December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Bypassing the trap door for LanMan
by Rick Osborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking about LanMan passwords on NT (thanks to Hobbit and Mudge for the background) when it occurred to me that you don't *really* have to brute force the entire keyspace to get a password under the two systems. Bear with me here for a sec, and please let me know if something I say is incorrect. I haven't read through Applied Crypto in a while and may be a bit rusty. What I'm thinking is this: why do you need *the* password? Can't you just find an MD5 collision by working the algorithm in reverse? Obviously, when working it in reverse you are highly unlikely to get *the* password, but if you then shove what you got back through and it hashes out to the same thing, what difference does it make? We know that you can grab Win32 password hashed with minimal effort (thanks to pwdump), and since the salt in those passwords is constant, and since the LanMan password is just an uppercased version of the NTLM password, could we not reverse-engineer that hash to get a working version of the password? It shouldn't have to be *the* password, as no challenge/response system is in place for LanMan, and it only has to hash out to the same thing (which is guaranteed). Also, in a RL scenario, you'd only need the password once: to add a given account to the Domain Admins group, or to create such an account in the first place. At that point, you use your dummy account and you are good to go. So we have a system here: 1. Use `net view` to get a list of all nodes on the network. 2. Get the list of Domain Admins. 3. Pass that list of nodes to successive calls to pwdump to grab passwords from the registries, until you find one that a Domain Admin has logged into. 4. Reverse-engineer the Domain Admin's password and create an account in the Domain Admin group. 5. Use pwdump on the PDC to get the list of all usernames and passwords. Now, if pwdump could be done in Perl (using Win32::Registry), then this entire process could be automated (also using Win32::AdminMisc and a backwards version of Cypto::MD5) trivially. Also, since MS has yet to truly fix the GetAdmin problem, steps 1-4 can be replaced with a single call to that. Using L0phtCrack (or something similar) and a nice big wordlist (say, 2 million words), I estimate that some 60%-70% of the user passwords could be gotten in this manner, including a few of the Domain Admins' (assuming normal, non-cypto-savvy Domain Admins), in under 2 hrs of work. Now, as a lighter side of this, this could also be useful: Say you already are a domain admin and are unhappy with the level of security your site is using. And say that whenever a user forgets their password it is reset to something trivial (like 'password' or their employee number, etc). A large number of employees are not going to change that reset password (unless User Must Change Password is set). An Admin could therefore hash out 'password', dump the entire user/pass list, and force the ones with the same hash to change their password at the next logon (this is in a bitfield somewhere). This script could be set to run once a week, insuring non-trivial passwords. In an environment where management refuses to institute strong-password securities, this could be a trivial way for an Admin to do it him/herself, without making it obvious what is going on or without making too much work for themselves. --Rick [Who has *just* that kind of management. :( ] -- Rick Osborne, <osborne(a)gateway.grumman.com> Real programmers don't use APL, unless the whole program can be written on one line.

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Re: Direct Socket to Remailer?
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:41 PM 9/3/95, starrd(a)iia2.org wrote: >On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Lance Cottrell wrote: > >> You should try the telnet port 25 trick. It is amazingly simple (but not >> secure). Just "telnet some.machine.com 25" and type help. It will guide you >> through it. It is quite informative. > >Se sure to test it first, sometimes it records who *really* sent it as >well as the "forged" return address. > >Test it by mailing to yourself and then look at all the headers. > I should have been more clear. I was advocating this as interesting and educational, not as an effective anonymity technique. -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: lack of evolution (So What!)
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One factor which everyone seems to be overlooking in this thread is the future impact of biotechnology. Sure, evolution by natural selection has largely halted for the human race - we were, on average, probably at our fittest about 10,000 years ago, before the introduction of agriculture. However, artificial evolution will soon take over. There are two main forms - purely biological evolution through genetic engineering, and a continued evolution in our collaboration with devices. We are on the verge of achieving the first. We may soon be able to eliminate many genetically related diseases and conditions. While Rifkin and other Luddites rail against the unnaturalness of it all, they will fail. There are too many cases where GE is an unquestionable good. If parents had the option of the following traits in their children, how many would refuse? * Perfect teeth - natural immunity to caries. * Immunity to cancer. * Immunity to AIDS (about 1% of the current population is naturally immune) * Ditto many other diseases, genetic and infectious. All the above may be available in the next 20 years. (The anti-AIDS gene maybe in 10 - it looks like an easy one). In the longer run, almost anything that can be imagined may be possible, including physical immortality and increased intelligence. Secondly, we've evolved as a tool-using species for a million years, and our technology is as much a part of our inheritance as are our genes. Where will it take us no one knows, but the future will be richer and stranger than we can imagine. Our machines will help re-make what it is to be 'human'. This includes all devices - cyborg or external, nano or macro, sentient or dumb. So I'm not too worried that the cull rate due to sabre-tooth tigers has dropped off, nor even that the irresponsible are no longer starving to death, which Tim would seem to want. Our technology can and will overcome these little problems. 'Not in vain the future beckons, Forward, forward let us range. Let the great world spin forever Down the ringing grooves of Change.' - Tennyson Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Re: Collection of personal info
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:39 PM 9/6/95, David Neal wrote: >From the huge number of people in the database, it would seem that TRW >is now marketing a subset of their credit records they keep on everyone. >Does anyone else remember the flap over Lotus' product (Magellan) that >was going to allow something similar? > >The risks? This is the perfect database if you want to red-line your offerings. >I'm sure others will have more creative answers. About the Lotus Marketplace product of several years ago, many of us thought at the time that the furor was misdirected, and the result ultimately damaging to privacy concerns. Why? Because the ZIP code data is _already_ available to the mass marketers, etc. The Marketplace produce merely made it available to "the rest of us," allowing many people to have their eyes opened about what exists. By getting Lotus to pull the product, the public went back to sleep, lulled into the false sense of privacy that their ZIP codes were once against private. Privacy needs to be protected by keeping some things secret, not by passing laws limiting the records others can collect from public or voluntarily offered information. Don't get me wrong--I don't like TRW Credit, Equifax, TransUnion, or anyone else compiling "dossiers" on my spending habits, my travel itineraries, etc. But by using my VISA and MasterCard cards, and by agreeing to their terms and conditions, I am tacitly accepting that credit reporting agencies will have access to my transactions. If there is a "market for privacy," and this is something we've talked about before, then someone will offer "The Privacy Card." We can debate what this card might offer, randing from complete unlinkability (ecash protocols of various sorts) to non-reporting of records to the Big Three of credit reporting agencies. Even cards issued in the name of pseudonyms, of various sorts and backings. Should there be laws _against_ this kind of Privacy Card, we should fight these laws. But we should not lull ourselves into a false sense of security by adopting the unconstitutional and anti-liberty approach of having "Fair Credit Reporting Act" and "Data Privacy Act" sorts of laws. In my opinion, of course. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Welfare / Norplant
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: > At 5:33 AM -0700 8/25/97, Peter Trei wrote: > >Several years ago I came up with a little variation on the > >Welfare Mother problem which I thought was a lot more > >palatable. > >Offer a 'birthday present' program, under which *any* > >female over the age of 11 who has not yet had a child or become > >pregnant, on her birthday, gets a cash award. The award should > >be high enough to encourage participation; $250 seems about > >right. A woman who can deliberatly turn down a $250 lump sum > >every year for the rest of her life is almost certainly able > >to afford to raise a child. > Possibly more palatable to the majority not already on welfare, but hardly > an incentive to a single mother contemplating the increase in her > AFDC/WIC/etc. benefits should she add to her brood. You are not thinking this through. Under this scheme, every welfare mother would march her girls down to the clinic and get them Norplanted as soon as she could. Those girls would not be able to further add to the welfare rolls until they reach legal age, and could have the contraceptive removed without their mother's permission. By then they'd have developed a habit of contraception, which would likely continue. [...] > But given the obvious flaws in Peter's plan, he probably has a future as a > bureaucrat in Washington. :-) Tim: Your keyboard is on, but the processor socket is empty.... > --Tim May Peter Trei

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Re: PGP5i supports RSA keys?
by John Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>TWOK! Au contraire, mon ami... > >Eric Drexler estimates that with nanotech, it should be possible >to create a 1 GHz processer that fits in 1/8 of a cubic micron. >It would take 1E24 such processors to factor a 2048 bit number. >If we wanted to factor that 2048 bit key in 1E6 seconds, a couple >of weeks, we would need 1E18 processors, which would fit in a cube >100,000 microns on a side. This is 10 cm on a side, about the >volume of a soccer ball. A far cry from the whole earth, no? GURK! I meant that it would take 1E24 seconds for one such processor to factor a 2048 bit number. The rest is right. Use an 8K bit key and it will be 1E30 times harder than a 2K key. Now your soccer ball is comfortably bigger than the earth. You will have to convert the sun into a CPU to break it with nanotech. "John ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: BXA Meet in Portland OR
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lee Tien wrote: >We discussed the IEEPA issues to some extent in our briefs in Bernstein as >well, in case anyone cares. The gov't also discussed them, opposing our >position. I don't keep track of which briefs are on the EFF website, but I >assume they're both up now. I'd like to applaud all those who've been working on this legal hack for years now, keeping flatfeet to fire. For mind-opening, hard-headed reading, in addition to Froomkin and Bernstein, see the briefs on Karn and Junger, see Gilmore's files, study all the crypto sites which show the depth of research that has often had to be ripped out of the government'g tight paws still fiercely resisting loss of control over "the national interest." Tim's "crazy man" threat, artfully delineated in his CA Manifesto and Cyphernomicon, who might just do what "rational minds" won't, is also to be admired for reminding the insiders that not everyone abides the rules of the court when they are not wisely applied for this time and these newly divergent, even anarchic, interests. Read Tim for inspiration when the briefs numb, then go back and study the briefs some more, and you'll see that they don't read the same, there's more fire there than appears at first glance, then return to Tim and see that, well, god damn, so that's what he's saying and we've not been really hearing. Shit, he's crazier, the briefs are crazier, the government's crazier than rational minds can bear to believe. When you can't take them any more, read Duncan Frissell, and freak with terrible understanding that the world you've long thought solid and, forever around to complain about and blame, may be crumbling, that we're going to be wholly on our own to fight the monsters. Beware, though, you may suddenly want the gov to endure. Too late, the angry power-infected lab rats are loose, AP bent.

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Re: gephardt slams crypto
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -=> Quoting In:vznuri@netcom.com to Harka <=- In> ------- Forwarded Message In> Date: Sat, 23 Aug 1997 00:57:05 -0700 In> From: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> In> Subject: [Fwd: Encryption is vital to the Net BY RICHARD A. GEPHARDT] In> Key recovery won't work unless the many countries that produce In> encryption adopt it. Otherwise criminals could still obtain In> encryption from non-complying countries. But countries like In> Germany have refused to support key recovery. That is not true. While the german government may object to US-escrowed software, they have no problem with GERMAN escrowed-software. There are currently several proposals on the "regulation" of cryptography in Germany, which are (suprisingly) similar to US-plans, i.e. TTP's, key-escrow, and even the possibility of outlawing "non-government-approved" cryptography. Ciao Harka ... "Use a Cipher - Be Free!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBNAHejDltEBIEF0MBAQHjpgf/QBy++2Dw7+8wOGKBHFygd6MTz1YQy+Wm rRDiIUQTr1io+RkPcGOebujAluykJc+lovc0vWlzlN1Rn/Hto6zujIWwEMwCsMgm Yu3NoNtr5n+XmVVDevyGRa0uVoITQkhr0GmHQZXHj6UqQMIoyOx+o81coHubaSWG qSLRPW+11EKgm4q3XDc8bCDqCSQgHCIp+QFSIK4hKvEdcXVwxwbPGSO1EFFx3nRa X7Ix+2S5acVlhRguFRciz9i2C93wWmm3Smwk6SL3D+IRe1edtlGsoj4RUAH22WKM PeVPIScmdopHd6CZZj/0Z6uvzllI36XNcVyESl19JP5o6+fKrL/1JQ== =SNNn -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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Netscape Crypto
by Jason William RENNIE 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody know how strong the export netscape crypto stuff is ?? Is the stuff only 40 bit crypto for export ?? A friend asked me about the secure credit stuff and if netscape was secure for credit cards ?? So is the export copy secure ?? I presuem the non-export wouldn't be to bad. Jason

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Reuter on Bernstein Ruling
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.cnn.com, CNN Online, 26 August 1997: Encryption rules rejected Judge says federal regulations barring unlicensed exports unconstitutional San Francisco, Aug 25 (Reuter) - U.S. government regulations on the export of encryption software are unconstitutional, a federal judge ruled on Monday. U.S. District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel said licensing requirements for the export of encryption software and related devices were an unconstitutional prior restraint on First Amendment free speech rights. Patel also issued a permanent injunction barring the government from enforcing the regulations against plaintiff Daniel Bernstein or anyone who sought to use, discuss or publish his encryption program. Encryption involves running a readable message though a computer program that translates the message according to an equation or algorithm into unreadable "ciphertext." "By the very terms of the encryption regulations, the most common expressive activities of scholars -- teaching a class, publishing their ideas, speaking at conferences, or writing to colleagues over the Internet -- are subject to a prior restraint by the export controls ...," Patel wrote in a 32-page ruling released in San Francisco. Patel said that, having found the regulations to be invalid, she could have issued a nationwide injunction barring their enforcement. But she said she had kept the injunction as narrow as possible pending appeal because "the legal questions at issue are novel, complex and of public importance." The ruling is important because the computer industry sees use of encryption technology across country borders as essential for advancing electronic commerce and private communications over the Internet. The government has previously cited national security concerns over the export of encryption programs. As a graduate student, Bernstein developed an encryption algorithm he called "Snuffle." In 1992, Bernstein asked the State Department whether Snuffle was controlled by export regulations then in force which classified cryptographic software as "defense articles." The government told him his program was subject to licensing by the Department of State prior to export. Alleging that he was not free to teach, publish or discuss with other scientists his theories on cryptography embodied in the Snuffle program, Berstein sued the State Department in 1995, challenging the regulations on free speech grounds. Bernstein is now a research assistant professor of mathematics, statistics and computer science at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Patel ruled last December that the old regulations limiting the export of encryption software violated the First Amendment. But late last year, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order transfering jurisdiction over the export of nonmilitary encryption products to the Commerce Department. Patel's latest ruling was on Bernstein's amended lawsuit which included the new regulations and new defendants. Patel said that her finding that encryption source code was speech protected by the First Amendment did not remove encryption technology from all government regulation. Cindy Cohn, a lawyer for Bernstein, called the ruling a "very big victory" for free speech advocates. "This brings us a step closer to people being able to freely publish ideas about encryption," she said. A U.S. Justice Department lawyer who defended the regulations could not immediately be reached for comment. The government could appeal the ruling. [End]

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