December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Fwd: Scrambled software gets an OK
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:30 AM 1/13/96 -0800, thad(a)hammerhead.com (Thaddeus J. Beier) wrote: >Scrambled software gets an OK > >-- Exports: Foreign encoding unfair to U.S. firms, Commerce Department says. > >Bloomberg Business News > >WASHINGTON -- The Commerce Department will recommend easing export controls >on encryption software after a study by the department and the National >Security Agency found the restrictions are hurting U.S. firms, Commerce >Secretary Ron Brown said. We discussed this a bit at the Bay Area cpunks meeting yesterday. It'd be fun to know the politics involved and what we'll get out of this, but "easing export controls" could be anything from "dropping the limits on anything but designed-for-the-military crypto" to "64 bits with escrow". And, of course, "we'll release a policy statement in a few months" isn't highly informative either. On the other hand, it's an invitation for lobbying and public comment, so we might as well take advantage of it. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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RE: Net Control is Thought Control
by D.R.Madden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DIa!?ayyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyRyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyNDyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyytNSe useful to set out, as I see it anyway, the main questions that need answering. Thanks for any info/insight that you can provide. 1. How is it possible -- in a legal sense -- for the laws of one state (Germany) to be imposed globally. I suspect the answer to this is : it isn't -- CompuServe seems to have pulled the plug without recourse to any legal battle (?). This makes it's protestations that it's all Germany's fault a little thin. 2. Even granted that Germany can impose it's porn laws on the world, how is CompuServe violating German law: it is *not* the case that CompuServe is producing the offending material *within* Germany. Rather , German netties are able to import the offending material from outwith. Hence it is the German netties (or at most the German connection banks) who are violating the pornography laws. Analogy: if a German stationary retailer buys a stack of smutty mags in Sweden, which wall foul of the German smut laws, and then brings them into Germany for resale in his store, do the Germans then have a case for closing down the Swedish publisher of the mags? Surely it is up to the German connection banks to comply with German law. CompuServe doesn't export anything -- users import. This kills the Satellite porn channel analogy which some people are using (UK censors some such channels). The Germans no doubt will argue that the above analogy is faulty in that whereas the import of smutty mags is (or can be) subject to border controls, the internet is, well, a net -- either the offending material is pulled at source or not at all. Not true: the offending material could be pulled from the German net servers. Of course, there are ways around the ban (cf. Duncan Frissel's emails passim) but the number of minors capable of effecting these would be negligible -- certainly not enough to justify 1. above (assuming that 1 can be justified upon any principle) 3. Why has Germany picked on CompuServe alone -- not only is it a daft law but one which quite obviously fails to capture the rationale behind the law (Thankfully). (Possibly a case of the Bavarians blowing the puritanical horn without actually wishing to upset the German cyber community too much. Although, interestingly, the silence on this issue amongst the German PC community is deafening -- I'll see if I can garner any response to this, and the other points, by sending this email to the Max-Planck Institute fuer Infomatik in Germany where I used to work). 4. 1 and 3 raise the question: why did CompuServe cave in so easily? The issue could have been in the European courts for the next few aeons allowing CompuServe to proceed as per normal (and since the whole of the EU is effected, surely this is precisely the sort of issue that should be settled by their courts). Can any lawyers out there give an indication of the chances CompuServe would have in such a case? 5. Bearing above, and previous cypherpunk emails on this issue, in mind, has anyone, or group actually challenged the German decision on legal grounds (as opposed to just discussing it)? 6. Has anyone heard any arguments emanating from Germany itself along the "thin end of the wedge" lines? There are plenty of dodgey states out there who will be only too willing to point at Germany, a "civilised Western culture", as a precedent to justify the removal of all sorts of topics which do not accord with their definitions of acceptability. I initially thought that Duncan's correlation of net control with thought control (cf. his email of 10th Jan, 12.52pm) was over-stepping the mark (on the grounds that we're not yet eating Clockwork Oranges in a Brave New World). But, bearing 6. in mind, if totalitarian states are able to dictate what appears on the net (and what is read by precisely the "young minds" which Germany purports to protect) then I'm beginning to think he's accurately characterised a potential state of affairs a few years down the line. Food for thought control. Peter Madden (formally of MPI, Germany, soon to be DRA, UK). P.S. Pity the average German nettie -- they're excruciatingly embarrassed by this whole business. yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy

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Re: Phil Z getting through customs
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:32 AM 1/15/96 +0000, Brad Shantz wrote: > attila <attila(a)primenet.com> wrote: >> answer the questions truthfully and they can not detain you??? > >Not true, I've been detained by Canadian customs for doing just that. >Everything went reasonably smoothly thanks to the customs officials >lack of knowledge of NAFTA. However, one of my travelling partners >had trouble with customs due to ...hmmm... their lack of knowledge of >NAFTA. > >> Rule 1: smile regardless of the adversity > >That's a good rule for things other than customs dealings. I haven't driven to Canada for well over a decade. But last time I did, when I was addressed the Canadian border guy, he asked me whether I had brought any firearms along. I said to him, "No. I didn't think I'd be needing them!" He didn't as much as crack a smile.

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None
by Mr. Nobody 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> > Cc: don(a)cs.byu.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Date: Mon, 15 Jan 1996 09:25:52 -0800 (PST) > > > I think that there are several. The one at CMU can be reached > > at http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/open.html. I thought that > > Sameer had one at c2.org, but a quick look at his web site didn't > > turn up anything. > > c2.org will be hosting the anonymizer shortly. We can't > exactly run it off of our T1 though, so we have to wait a little while > until we get T3 access. Is the source code for this anonymizer publicly available? Thanks.

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CAQ - Secret FISA Court Violates Rights (fwd)
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Subject: CAQ - Secret FISA Court Violates Rights C O V E R T A C T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N B U L L E T I N ========================================== CovertAction Quarterly has won numerous awards for investigative journalism. It is read around the world by investigative reporters, activists, scholars, intelligence buffs, news junkies, and anyone who wants to know the news and analysis behind the soundbites and headlines. Recommended by Noam Chomsky; targeted by the CIA. Each article in the 64-page magazine, which is in its 16th year of publication, is extensively footnoted and accompanied by photographs and graphics. ============================== For a single issues send $6. A one year subscription: US $22; / Canada/Mexico $27; Latin America/Europe $33; / Other areas $35. Please send check or money order in $US to: CAQ, 1500 Massachusetts Ave. #732 , Washington, DC 20005, USA Phone: 202-331-9763 / Fax: 202-331-9751 / E-mail: caq(a)igc.apc.org ================================================================= THE SECRET FISA COURT: RUBBER STAMPING ON RIGHTS by Philip Colangelo Part 1 of 3 SEVEN JUDGES ON A SECRET COURT HAVE AUTHORIZED ALL BUT ONE OF OVER 7,500 REQUESTS TO SPY IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. THEY MEET IN SECRET, WITH NO PUBLISHED ORDERS, OPINIONS, OR PUBLIC RECORD. THOSE SPIED ON MAY NEVER KNOW OF THE INTRUSION. NOW, CLINTON HAS EXPANDED THE POWERS TO INCLUDE NOT ONLY ELECTRONIC, BUT PHYSICAL SEARCHES. The aftershock of the Oklahoma City bombing sent Congress scurrying to trade off civil liberties for an illusion of public safety. A good ten weeks before that terrible attack, however with a barely noticed pen stroke President Bill Clinton virtually killed off the Fourth Amendment when he approved a law to expand the already extraordinary powers of the strangest creation in the history of the federal judiciary. *2 Since its founding in 1978, a secret court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA rhymes with ice -a) has received 7,539 applications to authorize electronic surveillance within the U.S. In the name of national security, the court has approved all but one of these requests from the Justice Department on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency. *3 Each of these decisions was reached in secret, with no published orders, opinions, or public record. The people, organizations, or embassies spied on were not notified of either the hearing or the surveillance itself. The American Civil Liberties Union was not able to unearth a single instance in which the target of a FISA wiretap was allowed to review the initial application. Nor would the targets be offered any opportunity to see transcripts of the conversations taped by the government and explain their side of the story. Without access to such materials, said Kate Martin of the ACLU, targets of FISA searches are denied any meaningful opportunity to contest the basis for the execution of the FISA search. *4 ======================================== OPEN-ENDED SURVEILLANCE When Clinton signed Executive Order 12949 on February 9, the frightening mandate of the FISA, court was greatly expanded: It now has legal authority to approve black-bag operations to authorize Department of Justice (DoJ) requests to conduct physical as well as electronic searches, without obtaining a warrant in open court, without notifying the subject, without providing an inventory of items seized. The targets need not be under suspicion of committing a crime, but may be investigated when probable cause results solely from their associations or status: for example, belonging to, or aiding and abetting organizations deemed to pose a threat to U.S. national security. Furthermore, despite a lowered standard for applying the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure than is necessary in other U.S. courts,5 under the 1995 expansion, evidence gathered by the FISA court may now be used in criminal trials. Previously, evidence was collected and stockpiled solely for intelligence purposes. ========================================================== LEGALIZING THE AMES SEARCH Granting new powers to the FISA court was accomplished quietly and treated as a non-event in the national media. The lack of reporting was somehow fitting, though, following as it did the silent debate last year when Congress rubberstamped the annual Intelligence Authorization Act. *6 Some legal minds found the whole exercise positively refreshing. The fact that this was done with a minimum of fuss and posturing on both sides, and without having to have a debate that tries to roll up the corners of classified information is very impressive, cheered former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker. *7 Reportedly, the Clinton administration had not always been enthusiastic about expanding the court's powers. Like its predecessors, it operated under the assumption that the executive already had inherent authority to exempt itself from Fourth Amendment constraints and could order warrantless searches to protect national security. Nonetheless, the government avoided allowing this inherent authority to be tested in the courts. *8 Then along came Aldrich Ames. The spy case proved a convenient vehicle on which to hitch expansion of state power. It also offered a glimpse at the state-of-the-art domestic counterintelligence techniques that might well be turned on an activist group near you. Following months of electronic and physical surveillance which included a break-in of Ames' car and searches through his office and family trash FBI agents were finally turned loose in the early morning hours of October 9, 1993. They didn't `pick' locks like in the movies; they made their own keys. Among other agents in the FBI, the consensus was unanimous: The tech agents were geniuses. *9 Thanks to a warrant authorized by Attorney General Janet Reno, a team of agents from the sprawling National Security Division had permission to enter the Ames home in Arlington, Va.10 There was only one minor problem. The attorney general of the United States does not have the authority to order a warrantless physical search of a citizen's home, argued Professor Jonathan Turley of George Washington University National Law Center. The Aldrich Ames search in my view was obviously and egregiously unconstitutional. 11 Other civil liberties lawyers agree with this evaluation, and the Justice Department itself was concerned enough about the question to refer to this problem when it negotiated a deal with Ames in order to avoid trial. While Ames was sentenced to life in prison, his wife Rosario received five years. We didn't get to the point of litigation, I regret to say, said Ames' lawyer Plato Cacheris. The problem was that Ames very much wanted to see that his wife was treated a little more softly than he was being treated. *12 Now eager to put a stamp of judicial impartiality on the hazy executive branch doctrine of inherent authority, the Justice Department immediately got behind the bill to expand the FISA court's power. Soon after Ames pleaded guilty last year to spying, administration officials began arguing that adherence to traditional Fourth Amendment protections for American citizens would unduly frustrate counterintelligence efforts against spies operating in the U.S.13 Physical searches to gather foreign intelligence depend on secrecy, argued Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. If the existence of these searches were known to the foreign power targets, they would alter their activities to render the information useless. 14 Gorelick went on to explain that A [traditional] search can only be made when there's probable cause to believe a crime is involved, whereas a national-security search can be made at a substantially earlier stage. We often don't know what we're looking for when we go in, she observed.15 ======================================================

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Re: Phil Z getting through customs
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:21 AM 1/15/96 -0800, Simon Spero wrote: >When I was a student and had long hair, I used to always get questioned >when going throught customs. After graduating, and having normal length >hair, I had a lot less trouble. This seems odd. Logically (okay, I know logic doesn't work with the government) any smuggler is going to try to be as innocuous as possible. He's cut his hair, and shave, and probably wear a tie, etc. Which means the government should pay more attention to.... Oh, never mind! >The strictest customs I've been through is at Lod (Tel Aviv); there the >assumption is that everybody is going to try and bring in at least >some sort of radio/fax machine to avoid the high taxes, so they check all >baggage. They do have the best security team in general though, so it >balances out. Some comedian 15 years or so ago (David Brenner, maybe?) had a joke which went something like this: "The odds of there being a bomb on a commercial airliner is one in a million. The odds of there being TWO bombs on a commercial airliner are one in a _million_million_. Therefore, if you are taking an airplane flight and want to feel REALLY safe....Take a bomb!"

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PGP for CP/M?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Okay, everybody, you can stop laughing now. I don't really want a copy of PGP for CP/M, but I was just a bit curious as to whether anybody had ever ported it to CP/M. Nostalgia reasons, primarily.

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Eggs, or, To Get Some Entropy You Gotta Break Some Eggs...
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Amazing that a discussion of eggs could come back to crypto...) At 2:17 AM 1/16/96, Rich Graves wrote: >Kind of analogous to an engineer like Paul Kocher taking a hard look at >crypto systems that had only been analyzed by pure mathematicians. You >need to feed the sniffers real entropy, not just highly evolved math. I keep thinking of different ways of looking at Kocher's timing attack. (Paul Kocher gave a nice talk at the Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting on Saturday.) Rich's point above suggests yet another way of looking at this: that a chip or algorithm that can be "instrumented" (timing measured) is in some sense too predictable. The chip itself lacks sufficient entropy. (Before the purists, especially those who've read the paper closely, jump on me here, I'm not saying adding random delays is the best way to deter the attack. In fact, a variation of blinding is the best approach it seems. (Though blinding does not affect attacks which monitor the crypto chip's or CPU's power dissipation.)) My point, or this angle on it, is that to some extent the mechanistic nature of the encryption process (such as Diffie-Hellman) can leak information to an attacker who can watch the mechanistic process unfolding. This is a result which is not surprising, in retrospect. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Digital postage and remailer abuse (was Re: Novel use of Usenet and remailersto mailbomb from luzskru@cpcnet.com)
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:47 1/13/96, Alan Bostick wrote: >Maybe I'm misunderstanding how using digital postage with remailers would >work. I was assuming that the postage stamp would be included *inside* >the encrypted envelope, that what the remailer would do on receipt of >mail would be: (a) decrypt the envelope; (b) validate the postage stamp; >and (if the stamp is valid) (c) forward the message according to the >now-decryped instructions. > >Using this model, if the perpetrator doesn't include a postage stamp, >then the message is ignored. If the perp includes a stamp, the first >horny net geek's message is relayed but subsequent ones get bounced for >invalid postage. You are right. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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TOR_del
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-16-96. NYPaper: "Louis W. Tordella, 84, Who Helped Break Cerman Military Code in World War II." A mathematician who helped break Enigma, and later spent 16 years as the deputy director of the National Security Agency. An intelligence visionary who had helped create and shape NSA even before he became its deputy director in 1958, Dr. Tordella was regarded both as a pioneer in the development of ever more powerful and sophisticated computers to break enemy codes and as a master administrator who established a combined code-breaking operation and then ran it. Since decryption devices did not exist, he and his colleagues simply designed and built them, not only breaking the enemy codes but helping to lay the theoretical and practical groundwork for what has become a vast computer industry. TOR_del [For more on Tordella, see Bamford's "The Puzzle Palace."]

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