December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Find Info You Never Thought Possible..ONLINE!!
by Feanor 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Aug 21, 7:56, INFOREVOLUTION wrote: } Subject: Find Info You Never Thought Possible..ONLINE!! > <HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"><FONT COLOR="#00FFFF" SIZE=3> > Find The Dirt On The Internet!! > > You will not receive any more correspondence from us!!!!! > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > We have done the research for you!!! With this power tool you can access > information all over the World Wide Web about your employees, friends and > rivals. We give you the access to hundreds of sites that will supply you > with information about DMV records, credit profiles, medical and criminal > records, most anything you would want to know. Wow. Pseudolibertarian spam. Anyone wanna bite, fork the money and report back to us?

1 0

SSL search attacks
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Scott Brickner <sjb(a)austin.ibm.com> >We've identified several forms of "real-world retaliation:" > >1) "Result hoarding" - failure to report a found key >2) "Segment hoarding" - requesting more segments than one can hope to search >3) Denial of service - preventing access to the server >The "random search" method eliminates all three of these at about 37% >higher cost in search time, on the average. I submit that if we >*really* were trying to break something important, we could design a >system which eliminated the first two and adequately limited the third, >but at *much* less cost. > >The problems in the current system were to be expected of a first >attempt. In the future: Only the server assigns segments, only the >assignee may report the status of a segment, and after all segments are >NAKed we know condition 1 has occurred, at which time we start over, >but never assign the same segment to the same searcher. Limit the >number of segments which may be outstanding with one searcher at one >time as a function of work rate. Deploy redundant servers. BEAAAT STATE! Push 'em back.. WAAAAAAY BAAAACK. (relevant comments follow) From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >An interesting question: Is it a valid approach for J. Random User to >"claim" some chunk of keyspace to search? > >If the "reward" of finding the gold buried in the keyspace (a key that >meets the challenge) is high and the cost of claiming the keyspace is low >(or nil), then game theory tells us that some folks will be tempted to >claim a bigger chunk of keyspace than they can possibly process. > >What can be done to reduce this effect? In regard to both messages, I think that with sequentially allocated keyspace an attacker who knows the real key would have trouble getting the right segment unless s/he grabbed a big enough piece. If the search is restarted, we know something's up. Ensuring that nobody gets to search keyspace they searched before would be one improvement. A random (instead of sequential) allocation _by the keyserver_ (out of unallocated piecemeal segments) would also take some work to implement. >On the negative side, ostracize or punish those who bite off more than they >can chew. This approach is fraught with dangers. If the search wraps around to catch the UNACK'ed pieces, this type of oversight will only slow down the actual discovery of the key. Failure to report a found key, though, is a bit different. I would not be opposed to having my program report possible hits, with the server being what discovers if I've found it or not. >On the positive side, let everyone simply attack the keyspace as they see >fit, picking random parts to attack. This should not be "worse" than a >factor of several from a "perfectly coordinated" attack. (I haven't spent >time calculating this, but my intuition is that a random attack, with >overlapping keyspace, is not a lot less efficiently attacked than >attempting to arrange for no overlaps...just based on my mental picture of >dropping line segments randomly on some interval and figuring coverage of >the line segment.) Why not have a random backup-mode, in case someone does mount a denial of service attack. Or imploy a combination of the two modes. The machines running brloop can search sequentially (out of the middle 50%?) and the machines not connected search randomly (out of the outside 50%?). Or, venturing further into the I-wonder-who's-gonna-code-this world, log the random searches for possible conversion to an exhaustive search later. It would be nice to be able to hit the emergency button and switch to random mode, but currently I don't think there's a need to actually use it. Don -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMEN/U8La+QKZS485AQHNcgL+ItlNLYcsIjjlQPQJBxgts66GXPMs3ijb QIcqiAbrg4cq7F9xWNRvZa9LTvw75UUM1+PmItGkSUuqOqvJ9VkzaUp8/Sf5zuDs 5XTlJLVhYa7qQzY4Ov4a3k0ora0SPvKh =wyzo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://bert.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Death threats ALWAYS pgp signed * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

3 4

Re: Socio-Economic Cults (Re: CypherPunk Cults)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

William H. Geiger III wrote: > Somthing is seriously wrong when a home owner is more afraid of the > consequences of defending his home than his is from the criminals > attacking it. Policeman: "Sir, I'm calling to notify you that a criminal has broken into your house." Citizen: "Damn. I hope he didn't hurt himself. I forgot to pay my insurance bill this month." Tell me about it...

1 0

pseudonyms & list health
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P.M. remarked in exasperation a little while ago that he thought that some of the best minds had been lost in list attrition due to high traffic, naming some people who had seemingly dropped from the list (Bill Stewart? Phil Karn?) but what if these people had just stopped subscribing under their clear name? and started using a pseudonym? this brings to light the idea that credibility is hard won, and that it is hard to get, and that people need all the credibility that they can achieve. it seems that virtually all accomplishments are credibility-enhancing, and people only "notch down" their reputation estimations in extreme circumstances. hence, what I am suggesting is that one of the "stable attractors" that TM is always talking about may be a reality in which people pool most of their accomplishments under a single nym. furthermore, they will wish to avoid conflict with other nyms in respect to attribution. isn't this, functionally, the equivalent of the supposed anti-cypherpunk "true names"? now, I'm not suggesting that "if you want to do something in secret, you must have something to hide". (although that seems almost like a tautology to me). but what I am suggesting, is that if you want to get credit, it may pay to pool all your accomplishments under one nym (tracing it to a physical body is a whole separate issue-- the two should not be confused; although the concept of "true names" does tend to blur this distinction). in the case of PM, he thought that because some people ostensibly dropped from the list, the list quality had decreased. but he seemed to be making this conclusion based on their "real identity". what if they were still around, posting under pseudonyms? would he be able to tell? would the signal quality be the same? the point is that people seem to judge list quality based on criteria in which "true names" play a major role. I'm not saying this is the only way to do it, but I am saying that "true names" seem to be very much ingrained into human psychology, particularly in public forums and attributing credit, and the idea that they are wholly irrelevant to most human endeavor is very suspicious, at least deserving more than a few paragraphs of supposed proof. -- another problem with pseudonyms and list noise is the following. first, let me start by saying I think this list approaches the "dysfunctional" level at times when everyone is ranting about each other about staying on topic. there is an awful lot of hostility on this list. maybe people like it, I'm not sure. I'm interested in the sources of this hostility, though, and I think I can identify some good candidates. the list hostility and tension is quite palpable. when TM prefaces many of his posts, and many others do, with frequent apologies about being on topic, I am amazed to see this because I don't see people so self-conscious on other mailing lists. in my opinion, this is where the role of the moderator is absolutely critical. any mailing list with an AWOL moderator is only asking for total chaos, IMHO. in this case I'll use the word "moderator" and "list creator" interchangeably. the best recommendation to everyone who subscribes to the list, and to the moderator, is that THE MODERATOR DETERMINES WHAT IS RELEVANT. that means that no one else has the authority to do this, NO ONE. if you find a post that bothers you, FIRST WRITE THE LIST MODERATOR. ask the LIST MODERATOR to deal with the offending poster. the list moderator should make a judgement when the list is in a "noise" phase and try to be clear about what is relevant to the list and what is not. what this requires is a watchful eye and regular interventions, IMHO. a list where the moderator is never around may seem like a haven, but in my opinion it only turns into a grouch free-for-all subject to regular conflagrations that leave everyone *really* pissed off, as did a recent eruption by TM and PM. now, whenever you see someone write, THIS ISN'T RELEVANT TO THIS LIST!! THIS DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH CRYPTO!! IMHO you should gently remind this person in email that THEIR OPINION OF WHAT IS RELEVANT OR NOT IS NOT RELEVANT. tell them to write the list moderator first, IN EMAIL. jamming up the communication medium with meta traffic about what is an is not relevant is absolutely futile and useless and counterproductive and extremely anxiety producing. so, as you can see, IMHO people who are continually making judgements about what is or is not relevant to the list, and posting those opinions, are PART OF THE PROBLEM. (I am reminded of one himself talking about people who are part of the problem and who is part of the solution. well, IMHO, ironically, he is PART OF THE PROBLEM, and for a very obvious and clear reason that even an intelligent child could grasp). -- the Yin to the Yang of all this, however, is that the LIST MODERATOR MUST OCCASIONALLY SHOW HIS FACE and make unambiguous rulings about what is and what is not appropriate, especially when the noise level increases and people start to wonder. the problem with this is a list moderator who likes to use one or two pseudonyms. the pseudonyms may be so secret that not *anyone* on the list is aware of his identity, even close friends. this list moderator may be loathe to ever post under his "true name" or whatever name he used to start the list. anyway, you can see that this whole business of pseudonyms, while perhaps workable, is certainly fraught with pitfalls IMHO. at least in situations of *public forums*, I am going to go out on a limb and say that it is very troublesome. it seems that in any forum, there are people who will try to disrupt the proceedings so to speak. in real life you can throw them out, by identifying their *picture*. in a cyberspace that lacks true identities, you cannot throw out these "problem people". they continually come back to haunt you despite your best attempts to bar them. doesn't that bug you? doesn't that irritate you? doesn't that drive you crazy? or do you like the idea that the person you most hate in life might be posting behind any of the next few messages? and there's nothing you can do about it? because you in fact embrace the capabilities that let him do this, and you're pretty sure you're not a hypocrite? well, just some musings for those who unabashadly promote pseudonyms to contemplate. p.s. in regard to the above, about "people other than the moderator posting judgements about what is and is not relevant to the list", I am not making a judgement about what is and is not relevant on the list. I am making a judgement about making a judgement about what is and what is not relevant on the list. <g> --Vlad Nuri

1 0

State Charges in Weaver Case
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One additional news tidbit. FBI director Louis Freeh said he was "extremely disappointed" in the charges against Horiuchi, and promised that the Federal Government would spare no expense in defending him against them. Hey, I've got an idea. Is Stephan Jones free? :) -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}

1 0

$1 Million Code Crack
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

$treet Journal, August 22, 1997, p. A7A. Hackers' Paradise: Get Wealthy Legally By Cracking a Code Crypto-Logic Offers to Pay $1 Million to the Breaker Of Encryption for E-Mail By Rodney Ho A start-up company would like you to hack your way to $1 million. Crypto-Logic Corp. of Austin, Texas, claims to have created an encryption system for electronic mail so foolproof that it can't be broken. If someone can figure out a special encrypted e-mail message within a year, the company says it will pay a reward of $1 million. But wait. The technology Crypto-Logic is using for the contest hasn't exactly been foolproof. The three computers needed to create the contest's Web site unexpectedly scrambled data in the site last week, said David Neeley, vice president and chief operating officer. The breakdown forced him to backtrack from last week's announcement that the contest would begin last Friday. Instead, he spent several days attempting to fix the computers, but to no avail. On Monday, he had to get replacement computers. "I've got thousands of dollars worth of machinery that's not worth blowing up," he grouses. But he adds, "I regard this as my screw-up. In this world, there are no excuses." He finally got the contest running Wednesday, at www.ultimateprivacy.com. On the bright side, cryptologists agree that the decades-old encryption method that Crypto-Logic is claiming to use -- called a "one-time pad" -- is theoretically unbreakable. Each "pad" has a set of uniquely random digital symbols that are coded to the actual message. The recipient uses the same symbols to decrypt the message. The pads are used only once. To limit the possibility of leaks, Crypto-Logic Chairman Stan Spence is the only person who knows the message that was encrypted. The solution is kept in a NationsBank vault in Austin, Mr. Spence says. In addition, Mr. Neeley says the $1 million is backed by an insurance company he won't name. Several other companies have held similar contests, typically offering more modest sums. Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security Inc. in Redwood City, Calif., says his company frequently holds break-the- code contests to test how tough certain encryption systems are. But he and other security experts are skeptical of Crypto-Logic's assertions. "Anyone who says their system is bulletproof is either a liar or stupid," says Winn Schwartau, a Largo, Fla., security expert. Mr. Neeley admits his integrity is on the line. "If I'm wrong," he notes, "we're out of business." [End]

2 1

European wilingness to pay ...
by p.v.mcmahon.rea0803＠oasis.icl.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> also, Bob Morris said in his talk, acc. to Gillogly, that Europeans > *were* willing to pay for encryption in their phones, but those in the > US weren't. please expand on that little nugget!! how did you come Presumably this is a reference to GSM. - pvm

1 0

Re: Crypto '95: Robert Morris
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> So Robert Morris worked for NSA. > Does that mean that the infamous 1988 Internet Worm > was part of a NSA-sponsored intelligence-gathering mission? > No, that was his kid! Imagine his chagrin! Patrick _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

1 0

maximizing cryptographic return
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the question of the cost-effectiveness of phone encryption was raised by my other message. I would like to question how cheaply good encryption could be done on phones, with a poor quality microprocessor. most on this list are aware of the idea that good encryption is often used to send a low-bandwidth session key, which is then used to encrypt that session using a less sophisticated but less computationally-demanding algorithm. hence you seem to have good security at a computational price that is less than encrypting everything with the secure protocol. I was wondering how secure the following algorithm would be for phone calls: suppose that at the beginning of each session, the random key is traded using RSA or some other very secure approach. the key is a *random bit width*, say 100-6000 bits. now, my question is, I wonder if some very cheap algorithms, in terms of computation time, could be used for the "on the fly" encryption of the voice using those bit. would XOR with the pad be totally out of line? the situation is such that trivial algorithms such as XOR with *unlimited cyphertext* can be broken quite trivially. but it seems to me this dogma that "XOR is WEAK" is based on the premise that you have a huge amount of cyphertext to play with. take away this premise, that you have a session key that is guaranteed to really give you very little cyphertext, do these supposedly "weak" algorithms then become pretty secure? what I am getting at is that it seems there is this frequent assumption that "good cryptography for on-the-fly encryption means you need huge computational bandwidth". I wonder how true this really is. can you have a situation where you spend a lot of time computationally negotiating the *random one time pad*, but then have a fairly weak algorithm doing the on-the-fly encryption with the random pad? IMHO this would be the holy grail for phone hardware. as I wrote, you are already going to have something approximating the power of a low- bandwidth microprocessor in a phone. now imagine it took a long time to send the key at the beginning, but that once traded it was no big deal-- real time communication using even "weak" algorithms. what I am suggesting here is that we can get encryption for almost *no additional cost* over existing phone hardware. and I am suggesting that the main hurdles to encryption are political, not technical. again, I wonder if "weak" encryption schemes are really that weak if they are only used on short cyphertexts and if you have a good, secure OTP (one time pad). I think it may be a delusion that you must have a huge amount of computational bandwidth or have to encrypt every bit using state-of-the-art, computationally-demanding algorithms to have extremely secure on-the-fly communications. p.s. can someone give a brief summary of the Nautilus and PGP session key / code frameworks? p.p.s. a few footnotes in regard to the previous article. widespread, seamless phone encryption is the NSA's absolute worse nightmare. everything they are doing to prevent cryptography can be thought of as trying to avoid this particular reality configuration. pay special attention how they approach the issue and it will tell you what they fear the most, and what they are trying to do to prevent it. also, Bob Morris said in his talk, acc. to Gillogly, that Europeans *were* willing to pay for encryption in their phones, but those in the US weren't. please expand on that little nugget!! how did you come to that conclusion? why are americans fundamentally different than europeans in regard to the value of encryption? if humans want the same thing in most markets (as the situation of international product marketing generally seems to suggest) does it make you think that something besides the desirability of crypto is at stake here in the localities, such as *politics*? --Vlad Nuri

2 1

[Fwd: (Fwd) Microsoft - The Next Generation...]
by Arthur Unknown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0