December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SSL search attack
by rkw＠dataplex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote >>> Assuming that you are multi-threaded--- Simply run two "workers" on the >>> same machine. If there are delays in getting keys assigned, the two will >>> soon get out of phase and keep the cpu busy. >> I kind of like that idea... > To which Piete Brooks replied: >I thought of that, but: >1) for the same server load, it doubles the number of unACKed segments >2) if process A is lagging process B, then when process B finishes and is idle > waiting for the server, process A will run faster and thus reduce the lag. > This will make the processes drift into phase. > I'm not convinced one way or the other. But you forgot that when process A finishes, process B will run faster and re-establish its lead. The real question is what is the parameter that we need to minimize? Assuming that the key is distributed in the keyspace with a uniform probability, then what we need to minimize is the expectation that two or more workers are searching the same keyspace. As long as we never reach the point that all of the keys have been distributed, it does not matter how many or in what method they are assigned. (The "fairness" WRT a prize being ignored) The assignments only become important as we exhaust the space and must prepare to make another pass. Note that we never got to that point on challenge 2. The assignment of the block containing the key was processed on its first pass and the key was found. In this regard, it is probably "best" to first attempt to identify those space assignments that have been lost. If we associate with each key, either explicitly, or by inference, an expected completion time, those segments which are most overdue are certainly good candidates for having been lost. Based on our previous try, and the assumption that we would not have extremely different resources available, the master allocator would not NEED to get reports back for the first say 12 hours. That is not to imply that reports should be delayed that long, but only that there is considerable opportunity to have a hierarcy of intermediate collectors that have plenty of time to adjust their allocation algorithms to match the ability of their workers. Later, more rapid response would be needed. When the required response becomes too small for the "little guys", they could be sloughed off on the next problem, leaving the "big boys" to clean up the last pieces. Of course, the "next" problem might be to resolve the same problem because the correct answer was incorrectly reported as not found. As I see it, except for perhaps the fastest of machines there is little reason to allocate to the workers more than one segment at a time. Their supervisor can quickly respond to requests for work and consolidate the results to be passed up the chain. The only reason that I can see to separate the acks from the assignments is to be able to have "memory-less" nodes. This is certainly unnecessary if there is a web of supervisor servers. I have a lot more thoughts that I will defer to the next missive. Gotta' run... ---- Richard Wackerbarth rkw(a)dataplex.net

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Key Escrow Workshop agenda & discussion paper 3
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following message segment: ------------------------------ From: Arlene Carlton <carlton(a)micf.nist.gov> Fri, 01 Sep 1995 15:30:46 -0400 Cc: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov Subject: Key Escrow Workshop agenda & discussion paper 3 September 1, 1995 Dear Participant: Thank you for agreeing to participate in the two-day meeting on software key escrow encryption. We are anxious to work with you and other industry representatives to facilitate development of exportable key escrow encryption in software products. I look forward to the workshop being an important step in that process. [snip] --------------------------------- Was sent to the following folks. I assume that this means that these people are participants. I see Dan W from CDT, Soble from EPIC and Whitfield Diffie, on our side, plus assorted folks with stakes such as tis.com and netscape.com And of course, DERD for the other side. Blank Unicorn had posted to c'punks that he was attending. Of course, while I know what he looks like, I have no idea which nym is his. Pat List of attendees/registered participants follows: 100436.3361(a)compuserve.com, 73167.2027(a)compuserve.com, 73534.3011(a)compuserve.com, 75300.3232(a)compuserve.com, 76225.2603(a)compuserve.com, ablee(a)mitre.org, ads012(a)email.corp.mot.com, ams(a)eit.com, amte09(a)email.corp.mot.com, asteen(a)novell.com, baum(a)world.std.com, bekutz(a)aol.com, bflowe(a)mcimail.com, bill.poulos(a)oga.eds.com, bill.poulos(a)oga.eds.com, branstad(a)tis.com, bsaclu(a)aol.com, c.baggett(a)cablelabs.com, carol.donovan(a)network.com, ccrafton(a)gi.com, charlesabzug(a)acm.org, ckc(a)rfpo1.rfc.comm.harris.com, cmo(a)cohnmarks.com, coallen(a)us.oracle.com, cpadilla(a)attmail.com, cpadilla(a)attmail.com, csmith(a)steptoe.com, davery(a)grci.com, david_rose(a)ccm.fm.intel.com, ddodson(a)nist.gov, denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, deyoung(a)rpcp.mit.edu, dinsmore(a)tis.com, djw(a)cdt.org, dkozlay(a)ire.com, dmiller(a)spa.org, Don_Sortor-ads012(a)email.corp.mot.com, ebarker(a)nist.gov, ed(a)tecsec.com, emessmer(a)world.std.com, ezzy_dabbish-amte09(a)email.corp.mot.com, flahavin(a)csmes.ncsl.nist.gov french(a)zeke.enet.dec.com, gomes(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil, gordon(a)ipower.nsc.com, hoffman(a)seas.gwu.edu, housley(a)spyrus.com, hoydyshd(a)mcln.unisysgsg.com, i.goldsmith(a)nexor.co.uk, infocker(a)megaweb.com, jackk(a)microsoft.com, jag(a)jgvandyke.com, jaltman(a)milchev.com, jamanni(a)missi.ncsc.mil, james.hughes(a)network.com, jdrandall(a)vnet.ibm.com, jean_m_baronas(a)co.xerox.com, jeff.rulifson(a)Eng.Sun.COM, jeff(a)netscape.com, jerry(a)ods.com, jgheiner(a)aol.com, jimmy(a)ipower.nsc.com, jimn(a)calv1.cray.com, jkrauss(a)cpcug.org, john(a)ipower.nsc.com, john_pascatore(a)ivision.com, jroberts(a)cmp.com, js(a)cup.hp.com, jseiger(a)cdt.org, jwinston(a)ota.gov, jya(a)pipeline.com, jya(a)pipeline.com, kandy(a)micf.nist.gov, karen.randall(a)att.com, kawamoto(a)mitre.org, kaye(a)ix.netcom.com, kent_landfield(a)sterling.com, khrose(a)annap.infi.net, klensin(a)mci.net, lc2m(a)andrew.cmu.edu, lcarnahan(a)nist.gov, lhg(a)nrc.gov, lovornj(a)usva8.dyncorp.com, lshomo(a)hqops.hq.nasa.gov, lthrash(a)hqamc.army.mil, lydia.bell(a)tip.navsea.navy.mil, maitgmu(a)aol.com, martin.ferris(a)treas.sprint.com, mary_smolenski(a)ita.doc.gov, mbohannon(a)banyan.doc.gov, mccord(a)nosc.mil, melanie.carter-maguire(a)nt.com, mendelson(a)tis.com, mfa(a)compaq.com, michael.palgon(a)sciatl.com, mignon(a)atc.boeing.com, mikus(a)viacrypt.com, mjl(a)liii.com, mpapillo(a)snap.org, mpapillo(a)snap.org, mppulkk(a)mikropc.fi, mrainey(a)itic.nw.dc.us, murray2(a)vnet.ibm.com, natstrat(a)dgs.dgsys.com, nazario(a)csmes.ncsl.nist.gov, paradise(a)wellsfargo.com, pfarrell(a)netcom.com, pjclark(a)ix.netcom.com, po7114(a)email.mot.com, polk(a)csmes.ncsl.nist.gov, powar(a)visa.com, randy(a)mci.net, ravenis(a)novell.wd.cubic.com, rjg9324(a)glaxo.com, rjoconnor(a)aol.com, rmedlock(a)mitre.org, roberth(a)bsa.org, rolfe.doc.gov(a)micf.nist.gov, rozzie(a)iris.com, rwessman(a)us.oracle.com, sbaker(a)steptoe.com, Schneck(a)mitre.org, Schneck(a)ncsl.nist.gov, sevans(a)csn.com, shabbir(a)panix.com, simona(a)sea.org, sking(a)mitre.org, sltm(a)msg.ti.com, snouffer(a)st1.ncsl.nist.gov, sobel(a)epic.org, squires(a)arpa.mil, stuart(a)bellcore.com, stw(a)atc.boeing.com, sullivan(a)interramp.com, tajalli(a)tis.com, tec.teclgl(a)micf.nist.gov, ted_gerbracht(a)ml.com, tfuhrman(a)ostp.eop.gov, thomas_clare(a)sterling.com, trivers(a)is.ge.com, trstsc(a)tevm2.nsc.com, ttobin(a)atl.ge.com, wafranklin(a)attmail.com, walker(a)tis.com, walt(a)osf.org, walters(a)snad.ncsl.nist.gov, wford(a)bnr.ca, whitehurst(a)vnet.ibm.com, whitfield.diffie(a)Eng.Sun.COM, whpayne(a)abq-ros.com, wmcglone(a)milchev.com, wright(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil, Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Fuhrman needed a digital pseudonym!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Before you folks jump on the "racist" Mark Fuhrman, think about the "surveillance state" issues. While it was not any government organization that taped Fuhrman's comments, there are some real issues involved in how deeply and how far back we want to "mine" comments made by people. Some real issues of privacy. The Mark Fuhrmans of the future may be interested in using technologies to protect their privacy, to give them "plausible deniability" should their recorded words come back to haunt them. Brief comments: * This post is primarily about the role of pseudonyms, not the OJ trial or the testimony/tapes involving Mark Fuhrman. * And the issue of "mining" of ancient records, especially as technology makes the recording of sounds, the taping of sights, and the archiving of electronic messages so much easier. * Those who think this is off-topic because it has nothing to do with coding in C are hereby invited to hit the "D" key, or whatever passes for it, right now. Caveat: I've watched entirely too much of the OJ trial on CNN, as I sit here at home and surf the Net every morning. It's easy to have the television on, and the OJ trial has had many interesting twists. When the stuff gets boring, I switch to music or perhaps to the financial network CNBC. So, I've see nearly everything being talked about here. Opinion on OJ: ***elided by Tim to head off debates about OJ's guilt or innoncence***. (I state this to show my prejudices, not to start an "OJ debate" on this list. Actually, I just elided (deleted) the opinion I had expressed, so as not to inflame anyone here.) What really bothers me, as it relates to the pro-privacy themes of this list, is the reaching back many years to comments made by a witness--Mark Fuhrman--to a screenplay writer. Because she kept audiotapes, going back 10 years, these comments may likely strongly influence the verdict in this "trial of the century." Anyone in favor of heading off the "surveillance society" should be alarmed at this development. As tape recorders and video cameras proliferate, comments may be compiled, taken out of context, and used as evidence. (Who amongst us has not said "nigger"? Does it count if I am asking why the rap group "Niggas with Attitude" chooses to label themselves as niggers? I figure that if blacks routinely call themselves niggers and call folks like me "honkies," then it's fair to call _them_ niggers. Not that I do this, but I don't see the term as so horrifying as to cause a killer like OJ to get off as this spectacle unfolds. Besides, it's become "permissable" for black leaders to refer to New York City as "Hymietown" in a way that would result in public stoning for a white to refer to a city as "Niggertown." The old double standard.) The point: Fuhrman should have used a pseudonym, should have taken steps to protect his identity. Of course, in 1985 this would have been harder. But have people given up the right to speak "for themselves" in private? If there is no solid evidence that Fuhrman actually committed any crimes, but only appeared to be puffing himself up, a la a Wambaugh wannabee, then why are his "racist" and "sexist" comments deemed so important as to have derailed the trial for the last couple of weeks? I have said an awful lot of inflammatory things at Cypherpunks meetings, at parties, in political discussions, and so forth. I don't claim that there should be a law against people bringing these issues up, or even a law against tape-recording various kinds of meetings. I just argue that we are devolving into a surveillanc To be sure, there are valid trial issues: -- Did he misspeak, misremember, or lie when he said he had "never" used the word "nigger" in the past 10 years? (I recall at the time, circa Feb-March, thinking to myself "Oh, sure!," when he said he had not used the word nigger in the past 10 years.) -- If this is perjury, how does it affect other evidence? (I'm not a lawyer, but I grok from the comments on CNN that this has to do with whether his testimony was supportive of other evidence, "cumulative," and related issues.) -- Does this possible misspeaking, misremembering, or lying have anything to do with whether he planted the bloody glove? -- etc. There are various valid issues. Spending a few weeks on these issues is another matter, though, IMHO. In my view, if I were the judge I'd have forced this issue to be resolved in hours, not weeks. Anyway, I am greatly disturbed by this "mining" of ancient comments, made to a screenwriter. Whether Fuhrman is a "racist" or not, this witch trial is a diversion from the real issues. And some real privacy issues are raised. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: O.J. ObCrypto: Fuhrman's Folly Fans Fakery Fears...
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I do not think that PGP 2.x can easily (ie: Automatically) use one key for >Signing and another for Encrypting a Message (it does both at the same time >if you ask). If I "Clear Sign" a message and then Encrypt it, then I get >the result but I'm not sure if doing the decrypt on such a message will >automatically spot the signature and verify it (as would occur with a E+S >pass). PGP identifies the key for decryption and signature checking from the message. When you're signing a message or key, you can pick which of your keys to use with the -u option. The difficulty is getting people to use your encryption key instead of your signature key when encrypting stuff for you. Derek mentioned one approach (get people to load the encryption key first); unfortunately, you can't predict their behavior, and if you change encryption keys more often than signature keys, they'll load the newest encryption key last. Another approach is to identify them in the names - my key certification key says "KeyCert-only" in the text. For the problem that started this discussion, though, there's no good solution. Since the Bad Guys _can_ encrypt a message to you with your signature key, and send it to you by anonymous remailer, they can plant a reason to suspect that you may have evidence encrypted with that key. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: Fuhrman needed a digital pseudonym!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:00 PM 9/1/95, Jeff Barber wrote: >I don't see any "surveillance state" issue. Fuhrman openly agreed to >speak to the screenwriter. AFAIK, he had no reason to believe the >screenwriter wouldn't tell anyone else. Nor should he have counted on >that anyway. Any loss of credibility (or other penalty) he receives >is entirely deserved, IMO. By the way, McKinny did not volunteer the tapes, nor did she consent to having them taken from her and used by the Defense. Private property was taken by a court action (the North Carolina lower court ruled that the tapes were the property of McKinny and could not be taken, then an appeals court overruled this decision and ordered McKinny to produce the tapes). (It is not clear how Cochrane and his team learned of the tapes. Speculation is that McKinny's agent or lawyer was doing some freelance shopping-around of the script. McKinny has denied that she was trying to sell the tapes. Regardless, they are her property and should only come in to a court case when directly and centrally involved. This is closely related to the Church of Scientology issue, and is being debated on another mailing list I'm on, the Cyberia list.) This raises serious issues. She was a screenwriter, Fuhrman was helping her to generate a salable script. Neither was speaking for the LAPD. (Kind of like the disclaimers we see on the Net, which I suspect are becoming worthless.) >> Anyway, I am greatly disturbed by this "mining" of ancient comments, made >> to a screenwriter. > >Not me. A few weeks there was a thread concerning the use of >information by private "reputation" bureaus. I can't find the thread >in the archives but I seem to recall you defending the right of >private entities to keep and distribute such information (my apologies >if this was someone else). Anyway, to me, these tapes fall clearly in You're imputing to my comments about what will happen, and what cannot be stopped except by coercion, a conclusion which you think is at odds with my point here. Just because I think people (like me, you, Laura McKinny, etc.) have the "right" to compile records, make notes, make tapes of conversations, etc., does not mean I think that courts can order them given to the court. (This is an issue I have with "discovery" in general, where even peripheral witnesses can be compelled to turn over diaries, journals, letters, tapes, records, financial reports, etc.) >the same domain. This screenwriter isn't a government agency, the >information was freely given, and the screenwriter has every right to >offer it for whatever purpose she deems appropriate, for free or >for money (barring any agreements to the contrary, of which I have >heard nothing). Again, to make it clear, McKinney did not offer the material and fought in the North Carolina courts to have her property kept confidential. The court ordered her to turn it over. (And apparently members of the defense team leaked the most damaging, and out of context, parts, provoking Ito to announce a major investigation of this is to come, with severe sanctions for those who leaked it.) We need a justice system which will not be dragged into spending a full year on this matter, with every indication that a mistrial or hung jury will result. I look forward to a day in which an OJ would get a reasonable, month-long trial...and then, if found guilty, be given an execution date no longer than a month away. As it is, OJ will be guesting on the talk show circuit. He butchers two people--from the overwhelming mound of evidence I've seen--and essentially cuts the head off of his ex-wife, but will likely get off as this trial spins out of control and fragments in various ways. Don't misunderstand my motivations: I'm sort of happy this is all happening. It makes people even more suspicious of governments and lawyers, and it will accelerate the disintegration of the current system. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Fuhrman needed a digital pseudonym!
by terrell＠sam.neosoft.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Fuhrman needed a digital pseudonym! >Before you folks jump on the "racist" Mark Fuhrman, think about the >"surveillance state" issues. While it was not any government organization >that taped Fuhrman's comments, there are some real issues involved in how >deeply and how far back we want to "mine" comments made by people. Some >real issues of privacy. > >The Mark Fuhrmans of the future may be interested in using technologies to >protect their privacy, to give them "plausible deniability" should their >recorded words come back to haunt them. > ... >* And the issue of "mining" of ancient records, especially as technology >makes the recording of sounds, the taping of sights, and the archiving of >electronic messages so much easier. > ... >What really bothers me, as it relates to the pro-privacy themes of this >list, is the reaching back many years to comments made by a witness--Mark >Fuhrman--to a screenplay writer. Because she kept audiotapes, going back 10 >years, these comments may likely strongly influence the verdict in this >"trial of the century." > >Anyone in favor of heading off the "surveillance society" should be alarmed >at this development. As tape recorders and video cameras proliferate, >comments may be compiled, taken out of context, and used as evidence. ... > >--Tim May > If you've ever watched Not_at_all_Funny Home Videos or any of the American Urinal school of tabloid television, you soon start feeling that the real threat to privacy is not the guvmint, but all of the yoyos with their little cam corders running around pointing them at people. Security cameras in ATMS and at airline ticket counters do more to threaten you privacy than do FIBBIE wiretaps, and PGP won't protect you from them. (and usually neither will the courts). Buford C. Terrell 1303 San Jacinto Street Professor of Law Houston, TX 77002 South Texas College of Law voice (713)646-1857 terrell(a)sam.neosoft.com fax (713)646-1766

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Web of Trust
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am current sorting through the PGP keyserver keyfile to extract a limited web of trust. I believe that current servers would be best to limit their keys in a similar fashon. Since we can't all have what we want without coding it ourselves, I'm doing the next best crappy imitation. Anyways, I am trying to find keys that are actually relevant and inter-connected with signatures. Naturally, it won't be anywhere near complete or extensive, and will be a dog to update, but 5 meg keyfiles take a long time to search... I am requesting that all "active" cypherpunks/cyphergroupies please send me their key number, IF it's already on the keyservers. If it's recently put there, be sure to tell me or I will be annoyed. If it's not there at all, I'll be annoyed. Personally annoyed, not I-ran-some-scriptfile annoyed. If you searched any of the RC4 or SSL keyspace, for example, I'm interested. If you post messages occasionally, [conspiracypunks need not apply] I'm interested. If you generated a key because your neighbor taught you how, don't bother. If anyone wants the keynumbers/script/entirekeyfile I could put it on ftp or something. Naturally, I'll be forwarding all results to the NSA quantum crack-o-matic. Have a nice day. :) Don -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMEb1A8La+QKZS485AQGMKwL/Qzf67QSnn3iLZ7gCumfPcC/KqSyYSM0s OknMHhGDLb74qSWBDRyM6pPdwIHOg+Pjpl53ruMSu9YhXQrjMHgZZUjFh6c7vhi2 c+j3BYQ87us0BRuoj9pu8/d89gG3vsv3 =3qRz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> fRee cRyPTo! jOin the hUnt or BE tHe PrEY PGP key - http://bert.cs.byu.edu/~don or PubKey servers (0x994b8f39) June 7&14, 1995: 1st amendment repealed. Death threats ALWAYS pgp signed * This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company *

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Re: CIA & Espionage
by syrinx＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Tatu Ylonen' was reported to have written: > I do find it rather shocking that the most powerful country in the > world sets industrial espionage as the primary task of their > intelligence services. Well, I have a letter from a United States Senator which was received last year in response to my phone call in opposition to the Digital Telephone Act of 1994 (S. 2375). Here's the interesting part: "According to the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Louis Freeh, the number one law enforcement, public safety, and national security issue facing us today is preserving the ability to conduct court approved wiretaps." In other words, retaining the ability to monitor citizen communications is their greatest concern. This should be more than shocking to anyone who cares about privacy. It appears as though the primary function of the FBI and the "intelligence services" are similarly directed. One significant distinction is that the FBI's stated mission is directed toward the "owners of the country" (to borrow a term from Perot).

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Re: Canarypunk: Jim Bell in a coalmine
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Okay. So we know that Bell has pled, and he's in there for a while. > >How long until he gets out, now? > >Has he moved to another facility? > >Is all this moot because he's admitting to something which is not related >to his activities on this list? If I remember, his A/P rant here was still >pretty central to the Feds' case, right? As far as I can tell from what I've read on the list, Jim has plead guilty but will not be sentenced until sometime in October. (November?) In the interim period, he'll be interviewed pretty extensively by a federal probation officer, who will prepare a presentencing report which discusses Jim's attitude(s), prior conviction(s), drug/alcohol use, family status/influences, work history, etc. The presentence report is supposed to provide a context (for better or worse) into which the conviction(s) and sentence are placed. Jim and his attorney are supposed to get a chance to review the presentence report and object to it or supplement it before sentencing. This is a part of the process where it's possible that Jim is about to get screwed, because in large part this is one big litmus test re "bad attitude" (towards authority), which Jim had at one time, and quite possibly still has. The sentence he recieves will depend upon the federal sentencing guidelines; the guidelines will provide a range of months for incarceration and/or probation, depending on the offense level of the crime(s) he plead to and his criminal history (which appears to be relatively minimal, e.g., a previous guilty plea re possession of a precursor to methamphetamine). It's difficult to guess what his final offense level will be (and hence guess what range the judge will have to work with) because it depends on the amount of taxes he evaded. The sentence is determined by the judge, and should be within the range(s) specified by the sentencing guidelines, unless the judge has a reason to depart (which can be "upward" = more time, or "downward" = less time) from the guidelines; there are a number of adjustments to the offense level for things like weapon use, acceptance of responsibility, etc. The judge is only allowed to depart from the range specified if there are aggravating/mitigating factors which aren't covered by the pre-existing adjustments. More information about the sentencing guidelines is available at <www.ussc.gov>. His political/economic ideas aren't relevant/important to the crimes he plead to, although I personally suspect that they've got a lot to do with the decision to investigate and prosecute him. -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by David Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May said in article <ac6b9e29040210042a10(a)[205.199.118.202]>: > At 11:32 PM 8/31/95, Scott Brickner wrote: .. > >he sells its assets to his own identity at a fraction of their worth, > >and defaults on the liabilities. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ .. > ideally, one never "trusts" an agent with a transaction greater than the > value of the reputation capital he will lose if he defaults. .. > Whether cryptographic protocols (cf. the "encrypted open books" proposal by > eric Hughes for one approach which may be useful) solve this problem is not > known at this time. But the non-crypto world has of course not solved this > problem, either. I've often thought that in a system of digital pseudonyms, where no-one need trade with a negative reputation (a reputation deficit?), something like Akerlof's Market for Lemons will arise, and _all_ pseudonyms will be treated as (reputationally) worthless. [Akerlof, if I remember my economics right (and I am confident that I will be corrected if I don't) analysed a market for used cars. There were two types of cars: good ones, and lemons. A purchaser couldn't tell the difference until she had bought the car. Since the expected value of a used car was less than the value of a good car, purchasers wouldn't pay the good car price. But that would mean owners of good cars wouldn't offer them for sale (in this market). So the only cars for sale would be lemons :-)] As Tim points out, this is a non-crypto problem as well, and devices such as bonds or (which are game-theoretically similar) expensive advertising or plush premises [if they spent an unrefundable $20million on the Rolling Stones, they're not likely to throw it all away by ripping you off for $100 ;-)] are used to convince potential customers of one's bona fides. How these transfer to the world of cyber-finance, I'm not sure, but I suspect it leaves a role for True Names in the management of credit risk: as escrow agents, middlemen, clearing houses etc. [Although, having said that, if the Akerlof analysis applies, you just *can't* grant (unsecured) credit to pseudonyms - the percentage of defaulters will be 100...] But these Names are True only in the sense that they are juridically persistent (that is, if they transact today, they can be sued tomorrow), and need not be traceable to any True People (Warm Bodies?) - anonymously held corporations, for example. If you can't rely on the unsecured promise of a digital pseudonym, and you can't accept reputation as 'security', how do you extend credit? Dm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMEd+81lo3j8JHzalAQFo0AQAkohUuFg6QwRaY7X5LwF1YXCby1uCKQmI FfmQHmEa55oeht9Vc4DN1V+dIGjVWRIxS3ib/oRYsXY9HWo8pI3gMKhbnsBf3OzN jVuoUR8Tgx1HcX59uBjbpxKNHFw5U4gPN70zvbLJhbw1UHWr24tq5RJri22coCh7 1Dm016RMHns= =rl4c -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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