December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [NOISE] CryptoAnarchy: What's wrong with this picture?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:37 PM 5/5/96 -0700, Sandy Sandfort wrote: >On Sun, 5 May 1996, Jon Leonard wrote: > >> Obviously we should send Sandy $1000 whether or not we follow the >> other steps, in order to defeat traffic analysis. > >Now you're talking. Defeat traffic analysis, yeah, that's the >ticket. I thought that was what the guys sitting in the semi-concealed cars next to the freeway were for... ]:> --- | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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Re: Money Laundering Conference with Government Types
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"unicorn(a)schloss.li" "Black Unicorn" 5-MAY-1996 18:25:57.83 >I think that should be >http://www.oceanalaw.com/20/conf/ml.htm ^ Yes; thank you. Weird spelling. -Allen

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Politcal Action Toolkit now available
by David HM Spector 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

...not having much in the way of sleep since reading Louis Freeh's testimony and his plans to assault the US Constitution I decided to do something about it, and try to develop something that would help others get involved too... I would like to announce the availability of a Personal Political Action Kit (PersPAK). It contains full databases of members of the House and the Senate and may be used for mail merging, faxing (senate only at the moment, house members hopefully this week with the next release), email campaigns, as well as plain old phone calls. The data were culled from the House and Senate directories that are on the Web, and are current as of September 3, 1997. The datasets are provided in two formats, tab-delimited and as an Excel spreadsheet. Two sample letters are included that show how to use the mail-merge features of Office95/97, along with a README file that will step users through the basics of using this kit and offers some hints on what to say -- and sometimes more importantly NOT to say -- in a letter to their congress-folk. The kit can be accessed at: http://www.zeitgeist.com/crypto I plan on updating this toolkit with more features soon with some more tools, and the ability to send mail/faxes to entire committees (as opposed to picking congress persons/senators by individually), some Java Applets to auto-generate letters, etc. I'm making it available under the GNU Public License, so feel free to use this kit as a base for other tools. Constructive criticism/ideas may be sent to perspak(a)zeitgeist.com regards, _DHMS ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- David HM Spector spector(a)zeitgeist.com Network Design & Infrastructure Security -.-. --- -. -. . -.-. - .-- .. - .... .- -- .- - . ..- .-. .-. .- -.. .. --- "New and stirring things are belittled because if they are not belittled, the humiliating question arises, 'Why then are you not taking part in them?'" --H. G. Wells

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Re: FW: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:27 5/5/96, blanc wrote: >I have a great idea - let's start a closed, elite mailing list for >"Offshorepunks". >Uni, Sandy, & Duncan et al could "show us how it's done". The list already exists. It was supposed to contain essays by Sandy and Duncan. It was called "Privacy 101". After two articles hyping the great info about to follow... nothing. Utter silence. [What ever happend, anyway?] Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: WWW proxies?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:37 PM 5/5/96, Mark M. wrote: >The same is also true for cpunk and penet-style remailers that do not use >encryption. You always have to trust remailer operators regardless of whether >encryption is used or not. The situation will become much better when there >is some way to chain proxies and encrypt to each individual proxy. If the >operator of a proxy is more trustworthy than the operators of any sites you >visit using the proxy, then you have nothing to lose. We haven't talked about traffic analysis of remailers and Web proxies much lately, so it bears repeating that: -- this is a little-studied subject -- that nobody has done--to my knowledge--a fairly detailed study of the traffic analysis that is possible -- that a model is lacking (I don't mean we don't have some ideas of what's important, but that we haven't filled in the details, figured out what sorts of correlations an analyst can make by looking at packet sizes, sending times, delivery times, etc.) -- the real world situation with remailers is that message volume is probably way too low for comfort (my presentation on remailers at the first CP meeting outlined a need for about 10 mixes, each mixing at least 10 messages of the same size before remailing...and 20 mixes each mixing 30 or more messages is much better...we are most likely far, far below this, for nearly all remailed messages. Fortunately, most remailed messages are either not critical or are being done for novelty, harassment, flaming, etc.). -- with Web proxies, the problem of traffic analysis (even with encryption, which I am taking for granted) becomes astronomically larger...all those commands sent to the site and stuff returned, and all in a "reasonable" amount of time! (How many of us will use a Web proxy in our current mode if we have to wait minutes to hours between actions? I'm not saying what the response times will be, as this will depend on mixing ratios, desired security, etc. But it is likely that "fast response" is counterproductive to the avoiding of traffic analysis.) (PipeNet-type schemes may help, depending on a bunch of details. So would "local mixes in cabinets," meaning, Web anonymizers with high bandwidth that do their mixing locally. They have to be "trusted," to some extent, but would help a lot. There are some gotchas.) -- I certainly believe the NSA has put at least an analyst or two on this problem, and probably long ago put together some models. We have a very long way to go before remailer networks are really up to snuff. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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6 USAF Crashes in 7 days = InfoWar?
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just a thought...

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Re: 6 USAF Crashes in 7 days = InfoWar? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: 6 USAF Crashes in 7 days = InfoWar? > Date: Sat, 20 Sep 1997 11:31:04 -0700 (PDT) > From: Mike Duvos <enoch(a)zipcon.net> > Why go in search of the complicated when stupidity is a perfectly > acceptable explanation? Well it really wasn't meant to be taken quite that literaly. It just seemed to me that a question of some import to this list might be how one tells such a statistical anomaly (if you'll allow me) from an actual concerted attack. What would the tale-tell's be for such a distinction? While full-blown war would not be hard to differentiate consider such an attack from a small group with an immediate and distinct goal as well as potential long-range goals. What sorts of processes and types of information would be of interest to a person who was tasked with evaluating such an occurance? Things like: - relationships between the history of the various participants, both mechanical and human - geographic relationships, weather comparisons, environmental conditions, etc. Consider your responce at first reading. That is a barrier that has to be jumped for such activities to be used effectively, wouldn't you think? This would indicate that an effective long-term strategy for a sect attack via the Internet would be advertising. Which would rule-out most real clandestine attacks as being from a small political or religous group. There is also the issue of talent recruitement and budget. So, with these sorts of issues in mind, what kinds of financial transactions might be of interest? And finaly, in such an environment can the elimination of non-GAK crypto really be effective? Is crypto really even an issue? Now consider, if you will, the requirements if we assume that we are under a concerted Pearl-Harbor attack from a rival 1st World power. How would that effect the issues discussed above? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:48 5/5/96, Alan Horowitz wrote: ><< " I paid approximately 60%...." >> > > >didn't the feudal vassels only pay 33% ? To paraphrase - I forget >which Presidential candidate of yore - "are you better off than you were >a thousand years ago?" > >ANd that's not even counting the interest you pay on your mortgage. Count >that, and the vassels were head and shoulders above Californians. Generally, the feudal subjects paid the Tithe. Yes, Robin Hood and his men fought the evil Sheriff of Nottingham for his crushing 10% tax. :-) [My last post in this off-topic thread.] Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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"Matchcode" technology sparks privacy flames.....
by Will Rodger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 One of the main assertions made by both sides in the privacy battles is people must be informed when a third party is gathering "personal" information about them. But what constitutes personally identifiable information, anyway? Where do "real" privacy concerns begin? Below is a story I wrote about Imgis Inc. - a little-noticed company whose cookies are among the most common on the Net. If you don't them now, look in your cookie file. Chances are you'll find several marked "imgis.com." Imgis thought it knew what the privacy concerns were with its technology. Others thought otherwise. Within two days of hearing about impending opposition, the company apparently changed its views. Note that the technology described is not yet in use. from http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/inwo/0919/inwo0006.html Ad tracking technology sparks new privacy war By Will Rodger September 19, 1997 11:42 AM PDT Inter@ctive Week Online An effort supported by two of the world's largest advertising brokers to tailor advertising to individual Internet users may pose the greatest threat yet to the protection of privacy in cyberspace, activists said. Under a system due for rollout in the first half of 1998, the Web advertising service Imgis Inc. will begin comparing detailed demographic information about Internet users to its stock of Web- ready ads, sending Net users only those ads Imgis determines are best matched to their interests. The company, based in Los Angeles, will use a system of "match codes" to identify individual users. Match codes are unique identifiers used to pick information about consumers out of databases, much as banks use Social Security numbers to identify customers. Under the plan, when Internet users visit Web sites carrying Imgis ads, participating Internet service operators would send Imgis a match code corresponding to a demographic database of 140 million consumers maintained by database marketer Metromail Corp. Imgis would then compare users' names, addresses, estimated incomes and automobile ownership against an inventory of advertisements. Thus, a white, single 25-year-old man living in Dubuque, Iowa, could see an ad that differs from that seen by a 65-year-old American Indian woman living in Manhattan. Yet, at the same time, the system has the ability to track the movements of any Internet user across participating sites, potentially revealing a dizzying array of confidential information, including users' reading habits, health concerns, political inclinations and religious affiliations. Imgis executives insist they won't do so, but the danger remains, critics said. Shelley Pasnik, an analyst with the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Media Education, slammed the proposal. "This is huge. This is the most detailed proposal I've seen and probably the most significant threat to privacy I've heard of," she said. "This is a really big deal; this is a real step back," added Tara Lemmey, chief executive officer of Narrowline Inc., a San Francisco- based Internet advertising firm and a member of the TRUSTe privacy consortium. "This is a case where it's really important to step back and say we've really crossed the line." Imgis, which specializes in Internet advertising, will place ads sold by Petry Media Corp. and Katz Media Group Inc. Exposure of the plan follows four days of hearings on cyberspace privacy at the U.S. Federal Trade Commission last June. Though direct marketers were often on the defensive over their use of surreptitious techniques in gathering consumer information in cyberspace, the FTC tentatively concluded that the industry should police itself before the government takes action to protect privacy on the Internet. But the Imgis case "accentuates all the concerns we've been talking about," said David Medine, associate director of credit practices at the FTC and moderator of most of the sessions. "Up until today, I think that users naturally assumed that users were anonymous through their Internet service providers when they surfed the Web. I don't think that you can say that anymore. If that has changed, it represents a dramatic shift in the relationship between the user and the Internet." Medine said the FTC would expect Imgis to disclose all aspects of its data gathering through participating Web sites and ISPs if it begins using match codes to tailor ad delivery. In an interview Tuesday, Imgis Chief Executive Officer Chuck Berger told Inter@ctive Week that his company had signed two Internet service providers, GTE Corp. and Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc., to carry the service sometime in the first half of 1998. At the time, Berger said he believed there were no privacy concerns with "anonymous match codes," since Imgis had decided not to record which sites users visit. "Once we pull your ad out of our database, we're done," Berger said. "We're not following you around the Web." Imgis abruptly altered its story Thursday after Inter@ctive Week found that privacy advocates were up in arms over the technology. Marisa Verson, a principal with San Francisco public relations firm Interactive Communications Inc., which represents Imgis, said Imgis never had agreements with GTE or Netcom. "GTE is nothing," she said. "If Chuck communicated that, I don't know how he even thinks that. This thing isn't even in the speculative stage until the privacy thing is down." GTE spokesman Bill Kula confirmed Thursday morning that "we do use Imgis - or plan to - related to using actual public billing files." But "there's not a contract between the two companies today." Netcom officials said they spoke with Imgis more than a year ago about the match code proposal but had discarded the idea over privacy concerns. "I have absolutely zero plans to be involved with this," said Netcom advertising director Terry Pittman. "Whatever we do needs to be in synch with some rules of the road so that people know what we do with their information." Imgis officials, stung by criticism of their plan, said they are moving swiftly. Though Berger earlier described Netizens who worry about their privacy online as a "vocal minority," Imgis marketing director David Kopp said the company is moving to develop some way of disclosing how it gathers information online and what it does with it. "We'll come up with a policy that makes sense," Kopp said. "These issues are very big issues. The main reason we haven't pursued the product is we're not entirely confident we have a set of standards that would work. Without informed consent you can't do this sort of thing." Kopp said the company would soon contact TRUSTe for guidance. TRUSTe Chairman Lori Fena said she hoped to hear from Kopp soon. "We mandate full disclosure," she said. "We expect full disclosure at all the Web sites, so this would no longer be a back-door deal." The FTC's Medine agreed. "It's going to take enough firms getting beat up in the press to make people realize they have to think about this first - before they develop the technology," he said. Imgis can be reached at www.imgis.com The FTC can be reached at www.ftc.gov -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNCQghdZgKT/Hvj9iEQLu5ACfSVkRIbX8iYE7EgKnwV2FIZK82fUAoIBl 2TyMisA624IB1nWUwhI3qx54 =08lI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FW: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:27 PM 5/5/96 -0700, blanc wrote: >From: Black Unicorn (in reply to TCMay): > >> I have no doubt that "tax planning" works for some people, and I think >> certain people like Vince Cate may do well in places like Anguilla, >> essentially starting a business from scratch. I even have longterm hopes >> for tax havens, cyberspace tax havens, anonymous systems, etc. But this >> ain't happening soon. > >Here I'm not so sure I agree. Several of us are working on making it >happen, soon. >.................................................................................................. > > >I have a great idea - let's start a closed, elite mailing list for "Offshorepunks". >Uni, Sandy, & Duncan et al could "show us how it's done". Let's turn this around, shall we? I have a theory that within the next few years, one of the biggest users of these off-shore accounts will be government employees who see their worlds crashing down around them, and they want to be able to escape the country with their loot. Maybe the most useful task we could accomplish would be to identify them for later targeting. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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