December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: credit card conventional wisdom
by wiltship＠iccu6.ipswich.gil.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote... >While not as familiar with the US system as the Canadian, I can give as a >simple example, the bank clearing system for paper checks. In Canada, we >can clear a check from one side of the country to the other overnight. We >have 24 hour clearing. While this is far from "perfect", our existing >paper systems allow for a degree of efficiency which I don't believe is >engineered into the US clearing system. Here in Australia most banks take 5 working days to clear a cheque.. even if it's deposited at a bank just up the road from drawer's bank. cheers Peter Flight to Quality Wiltshire Productions Pty Ltd Brisbane, Queensland, Australia Intl Voice 61 7 3376 3535 Intl Fax 61 7 3279 4027 Email wiltship(a)gil.com.au PGP Key ID 3E584C7D PGP Fingerprint 01 03 FB F4 BE F8 2B F3 5D 84 6B 69 37 80 FE 10

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Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks.
by ahupp＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> >Date: Thu, 16 Nov 1995 15:13:27 -0600 >Subject: Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks. >The problem is that the non-encryption program must use the same >interface as the encryption program. Text compression is often cited >as an example of a non-encryption program that can use the same hooks >as a compression program, but there's a key difference: the text >compressor *doesn't* need a key. > >The encryption tool would have an interface like > Boolean (*)( DataSource, DataSink, void*); > >A compressor written to the same interface would never need to touch >that third argument. Therefore, the second argument is "specifically >designed" to permit an encryption tool to be used. > >You'd need a program which not only *accepted* the additional parameter, >but also *needed* the second parameter. I confess I have some difficulty >thinking of one. > PKZIP allows encryption (other's ?). How about a hook to that? _____________________________________________________________ "We work in the dark We do what we can We give what we have Our doubt is our passion And our passion is our task The rest is the madness of art." --Henry James ___________________________________________________________

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RealAudio website TEMPORARY PASSWORD
by RealAudio Welcome Wagon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. Please do the following: 1. Go to http://www.RealAudio.com/welcome.html 2. Enter the following: Username: cpunks TEMPORARY Password: New.Norfolk 3. Choose your personal, PERMANENT password for the World of RealAudio If you have trouble with the software, please refer to the RealAudio FAQ and Technical Notes available at http://www.RealAudio.com/help.html You can also contact us through http://www.RealAudio.com/comments.html Thanks for using RealAudio! Progressive Networks, Seattle, Washington, USA

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Re: e$: Come aaaannnndddd Get it!
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>jim bell writes: [re: payee anonymity] >> It seems to me that this should be possible, within limits, if the potential >> payee could generate a "blinded" note to be delivered to the payer by >> anonymous means. The payer could get the note certified by the bank, >> possibly given an extra "blind" if necessary (is this possible? Desirable? >> Why not?) and then the resulting still-blinded but certified note is posted >> (in encrypted form, I supposed) to the 'net so that only the payee can >> decrypt and unblind it. > >This sounds like a version of "Hey, I'll pay you $10, if you give me a ten >dollar bill first." As I understand your protocol, Bob gives Alice an enote, >then Alice gives Bob an enote. Alice isn't paying Bob in any meaningful sense, >since Bob ends up with the same amount of e$ with which he started. Perhaps >you could clarify what you meant. It sounds like you understand even less about the details of digital cash than I do. First, read the August 1992 issue of Scientific American, the article by David Chaum. He explains, with a certain amount of detail, how blinded digital cash operates. To become validated and worth money, it first has to be electronically "written," blinded, and then signed by the bank. Then it is unblinded, at which point it can be spent. What I was saying is that the notes would be written by the payee, then blinded by the payee, given to the payer, and then signed by the payer's bank. At this point, they are worth money, and they are then returned to the payee, possibly by encrypting them and publishing them in encrypted form on a publicly-accessible portion of the Internet, so "anyone" could read them. Only the intended payee would be able to decrypt them, however, and only the payee would be able to unblind the notes.

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Re: Ecash account
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 17 Nov 1995 don(a)cs.byu.edu wrote: > So who here is going to use their ecash account to set up a money > lau^H^H^Hexchange service? Oh boy. Not this argument again. The one that says that if someone makes "change" that its money laundering. *Sigh* I suppose it is, if that's the way you're going to look at it. On that basis, every time I go to the corner grocery, I'm "laundering" my money. So be it. And I suppose if I put aside a small "nestegg", that then I've got something to hide as well?? > Ob Cyphernoise: Would Dr Fred, Alice, and any other names LD has set up > for himself lately please keep the noise limited to email? Please? I too am tired of LD spoofing me. But I am not going to actively "deny" every one of his posts. It's just not worth it. Hopefully the people on this list can tell the difference between what I stand for, and what certain people would like to paint me as standing for. As I've said, and repeated, my only interests lie in E-cash, and in removing code from the Internet which opens up security holes. Software, like Netscape Navigator and Java. The rest ... or anything else that someone tries to paint me as "standing for" is simply juvenile antics. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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[NOISE] Review: GoldenEye
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just got back from the new Pierce-Brosnan-as-007 flick. It had a few typical "hacker" stereotypes, and a couple of interesting crypto relevant references. * Boris, the stereotypical hacker, was hacking through American banks. A screen had the words "Department of Justice" and the DoJ logo; underneath were the words "Clipper Chip" and a list of banks. * The archvillian's plan involved a massive money transfer and an EMP pulse; he very briefly explained the effects of what would happen if every computer in London were rendered non- functional. Possible crypto-anarchy bits. * Boris should learn the value of strong passphrases. His password for the massive mainframe which will be used in the archvillain's scheme is a five-letter dictionary word, which didn't change (and it was used on two different computers), and he revealed it indirectly (it was a word puzzle). * A few on-computer-screen references to "encryption". * Boris and the mastermind kept bantering about "breaking codes." * Boris' computer in Russia - in his apartment - has a domain ending in ".comp.math.edu"; when his screen lights up with the words "INCOMING EMAIL" he goes into a live chat (complete with graphics). Above-average action/adventure flick. The technical mistakes are forgiveable in the interest of dramatic license. Don't watch it for the techno/crypto bits, though. Watch it because lots of things blow up :) Dave----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745 +1(314)339-3814, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMK1btCoZzwIn1bdtAQFmOgF/ZLYc3sT1L5sQS+wqmS5U6wsx9jL86job Ie6DU65FIuSZF6vFDBDNZFxZxs0HuaR6 =5PGz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Lizard 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:09 PM 9/18/97 -0400, Declan McCullagh wrote: >The answer: "I don't think compromise is the right word. But we need to >give something to law enforcement." Oh, I agree. I *definitely* think we need to give something to law enforcement... THE TOP TEN THINGS WE NEED TO GIVE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT By Lizard 10)A clue 9)A good kick in the pants. 8)A copy of the US Constitution, and I don't mean the aircraft carrier. 7)Footage of Mussolini hanging upside down with his intestines draped over this face, as a reminder of the fact that sooner or later, even the most downtrodden people will say 'enough is enough'. 6)A picture of Aldrich Ames labelled "Would you give YOUR keys to this man?" 5)A pile of "This T-shirt is a munition" T-Shirts. 4)Another clue. (Take two! They're small!) 3)A copy of '1984', along with a note reading "This was a warning, not a blueprint." 2)An English-Navajo dictionary. And, lastly... 1)A boot to the head. (Nah-nah)

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Re: protecting against impersonation (was: CANADIAN PRESS REPORTS)
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>anonymous writes: >> I still feel such a sense of violation with what LD did, such an >> utter sense of helplessness at the character assassination I've >> suffered at his hands, > >So use PGP, sign your messages. Simple solution. Absolutely! Anybody who uses anonymous remailers to post to public areas, and does not use digital signatures to prevent spoofing when it is obviously needed, is a fool or worse.

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SA: Confidential Communication on the Internet
by Aleph One 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the December issue of Scientific American there is an article by Thomas Beth, "Confidential Communication on the Internet". Lite on the technical side but good reading anyway. Aleph One / aleph1(a)dfw.net http://underground.org/ KeyID 1024/948FD6B5 Fingerprint EE C9 E8 AA CB AF 09 61 8C 39 EA 47 A8 6A B8 01

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Re: Crypto-law etc
by John Kelsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Chuck McManis <cmcmanis(a)FreeGate.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Crypto-law etc > Date: Wednesday, September 17, 1997 2:35 PM > The longer I follow the crypto "debate" the more I begin to > understand what must have been the real intent behind the > 2nd amendment of the constitution. > > If the White House can get crypto code defined in the true > legal sense (that is backed up by case law) as a munition, > do US citizens then have a constitutional right to "bear" it? Sure. We get the same right to bear it as we have to own rocket launchers, machine guns, or flame throwers--none. The second amendment hasn't protected our right to possess those things, which pretty clearly fall into the realm of its direct intentions--why would it protect our right to use crypto, which isn't even that clear cut? > Just curious, > --Chuck --John Kelsey, kelsey(a)counterpane.com

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