December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 29 Jan 96 6:45:43 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net *+***+* 10:20 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +-++++++++++ 44:43 99.99% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org #####*###*## 6:24 99.98% c2 remail(a)c2.org +**+******** 16:42 99.96% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++-++++--+++ 2:20:51 99.96% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -+___.-+--++ 13:18:57 99.96% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ** ###-*#### 3:55 99.94% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org #**** ****** 3:33 99.89% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -------++-+ 1:34:41 99.83% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *#+ *+*+-+## 17:44 99.82% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *## # #*#+*# 2:10 99.72% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ############ :31 99.53% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi .__--.._ .- 27:57:50 97.03% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net + #+### #### 2:06:45 94.21% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ...-_.-_. 24:28:54 92.68% rahul homer(a)rahul.net *+***--** ## 17:20 99.69% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net +**** +*+* 14:48 83.47% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** 6:00 56.93% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ** 8:12 55.13% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu * 8:49 8.99% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:43 PM 1/28/96 MET, Olmur wrote: >The difference is, that the German government was not ordering this >block. German prosecutors are sending intimidating messages to various ISPs. Some ISPs are more easily intimidated than others. The messages fall short of saying "You will be prosecuted if you do not obey", but they do say "You may be prosecuted if you do not obey." --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:08 PM 1/28/96 -0800, sameer wrote: > When I worked for Walnut Creek CDROM they had to remove > "Castle Wolfenstein" from one of their CDs because they wouldn't have > been able to ship to Germany if they didn't. In "Castle Wolfenstein" you run around shooting Nazis, just as in "Doom" you run around shooting demons. And similarly Zundel is not a Nazi, he is an anti fascist. Hmm, these "Anti nazi laws" look suspicious like pro Nazi laws. Seems that the government of Germany is primarily concerned about their own hurt feelings, and to hell with the hurt feeling of the Jews. > >-- >Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-601-9777x3 >Community ConneXion, Inc. FAX: 510-601-9734 >The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 >http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:04 AM 1/29/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >You're actually quoting from an inspired bit of trolling. See my recent >message: "Ernst Zundel impersonator on Usenet" Oops: I guess I should read *all* my cypherpunks mail before I start sending off stuff. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: CP LITE: A Censorship Device?
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the mail-to-news gateway is better than a "lite" list at this point. On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 03:54:31 -0600, Carol Anne wrote: >I've been watching this CP Lite thing develop. >Sounds like an attempt to moderate the list. >I mean it's easy to post out of it, >but hard to answer to it. >And all of the good back and forth discussion >gets lost in a backwash of private email. >There is just no way I will send someone an >email to a posting they post out of there. >I think that would be a disservice to everyone here. >Love Always, >Carol Anne >-- >Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress >*********************************************************************** >Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 >My Homepage >The Cyberdoc >*********************************************************************** >------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- >M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M >MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ >MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` >------------------------------------------------------------- >for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Downsizing the NSA
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 02:04:52 -0800, Tim wrote: [..] >However, as Phill notes, the NSA and other intelligence agencies are now in >that most dangerous of positions: a powerful agency or department casting >about for something to do. >Spying on citizens and keeping the keys to their private communications and >diaries is not an appropriate option. >AT&T is downsizing, IBM downsized a while back, so why couldn't the NSA >just do the right thing: admit that the Soviet threat is no more, >congratulate the victors, and downsize by 20,000 employees? Perhaps they are worried about the implications of putting thousands of cryptographers into the private sector? And what if you were one of them? You'd probably have a hard time using or publishing anything classified. Not to mention the usual governmental conflict-of-interest work rules (for low-level employees the standards of who you can work for after leaving the government is a lot stricter than if you were a cabinet member). Just a thought.

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Slip over non-slip ports
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(please respond directly to fc(a)all.net and not to the list) I am looking for a way to run slip over a telnet connection on a local Ethernet. Does anyone know of any freely available software that allows me to start a SLIP connection over a telnet channel? -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Of course. My signature was bad. I got a message in response to a request I made to someone for their public key. I wanted to check the signatures that they included with their posts to cypherpunks, but their key was not on the keyservers. The key they included was completely unsigned, and when I use it to validate their previous posts as well as the message they sent which included the key, the signatures come back as bad, the contents of the file changed. Names are appropriately withheld (I hope). As I understand the bcc: definition, only I and the first smtp server this message hits should know who it's to. I don't know if anyone else reading this mailing list needs this info, but just in case... here's my reply to the message. At 10:03 PM 1/28/96 -0800, you wrote: >Sorry, I'm a newbie to Internet, and also the Internet usage of PGP. I just >participated in a local keysigning meeting, so maybe my key will find its >way to a server. Don't worry about being a 'newbie'. Everyone starts somewhere. However, your key will usually not 'find its way' to a server without you specifically sending it. The keyserver I usually use is accessed by sending a mail message which fits the following format. As far as I know, all the keyservers use this format to add or update keys in their databases. You only have to send it to one keyserver, and it will propagate to all the others. I have indented the text so that no handlers decide to interpret it as a new message. - - To: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu - - Subject: ADD - - - - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - - Version: 2.6.2 - - - - [key deleted to protect the innocent] - - - - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >I'm sorry to have to admit that I don't even know how to do this! Newbie >alert! If you don't admit you don't know something, nobody will usually tell you how to do it. Also, you should sign your own key. That will make it harder to forge, I think. The reasons were spelled out in a couple of the web pages I read, but I've forgotten them. It has something to do with either a denial of service attack or a man in the middle attack, or both. The command to do this is: pgp -ks 0xHEXKEYID Honestly, I've only just begun to use pgp myself. Also, you should add your e-mail address to the user-id of your key. The command to do so is: pgp -ke 0xHEXKEYID You will be asked if you wish to add a user id to the key. Say yes, and give it your e-mail address. What this does is it allows people who are using pgp-enabled mailers to directly encrypt messages to you without choosing your key manually. The reason that I have not encrypted this message to you using the key you provided is that when I extracted the key and re-checked your message, the signature was no good. I've found that (using eudora) I must turn off the word wrap feature of my mailer to allow for good signed messages out. Of course, having said this, I'll probably not get a good signature on this message. Let me know if it signs ok. Now, I have a question. Which attack(s) is/are a person vulnerable to when distributing an unsigned public key in the open? Could this actually be a complex man-in-the-middle attack? Am I paranoid? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQzROLTS4SjerN/RAQGLNwP8DMXP1BLdeygfEaBF//lYZHkxWGFaFx9L R59KJQ/VaYVU/Q17bFDhXyCztu2IRlzLhBqno+5uHsZTL01M3D1dyXGDBvlxY+FB kNaClKzeXYqA3Or7Ny2mcgyZW/bGXA6v3Z+RQgDuVrXsJz5wGP/UxBU3Ppr05+qL i+5KB2efLxA= =iXlS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Politics of Mistrust 2
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Replay, The Washington Post series on "The Politics of Mistrust" simmers at: http://www.replay.com/young/ Today's second article of six is, "Who's in Control? Many Don't Know or Care." Politics is "a waste of my time. They're cutting each other down, just playing childish games. It's confusing nonsense, like two little kids on a schoolyard," says Temera Porter, a computer chip inspector in Beaverton, Oregon. "When I voted last I wrote in that George Carlin should be president, I really did." A sidekick report tells of Rush's 20m dittoheads' wishes to rid DC of George Carlin's Who's, fuck, shit ...

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Re: more RANTING about NSA-friendly cpunks
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:58 PM 1/29/96 +0800, Bruce Murphy wrote: >In message <199601282104.NAA10926(a)netcom3.netcom.com>, > "Vladimir Z. Nuri" wrote: >> >> >In message <199601262011.MAA17408(a)netcom16.netcom.com>, >> > "Vladimir Z. Nuri" wrote: >> >> >> >> has anyone *tried* just ignoring the ITAR wrt crypto and seeing what >> >> would happen? the gubbermint blindly thinks that cyberspace will >> >> inevitably bring the wrath of four horsemen of the infocalypse, but aren't >{snip} >> > >> >Zimmerman. >> >{snip} >> Zimmermann supports my contention, as I wrote in the post. NOTHING >> happened to him. it is conceivable this same result could have >> been arrived at (government drops investigation) if he never even >> hired a lawyer. >> >> Zimmermann is a perfect example of what may be counterproductive >> hysteria on *our* side, toward advancing crypto. if Zimmermann >> cannot be prosecuted, and is not prosecuted, where are the ITAR "teeth"??? >> > >Nod. You may have a point there... > >I'll tell you what, seeing as I *can't* export cryptostuff against >ITAR, what say *you* do it. Lots of it. And if nothing happens to you, >well and good. >OTOH the cause needs a few martyrs. >Packrat (BSc/BE;COSO;Wombat Admin) Packrat, I agree with the (likely) implications of your (tongue-in-cheek?) commentary. The fact that "nothing happened to Zimmermann" is scant hope to us. If ITAR is causing cryptosystems to not be built, merely due to FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) then it is actively harming us. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQz8y/qHVDBboB2dAQGmRwP/YJPpzwQ4pZU3QZcSNNzKSz2kOEml1a9x nV8wWDj019NLrPE0u1sKhsSkDu8QYeaAtSr3NnSMTK+DlLkuV7SKyXg6k/Pk3uWL xqEmWNCM8+rTXyP2FuflD3w+HCe0oCRt2AzmclzUwlalTP2gY2bfKeAAawCdubST FKZFFdlWNG0= =Is7T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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