December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What backs up digital money?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I apologize for changing the thread name, but the existing name, "Re: (X:x)e$ 's other use," seems unrelated to these points. At 1:46 PM 3/27/96, Scott Schryvers wrote: >Question. >If e-cash were backed by gold would that make it more reliable than say the >dollar? This question, and much of the debate that appears here about digital money in its many and confusing forms (e-cash, digicash, bitmarks, e$, cypherfrancs, chaums, etc.), displays a "type error" in thinking about digital money. No form of digital money extant is an actual currency in the conventional sense. Nor does this seem likely. Nor necessary. Nor useful. Nor important. Rather, think in terms of _checks_ or _wire transfers_ and the like. An order to transfer funds from one account or place of holding to another. Eric Hughes was our local resident self-educated expert on commercial paper, notes, bank drafts, etc. Bob Hettinga has also written extensively on this. A nice little book I use is "The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics," 4th, edited by David W. Pearce, 1992. Nothing yet on digital money and how various forms of it fit into the taxonomy of financial instruments. I expect by the 6th edition, in a few years, we'll see some stuff. But here are just a couple of definitions, to tell you all that an actual taxonomy does exist, that "money" is not the all-inclusive type. * "currency. Strictly, that component of a country's money stock that literally circulates from hand to hand, i.e., coin and banknotes...." * "cheque. A document, normally supplied in printed form by a bank, ordering the bank to transfer funds from the drawer's current account to a named payee...." (more wrinkles about negotiability, endorsements, counter checks, etc.) So, what are the classifications of the schemes offered by CyberCash, First Virtual, Digicash, Mark Twain Bank, and so on? A useful project for any of you out there with banking or finance interests. Most of these are currently variants of credit card transactions, and the best of these (in cryptographic terms) appears to be a variant of a straight bank. I might give instructions for Union Bank to transfer X amount of gold, or Swiss francs, or dollars from Account X to Account Y, where Account Y might be in the same bank, might be in another bank, or might be to anyone who showed up at the bank and produced the claim... The point being that talking about "what backs up digital cash?" is misleading. (What really backs it up is the reputation of the entities, but I digress.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by shabbir＠vtw.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read Tim's comments with enthusiasm, as I think we agree on many things. I, as well, wish for a world where there is crypto so heavily proliferated that all the regulations in the world cannot either hinder or help get it into the hands of the public. In the meantime, Tim advocates putting good code out there for people to use, racing to the point of no return. I don't disagree, but that's not where my talents lie. Mine lies in keeping Congress from doing damage today, a strategy which Tim may call very short term (getting good code out and well-deployed is long term) but hey, it's what we do. Let's hope we both arrive at that end in time to retrospect about strategy. I must agree though, watching legislation is a lot like watching sausage being made... -Shabbir J. Safdar * Online Representative * Voters Telecomm. Watch (VTW) http://www.vtw.org/ * Defending Your Rights In Cyberspace PS If you're going to be at CFP, stop me and say hi. Timothy C. May writes: >At 7:08 AM 3/26/96, Shabbir J. Safdar wrote: >>Timothy C. May writes: > >>>I don't see any compelling need for U.S. legislation. And given the >>>pressures to attach all sorts of language to bills, I think it best that no >>>legislation happen. >> >>Unfortunately, this is not an option. Legislation will happen, with our >>endorsement or without it. One good example is the Grassley computer >>crime bill earlier in 1995. Nobody advised him on this, as far as I can >>tell, he just went out and drafted it. Lo and behold, he drafted a >>provision that basically criminalized all crypto, including rot13. > >Of course I am not saying everyone should just be silent. Various >organizations, including Shabbir's own very able VTW, do a good job in >challenging bad laws and helping to make the "political sausage" which is >so very disgusting to watch being made. > >My point is that I see no compelling legislation that is needed. If enough >people in Washington really want increased length in _exported products_ >(remember the "exported" part), the Congress and the President should find >it easy enough to get said products on to the Approved List. (I note that >the Leahy Bill really doesn't change this system anyway...some products go >on the list, some don't...the law only seems to say that when the horse has >already left the barn, i.e., when "comparable" products are already in >fairly wide use outside the U.S., then the products should be put on the >approved list. Big deal. > >And my meta-point, repeated in several recent posts, is that compromising >on very basic liberties for the sake of a "deal" to let Lotus or Microsoft >or RSADSI have one uniform, "world" product is a very bad deal. > >(Key length alone is not an answer, anyway. Domestically we can have >arbitrary key lengths, with no limits on strength. So, will a "world >version" be limited to 64 bits (at best)? Will I, as an American, be forced >to limit myself to this "world" length? This is a compromise of my >liberties, just for the sake of simplifying the inventory control problems >of Lotus and Microsoft! And it still doesn't address the many points we've >discussed over the years about superencryption, rogue programs, and access >by foreign LEAs.) > >Granted, the Leahy Bill does not explicitly mandate key escrow, whether >TIS' CKE/SKE or Lotus' "40+24" crypto-with-two-heads scheme. But it >includes language that suggests a role for government in key escrow and >even says escrow holders may not notify the subject of a subpoena that his >key has been snarfed by the Feds. (Superficially, this resembles wiretaps, >except that one's escrow agent may be one's lawyer, or mother, or business >partner....it makes for messy situations.) > >I'll have to move on to Shabbir's other comments. > >>We have to wake up and learn from the fight against the net censorship >>legislation. This is realpolitik. Congress will legislate crypto, >>whether we want them to or not. This is not news anyone wants to hear, >>but we have to face up to it. > >Be my guest. You're in Washington, you're connected, you're in a position >to lobby. I only speak for myself, and my views. I am 3000 miles away from >D.C., and have no intention of visiting that mosquito pit (I grew up >outside of D.C.). > >I put my argument efforts into this mailing list (and Cyberia, until >recently). If people want to read my arguements, they can subscribe, or get >the occasional article forwarded. Frankly, I don't think my brand of >political philosophy fits, and I'm not going to change my political >philosophy just to help Lotus or Microsoft get approval to export a 64-bit >version of "Lotus Notes" or "Bob." > >>Congress has discovered the net, and partly though the widespread fame >>of this list, they have also discovered crypto. Simply saying, "we don't >>want any laws that address crypto" may be the ideal solution, but that won't >>stop them from passing laws that govern the domestic use of crypto. > >Well, this is when things will get exciting. This is the Real Battle (tm) >we've all been anticipating: laws on domestic use of encryption. Maybe I'll >share a cell with that guy who was caught writing in an unapproved >diary...Winston Smith, I think his name was (CNN carried a report on his >conviction..."Escrow is Freedom"). > >Until then, the more Congress learns about the Potential Dangers of Crypto, >the worse for us. (I had a noted lobbyist approach me about speaking before >a committee...when it became clear to him that I wasn't interested in >giving a "See Dick read, see Jane encrypt" PR blurb for crypto, he realized >I was not the right person. Frankly, the ACLU and that sort can do a >perfectly fine job on the "basics" of crypto, the 10-minute version (that >still leaves the Congressfolks in a haze). > >Aside: My hunch is that crypto legislation will languish. Until, maybe next >year, maybe the year after, some major event occurs. Could be a new >bombing. Could be a terrorist cell raided. But they will be found to be >using PGP or somesuch (80% likely to be PGP), with anonymous remailers used >for breaking traffic analysis. The media will go into a feeding frenzy. >John Holliman of CNN will be taken off his usual space shuttle duties and >assigned to figure out what this crypto stuff is all about. Cathy Cleaver >and Donna Rice will tie it into pornography. Ralph Reed will mutter about >the Number of the Beast. And drastic legislation will be proposed and >passed. Don't forget that Clinton's Anti-Terrorism Bill, which predated OKC >by a few months, came very close to passing (and may still...as of a few >days ago it was still pending, though parts of it had been gutted). > >And what effect will Leahy's Bromide ("bromide: a soothing concoction") >Bill have if such a crypto-facillitated incident occurs? None. It will be >swept away as a sand castle is swept away by the incoming tide. > >So why bother? Why not instead "race to the point of no return"? (For a >fuller description of this "point of return," the point at which >sufficiently strong crypto has been sufficiently widely deployed so that it >cannot be recalled, cf. my Cyphernomicon. The crypto anarchist point of >view is that the genie is out of the bottle, Pandora's Box has been opened, >for the good, the bad, and the ugly, and that legislation will matter >little in the long run. > >To be sure, for people who live near Washington, whose interest is >primarily in the political (the conventional political), then I can see why >their interest is in helping Congress to craft better laws. But for the >rest of us, we have our own work to do. > > >>>* EXPORT OF CRYPTO BEYOND U.S.: This is indeed a thorn in the sides of U.S. >>>companies, but is not _per se_ an issue I worry about. So long as I have >>>strong crypto, I don't really care too much about export. It would be nice >>>to get the ITARs modified, but not at the risk of adding language (such as >>>Leahy did) making use of encryption a possible crime (we've debated this, >>>so I won't elaborate here). Besides, I think the best way to overturn the >>>ITARs is through a court challenge; as I have noted, even the NSA's lawyers >>>felt that the ITARs would not withstand court scrutiny. >> >>Unfortunately, many U.S. software companies don't agree with you. > >This is fine. I don't expect them to agree with me. When one of them begins >paying me a salary or sending me shares of their company's stock, then >perhaps I will argue for their positions. (Not that I'm a sellout, just >noting the obvious. They're looking to sell more products, at lower cost, >which if not surprising. But if the price for "getting" approval for 64-bit >export is some flavor of key escrow or limitations on domestic use, then >why should we help them push for this?) > >>While I agree with you (I've got PGP, what's the problem?), several of >>these companies are working through their trade organizations to introduce >>and push crypto legislation to allow them to raise the key length in their >>products. >> >>Put ourselves in their shoes for a minute. They're sitting there, with >>their 40 bit products, knowing that it blows chunks. They want to >>produce stronger crypto, but know they won't be able to export it. >>They talk to the company's attorneys, who speak to speak to the >>lobbyists, and poof, a crypto bill. > >I outline the answer to this during the Netscape--Jim Clarke situation >several months ago. The simple solution: have two versions. > >Version 1 has unlimited-strength crypto, no mandatory key escrow. It ships >to domestic customers only, and can only be downloaded domestically (a la >the PGP distributions). > >Version 2 is crippled. 40 bits, 45 bits, whatever. Maybe it has a set of >hooks for attaching "local regulations" hooks (e.g., all versions of >Netscape entering France must have no crypto, all versions entering The >Islamic People's Republic must automatically cc: the secret police on all >e-mail, etc.). > >These versions may or may not intercommunicate easily. > >The "added inventory" problems that a vendor faces are real, but he faces >problems already with multiple languages (English, French, Spanish, German, >Japanese, etc.), with multiple platforms, etc. > >Also--and this is seldom mentioned!--the inclusion of U.S.-mandated crypto >restrictions may end up "opening the flood gates" for various other >countries to demand their own versions (as noted above in the examples). If >the U.S. stands firm and takes no stand, it will be very hard for Iraq or >Singapore to demand special versions. But if the U.S. insists that packages >have NSA-friendly provisions, so, too, might the other countries demand the same. (A vendor may refuse to comply, but his hand has already been >weakened by his acquiescence to the U.S. demands for a special version.) > >Thus, it is possible that the crypto provisions will actually _worsen_ the >inventory problem. (As noted by so many others, what are the chances that >France or Singapore or Iran will go along with the inclusion of NSA >trapdoors in products their citizen-units and corporations will be using? >Does anyone imagine that France will tolerate a version of Netscape being >used by its corporations that the NSA can trivially break? Get with it.) > >But the issue raised by Shabbir is still this: corporations really want to >ship stronger products and they'd like to be able to only have to develop >and stock one version. So should we accept a weaker domestic encryption >standard to let RSA and Lotus achieve this goal? > >(One can imagine many parallels with other products. Perhaps some countries >only allow citizen-units to have access to .22 caliber firearms. Gun >companies would like a single world standard. Does this mean gun >enthusiasts in the U.S. should then lobby for the .22 as the allowable >standard? Interestingly, at least some gun companies (names excised to >avoid lawsuits) have exactly this position, that gun control laws are fine >with them if it means they can ship more products and face less regulation. >I am not equating Jim Bidzos, Ray Ozzie, or Jim Clarke to these folks, but >am pointing out that the "interests of industry" are not always coterminous >with the interests of citizens, or users, or free men.) > >There are in fact many situations where a corporation will gladly welcome >government regulation. They can cement their own positions and keep out >upstart competitors. There's a lot of evidence that some large electronics >companies actually _like_ regulatory burdens, as it tends to make it very >tough for a small company these days to start a production fab. I can thus >see that some crypto and software companies would potentially make a deal >with the devil if it increased sales and strengthened their "franchise." > >I've written more than enough, so I'll have to stop here. > >I believe what I have read from others, that the Leahy Bill is going >nowhere. As to other legislation, I've never said people should do nothing. >What I've said is that I place more faith in technology: the development of >anonymous remailers, for example, does more to disperse unstoppable >communication than any bill I've seen come out of Congress. > >And, frankly and bluntly, while I am not as extreme (in some ways) as, say, >Jim Bell, in other ways I and many others of us are quite extreme. (I >usually vote Libertarian, but even they are recognizing that they have no >effect on Congress because the goals of Congress and of themselves are so >far apart.) > >Were I closer to Washington, maybe I'd be more interested. But I'm not. I'm >even too far from San Francisco to drive the 100 miles over mountain roads >to stand in the rain with a placard being a spear carrier for some cause. > >Life is tough. > > >--Tim May > > >Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! >We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." > > > >

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Sun patch pulled (was Re: HP & Export of DCE)
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I noticed that Sun's latest libc patch (101759-04) is empty. Previous versions contained the complete U.S. version of libc, including the tres-dangerous DES and crypt functions. In the current rev only the README remains, presumably because: EXPORT INFORMATION: This patch includes code which performs cryptographic functions, which are subject to U.S. export control, and must not be exported outside the U.S. without prior approval of the U.S. government. Prior export approval must be obtained by the user of this patch. So, you might ask, what fixes is Sun not distributing??? (Rev 04) 1190985 gethostbyname() can trash an existing open file descriptor. 1182835 portmapper silently fails with version mismatch by PC-NFS client 1219835 Syslog(3) can be abused to gain root access on 4.X systems. Yup, that's right. The syslog hole that was so well publicized by CERT will remain open indefinitely because the ITAR makes it illegal for Sun to distribute the fix! So did HP and Sun spontaneously, simultaneously develop crypto awareness, or is some gummint dweeb whispering threats in their ear?

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Re: Bad news from Judge Richey
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:29 PM 3/26/96, jim bell wrote: >Now now, Tim. You know me better than that. You know that I would never be >so restrained as to call for the killing of ONLY ONE federal judge. Your sense of humor is also called "digging your own grave." Better hope your words don't get to prosecutors anxious to set an example.... >Seriously, however, I think you slightly mis-read my letter. The implied >"threat", if you are inclined to call it that, would simply be that if >domestic >software writers are prohibited from exporting encryption software, they >might be inclined (and have time for) writing the entire AsPol system into ... I read your article as essentially saying: "Judges ought to remember that a box of shells costs a lot less than an appeal." --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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HP & Export of DCE
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, if Leahy passes, DCE is exportable. Anyone know if the 'SecureRPC' in DCE is the one BAL broke years back? I asked a few DCE supporters this, and never got an answer, so I suspect they're still shipping bogus crypto. Adam ----- Forwarded message from Anonymous ----- As I sit, somewhere not in North America, I can see a CD-Rom from Hewlett-Packard, which I've had since last year. Recently I received the following letter. I've attempted to retype its contents accurately. ---------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8< [HP Logo] Hewlett-Packard Company Software and Information Delivery Operation, SST 690 East Middlefield Road Mountain View, California 94043 415/968-9200 Dear HP-UX Support Customer, Hewlett-Packard has uncovered a bundling problem in the DCE-Core fileset that is on the October HP-UX Application Release 10.0 s700/800 Application CDs. These products were bundled such that they are not compliant with U.S. Government export regulations. The part numbers for the affected CDs and products are listed below.

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Re: ITAR double standards?
by rkmoore＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3/26/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >So, did Intel have to apply to the State Department's office on munitions >exports in order to send engineers to Malaysia, Israel, Germany, Ireland, >etc., to do development work? Not that I ever heard. Engineers simply >hopped on planes and that was that. So true. When I worked in Silicon Valley firms, I noticed how International Air Courier services were used entirely like Interdepartmental Mail, with no concern for export laws or import duties, etc. If we travelled overseas, _of course_ we took our laptop with all it's software (including encryption), and _of course_ we'd leave software copies on colleagues hard disks, after doing demos and such. All with a sense of total righteousness -- we were tax-paying wage-earners just doing our job. There's a real irony here, if you think about the Barlow-expressed sentiment that cyberspace is a new free domain, having achieved escape velocity from terrestial anachronisms. While Barlow's critics, it seems, demolished _that_ thesis as wishful thinking, there's a parallel thesis that may actually be true: that _corporate environments_ have achieved escape velocity from civil jurisdiction, and now live in a world where rules & ethics are relative only to corporate culture, and "parochial" national laws are to be quietly ignored, knowing there's a highly-paid legal staff to deal with occasional embarrasments. We dream and they implement. Cheers, Richard rkmoore(a)iol.ie (not on cypherpunks) ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~ Posted by Richard K. Moore - rkmoore(a)iol.ie - Wexford, Ireland Cyberlib: www | ftp --> ftp://ftp.iol.ie/users/rkmoore/cyberlib ~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~--~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=~

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The Law Loft: Surviving the Biometric I.D. Card
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Though some will petulantly claim that this has "nothing to do with crypto," I think the report on legislation which may lead to new levels of national identification is very apropos to the themes of this list. A national ID card could be tied in to the CDA and other such legislation: the "Internet Driver's License" we are worried about. This would also facilitate the criminalization of anonymous remailers. (I noticed at a local night spot large posters announcing the city's "Zero Tolerance" policy for passing a drink to a minor. Imagine the same folks passing laws about the criminalization of giving access to a minor....) Here's the forwarded article: > Path: we.got.net!news.oz.net!newshub.internex.net!news.Stanford.EDU!agate!overload.lbl.gov!news.kreonet.re.kr!news.dacom.co.kr!nntp.coast.net!news.kei.com!news.texas.net!usenet > From: klynch(a)intrepid.net > Newsgroups: misc.survivalism > Subject: The Law Loft: Surviving the Biometric I.D. Card > Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 09:34:25 GMT > Organization: Texas Networking, Inc. > Lines: 148 > Message-ID: <4ir7hj$391(a)nntp.texas.net> > NNTP-Posting-Host: klynch.intrepid.net > X-Newsreader: Forte Free Agent 1.0.82 > > -------------------------------- > Here is the latest Alert from The Law Loft. Sorry its > late. > > If you are benifitting by this information, please don't just > keep it to yourself - share it with someone immediately. And > perhaps you can Fax Suzanne and Pete a thank you and ask > them what you can do to help. > > This work is pretty lonely and grinding. And oh so few ever thank > you for it. Of course that's not why their doing it. > > Many of you could do the same thing I'm doing. You can listen to > 7.435 MHz at 8:00 pm EST and take notes from The Law Loft. You > can FAX them a request to send you information. You can then pass > it on to others. > > When you don't see anything from me out here, you can pitch in and do > it. This is late, because I had no other choice but to catch an early > train. > > Throw away the "boob" tube and stop wasting your precious little time > that we have left to learn and work together. Invest in a good > Short-Wave radio with a built in tape machine. I use the Radio Shack > DX-392 portable receiver. NO LICENSE REQUIRED TO LISTEN. > > Check out other fine alternative news programs on 5.065 between 6:00 > pm EST and 12:00 midnight week nights. > > Please help us - do your little part. > > For Freedom, > Kerry > http://www.intrepid.net/~klynch/uslaws.html > --------------------------------------------- > H.R. 2202 Immigration Bill > > Special Alert II > > March 19, 1996 [Please note this date when reading - Kerry] * * * * * > * * * > > H. RES. 384 bringing H.R. 2202 and 17 proposed amendments to the floor > passed today in the House. Debate on the bill and amendments > continues tomorrow. Vote on amendment number 4 is expected tomorrow: > > The picture in the House of Representatives grows darker. H.R. 384 > bringing H.R. 2202, the Immigration bill, to the floor for a vote > along with 17 proposed amendments passed easily by wide majority in > today's session. > > Work on amendments including Congressman McCullum's amendment no. 4 > will start up again tomorrow. We estimate that the vote on amendment > number 4 will occur about 3:00 pm EST. > > Both the House and Senate bills are intended to bring us some form of > universal biometric identifier i.d. card either in the form of a new > social security card or a passport linked to biometric identifier > birth certificates and drivers' licenses: > > The House bill, H.R. 2202, if passed will bring in the biometric > identifier slowly with greater subtlty than the Senate version. The > biometric identifier is clearly in the picture here. Here's why: > > 1) The report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration entitled U.S. > Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility talks openly about the use > of biometric identifiers for driver's licenses on page 65. Key > language throughout the report dealing with fraudulent use of > identifying documents also leads to only one place - introduction of > the biometric identifier form of identification. > > 2) The NarcOfficer, official publication of international narcotics > enforcement officer association in its September/October 1995 issues > states point blank that a universal biometric identifier system is > intended for use by everyone on the planet. > > 3) The Senate bill formerly S. (unumbered) now split into S. 269 and > S. 1361 in sections 111-116 talks about birth certificates with > fingerprint or other biometric data'. The same section talks about > new driver's licenses with fingerprint or other item of biometric > data'. > > 4) The Hoke Amendment to H.R. 2202 added by the House Judiciary > Committee talks about a demonstration pilot project with a reliable, > easy to use, confirmation mechanism'. > > > 5) The McCullum amendment, no.4 on the calendar of amendments to H.R. > 2202 talks about creating an official document that offers the best > possible security against counterfeiting, forgery, alteration, and > misuse'. And provides for creating a new social security card that > would be as secure against fraudulent use as United States passport'. > Part of the catch here is which version of the passport? The Senate > bill provides for the creation of anew fraud resistant passport. > > The McCullum amendment would make the new technology binding on all > social security cards issued after January 1, 1999. Beginning on > January 1, 2006, all employers would be required to verify employment > eligibility with the new social security card. > > Any way you cut it, this is too much authority to invest in any > government! > > Our founding fathers knew that only way to be free and remain free is > to constrain the power of the government. As John Dickinson said in > 1768 in Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania: "For who are a free > people? Not those, over whom government is reasonably and equitably > exercised, but those, who live under a government so constitutionally > checked and controlled that proper provision is made against it being > otherwise exercised". > > Creation of a mandatory, universal biometric identifier identification > system lets the genie out of the bottle. It would gut the 4th > Amendment's right of provacy and let the government surveil and > control us instead of vice versa. > > What to do now: > > We need at least 100,000 phone calls and faxes in Washington by > tomorrow. We may not win in the House but we have to try. Remember > if we build up steam now in the House our chances will be better later > in the Senate. > > Contact your congressman tonight by fax (best) or tomorroww by phone > (good). Argue with him, politely. He might think that just because > amendment 4 says it won't be used as a universal identifier, that > amendment 4 and the bill are okay. Remind him what happened to the > social security card. It was supposed to be voluntary too in the > beginning. > > As time permits, contact as many congressmen as you can in California, > New Mexico, Arizona, Florida, and Illinois. These congressmen are > going to be under especially heavy pressure to pass the bill no matter > what it says. You can use the toll-free numbers for your call: (800) > 962-3524, (800) 972-3524, or (800) 872-8513. > > Tell them we want to keep the 4th Amendment to the Constitution and > the only way to do that is to kill the 4th amendment to the bill. > Tell them that we are not at all amused by the hidden joke of using an > amendment 4 to kill the 4th Amendment to our Constitution. No, no, no > to any version of the biometric identifier! Vote no to H.R. 2202! > > Suzanne Harris > The Law Loft > Los Angelos, CA > (818)-305-7613 > 7.435 MHz (Short-Wave) 8:00 pm EST Week nights.

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RE: Why Americans feel no compulsion to learn foreign languages
by James Bugden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wednesday, March 27, 1996 9:55 AM, Tim May wrote >For Europeans, knowing the language of one's immediate neighbors (probably >only a hundred kilometers away), and knowing English, accounts for much of >their language facility. >Americans are typically thousands of miles away from those speaking >Japanese, Mandarin, Tagalog, Polish, Italian, Dutch, Spanish, Hindi, >Talegu, and the hundreds of other languages. It is not at all clear what >language Americans should pick as a "second language" to study. >Europeans who look down on Americans for not studying the language of their >neigbors simply aren't familiar with a map. >There is not a single foreign language I can think of it that would help me >in my goals or help anyone I know. This is the reality of a world dominated >by English-speaking persons and in which all technical people learn >English. If I can paraphrase, you argue as follows: 1) People learn languages of those they may interact with. 2) Americans do not interact with (enough) non-English speakers. 3) Therefore, learning another language does not help the goals of Americans. While your phrase refers to geographical proximity, I think we could agree that the essential factor is that you interact with those that are close. If you never talk to your neighbours, you don't need to understand their language. So my question: Do you not see the irony of writing this on the internet? Plus ca change, plus c'est pareil. Many threads within Cypherpunks have stated the irrelevancy of national boundaries in this age of global communications. I would suggest that geographical proximity is irrelevant for similar reasons. But the ability to communicate requires the ability to comprehend. While it may be true that "it is not at all clear what language Americans should pick as a 'second language'", it does not follow that you would not benefit from knowing one. Of course, this may be a chicken and egg problem in which your benefit is unclear before you learn a second language, but your motivation is zero unless you see the benefit. If we choose to be unilingual, it is not because we would lack opportunity to use another language, but because we choose to decline such opportunity. James Bugden jbugden(a)alis.com

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Question about Blind Signature
by Chein-hsinLiu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! I have some stupid question about how to implement blind signature. I Know it works as follows: If A wants B to sign X but donot know it is X, A can send X*PK(random) : PK is public key of B Then B signs on message: SK(X*PK(random)) ==> SK(X)*random Then A can obtain SK(X) by SK(X)*random/random My question is when I see how RSA encrypts using PKCS The PKCS block is like this 00 01 FF FF FF FF ... 00 input Then SK(00 01 FF FF FF .. 00 input) . If the input = X*PK(random) then SK(00 01 FF FF FF .. 00 X*PK(random)) will not produce SK(X)*random How to solve this?? Thanks!!

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Edited Edupage, 24 March 1996
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"educom(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" 26-MAR-1996 19:24:26.78 To: IN%"edupage(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" "EDUCOM Edupage Mailing List" CC: Subj: Edupage, 24 March 1996 ***************************************************************** Edupage, 24 March 1996. Edupage, a summary of news items on information technology, is provided three times each week as a service by Educom, a Washington, D.C.-based consortium of leading colleges and universities seeking to transform education through the use of information technology. ***************************************************************** >ONLINE TRADING >Lombard International Brokerage in San Francisco and Pawws Financial Network >in New Jersey are two brokerage houses that have opened Internet trading >services, allowing customers to monitor their portfolios and retrieve >corporate and financial information from brokerage databases or through >links to other Web sites. "You're seeing the culmination of the information >brokerage -- with customer service, advanced analytical tools, and news >available at one place and one time on the most incredibly productive medium >that ever existed, the Internet," says Lombard's CEO. By incorporating a >Java applet into their Web design, Lombard's Web site refreshes its >information every 30 seconds so that intra-day trading charts are >automatically updated. The Pawws trading system, a tailored version of the >Security APL cash-management system, is used by several other investment >houses to display their wares. "Why should we spend time and money to tell >people how to get a modem to work? We provide brokerage -- not technical -- >services," says one user. (Information Week 11 Mar 96 p64) And discount >broker Charles Schwab & Co. will begin this May to allow its customers to >trade listed and over-the-counter stocks, get real-time quotes, and access >account information using the Schwab site on the World Wide Web. (Atlanta >Journal-Constitution 22 Mar 96 F3) They're using _Java_ to do this? >PORN IS A GOLD MINE FOR IDT >Tiny IDT Corp. has found a way to differentiate itself from the >run-of-the-mill Internet access provider. It pitches its service to porn >aficionados, with ads like: "With IDT, I access *all* Internet services. I >said *all* Internet services -- get that smirk off your face." In fact, its >service and pricing are similar to everyone else's, but its subscriber base >has grown six-fold to 65,000 in the past six months using this approach. >"IDT is looking for a marketing niche, and given how we think the primary >Internet audience is -- lonely 20-something and 30-something males -- why >not aim that niche at them?" says Gary Arlen, an Internet consultant. (Wall >Street Journal 22 Mar 96 B4) An interesting way to differentiate oneself. I would suggest that anonymnity (i.e., C2) would be a logical add-on. >NETSCAPE TO GET IN ON THE PHONE-BY-INTERNET ACTION >Netscape co-founder Mark Andreessen says that within six months the company >will build into its Navigator program voice software (which it calls Insoft) >for making low-cost long distance calls via the Internet into its Navigator >program and that long-distance phone companies increasingly won't be able to >justify their rates for telephone service. (Sydney Morning Herald 13 Mar 96 >via Individual Inc.) Any possibility that Netscape might build in some form of cryptography? I realize ITAR rules would make this problematic, but perhaps some sort of out-of-country deal for putting in the hooks for PGPhone could be done. -Allen >Edupage is written by John Gehl (gehl(a)educom.edu) & Suzanne Douglas >(douglas(a)educom.edu) Voice: 404-371-1853, Fax: 404-371-8057. >Technical support is provided by the Office of Information Technology, >University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. >*************************************************************** >EDUPAGE is what you've just finished reading. To subscribe to Edupage: send >a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: >subscribe edupage Graham Greene (assuming that your name is Graham Greene; >if it's not, substitute your own name). ... To cancel, send a message to: >listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: unsubscribe >edupage. (Subscription problems? Send mail to educom(a)educom.unc.edu.)

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