December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:58 PM 1/25/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >The big problem is how are the labels attached to the programs. I >agree with Tim that it is probably imposible for individual Usenet >postings. However is should be possible for TV programs, and whole >newsgroups. Since TV programs will soon *be* "individual Usenet postings," it will not be possible to rate them. Even the Earth doesn't have that much time. The economic "drag" involved would be too great. Once we have high-speed connections to the nets, the amount of video out there will explode. There will be more to watch than watchers (remember video archives). Search engines will help people find what they want and avoid what they don't want. "Sex and Drugs and Rock and Roll" (Wine, Women, and Song) will be like any other available subject -- some will want to find it and some will want to avoid it. Just another problem of how to extract the content you want from all the mess. Search engines won't be all that perfect but they will be all we have. One wonders why people spend so much time arguing about the V-chip, telecoms dereg, sex on the net, Trade Policy, or Immigration when it's intuitively obvious that these things are (or soon will be) no longer subject to central control of any kind. DCF "King Canute, we are here!"

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RE: Microsoft's CryptoAPI - thoughts?
by Alan Pugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>What does everyone think about this? Perhaps I already missed the boat, but >>I just found out about it. How would international apps work? Would a data >>file encrypted with an app compiled with a US-only CSP (cryptographic >>service provider) be able to be loaded by a European equivalent app? >> >>[Info can be found at: http://www.microsoft.com/intdev/inttech/cryptapi.htm] I too would be interested in any insights some of the folks here might have on this API. It would seem to me that in light of some of the discussions on this list recently concerning the perversity of ITAR, that this API could easily run afoul of it. I've seen a brief article on it in pcweek and was suprised I'd not seen it here yet. Perhaps I just missed it. I hate to say good things about M$, but they certainly have the pull to perhaps get an API through. amp

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Re: PGP in Eudora and other mail programs
by geoff klein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- X-Pgprequest: signed MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=dgjlnouteqkhfsmbcz97531sfhkmpi > THIS IS A MESSAGE IN 'MIME' FORMAT. Your mail reader does not support MIME. > Some parts of this will be readable as plain text. > To see the rest, you will need to upgrade your mail reader. --dgjlnouteqkhfsmbcz97531sfhkmpi Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Description: PGP encrypted file Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: tcmay(a)got.net, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Fri Jan 26 14:30:46 1996 At Thu, 25 Jan 1996 11:54:46 -0800 Timothy C. May wrote: >..... > And yet how many of these programs actually can transparently > (automatically, push-button, etc.) support PGP? >...... Commtouch is about to release Beta-1 of Pronto Secure. This will REALLY support PGP transparently, and as far as E-mail clients go, Pronto makes Eudora look like "sour grapes". We expect to announce a special Beta testing offer for c'punks in early February. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Geoff Klein email: geoff(a)commtouch.com Product Manager - Pronto Secure http: //www.commtouch.com - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- CommTouch SW Inc, U.S CommTouch, Israel Home, Israel 1206 W. Hillsdale Blvd 10 Technology Ave 27 Amishav St San Mateo, CA 94403 Ein Vered, 40696 Tel-Aviv, 67191 Tel: (415) 578-6580 Tel: 972(9)963445 972 (3) 7321378 Fax: (415) 578-8580 Fax: 972(9)961053 972 (3) 5716203 - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMQlWGkLv5OMYFK1FAQFYeQQAqPXMk0fS7ZmFkV0rCD3goLgkCnfxbN6F sPXZ08pHD2mH5MU50+gyprgJx87H/9OGwzR+pbGHtZP3QwucWBrwLCU2gj1dAzZ6 CGhrgZJTOa1XEKy9xzXJSuLXEAHuJYDQnmANVneRt04Ld0Z67QEW6cZHYCeVwHeH KavQ4tAJ9WM= =ouF2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --dgjlnouteqkhfsmbcz97531sfhkmpi--

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Information
by Khalil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am very much interested to find out more about this type of remailing service. I would appreciate any information I get. Regards Khalil

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NSA advanced knowledge
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by rsalz(a)osf.org (Rich Salz) on Wed, 24 Jan 7:34 PM >Is there any indication that the NSA knew about >public-key before it entered the open literature? Fred B. Wrixon writes in "Codes and Ciphers," under the "Public Key" entry: ... This Hellman-Diffie proposal was apparently anticipated by a similar version developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) a decade earlier. (p. 164) No citation or elaboration is given for this claim. Wrixon's book is a simply written compendium: Codes and Ciphers: An A to Z of Covert Communication, from the Clay Tablet to the Microdot. Fred B. Wrixon Prentice Hall, 1992. Paper $18.00 ISBN 0-13-277047-4

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Re: German home banking (fromn RISKS)
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Don't high speed modems transmit and receive on the same frequencies, > using echo cancelation to decode the receive signals? Does that > make it impossible to eavesdrop on high-speed (i.e. V32bis) modems? No, and a lot of crackers and phone phreaks found out the hard way. You can buy protocol analysers off-the-shelf that will give a dump of the entire communication by just passively listening in (or possibly playing back a recording). I have seen units that could decode all of the popular Blue Book protocols for consumer equipment such as faxes and high-speed modems as well as ISDN, T1, DS3, ATM, etc... Most are programmable and some are full-blown computers running stripped down versions of Unix and can also be controlled over the network from RealComputers. With multiple analysers and a little custom software you could easily perform MITM attacks. The hardest part is getting in the middle. Modulation, comm-protocols, and compression techniques are not a replacement for honest to goodness crypto. andrew

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Denning's Crypto Archy
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherptoady's updatest unscratchable crypto itch and salve: http://www.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/Future.html

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Re: Intl. Keysize Limit vs. U.S. Keysize Limit (Was: Re: Hack Lotus?)
by Karl A. Siil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:50 AM 1/26/96 -0500, Futplex wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > It would be just as easy to build the intl. version of Notes with 128-bit+spy >keys, with 40 bits of truly protected key and 88 bits of espionage-enabled >key, and then use straight 128 bits in the domestic version. Does anyone else find it worrisome that given 24 bits of a 64-bit key, the encryption may not be as strong as the same algorithm with a 40-bit key (e.g., for a variable key-length algorithm like RC4)? In other words, I suspect some algorithms might not derive their protection mechanisms equally from each key bit. What if guess the remaining 40 bits is as easy as guessing the rest of xyl******? Just pondering. Karl

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Re: Etch-a-sketch
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Ok.. I'm still getting mail regarding the etch-a-sketch keychain. Thus > I'm going to look at how to get em for everyone. :) > > Just letting you all know. Don't bury me in 'I want one mail.' As soon as > I have the info I'll get it out to the hungry crowd. Heh. At that point > you can bury me happily. > > Jonathan Can't be too many cpunks out there with rugrats. I've seen these in toy stores. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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re: [local] Report on Portland Cpunks meeting
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:33 1/24/96, Jonathan Rochkind wrote: >If, on the other hand, I sign "Toxic Avenger"'s key, then what benefit is >this for third parties? Since Toxic Avenger is, by intention, _not_ linked >to a real person, I'm not saying that I feel confident that this key really >belongs to any particular real person. What am I saying? What if the nym is linked to a real person? There are nyms on this list that people here have met in person, talked with on the phone, etc. Say that person verifies their key fingerprint. Should one sign the key? I have signed keys of people without seeing their ID, because I and everyone else I know knows them under the name on the key. What if I watch someone _generate_ a key under the nym "Master Blaster"? I know that "Master Blaster" isn't their real name. Does that mean I shouldn't sign the key? -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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