December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NYT login
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just Rich wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Mar 1996 hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > > > >The tobacco companies need a forum. And they are used to spending big > > >bucks on sponsoring things. > > > > That misses the point. There is no shortage of potential sponsors. > > What these people are asking me is "how much business will Web > > advertising create for me". > > This misses another point. The question was, how do *we* pay for this > stuff (emphasis mine). > > If someone develops a reasonably easy-to-use and reasonably secure digital > cash micropayment system, then I would be happy to pay to read the New > York Times on the Web. I would rather they were dependent on my money than > R.J. Reynold's. I am attempting to support the largest number of models possible. Micropayments is only one model, I have an internet draft out describing a scheme based on a suggestion by Ron. I don't think I should choose how people will raise revenue. I don't think that the NYT will want to be associated with cancer sticks in any case. There are plenty of sponsors such as IBM, Intel etc who will be happy to pay cash for a Web site ad, provided it makes them money. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuaOCoZzwIn1bdtAQF5DQGAsdUiYsmP0EwHZUWA2ijeAZf/pBoqFtzR VDYY2760gf0QLqNBDbLHo6LnJp7T4b5h =vjES -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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What's anyone know about Teledyne Electronic Technologies?
by Mark Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a competitor against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. They are claiming a non-linear approach in which (as best I can tell) they are permuting the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry substitution tables. They are also asserting that these "key generated substitution tables and inter-round permutations" are supported by "nonlinear orthomorphic mappings generated from arbitrary key" (and that this is patented) and "row-complete Latin Squares generated from an arbitrary key" (and that this is also patented). The claimed benefits include being invulnerable to differential and "linear" cryptanalysis, no linear key/data interaction to hide, that this results in the tables and permutations being "transient/secret," and that fewer rounds are needed (fewer than what, I don't know) to attain "resistance to cryptanalysis." If there's any c'punks who'd care to comment on these notions, I'd very much appreciate the feedback. Also, if anyone's actually seen the algorithm, reviewed it, or knows of published material about these techniques, I'd also appreciate seeing those posted. Of course, any feedback from existing customers of TET would also be great. Thanks! ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |So, I went walking through the street. |Mark Aldrich | |I saw you strung up in a tree. |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |A woman knelt there, said to me, |maldrich(a)grci.com | |Hold your tongue, man, hold your tongue. |MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Timothy C. May wrote: >The Red Brigade in Italy sought a fascist crackdown, and > the "strategy of tension" is common. (And even revolutionists of crypto > anarchist persuasion often think laws like the CDA are good in the long > run, by undermining respect for authority and triggering more extreme > reactions....) It is important to note in this regard that the worst bombing in Italy was the Bologna station bombing, now decisively linked to right wing facist groups the involvment in which of ex-prime minister Adreotti is shortly to be examined in a criminal trial. The point being that the extreemists play into each others hands. > -- expect increased support for a "New World Order" to restrict > non-governmental access to strong crypto (via key escrow measures) This is pretty much a diversion. Terrorist groups have been using encryption since long before PGP arrived. > -- expect the various laws about "talking about explosives on the Net" to > be used to clamp down on various fringe groups Hang on here, some of those groups are actively conspiring to commit terrorist acts. If someone sends a message saying "lets plant a bomb under a federal building, that will show them" I'm not worried if the govt. decides to arrest a few people. There is a border between free speech and conspiracy to murder which some people have crossed. > -- expect "national security" to become a bigger part of the political debate Possibly. > -- expect more and bigger bombings, as the groups thinking about bombings > see how productive they are in accomplishing policy goals (such as ending > peace talks, triggering police state actions, etc.) The IRA has not got very far after 25 years or terrorism. The civil rights movement which the IRA usurped achieved much more in the five years before the IRA started killing people. Had it not been for the IRA there would probably have been a settlement by now. The same goes for Israel where the PLO only gained a partial settlement after giving up the terrorism. > I predict that it will take about 5 more major bombings in European and > American cities to trigger substantive changes in laws. Generally it takes two. The legislation is written after the first and then staled until being passed on the second. There is a usefull procedure in the UK parliament which causes bills to expire at the end of each session. Note that on the CDA there was the behaviour of certain people deliberately seeking to create an issue. The CDA was to a large extent the work of one Marty Rimm and his fellow conspirators. > Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who > moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want > their land back is asking for trouble. A point to consider is that there are many Isralis born in Israel who have no other home. These people did not ask to be born in the middle of a desert state. As with the Irish problem it is easy to solve if one could change the past. The fundamental problem being that the wrong side won at Hastings. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuYpioZzwIn1bdtAQEkMQF+I1lUyGbzdScAyYqtSDLPGuX4qsCTKcmM Plfdv25rn9u8M6squAw5xfgaQu8au1Ce =9xbY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Lots of stuff deleted) >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? (more stuff deleted) I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or another soon. nobody@unimportant

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Newest CACM and Key Escrow
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The newest Communications of the ACM (March 90) is entitled "How to Use Key Escrow." I haven't read it yet, but on a quick glance, I don't see some of the newer schemes I've heard of, but there is an article "taxonomy of key escrow encryption systems" by Denning and Branstad -- Which does briefly mention of the Lotus scheme and some of the other published schemes that I was thinking of. _______________________ Regards, 8146th member of the CIEC coalition Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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Re: TET cryptosystem
by B. Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************************************************************************* This is a temporary e-mail address; I am in Cambridge until 12 March. Continue to send mail to schneier(a)counterpane.com; it forwards by itself. ************************************************************************* > Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a > competitor against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. > They are claiming a non-linear approach in which (as best I can > tell) they are permuting the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry > substitution tables. > > They are also asserting that these "key generated substitution > tables and inter-round permutations" are supported by "nonlinear > orthomorphic mappings generated from arbitrary key" (and that this > is patented) and "row-complete Latin Squares generated from an > arbitrary key" (and that this is also patented). > > The claimed benefits include being invulnerable to differential and > "linear" cryptanalysis, no linear key/data interaction to hide, > that this results in the tables and permutations being > "transient/secret," and that fewer rounds are needed (fewer than > what, I don't know) to attain "resistance to cryptanalysis." This explanation is so laced with nonsensical buzzwords that the algorithm is probably absolute nonsense. I can't tell you (because of NDAs) how many times I've seen proprietary algorithms that make all sorts of grandeose claims of security and are actually terrible. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)counterpane.com **************************************************************************

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Re: What's anyone know about Teledyne Electronic Technologies?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:42 AM 3/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >>Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a competitor >>against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. They are claiming >>a non-linear approach in which (as best I can tell) they are permuting >>the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry substitution tables. > > A couple of points: 1. DES is nonlinear and (I believe) provably not a group; that TET is alluding to DES being linear casts grave doubt. If their S-Box "permutes" I'd also be concerned! >Dont trust it unless you are a good cryptanalyst and have a copy of the >source code. Most commercial crypto products are crap. > >Jonathan Wienke > 2. Most NEW UNPROVEN CRYPTOSYSTEMS are crap, not crypto products. That's too strong an assertion. Plenty of commercial crypto products(and perhaps "most" which in significant commercial disctribution) are based on strong DES/RSA, etc. proven technologies.

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Re: Anonymous remailers and Leahy bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:26 AM 3/7/96 -0500, A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: > >>I am assuming they fix the obvious error in the phrasing above. > >Until they do, we can only guess at the intent. > >>"Thanks for the use of your nifty anonymous remailer. Under a different >>name, I intend to use this remailer (along with others) to transmit child >>pornography, plot terrorism, and do all of my drug deals. You've made my >>life so much more secure!" > >At this point, Bob has no choice other than to reply with: "I assume you are >joking however since what you have stated is in violation of numerous laws, >we have no choice other than to disable your account. If we find that >illegal acts have been committed using this remailer, we will have no choice >other than to report such actions." Wouldn't help "Bob" in the least. And you didn't read what I wrote very carefully, either: Notice that I said, "under a different name." In other words, the source of the note does not identify the user name under which the illegal activity is promised to occur. Cancelling this particular fellow's account does NOTHING to prevent the illegal activity from occurring by other, unidentified users, and "Bob" knows it. Moreover, such a statement (by Bob) would be considered deliberately ineffective: Any anonymous encrypted remailer operator is perfectly aware that his remailer can be used for illegal purposes without him ever finding out. If the law was written carefully enough, that mere knowledge would make it a crime to continue to operate that remailer unless its use could be monitored and verified to be legal. Technically, encryption would not be illegal, but using encryption would open one up to harrassment by government. This would become a de-facto ban, at least for whoever was on the government's "shit list" that week. >Anyone stupid enough to make a statement like this deserves to be disabled. Anyone stupid enough to misinterpret what I clearly wrote above deserves to be lambasted. >>At that point, Bob is GUILTY of violation of the Leahy bill, because his >>encrypted anonymous remailer: > >No, if Bob were to follow the above scenario, he would already be guilty of >terminal stupidity. Poor response, and inaccurate too. >>So maybe the word gets out, occasionally. At that point, usage of anonymous >>remailers declines, and people willing to risk operating one declines. A >>few come up which are run by the Feds, which log anyone who attempts to use >>it... > >Declines ? They are only protection from amateurs. Do you really not >believe that everything in and out of anon.penet.fi & others is not >monitored *at the ISP/carrier level* ? I am well aware of the possibilities. But you just destroyed your own argument: If the government is already capable of tracing such messages, and is doing so, it is presumably doing so illegally, or this tracing SHOULD be illegal. If the government is already doing that, then we'd damn well look VERY carefully at any new bills that are proposed to regulate encryption, because we have far more to fear from them than they currently let on. > Warmly, > Padgett I'm disgusted by your "Warmly, Padgett." While I don't sympathize with their motivations, the "red-hunters" of the early 1950's had a term, "pink" to describe a person who was unduly sympathetic to the Communist cause: A person who was just a bit too cozy with their philosophy. Not quite "red," but... In the 1990's encryption debates, you're a bit too "pink" on the pro-government side for me. With generous amounts of disgust, Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com .....Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT8axfqHVDBboB2dAQHp5AP5AeJ8dPNy9Hkbvyrk6QD/pIIEz7ZeLK3l V2O7zD9Fsvtb6KfIlczX6wpWXOM3RTvgItASg8yNnibLwT37vCKkrpkWKujjIUKb CXGZPZaHGMAAOc9+nU5OzjsAS4IyFuycOlP5z7PlpEap9xo4DlQFJwpgFxHeu53E B3277PHwak4= =5Ff6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote: >Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest >in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. >Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. >Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit >to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. To avoid a trusted intermediary, the problem can be thought of as a secure multi-party communication problem with private inputs, which is much studied in the literature. The easiest formulation is pairwise: Alice and Bob mutually engage in the calculation of "Alice loves Bob" AND "Bob loves Alice". Each inputs his feelings as an input bit, and the output will be true only if they have mutual feelings. Each pair of potential lovers would then go through the protocol with each other. This problem is solved in "Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result", by Chaum, Damgard, and van de Graaf, in the proceedings of the Crypto 87 conference. They even discuss this application directly: "Note that this AND-gate computation, where both parties want to hide their input from each other, has a meaningful application: consider the situation where Alice and Bob have just met, and each considers dating the other. Neither wishes to lose face in the following sense: if Alice wants a date but Bob doesn't, Alice does not want to let Bob know that she wanted the date. And the same holds for Bob. In other words: if a party does not want the date it does not find out the other party's decision." The solution is reasonably practical, involving scrambled truth tables and bit commitments, and is related to some of Chaum's work on zero-knowledge. The paper is a bit theoretical and hard to read, though. I can write up the protocol if anyone is interested. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBMT8p4RnMLJtOy9MBAQHUAQIAv6tTbhLvTnbxX+7BlSIQcxCBfF+FhL1E mR57Ks8Rklg2PxEotSl9BDEtKWVFoqXg8UdNhsj6d3ASFzdQe0B6Hg== =tCch -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> > [>>Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote:] > > >Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest > > >in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. > > >Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. > > >Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit > > >to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. > > >- T is the trusted third party. > [Padgett contribution elided] > Oh, that would work fine. Let a, b, and t be Alice, Bob, and Trent's secret DH > keys, and g and p be the generator and prime (all math below is mod p.) > If Bob wants to talk to Alice, he sends Trent B = g**b, marked "For Alice", > optionally anonymously. Trent calculates X = B**t == g**bt, and sends it to > Alice. > Alice calculates K = X**a == g**bat, calculates H = Hash(K) and > posts it anonymously, or sends it to Trent to post or mail to Bob. > If Alice wants to talk to Bob, she calculates A = g**a mod p, > sends it to Trent, optionally anonymously, marked "For Bob". > Trent calculates Y = A**t == g**at , and sends it to Bob. > Bob calculates K' = Y**b == g**abt, calculates H' = Hash(K') and > notices that it's the same as the H he pulled off the net earlier. > Bob says "Oh, wow! Alice wants to talk to me!", encrypts some lame drivel > of a message M with key K'==K, and mails it to Alice if he knows her address > or posts it with Subject: H', which Alice receives. I don't think this satisfies the requirements. Once Bob calculates H' and sees that it matches H, he knows that Alice likes him, but Alice doesn't know that he likes her. The whole point of the protocol was to be fair. Bob must only learn that Alice likes him if Alice is guaranteed to learn that he likes her. I have posted an alternate solution in another message. Hal

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