December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Commercialism on Cypherpunks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We face interesting times. It's apparent that the Cypherpunks list is now becoming even more of a hangout for reporters, commercial vendors, and those seeking advance knowledge of security holes and whatnot...maybe even a few stock traders looking for tips :-}. It was this way to some extent a few years ago, with Steven Levy, John Markoff, Kevin Kelly, Julian Dibbell, and others looking to our list for stimulating ideas for stories. Now, the time between something being posted here and its headline appearance in one of the major papers is even shorter. The "electronic commerce" business is heating up, and basic flaws and limitations are obviously big news. And the list has grown in recent months, as publicity has increased. In addition to the usual corporate connections that people have because some corporation employs them, we have people _directly_ involved in several crypto-related or security-oriented businesses, including Netscape Communications, Digicash, First Virtual, Enterprise Integration Technologies, RSADSI, Verity, Intuit, and so on. And a bunch of folks of course from Sun, SGI, Apple, Microsoft, etc. (Sorry if I've left out your company.) Clearly some of these groups have conflicting goals and approaches. Some have different exposures to security holes. Some of these electronic commerce companies even stand to gain at the expense of others when security problems are found. Some of the commercial folks are concerned that the freewheeling, anarchic, "say anything" nature of the Cypherpunks list is sometimes reflecting badly on their companies. Some are concerned that reporters are reading the list to find leads for stories. Well, get used to it! (Lest you think I was going to pull a Rodney King and say "Can't we all just get along?," I'm taking the anarchist route.) People will say what they wish. Sometimes they'll speak inaccurately, sometimes without all of the facts. Such is life. There is no moderator, no leader, contrary to what at least one reporter seems to think. And it's a good thing, as I could otherwise see that moderator or leader someday being served with papers because of some insult or denigration about a company or its products posted here. With the "electronic commerce" market heating up so much, and with our list becoming one of the several de facto watering holes where gossip and G-2 gets exchanged, there are bound to be conflicts and alleged damages to reputations. Think of our list as a kind of Casablanca, a "free city" not controlled by any side. I'm "shocked, simply shocked," that anyone would think it could be anything else. --Tim, owner since 1992 of "Rick's Place" Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Privsoft
by lethin＠ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope Mr. Orrin has his asbestos codpiece well positioned.

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IDEA algorithm
by Jonathan Zamick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be an odd question, but who is it that owns the IDEA algorithm? We've had a number of requests regarding licensing RSAREF tying into legitmizing PGP products. Part of that includes IDEA obviously. Anyway, take care. Jonathan

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Cylink license fees
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just received a very informative package of information from Bob Fougner at Cylink, which, in addition to a copy of the relevant patents and hardcopy of the materials available on their web page, contains a "limited time offer" to license their patents in one of three ways: 1) Practice of DH Key exchange & DSS: $50,000 2) Right to use & distribute RSA: $62,500 3) Ulimited field of use to practice public key: $75,000 Those interested in obtaining this information should probably fax him at 408-735-6642 with a request for the info. Much of the information is available online at: http://www.cylink.com. Obviously, anyone wishing to practice RSA would also need to get a license from RSADSI. Also, it is my impression that are claiming Hellman-Merkle as the precursor patent to RSA, which means that this situation will prevail at least through late 1997, not early 1997 (when Hellman-Diffie expires.)

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(no subject)
by Rob Lesan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am a contractor currently working for Tandem Computers, and I found this press release interesting. Thought this group might need a target of a different flavor to kick around: SUBJECT: PRESS RELEASE: ATALLA WEBSAFE ATALLA BEGINS SHIPPING HARDWARE-BASED SECURITY FOR THE INTERNET SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA - October 2, 1995 - Atalla, a Tandem Company, announces that the WebSafe Internet Security Processor is ready for shipment. Now you can use the same technology that made the "bank ATM" network safe enough for bank transactions to secure the Internet for commerce. "The Internet is a 'party-line' where everyone can jump in. Our vision is to make it a 'private-line' for those situations where privacy is essential for doing business on the Net," says Bob Gargus, President of Atalla. "When we set out to build WebSafe, we wanted a system safe enough to do bank transactions on the Internet. We're taking our 23 years of experience in financial network security systems and applying it to the Internet. WebSafe is the first Internet processor that gives banks and our other customers the security that they have come to trust Atalla to deliver," Mr. Gargus also noted. WebSafe is a hardware-based security processor specifically designed to help transform today's emerging point-to-point Internet security into a full end-to-end security system. Typical WebSafe applications include payments (such as credit cards), web commerce, certification authorities (electronic notarization), PEM (Privacy Enhanced Mail) and EDI. WebSafe's security architecture is the perfect solution for banks, brokerage houses, telecommunications companies, legal and medical institutions or anyone who needs to send sensitive data across the Internet. This revolutionary product protects transaction data against unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, duplications and substitution. WebSafe supports both public (e.g. RSA) and secret key (e.g. DES) technology and employs sophisticated key management similar to global EFT/POS payment networks. HOW THE WEBSAFE WORKS Attached as a peripheral device to your Web servers, the WebSafe processes your secret information in a "hardware-secured envelope." But unlike software security solutions which are vulnerable to attack from cyber-pirates, the WebSafe is both physically and logically secure. Physically secure means that if anyone tries to penetrate the WebSafe, it will "zeroize," erasing the secret data so it's impossible to retrieve. Logically secure means that, because all of the security processing is done within the WebSafe security processor, it's impossible for anyone to ever see your cryptographic material. WEBSAFE IS THE BRIDGE FROM THE INTERNET TO THE PAYMENT NETWORK The best example of a major deployment of an end-to-end security network is the bank ATM system. Today, 100% of all bank ATM transactions in North America have hardware-based security, 70% of which is provided by Atalla. The Internet is currently going through the same evolution that the bank ATM network went through 20-plus years ago. What's holding back electronic commerce on the Internet today is payments. The truth is, banks are the payment network. You simply can't have payments without them. However, the bank payment network and the Internet operate very differently. For example, the bank payment network primarily relies on secret keys (like DES) for security, while the Internet typically relies on both secret and public keys (like RSA). But because the two networks operate differently, a bridge needs to be built between them. "WebSafe is the bridge from the bank payment network to the Internet. It combines the best of both worlds (DES and RSA) into a single unit. And, it's the only secure DES to RSA translation device available today... The point is, we're not reinventing here. We're taking proven technology that has been time tested, under the most demanding conditions, and applying it to the Internet," states Gary Sabo, Vice President of Product Management and Marketing for Atalla. WEBSAFE'S CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY SUPPORT: HOW TO VOUCH FOR SOMEONE ON THE INTERNET. One new service that is arising is the need for electronic notarization by Certification Authorities. They'll provide proof that you are who you say you are. Major credit card companies, banks, telecommunications companies and post offices are the most likely institutions to pick up this role. The WebSafe is designed to be the cornerstone for supplying cryptographic services for Certification Authorities. WEBSAFE'S SECURE KEY MANAGEMENT. When most people talk about cryptographic security, they're talking about a single key type. It's impossible to have security with this method. There must be different keys for different functions. Atalla employs a key architecture that includes hierarchal support for a wide variety of key types, such as: Key exchange key, data encryption (DES and RSA), PIN data, Message Authentication Code (MAC), digital signatures, and certificates. Applying different key types for different functions restricts how a key is used and can prevent a security system from being spoofed into giving up secret data. This way, even through the most complicated series of transactions, your data is kept secure. Founded in 1972 and acquired in 1987 by Tandem Computers Corporation, Atalla designs, manufacturers and supports secure on-line transaction automation systems for financial, retail and business applications. Atalla's products include POS/POE credit/debit payment terminals, check readers, security processors for the Internet and other networks, customer authorization and PIN selection terminals and secure enrollment products for banks, retailers and state EBTs. The company is headquartered at 2304 Zanker Road, San Jose, CA 95131. Phone: (408) 435-8850, (800) 523-9981. Fax: (408) 435-1116.

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smartcard encryption: revised paper available
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've put a (slightly expanded) revised version of my paper, "High- Bandwidth Encryption with Low-Bandwidth Smartcards" in my ftp directory. This paper describes a little protocol for exploiting the secure key storage facilities of slow smartcards but with the host processor doing most of the actual work. ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/card_cipher.ps -matt

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Oct 14 meeting, focus on Java, Mountain View, California
by mrm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello again - First, my sincere apologies for not making it clear in the first announcement that the Oct 14 meeting focussing on Java is being held in the bay area of California. Next, feel free to speak up for speaker slots if you're so inclined. I was surprised no one wrote in to ask for speaker slots although a lot of people wrote in to ask for more details on where the meeting was and others wrote in to chastise me (correctly) for being so bayAreaCentric. Saturday Oct 14 Time: 12 noon - 6 p.m. Place: Sparcy's cafeteria, building 21, Sun Microsystems Mountain View, California AgendaSoFar: 12 - 12:15 - Settle in, have a bagel 12:15 - 12:45 - Overview of Java/HotJava 12:45 - 2:00 - Java Security Model, Sami Shaio, Java group, Sun 2:00 - 3:00 - discussion, Q&A, open mike 3:00 - 3:30 - break 3:30 - 4:30 - Jcrypt, Doug Barnes, Amanda Chou 4:30 - 6:00 - TBD Directions: Take 101 to Amphitheater Parkway. Turn left onto Garcia, and drive about 1/2 mile and turn onto the first genuine side street which is named Marina Way. Drive about 1/4 mile and look for a right hand turn onto Coast. Building 21 will be on your left. It's on the corner of Coast and Marina Way. There's plenty of parking there. Internet: I'm trying to arrange to get a computer connected to the net in that room so that we can set up MBONE, but I don't know if that will be possible or not. Enough people wrote in to say that they'd like to hear a bit about Java and HotJava (and how Netscape is using Java) to convince me it would be a good idea to start off with setting some context. See you on Saturday! Should be fun. Marianne mrm(a)netcom.com mrm(a)eng.sun.com

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(fwd) checkfree/cybercash diff
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 12 Oct 95 14:34:46 +0100 From: Holger.Reif(a)PrakInf.TU-Ilmenau.DE (Holger Reif ) To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Subject: checkfree/cybercash diff Hi all, I studied both websites regarding their wallet system. I noticed a press release that checkfree will license cybercash technology and develope products. I saw _no_ release that checkfree has already released a cybercash wallet compatible SW. But I cannot find any difference between cybercash wallet and checkfree wallet. Is it behind the open part of the tech information? Who can make things clear??? read you later - Holger Reif http://remus.prakinf.tu-ilmenau.de/Reif/ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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FWD: International Encryption Protocols
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: "Frank O'Dwyer" <fod(a)fws.ilo.dec.com> cc: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM (Firewalls Mailing List) From: Justin Mason <jmason(a)iona.ie> Subject: BoS: Re: International Encryption Protocols Frank O'Dwyer sez: >After all, if the CoCom countries _weren't_ willing to sell each other >crypto equipment, how could they spy on one another? :-) > >(Actually the :-) may not be necessary - I believe there was a story > in the news recently about the UK 'authorities' snooping on Irish > official traffic carried on UK-supplied equipment.) Almost right -- it was the UK surveillance service (GCHQ) snooping on Irish official traffic carried on US-supplied crypto equipment. Apparently, the equipment in question had a "back door", courtesy of the NSA; when GCHQ found out that the Irish govt were using this equipment, they had only to ask their NSA pals for the details. I only heard the details myself via a popular-science program on crypto ;), so the so-called back door may not have been a deliberately weakened algorithm, it may have been a set of keys from an key-escrow repository or some such. --j. Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/~weld L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Re: NYT on Internet Flaws
by David Berger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just read through the stack of news this was based on (comp.security.unix) The Berkeley folks rightly point out that if I trust an NFS to send me a binary, then an interaction with the server sans authentication/encryption can leave me with a compromised binary. This is valid when I get my binary from out on the net. This seems much less valid when I live behind a firewall and trust my fellow workers who have access to the server, the wires coming out of my cube, and my whole machine for that matter. As a result, the only thing I think this article should say is that we need secure ftp. Isn't this being worked on? As for the article - 9/10 scaring people, 1/10 semi-fact. Be serious? NFS is not the basic structure of the Internet. I'm embarrassed that an article so weak in its explanations and so high on fluff appeared on the front page of a well respected newspaper. Dave -----the article for reread------- > The New York Times, October 11, 1995, pp. A1, D3. > > [Page One] > > Discovery of lnternet Flaws Is Setback for On-Line Trade > > By John Markoff > > > San Francisco, Oct. 10 -- Newly publicized weaknesses in > the basic structure of the Internet indicate that the > worldwide computer network may need a time-consuming > redesign before it can be safely used as a commercial > medium. > > The flaws could allow an eavesdropper or criminal to divert > many types of documents or software programs traveling over > the Internet, examine or copy or alter them, and then pass > them on to the intended recipient -- who would have no easy > way of knowing that the files had been waylaid. Not only > could electronic mail be read in transit or credit card > numbers be copied en route, but special security techniques > meant to protect such transactions could be dismantled > without the user's knowledge. > > That such security flaws exist is not surprising in a > system designed originally as a scientific experiment. But > the recent rush to the Internet by companies seeking to > exploit its commercial possibilities has obscured the fact > that giving the system a new purpose has unearthed > fundamental problems that could well put off true > commercial viability for years. > > "Companies would have you believe this is a trivial > problem," said Eric Brewer, a professor of computer science > at the University of California at Berkeley. "But now there > is a financiat incentive to exploit these flaws and to do > it secretly." > > The problems were described in a posting that researchers > at the university made on Monday to several on-line > discussion groups. While the discussion groups are intended > for computer security experts, they are potentially > accessible to millions of Internet users -- including > break-in artists, who are known to monitor such discussion > groups for tips on new ways to crack computer systems. > > The researchers who described the Internet weaknesses > include two Berkeley computer science graduate students who > noted a security weakness in a popular Netscape > Communications Corporation software program last month. > Then as now, the students' stated motivation in publicizing > the problems was to underscore vulnerabilities facing all > companies and customers wishing to use the Internet for > commerce. > > When the Netscape problems were disclosed last month, the > company said the security flaws would be corrected in the > next version of its software, which users would be able to > download at no charge from Netscape's Internet site. But > the newly publicized flaws in the Internet itself indicate > that even if a user downloaded a copy of the new, improved > Netscape program, a criminal could tamper with the copy > along the way and make it unsafe for use in credit card > transactions. > > The problem is not Netscape's alone; it potentially affects > any organization that operates a computer from which files > or software could be downloaded over the Internet. The > weakness can be traced to the technical underpinnings of > the network, which was set up more than a quarter-century > ago not as a medium for conducting business but as a way > for academic and scientific researchers to exchange > information. > > The disclosure of the flaws casts doubt on the aspirations > of companies like Netscape, which last summer had one of > the most successful stock offerings in Wall Street history > based on the promise of the impending arrival of a > full-fledged on-line marketplace. > > "Companies should take a step back and think about this a > little more," said Ian Goldberg, one of the Berkeley > students. "If it takes a bit longer but comes out more > secure, we will all be better off in the long run." > > The way many Internet systems are set up -- especially the > Internet's increasingly popular World Wide Web service in > which software images and even video and audio clips can be > easily downloaded -- information is stored on a computer > called a file server and then transferred to a user's > computer when it is needed. > > The newly publicized weakness occurs in a widely used > Internet protocol -- or technical standard -- known as the > Network File System, or NFS. Because NFS does not have any > means for allowing the recipient of a program or document > to verify that it has not been altered during transmission > from the file server to the user, any interception or > tampering would go undetected. > > "The Internet protocols have been insecure since day one," > said Jeffrey I. Schiller, the manager of computer networks > at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and director > of an industry task force that is trying to design a new > secure version of the Internet. > > But the group's timetable is uncertain, and even when it > does have recommendations ready, Mr. Schiller is not > optimistic that the industry will be willing to devote the > time and money to put them into effect. > > He said that many technologies already exist for improving > commercial security on the Internet, but many of them > require too much technical sophistication on the part of > computer users. He criticized makers of hardware and > software for not moving more quickly to make easy-to-use > security features a built-in part of the technology used on > the Internet. > > "The people who should be the leaders in offering security > have been too busy counting their money to build these > features in to their products," Mr. Schiller said. > > Some commercial Internet merchants have tended to play down > the potential for harm from an illegal interception of > credit card information over the Internet. They point out > that consumers routinely make their credit card numbers > available in transactions done by mail or telephone and > that the law puts limits on a consumer's liability in cases > of credit card fraud. > > But Mr. Brewer, the Berkeley professor, said that the > crucial difference in the proposed Internet commerce > systems was that for the first time it would be relatively > simple for a criminal to collect hundreds or thousands of > credit card numbers. Then a thief could use each credit > card only one time, making detection much more difficult. > > Sensitive to heightened concerns about security, Wells > Fargo, the large California bank, which earlier this year > began permitting customers with personal computers to view > their account information with the Netscape software, > suspended the service in September after the Berkeley > students reported the flaw in Netscape. > > After Netscape followed with an improved version of its > software, Wells Fargo officials found it secure enough that > they planned to resume the service later this week. The > bank will, however, require customers to use the corrected > version of the Netscape program. > > Even then. Wells Fargo customers will be able only to view > account balances and other information, but not transfer > money or conduct other transactions of the type that might > leave them vulnerable to the Internet NFS weakness. > > "We still hope to be able to offer transactional > capabilities next year, but this has slowed us down a > little bit," said Lorna Doubet, a Wells Fargo spokeswoman. > "Many of our customers feel that security is absolutely > essential and we have to be cautious in this regard." > > Executives at Netscape said yesterday that they were aware > of the security issues surrounding NFS and would make > changes in the next release of their software expected > before the end of the year to permit a recipient of a > downloaded program to check it for signs of tampering. > > And hoping to take advantage of the fault-finding talents > of the Berkeley researchers and other like-minded software > experts, the company announced a contest today called > Netscape Bugs Bounty, in which Netscape will award prizes > to users who find bugs or security loopholes in its > software. > > Some Internet experts said they expected that many security > weaknesses like the one the Berkeley group had demonstrated > would be found, because the Internet was simply not > designed to insure secure commerce. > > "Imagine a walled town or a house," said Noel Chiappa, a > member of the Internet Engineering Task Force, a > standards-setting group. "It doesn't matter if 99 windows > are tight as can be -- if the 100th is wide open, the bad > guys will bypass your security. " > > [End] > > > > > > > > > > >

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