a OTP, and it is used only once. They key is random: generated using a real random source, such as specialized hardware, radioctive decay timings, etc., and not from an algorithm or cipher. Anything else is not a one-time-pad. The vendor may confuse random session keys or initialization vectors with OTPs. Algorithm or product XXX is insecure ------------------------------------ Avoid anything that makes claims that particular algorithms or other products are insecure without backing up those claims (or at least siting references to them). Avoid anything that misrepresents 'weaknesses' of other algorithms. (For example, if the product claims it doesn't use public key crypto, citing timing attacks or factoring as reasons.) Keys and Passwords ------------------ The "key" and the "password" are often not the same thing. The "key" generally refers to the actual data used by the cipher algorithm. The "password" refers to the word or phrase the user types in, which the software converts into the key (usually through a process called "hashing" or "key initialization"). The reason this is done is because the characters a user is likely to type in do not cover the full range of possible characters. (Such keys would be more redundant and easier for an attacker to gues s.) By hashing a key can be made from an arbitrary password that covers the full range of possible keys. It also allows one to use longer words, or phrases and whole sentences as a "passphrase", wh ich is more secure. Anything that restricts users passwords to something like 10 or 16 or even 32 characters is foolish. If the actual "password" is the cipher's key (rather than hashing it into a key, as explained abo ve), avoid it. Anything that claims to solve the "key management problem" is also be to avoided. (Key management is an inherent problem with crypto.) Convenience is nice, but be wary of anything that sounds too easy to use. Avoid anything that lets anyone with your copy of the software to access files, data, etc. without having to use some sort of key or passphrase. Avoid anything that doesn't let you generate your own keys (ie, the vendor sends you a key in the mail). Avoid anything by a vendor who does not seem to understand the difference between public-key cryptography and private-key cryptography. Lost keys and passwords ----------------------- If there's a third-party utility that can crack the software, avoid it. If the vendor claims it can recover lost passwords (without using a key-backup or escrow feature), avoid it. Exported from the USA --------------------- If the software is made in North America, can it be exported? If the answer is yes, chances are it's not very strong. Strong cryptography is considered munitions in terms of export from the United States, and requires approval from the State Department. Chances are if the software is exportable, the algorithm is weak or it is crackable (hence it was approved for export). If the vendor is unaware of export restrictions, avoid the software: the vendor is not familiar with the state of the art. Because of export restrictions, some legitimate (not-Snake Oil) products may have a freely exportable version for outside of the USA, which is different from a separate US/Canada-only distribution. --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Devil's Bargain
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, July 21, 1996, WIR, p. 5. The Devil's Bargain of a Better World By Tim Weiner Washington. The arc of the burning plane falling into the ocean, the fire glowing on the dark waters, shed light on how vulnerable we are. When a jumbo jet falls from the sky, technology has failed or terrorism has succeeded. In the hours after Flight 800 went down off Fire Island, everyone in officialdom said there was no reason to believe it was a terrorist attack. Nearly everyone else instinctively believed it was. However the facts turn out, it is revealing that Americans thought first of a bomb borne by angry men on a mission from God. There was no more evidence to blame it on it was close enough to truth, given the absence of facts, Americans' shared fear of terror and their faith in technology. In any event, if the crash turns out to have been an accident -- horrible but still an act of God -- the relief may be fleeting. "It doesn't matter whether it was a bomb or not, in the way we think of it -- it's what we expect," said Ronald Steel, professor of International relations at the University of Southern California and author of "Temptations of a Superpower" (Harvard, 1995). "We know it's going to happen somewhere --if not this airplane, then the World Trade Center, Lockerbie, the bombs in Saudi Arabia and Paris and London. This is a part of our life. If for some reason this wasn't a bomb, we better get ready for one tomorrow." [See Steel's NYT Op-Ed today: http://jya.com/rsteel.txt.] High-Tech Freedom With the doubled-edge sword of technology, Americans have carved a world of gleaming aircraft and guided missiles. The airplanes that transport them, the cell phones and television cables and computers that link them, define how they live, how they work, how they take their pleasure. They are right up there with freedom of speech and religion, freedom from want and fear. They make America rich, powerful, and free. But Americans cannot control technology; increasingly, it controls them. And when the people Americans fear get their hands on it, the fear is accelerated and amplified by 500 channels of interwoven media hype. The airlines and telephones and E-mail that connect Americans connect those other people too: a computer disk is the crucial piece of evidence in the current trial of Ramzi Ahmed Yusef, accused of planning to blow a fleet of commercial planes from the sky (and in a pending case, of leading the World Trade Center bombing). The subway rider poisoned in Tokyo and the American soldier blown out of bed in Dhahran share a common knowledge: High technology may make a fine sword, but it is a flawed shield. It cannot stop every nut with a grudge. Americans are slowly getting used to the idea that one can no longer go through the world without passing through security. They are learning to live with terror and the technology of counter-terrorism, as people have for years in Tel Aviv and Cairo, Belfast and Berlin, Karachi and Algiers. They all visit those cities now; they enter them every time they walk through a metal detector. So life feels more and more like an international airport: identity checkpoints and security zones in concrete and glass buildings, pretty flowers planted in concrete barricades outside, robot voices delivering warnings. The fear means they arrive early to spend more down time waiting in line to pass through security. So they adapt, thinking: That's not a barricade, it's a flowerpot. They give up a little freedom in exchange for feeling safe, "all watched over," as the late poet Richard Brautigan wrote, "by machines of loving grace." Visitors The people who hate, love, envy and fear America's prosperity and power, also pass through that international airport. The United States needs their oil for fuel; it needs their sweat for work Americans don't do any more. They are woven into America, traveling through open lines of trade and telecommunications and technology. So everybody learns to live with the fear of the bomb in the cargo bay: you have to catch that plane if you have business abroad. If the United States were determined to buy machines that could sniff out the Semtex in the boombox, it could have done it -- the cost is perhaps $2 billion, or slightly less than one Stealth nuclear bomber. But that is not the war Washington prepared to fight after Vietnam. Generals today want wars they are sure to win. We -- the United States -- have the smart bombs, built with the billions that bankrupted Moscow and made America Number One. They -- the furious and the powerless -- have the dumb bombs, made from fertilizer and fuel oil, ignited by rage and religion. But the United States can't stop them all, not with its ever-tightening laws, not with its trillion- dollar military, not with its weapons and warheads. So the thinking goes. On the simplest level, terrorism works: it terrifies. It can increase the technology of control and erode the edges of the Constitution. That can fuel the fear of Big Brother, make people paranoid -- and in turn promote the homegrown madness that exploded last year in Oklahoma City. Terrorism cannot destroy the United States, but it has the power to wound, outrage, sadden and change it. When Iranians took Americans hostage and controlled the nation's politics from half a world away, when a suicide bomber blew up 241 American soldiers in Beirut and drove the Marines from Lebanon, when the World Trade Center shook, when the Dhahran barracks went up in smoke, it expressed a burning anger in the world, the anger of the poor and the powerless and the God-mad and the stateless. The Method Through repetition, Americans are slowly coming to recognize the method in this madness: These attacks are meant as blows against the global dominance of American culture, money, power and technology. Mr. Steel says the United States' stature as the one surviving superpower and the architect of the new world order is the very thing that makes it a target. "Terror," he says, "is the weapon that the powerless use against the powerful. We don't have any conception of what an ideologically threatening power we are to people who have different beliefs. Globalization and modernization are truly threatening to people. They're even threatening to the working class in this country because they drive down wages. The very faith in technology that we spread is something that runs head-on into another faith based on tradition, asceticism and authority. We're the alien ideology now." [End] ---------- The New York Times, July 21, 1996, p. 25. Top F.B.I. Investigator Is Known for Bluntness James K. Kallstrom the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation s New York City office, is a technical wizard who has bugged, wiretapped and generally bedeviled mobsters, terrorists and other criminals for more than two decades. The crash investigation is the first major, high-profile investigation of Mr. Kallstrom's tenure of a year and a half. Since Wednesday night, Mr. Kallstrom has spent most of his time shuttling, in a Blackhawk military helicopter, between the F.B.I. command center, at 26 Federal Plaza in Lower Manhattan, and the crash site, where he has held two press conferences a day with a top official of the National Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Kallstrom is known for a no-nonsense, blunt approach with his colleagues. He also never passes up a chance to express some strongly felt opinions, they say. Often, Mr. Kallstrom has offered his long-held view that Congress is not doing enough to help Federal law enforcement in its fight against criminals who use new technologies, such as the Internet. Since the crash Wednesday night, Mr. Kallstrom has had a strong suspicion that it was tied to a bomb or missile. "You have a lot of things that look like terrorism," Mr. Kallstrom said at a press conference Friday afternoon. "At some point in time, we're going to reach critical mass and then we're going to be prepared to say exactly what we think it is." As late as last night, he said he had not seen anything to make him change that opinion. But publicly, at least, Mr. Kallstrom has been reluctant to declare that the crash was caused by a bomb or missile until physical evidence, enough to reach a "beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold, is found. By selecting Mr. Kallstrom as assistant director in charge of the New York Office in February 1995, the F.B.I. Director, Louis J. Freeh, chose one of the bureau's most respected surveillance experts, a man whose techniques played a critical role in the arrests of every major organized crime leader and terrorist in New York in the last 20 years, including those involved with the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. [End]

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