December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cryptanalysis Trainer
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:05 PM 12/29/96 -0500, John Young wrote: >We've transcribed from PDF to ASCII the cryptanalysis >program in Appendix F of the US Army's Field Manual >FM 34-40-2, Basic Cryptanalysis, September, 1990. > > http://jya.com/appf.htm Why does it not surprise me that the code is in BASIC... BTW, the link to the PDF does not work. Seems the CGI they use to feed the pdf files is broken. (Or someone paniced and pulled it in a manner that broke the CGI. Would not be the first time...) --- | If you're not part of the solution, You're part of the precipitate. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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HOW TO HACK www.pgp.com -- stupid CGI script xploit
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Go to www.pgp.com Go To "Keyserver" Go To "Query" In the search window, type `whoami` (note the back quotes). Watch for result. How stupid. Seems to be a common problem of cgi scripts. like the one in norway... xaxaxa

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 30 Dec 96 6:48:57 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +#*#+#+ 1:44 99.99% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +++++++ 1:06:00 99.99% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +++++++ 33:39 99.98% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -++++++ 1:11:39 99.98% nym config(a)nym.alias.net *##*### :19 99.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ------+ 1:37:49 99.97% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++++ 1:06:32 99.96% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ------ 2:20:53 99.86% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com _ .-*+* 17:45:40 99.70% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com **** +* 8:06 99.55% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net * **+* 29:35 99.50% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com *##** * 1:02 99.43% replay remailer(a)replay.com * -** + 1:13:13 98.96% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com --- - 7:19:53 95.17% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net .-.- - 10:43:57 91.13% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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New crypto regs online
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hola, The new regs for crypto exports are available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/interim_regs_12_96.html Dave ========================================================================= David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 PGP Key: http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html =========================================================================

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Re: "Structuring" of Communications a Felony?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:11 PM 12/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >For example, while citizen-units in the United States are free to move to >new locales without permission and without registration, unlike in some >countries, the tax collector expects a valid home (or at least mailing) >address on tax returns. There is no requirement that you list a home address just as there is no requirement that you have a home. A mailing address anywhere on earth is sufficient for tax purposes. The form *says* home address but no one's done any time for not putting one on the form (right Brian). Proving that you had another home than the one listed on the date you filled out the form is beyond the capability of even the federal government. The instructions even say "use P.O. Box only if the Post Office doesn't deliver mail to your home" but don't say anything about mail receiving services and so forth. If you know how, you can even wander into most rural post offices and get a P.O. box in an area that doesn't have home delivery without living in the vicinity or proving it. Addresses are much too slippery things to control very well with the US model. DCF

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Re: "Structuring" of Communications a Felony?
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:08 PM 12/29/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >As to the "anonymous speech" rulings, I mainly know of the 1956 Georgia >case, in which the Supremes struck down a law requiring that leaflets >handed out have a name attached. I don't know of more recent rulings, >especially ones related to the Internet. This was upheld by another recent case involving an anonymous pamphlet from an Ohio woman. >If origin-labelling is unconstitutional, as Steve claims, then on what >basis can the U.S. Postal Service require identification for packages over >one pound? Surely what is inside the package may be considered "speech" (by >those interested in pushing the point). The new rule doesn't require that ID be presented at the Post Office. You just have to present the package in person and fill out a form. They could try and require ID later, of course. >And there are many other situations where anonymity is no longer allowed, >where once it was. The gambling example Brian Davis brought up is an >example: for the purposes of tax collection, regulation of gambling, etc., >winners of nontrivial amounts must identify themselves. They have to identify themselves they don't have to present identification (an important distinction). Brian also pointed out that the guy could have avoided the problem if he'd been smarter. >1. A sharp increase in spamming, mass mailing, threatening letters, >etc....sort of like the "denial of service" and spamming/looping attacks >seen here on Cypherpunks, and being seen widely on the Net. This will >increase pressure to "do something about it." A Senator Exon type person >will introduce legislation to require e-mail be labelled. If they have yet to successfully mandate positive ID for bank or credit accounts, how can they expect to successfully mandate positive ID for something as ephemeral as an Email account? >In closing, I think the Supreme Court will, when it eventually agrees to >hear a relevant case, will differentiate between protected anonymous speech >in public forums and the labelling of sealed packages, sealed letters, and >sealed e-mail. They will argue along the lines of saying that the labelling >law is for the protection of society and not for tracking down dissidents. >The effect will of course be the same, but this will be the fig leaf which >allows them to uphold such laws. Though they have not done so over the several centuries we've had anonymous postal mail. DCF

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IDEA ecryption algorithm in 8 bits ?
by Pavel Korensky 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I hope that this mail will find his way to the mailling list. I have one question. For one small embedded application, I need some encryption algorithm which can be easily implemented in 8 bit microcontroller with 38 bytes of RAM and 1KB of ROM. I tried to modify the IDEA algorithm to 8 bit operations - all multiplications modulo 257, subkey length 52 bytes, block size 4 bytes. Simply, all operations are converted from 16/32 bits to 8/16 bits. Because I am no professional cryptographer, I would like to ask you, if there is some major problem with this modified algorithm. Something what makes the 8 bit variant completely useless ? Is it possible to use this encryption algorithm ? I know that this variant will be far less secure than IDEA itself, but I don't need so strong encryption. The amount of data for encryption will be small, approx. 16 - 32 bytes. Thank you for every information. Best regards and PF 1997 Pavel Korensky -- **************************************************************************** * Pavel Korensky (pavelk(a)dator3.anet.cz) * * DATOR3 Ltd., Modranska 1895/17, 143 00 Prague 4, Czech Republic * * PGP key fingerprint: 00 65 5A B3 70 20 F1 54 D3 B3 E4 3E F8 A3 5E 7C * ****************************************************************************

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Re: ssn hack
by AwakenToMe＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-12-29 08:35:47 EST, jazzmin(a)ou.edu (Jazzmin Belle Sommers) writes: << She bought it! I got asked where I belonged to, so I said Germany (not actually a lie, it's my heritage). Next time I think I'll say Belgium. What's that itty bitty country between France and Spain? Angorra? Yeah. That's it.>> That sure isn't a hack.... maybe Im not seeing the advantages of it.. as compared to just saying 'I dont give it out..etc..' << What, you really think someone's actual name is Jazzmin Belle Sommers? Get outta town! >> Nahhhhh ya spelled it WAY differently and Angora is wrong.

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JOIN NOW!
by swedoc＠swedoc.se 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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[Quasi-RFC] RNG_DEVICE Standard
by Robert Rothenburg 'Walking-Owl' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The URL below has a proposal/ideas for an RNG_DEVICE standard: http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/rng_std.htm Comments and suggestions would be appreciated. (This isn't an official RFC.) Please feel free to forward this message to interested parties. Rob ----- "The word to kill ain't dirty | Robert Rothenburg (WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com) I used it in the last line | http://www.asb.com/usr/wlkngowl/ but use a short word for lovin' | Se habla PGP: Reply with the subject and dad you wind up doin' time." | 'send pgp-key' for my public key.

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