December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by minow＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> comments on the responsiblity of prudent persons (in, I presume, the context of threating e-mail sent through an anonymous remailier). I'm still perplexed: what can a "prudent" remailer operator do if a threatening e-mail was sent through a remailer under one or more of the following conditions: -- The remailer operator is legally enjoined from reading messages transversing his system. (For example, the remailer is subject to data privacy laws.) -- The message was encrypted using the intended recipient's public key. (This means that, without access to the private key, the operator has no mechanism to examine the e-mail.) Confused in Cupertino. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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No Subject
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The answer to information is more information.

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Re: Innocence & harmless weapons (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 21:35:57 -0700 (PDT) > From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> > Subject: Re: Innocence & harmless weapons > > > Whose side of the truth? > > That was a capital "T", bub. Truth doesn't have sides. (Think > of it as an archetype.) Sorry but the very fact that I don't agree with you is proof enough that there is no absolute 'Truth' as you use it. That is unless you are attempting to claim absolute omnipotence on the point of determination. > > To be honest I was surprised by your simplistic responce. > > That was a question mark, bub. It wasn't an answer, it was > a question. Hey, the devil is in the details, gang. Too bad > modern schools teach "self-esteem" instead of reading, writing > and rhetoric. (Spelling wouldn't hurt either.) Nice tactical ploy, an ad hominem buried in a straw man argument. Jim Choate

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Innocence & harmless weapons
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Sandy et al., Whose side of the truth? To be honest I was surprised by your simplistic responce. Jim Choate Forwarded message: > From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Thu May 23 16:01:31 1996 > Message-Id: <2.2.32.19960523200615.0072a288(a)popmail.crl.com> > X-Sender: sandfort(a)popmail.crl.com > X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 2.2 (32) > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > Date: Thu, 23 May 1996 13:06:15 -0700 > To: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> > From: Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> > Subject: Re: (Fwd) Re: TCM: mafia as a paradigm for cyberspace > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > At 12:11 PM 5/23/96 -0800, jim bell wrote: > > >Tell ya what: name a weapon that CANNOT be used to harm an > >innocent person. Go ahead, I'm waiting. > > The Truth? > > > S a n d y > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >

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[SCARE]: "If you only knew what we know..."
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 PM 5/23/96, jim bell wrote: >Well, he must have learned it all in the last few months, because his bill >was the closest thing to DOA that we've seen in a long time, exceeded only >by GAK 3. I'd like to hear from him what the source of the text of the >Leahy bill on encryption really was: Who pressured him to make it so bad? "If you only knew what we know..." ("...you wouldn't support encryption, you wouldn't push for privacy legislation, you would order all citizen-units to have tatooed ID numbers on their arms...") Though I normally avoid "Wired," I did pick up the latest issue to skim through. A couple of good things, actually, including a nice summary of the state of crypto laws, etc. (I don't recall the author, as I didn't buy the issue.) A great discussion of the Deepest and Darket Secret in Washington, the special "If you only knew what we know..." briefing given to legislators, staffers, etc. to convince them of the Evils of Cryptography. Paraphrasing the "Wired" item, "No person who has ever received "The Briefing" has ever again argued forcefully for the rights of citizens to use strong cryptography." I surmise that either Sen. Burns has not yet been given The Briefing, or he is for some reason more resistant than most other burrowcrats to the scare tactics used in The Briefing. I sure would like to know what's in this briefing. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Internet traffic is monitored.
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:03:11 -0700 X-Sender: bstout(a)osc.hidata.com To: Firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM, Return requested <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM> From: Bill Stout <bill.stout(a)hidata.com> Subject: Re: Encryption Technology Sender: firewalls-owner(a)GreatCircle.COM At 09:05 PM 5/22/96 -0700, Michael Dillon wrote: >... >RTFM ><SNIP - Other literary content deleted> On the Encryption note, and I swear not along the lines of the 'DOJ' and 'FBI Snooping' Big-Brother events, I heard another story recently. # begin story A person working on the MBONE project did an unannounced experiment across the internet using Triple-DES for MBONE, and the very next day, 'ATF' agents knocked on his door and warned him against exporting munitions. The experimentor was shaken by the fact that agents approached him so quickly after the experiment. # end story Extrapolations of fact: 1. Internet traffic is monitored. 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. (See above). 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. 6. Using encryption only flags traffic for capture and decryption, using strong encryption makes you all that more interesting. Sorry, couldn't resist. I'll try not to start a threads about electro-plasma propulsion craft at Area 51, metallic-ceramic skin and pulse-jets on the Aurora spy plane, heat-imaging video cameras on satellites and planes that can watch you through your houses' roof, etc. :) Bill

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ONE_two
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-28-96. NYPaper: "Physicists Put Atom In 2 Places At Once." A team of NIST physicists has proved that an entire atom can simultaneously exist in two widely separated places. The achievement not only sheds light on the paradox of Schrodinger's cat but could also have important consequences for cryptography, a science that creates codes to safeguard the electronic transfer of money, state secrets and other valuable things. ONE_two

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DCSB: The FSTC Electronic Check Project
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Frank Jaffe, of The Bank of Boston and The Financial Services Technology Consortium (FSTC) "The FSTC Electronic Check Project" Tuesday, June 4, 1996 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Frank Jaffe is a Senior Systems Consultant in the Applied Technology Group at the Bank of Boston. Frank is currently the project manager for the FSTC Electronic Check project which involves over 30 companies. Frank has played a leadership role in planning the amalgamation of Bank of Boston's five major retail computer systems into a single, common software system; acting as project leader for a new teller system, and leading the screen phone R&D project in cooperation with Northern Telecom and Bellcore. The FSTC Electronic Check project will develop an enhanced all-electronic replacement to the paper check. Electronic checks will be used like paper checks, by businesses and consumers, and will use existing inter-bank clearing systems. Like its paper counterpart, the Electronic Check represents a self contained "information object," which has all of the information necessary to complete a payment. Likewise, paper checkbooks are replaced by portable Electronic Checkbooks; pens & signatures are replaced by signature card functions and digital signatures using advanced cryptographic techniques; stamps and envelopes by electronic mail or other communications options such as the World Wide Web over the Internet. The fully automated processing capabilities of Electronic Checks opens the possibility of other types of financial instruments, such as electronic cashiers, travelers, and certified checks. Electronic check writing and processing will be integrated into existing applications, from cash registers to personal checkbook managers to large corporate accounting systems, to greatly increase the convenience, and reduce the costs, of writing, accepting, and processing checks. This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, June 4, 1996 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, June 1, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for the following few months are: July Pete Loshin Author, "Electronic Commerce" August Duane Hewitt Idea Futures We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, rah(a)shipwright.com . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMZnOlvgyLN8bw6ZVAQEm8gP/deJ/J0ncmiUTJo82jeGMRp38q+8u+/LH zUZ3dgOCXFM9Nldni/EM0nKiRAgPJTqlcGkrE6Q44s2+ZSPtTiop2Tbx+3xoCW9t zTeKoLoTLgcS7LYS1b/VpcJqN9+q7gGxqmyAd88yZei+i4ZHw6kUGB6MyeHMPq+t CSrEOkkikXE= =SWUd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Philosophy of information ownership
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, At 10:55 PM 5/27/96 -0700, Bruce Baugh wrote: >What specifically bothers me is the reselling of information that I chose to >reveal for a specific transaction, most especially when I did so with an >assumption of privacy. ^^^^^^^^^^ The magic phrase in law is--and should be--"reasonable expectation of privacy." The world is full of unreasonable assumptions about all sorts of things. One certainly has the right to feel bothered about acts that violate one's assumptions, but this hardly gives one the right to compel others to comply with those whims. >...I'd feel much ground >for complaint if I learned the list owner were selling credit histories >gathered during the subscription process. (Unless, of course, I assent to a >clause to the effect that the list owner can do anything he wants with my >credit info, as opposed to the specific purpose of getting payment for the >list.) Every day, merely by existing, we give other people information about ourselves. is it reasonable to expect these people to no release nor use that information unless we specifically give them permission? I don't think so. In most situations, we must take positive steps to assure that our privacy will be maintained. Generally, it is incumbunt upon us--not others--to secure our own privacy. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Philosophy of information ownership
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:29 AM 5/28/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Contracts are the key. Agreed. The more that can be explicitly spelled out about these matters, the better. A separate problem arises when the government compels the disclosure of information for one purpose - getting a driver's license, say - and then turns around and sells it to others. It's much harder to either negotiate a new contract or go to a competitor when the other party is a government. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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