December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Assault presses with cop killer computers.
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Dec 25, 1995 23:36:00, 'Kevin L Prigge <Kevin.L.Prigge-2(a)cis.umn.edu>' wrote: >According to rumor, James A. Donald said: >> >> While channel surfing around 6PM today on Christmas day, I saw >> President Clinton announce the grave international threat >> posed by terrorists, drug dealers and money launderers wielding >> computers (Only three horsemen -- he left out child pornographers.) > >Probably because child pornographers have been dealt with in >the recent bill signed by Bill, which mandates 24-30 months >for transmitting child porn, double if a computer is used. > see Reuters, "Clinton acts to tougher penalties" 23 Dec 95 08:40 clari.news.crime.sex Message-ID: <Rclinton-pornographyURN-1_5DN(a)clari.net> see AP, "Clinton signs porn bill," 23 Dec 95 09:40 clari.news.crime.sex Message-ID: <Aclinton-pornoURCBj_5DN(a)clari.net> What is most interesting is how far the four horsemen have rampaged and the destruction they have already done. The internet is not the *least* regulated as those pushing for "tougher penalties" claim. One can argue, using the new federal doubling of prison terms when computers are used, that it is the *most* regulated. One can also see how far the combination of sexual hysteria and fear of new technology has fed into and been used by politicians from throughout the political spectrum. It also shows how much of the government threat to privacy is a social, not a technological, issue. While people argue about heat-death-of-the-universe encryption algos, a different form of hot air is producing the heat death of civil liberties. While cyber-libertarians talk about how strong crypto algos are needed to protect property and how "the statists in Washington" are trying to take away their crypto, right-wing pro-capitalist politicians have already taken away civil liberties. While crypto-radicals talk about how strong crypto algos are needed to lead the revolution and how "the nazis in Washington" are trying to take away their crypto, sexual hysterics calling themselves "radical feminists" have already helped take away many civil liberties. I support strong crypto. I support powerful and secure algos. I see it as a wonderful development of technology to protect individual privacy. But privacy is only one right of the citizen; it is only one of the many civil liberties under attack. I am also disturbed by the number of discussions on the list that may be on topic but avoid *these* social issues, E.G. Army vs. Navy Captain? how cheap is AT&T? Bizdos: confused executive vs. conspiratorial swine? Are CFS programmers being treated nicely? Fred Cohen: nice guy victim or swine? Why Alice should use PGP. Ever heard of bit fiddlin' while Rome burns? --tallpaul

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Re: Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:33 12/25/95, tallpaul wrote: >Thoughts? (I see one problem with this but it should be able to be worked >out once the basic method is agreed to). I assume that the "Problem" is that by only giving each corespondent ONE E-Stamp, you are single streaming your connections with them (ie: Are talking Half-Duplex). Not only are they restricted to one message "in-flight" but they can not start another message until they have done a capture run to acquire your ACK and get the new key.

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Austin CPunk Video Update
by combee＠techwood.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, a lot of thanks to all of you who sent me ideas for the Cypherpunk video we are working on here in Austin. I'm sorry I haven't individually acknowledged all of you, but it was been a busy couple of months. Here is our status: We have agreed on the meeting infrastructure, with a video working group meeting twice a month of planning/strategy meetings and at other times for filming, editing, and so on. We have decided to do a 30 minute video with segments dealing with crypto history, basic theory, popular applications, and possible futures. We may go one to produce further videos which look at these topics in more detail. We have a outline of the segments of the video. The outline was originally conceived for a 60 minute program, so some items might have to be cut. This outline should be available online sometime soon off my web page at http://www.yak.net/combee/crypto/ (URL not yet active). This program will initially air on Austin's public access stations, but we have nebulous plans to distribute it once that requirement is met. Questions? Just write to me or to all the Austin CPunks at austin-cpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com. -- eebmoC .L nimajneB | Benjamin L. Combee (REVERSE) gro.doowhcet@eebmoc | combee(a)techwood.org (ENGINEERING) \eebmoc\ten.kay.www\\:ptth | http://www.yak.net/combee/ (RESERVE)

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Re: a new idea: stocks == currency
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I've not seen promoted by any single author yet (although I have seen > some prominent cpunks argue the opposite). There was a book written some time ago called "SuperMoney" that basically argues this point (that stocks were not only money, they were *better* than money). One example would be a deposit at a bank. How can you tell if there is a potential solvency problem at the bank? One quick and easy check is to look at the value of the stock of the bank! You see this behavior in currencies when you are exchanging a stronger one for a weaker one or vice versa :-) PS: I read Prechter's "turn of the tidal wave" book over the holidays, and although it is mostly dry, it is an interesting read. Regards, Mark Hittinger Netcom/Dallas bugs(a)freebsd.netcom.com bugs(a)ritz.mordor.com

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Re: HRB Systems Data Storage Encryptor
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:45 AM 12/26/95 +0100, Anonymous wrote: >Check out http://www.hrb.com/encryption/ssp.html, your >exclusive source of the Ultron Crypto-Engine (tm) The web page proudly announces: "is the only NSA-approved Type I data encryptor available today." There are probably some people ignorant enough to regard that as a recommendation. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: corporate bashing
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fred seems to have been slipping through my filters in recent days. Though I usually trash any message containing a reference to him, I thought that this latest escalation into the ionosphere of net-sillies begs to be brought to heel... On 24 Dec 95 at 17:20, Fred Cohen wrote: > and that anonymity should be used as an escape from > responsibility for what they do and say. If you want to > remain free to speak your mind, you have to become > responsible in at least two ways: > > 1 - You must top slandering people. > 2 - You must stop using anonymity as a way to avoid being > responsible. > > When I say must, I am not intending to mean anything less. > If the cypherpunks continue to do these two things, they will > rapidly find that they are doing more to destroy all of our > rights to free speech in the Internet than they ever did to > encourage freedom of expression. There are several things wrong with this, but first, just on the surface: Fred has now dropped his cyberdrawers and stands before us displaying the ugly engine of his manhood, the handle by which he maintains a grip on his pointless existence. He reveals himself to be yet another in that small, tired parade of self-appointed lightning rods -- people with so little of import in their lives that they have to resort to trolling for what they can claim are offenses against them, then flex the borrowed, imagined musculature of mindless law to rise in self-righteous threats of exercise of vindictive wrath. This is worse than "My big brother will kick your ass!" It is like a 90-pound weakling going to the beach with a large but retarded cousin in tow. The idea is to troll to get sand kicked in his face, then to point to the drooling cousin and use him as a lever to gain and exercise control over the hapless dupes of the ruse. Freds have existed on BBS's, and before the technological age in most small clubs and societies. In the Internet they show up in newsgroups and on mailing lists, and when crossed they ALWAYS descend to threats of legal action. So predictable, so utterly dull and unimaginative, they are like the party guest who has that inappropriate laugh, who doesn't seem to notice that pairs of people are together, who approaches people oddly and, in the end, makes a scene and reveals himself to be a complete fruitcake. Unmoderated fission looking for a place to fulminate. Fred, you've come to the wrong place. If you want to be ignored, just pack your terminal and stay home with the sitcoms. Noone asked you to interject your trolls and threats here. You invited yourself, and whatever you are suffering is of your own creation. Speaking of Freds brings me to a more interesting aspect of this nonsense: How do we know there is only one Fred? Fred doesn't sign his messages... oh-oh. This attack of deja vu feels like I've had it before. Why do I get the feeling that Fred is about to embarrass himself terribly by blurting out some of the poison that fills his soul? Let him who hath not slandered cast the first suit. We Jurgar Din (that will have to suffice: I do not yet live in a free country) +"The battle, Sir, is not to the strong alone. It is to the+ +vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, Sir, we have no + +election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now + +too late to retire from the contest." -Patrick Henry 1775 + -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMN8TVEjw99YhtpnhAQFDngH/cTzEDHzxYZ7Z9jOmoALxaIdxpgpvlIr+ /zsZndz1KfQlqUunH5i7YsJS7tm/XOsrRcWQgKQEr9WaI8wRgrqh5g== =Hl/v -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Another Internet Provider Censors Access (fwd)
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Another shoe drops? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 19:44:30 -0600 From: x To: y Y - Coming off CompuServe's announcement last week that it was cutting off all access to "alt.binaries" newsgroups under pressure from the German government, I'm passing along another apparent development from another Internet access provider, Netcom. Under the guise of a minor software upgrade, Netcom has changed its newsgroups access list to totally exclude "alt" groups altogether. Since there is no way to sign up for a newsgroup other than via the selection menu that Netcom provides, it appears that Netcom has managed to censor access to all those discussion groups. We are witnessing the not-so-gradual erosion of freedom of the Net. I not often find myself allied with John Perry Barlow, but on this one we are four-square: what with stupid attempts of government to pass unconstitutional restrictions, and acquiescence of the private sector to intimidation and pressure, freedoms of the many are being dictated by reactionary elements in places like Memphis, Tennessee. The next opportunity, I expect, will be to help underwrite the defense of the first criminal action brought under the new law. In the meantime, we can unsubscribe to services that curtail our liberties. "X" Speaking solely for myself, this time.

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Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: Vin McLellan \ Internet: (vin(a)shore.net) > it's Pretty Good >(tm) security, but like anything not biometric, it is vulnerable to >black-bag attacks. physical possession being all that is required. VM> Actually, all ACE/Server or ACE software modules _require_ a VM> user-memorized PIN. Physical possession of a stolen token is not VM> enough to gain illicit access. >if >you know the algorithm and the serial number of the card and the >time, even that isn't necessary. VM> Bleep! Earth to amp! Check your voltage, lately? The token's VM> serial number has nothing whatsoever to do with the generation of a VM> SecurID's PRN token-code. hmmmm, let me see... yup. you are right. voltage low. give me a second to plug back in... VM> and distribution. The serial number stuck to the back of a SecurID VM> after it is programmed with its secret key -- a unique PRN VM> "significantly longer" than 56 bits -- but they are not the same VM> thing. The cpu in a SecurID doesn't even "know" the serial number VM> stuck on the back of the token. VM> (It would be Pretty Stupid <TM> to glue or emboss a secret on VM> the back of the damn token, wouldn't it?) I should note that Alan is VM> just regergitating one of the most widely circulated rumors about VM> SecurIDs -- which like any popular crypto device attracts a lot of VM> wiLd & w00ly speculation. actually, i was speaking pretty much off the top of my head. it's been a while since i registered it, but all i basically had to tell the server the first time i used it was the s/n. and yes, i think it would be Pretty Damn Stupid to have the s/n have anything to do with the actual seed or pin. VM> Getting the algorithm for SDI's one-way hash is no big deal, VM> given that it sits in software in thousands of SDI customer VM> installations, protected only by contract and trade secret status. VM> (The integrity of the product -- the unpredictability of the VM> token-code PRN series, and the secrecy of a specific token's seed or VM> key -- rightly depends cryptographic strength of the hash, not the VM> secrecy of the algorithm.) Getting a token-specific secret key would VM> hopefully be a much greater challenge. one would certainly hope so. <g> personally, i like the card. it offers pretty good security and thus gives me remote access to systems my employer would otherwise laugh in my face for access to (and did, more than once before we got these things). its main weakness would be a black bag job where someone gains physical posession. at that point, all bets on its securty are off for obvious reasons. luckily, because of the nature of the device, i can simply report it as stolen and it quickly becomes a rather worthless piece of silicon. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 22:15

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:27 PM 1/1/96 -0800, you wrote: >Jim Choate: >> If you live in the Austin, TX area I will setup a dedicated slip for you at >> only $100/mo. > >in the Portland Oregon area, the price ranges from $234/year to >$1750/year for unlimited ppp access. (I have no idea how long the >$234/year is going to stay in business. that won't even cover the >cost of a phone line.) It seems to me that phone line costs are turning into a floor price for Internet access, when they shouldn't really be. The main asset telephone companies have, right now, is in RIGHTS OF WAY. Put an ISP in a business park that allows you to run your own dedicated copper pairs, and you've bypassed $25/month/line business phone line charges. At some point, individual urban and suburban blocks could easily be "guerilla re-wired" for ISP access without serious trenching, etc. The phoneco would still be involved, but in a far lower-profit mode, as the supplier of a single T1 to a multi-block area.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 1 Jan 96 6:49:52 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org +.-+++-.-*** 47:18 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *****+****** 8:12 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#+#+##++*# 3:50 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+**+*** 6:58 99.98% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +--++* 1:32:43 99.97% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -+-++-+--+++ 2:16:40 99.97% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #.-##+-.-#*# 23:11 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +.-----+-++ 2:35:44 99.93% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net *.--+-.--.-+ 4:33:40 99.88% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -++--------- 3:31:08 99.85% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++++++ #### 15:42 99.81% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __.------+- 6:43:02 99.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com --.-------- 5:40:08 99.69% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * **+ *** * 13:04 98.86% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --- *+++++++ 3:07:11 98.86% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +###*++*-- # 31:22 98.14% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net ----- - -* 1:22:32 98.12% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #####+##- # 26:19 97.36% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net -+++++++++ 1:33:37 90.69% rahul homer(a)rahul.net -+##*+*+#### 5:20 99.99% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #+#*#*# :40 89.19% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -#___.## 16:32:15 67.10% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -*+..* 15:03:39 46.77% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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