December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: RemailerNet
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408051528.LAA18523(a)cs.oberlin.edu> Jonathan Rochkind writes: > You seem to be talking about a Julf-style anon system, where the system > knows who you really are. If the system is corrupt, if Julf were an > NSA agent, then the entire system is compromised and useless. If you are using unmodified Internet hardware and TCP/IP as the underlying transport system, then your point of entry into a remailer network definitely knows which machine is originating a message and the point of exit definitely knows where it is going. If your transport system is the email system, the same holds true because email runs on top of TCP/IP. While fiddling with email headers may make you feel secure, it gives you no protection. It is a large project (say 30,000 lines of code, some of it at the kernel level) to build a remailer network which does not use SMTP and TCP/IP. >From the scale of efforts that you are talking about, I assume that you do not intend to do this. So the remailer gateways know the source and destination addresses, they know your electronic identity. This may or may not lead them to your physical identity. That can be concealed fairly easily, especially in large institutions with poor control over their network resources. But this has nothing to do with our discussion now. > I like the cypherpunks remailer concept better, where each link in the chain > only knows the next link in the chain, and security is achieved by > multiple links. If several of the links are actually NSA agents, your security > is reduced, but not compromised completely. If you've got a chain of, say > 10 links, even if 7 of them are evil NSA agents, you still can probably retain > your anonymity. Return addresses are accomplished by encrypted > "resend-to:" blocks. It seems much preferable to have a system where it > isn't neccesary to trust any one net entity completely, as it is in a > Julf-style anon-ID system. [Of course one could use a combination of both > in communications too, but I wouldn't feel safe unless my anonimity was > safe even if the Finish FBI raided Julf's site.] Promiscuity leads to infection. Each contact with a new RemailerNet gateway increases the probability of your being compromised. If you modify the proposed RemailerNet to allow reposting at gateways, you have all of the benefits of the system described above, without the risks. Reposted messages would be encrypted with the far gateway's public key. The near gateway would then have no idea of the ultimate destination of the message. In a well designed system, the far gateway would also not know the identity of the sender. > When looked at with this goal in mind, I think maybe the newsgroup as a method > of passing remailer net information makes a bit more sense. > > I don't think the possibility of the newsgroup being spoofed is actually > fatal to the system. Let's examine ways in which it could be attacked: > > 1) The Enemy could introduce completely made-up "i'm here" messages, pointing > to non-existent remailers. ... > 2) The Enemy could announce his own Evil-remailers to the net. These remailers > would in fact exist, but would do evil things designed to compromise the net... > 3) The Enemy could intercept announcement messages from good remailers, and > replace their public key with his own. ...He could then intercept all mail to this > good remailer, and read it, and forward it on, or drop it in the bitbucket. > 4) Denial of service: The enemy could intercept the announcement messages, and > keep them from getting to the newsgroup. ... > 5) The enemy could intercept announcement messages from good remailers, and > replace both the public key and address with his own. This is really just a > combination of several of the previous attacks, nothing new. In the early to mid 1950s the FBI set out to penetrate Communist Party USA cells. At some point, when the fear of the Red Menace began to recede, people began to talk. The communists said, "you could always tell who were the FBI agents. They were the ones who paid their dues." The FBI was actually providing most of the funds for CPUSA. If anyone cared enough, what they would do is (a) put up enough remailers so that they were, say, a steady 80% of those announcing in the alt.x group; (b) provide a good, reliable service nearly all of the time; and (c) drive the other 20% out of business with a steady disinformation campaign (rumors, complaints, etc) and other more aggressive tactics. The FBI types running (a) and (b) would be well funded and they would be the sort of steady, unimaginative people who run small businesses well. The CIA field agents masterminding (c) would be very well funded network freaks, some of them ex-hackers. They could operate outside the USA and pay little or no attention to US laws. Pity the poor 20% in the face of such attacks. Any traffic sent through this remailer network would have only a tiny chance of getting through without being compromised. If you picked 5 remailers, the chances of all being non-FBI would be about .2^5, 3 in 10,000. The other 9,997 messages would be copied immediately to Langley. The proposed RemailerNet could be attacked in much the same way. But if the network were widely distributed so that gateways were in different legal jurisdictions and different countries, and if most of the people involved knew one another, it would be more difficult to compromise it. -- Jim Dixon

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fast 386 DES code figures
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To see if software DES could really be made acceptable in a IP security protocol, I've been bumming cycles out of my old DES code. I've completely translated the encrypt and decrypt routines to assembler, with no calls or jumps inside either routine. I picked up Richard Outerbridge's seriously clever initial and final permutation algorithm from Schneier, along with a few of his other tricks. The bottom line: about 38,373 encryptions/sec (2.456 megabits/sec) on a 50 Mhz Intel 486 running in 16-bit real mode. This includes the overhead of the C loop that calls the encrypt function and prints a status line every 10,000 loops. The code would probably run faster if assembled and run in 32-bit native mode, as this would eliminate a lot of 1-clock operand size prefixes (I do many 32-bit operations). Oh, by the way, if I eliminate the permutations the speed goes up to about 42,986 encryptions/sec (2.751 megabits/sec), an increase of about 12%. That says I should be able to do triple-DES at about 13,777 blocks/sec (881.7 kbit/sec) although I haven't tried it yet. What still bugs me is that Schneier lists the speed of one commercial DES implementation as 40,600 encryptions/sec on a 33 Mhz 486. I just don't see how that's possible without using a lot more memory for lookup table space (I use only 2K, which is nice in a DOS environment). In any event, this should be enough for a T1 link (half duplex) as long as too many cycles aren't needed for things like routing packets. :-) Phil

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Re: Remailer ideas
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408051709.AA14763(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > Jim Dixon analogizes between the Internet and remailer networks. The > analogy has some merit, but yet breaks down badly with the very first > point: > > * all packets should be acknowledged > > This is not the way the Internet works. There are some problems with vocabulary here and some conceptual problems. The objective is a system which is highly reliable and resistant to traffic analysis. If you have three messages in, one 10 bytes long, one 1000 bytes long, and one 1,000,000 bytes long, and you send them out to three different destinations, it does not take genius to see which is which, no matter what order they are dispatched in. But if you send them out as packets, each say 4096 bytes long, with all packets acknowledged, and the routing of the packets is random, and noise has been introduced ... traffic analysis is very difficult. TCP/IP is designed to work in an environment which is unreliable but also unhostile. The sliding window algorithm and acknowledgement at the message level is suitable for that environment. TCP/IP has been optimized for speed. [stuff omitted] > Further, in email, there's currently no notion of a connection. The internal functioning of RemailerNet is not the same as the functioning of the email system. All RemailerNet communications are reliable. Packets are acknowledged and the acknowledgement includes a hash of the packet contents, so that the packet cannot be tampered with. Acknowledgements will in general take different routes from packets. > * users should communicate with trusted gateways > > This point is only half true, because the analogy only subsumes one > kind of trust. For remailers there is both trust in delivery and > trust in silence, the destruction of the message and information about > it. 'Trust in silence' is a good term. This can be enhanced in a number of ways. If you are corresponding with someone you know, you encrypt your messages. If you are corresponding with a stranger, you encrypt your message with the public key of a far gateway; then post it to the far gateway through a near gateway. The near gateway knows who is sending, but cannot read the message and does not know the destination. The far gateway decrypts the message before delivering it, so it knows the message and the destination, but not the sender. If you are sufficiently paranoid, you put your message inside yet another envelope, mailing it through the near gateway to a far gateway, which posts it on to another gateway, which finally posts it to its destination. Remailer gateways should be spread very wide geographically if the network is to be secure. If you are very concerned about anonymity, bounce a message through gateways in, say, the USA, Finland, Russia, and Ireland. If your concerns are about your employer, say, the probability of his getting at four different gateways in four different jurisdictions simultaneously is vanishingly small. If your concerns are about governmental authorities, they are not that much higher. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Remailer ideas (Was: Re: Latency vs. Reordering)
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408061404.KAA02300(a)cs.oberlin.edu> Spencer Mullen writes: > Jim Dixon writes: > > >Commercial remailers would probably be very concerned with legal > >issues, both criminal (pornography, etc) and non-criminal (copyright > >violations). > > It would seem that remailers shouldn't be anymore accountable for > passing on illicit pornography than the postal services are today. I really do not want to try to argue the legal issues here; I am not a lawyer and claim no expertise. At a practical level, if you were running, let us say, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) and offered remailer services, you would in time attract the business of people who used your services for various unlawful purposes. You could not stop this without going through everyone's private mail. This would itself probably be illegal and certainly would lose you business. I understand that Playboy magazine spends lots of money pursuing people for copyright violations, and that criminal charges have been filed by the authorities in Tennessee or Arkansas against someone in California who sent them pornographic materials over a telephone line. The Post Office has what is called in the UK "crown immunity" against such prosecutions. So do "common carriers" in the USA. They are given special legal status. I do not know, but I believe that the telephone companies are legally common carriers. As a remailer gateway operator, you would probably have to argue things out in court, which could be very expensive. In the case of criminal charges, you would have to expect to lose your equipment for some time, and perhaps your freedom. I suspect that legally the key step would be to never store messages for any period of time. It would be prudent to erase them as soon as their receipt was verified. This would also save disk space, and it would be in line with the 'trust in silence' ethic. I would do this and then publicize the fact that I did so widely. This would discourage public prosecutors, who really don't like to do futile things. And I would incorporate the gateway and make sure it wasn't worth a great deal. This would discourage civil suits; clients get very irritated when they win the lawsuit and find that after all their legal expenses the target has filed for bankruptcy. -- Jim Dixon

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Cnet's stance on content filters
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 12:48:48 -0400 From: Lauren Gelman <gelman(a)acm.org> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: Cnet's stance on content filters >Date: Wed, 23 Jul 1997 17:40:12 -0400 >To: chris_barr(a)cnet.com >From: Lauren Gelman <gelman(a)acm.org> >Subject: Cnet's stance on content filters >Cc: >Bcc: >X-Attachments: > >with regard to: http://www.cnet.com/Content/Voices/Barr/072197/index.html > >First, I think there are a number of problems inherent in any content >filtering system, some of which you discuss in your column. > >Given that, I think the main problem with the Internet Content Coalition >approach is how, and who, will determine what is a "real news >organization" is and what "bona fide news sites" are. Is this the job of >the ICC? You completely ignore this issue both in the column and on the >ICC web site. What are the criteria that categorize Cnet as a "news >organization? Would EPIC and the ACLU (cited in your column) also fall >under that category? What about listservs where news is disseminated? > >The U.S. Public Policy Office for the Association for Computing (USACM) >web site http://www.acm.org/usacm disseminates news about computer policy >related issues as well as USACM position pieces on those issues. It also >archives back- issues of the "ACM Washington Update", a bi-weekly >electronic newsletter. Is the USACM web site a "bona fide news sites"? > >I believe these are important questions which need to be addressed before >Cnet endorses any content-filtering approach to censorship. "Privilege" >needs to be defined before Cnet or any other group can seek "to make sure >that only real news organizations claim this privilege." > > >-Lauren Gelman >Associate Director >USACM > > /\ /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/ Association for Computing, + http://www.acm.org/usacm/ Office of U.S. Public Policy * +1 202 544 4859 (tel) 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 302 B * +1 202 547 5482 (fax) Washington, DC 20003 USA + gelman(a)acm.org

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Boulder, Colorado RMIUG Crypto-Fest 9/13 6:30pm
by Michael Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- What: Rocky Mountain Internet User's Group (RMIUG) Crypto-Fest When: Tuesday 13 September 1994 7:00pm-9:00pm, cookies at 6:30pm Where: NCAR (West end of Table Mesa Drive), Boulder, COLORADO Who: Philip Dubois (Philip Zimmermann's lawyer and a very nice guy) and Mike Johnson (alledged crypto expert, designer of the Diamond Encryption Algorithm, PGP beta tester, and PGP user). Sorry, Philip Zimmermann had a change of plans and will be at a conference in Atlanta. The show must go on! RMIUG "Crypto-Fest" A users approach to encryption with PGP (Pretty Good Privacy): I. A Very Short History of Cryptography A. Single Key Systems B. Two Key Systems (Public Key Cryptography) C. Hash Functions (MD4, MD4, SHA) D. What can be done with encryption? II. Current crypto applications III. PGP Building Blocks A. Public Key Algorithm (RSA) B. Hash function (MD5) C. Symmetric Key Algorithm (IDEA) D. Compression engine (Info-ZIP) E. ASCII armor engine F. Key database G. File formats IV. What can PGP do? What are its advantages? A. Privacy B. Authentication with nonrepudiation C. Compression (ZIP) D. ASCII armor C. Distributed Key Management (the Web of Trust) D. Inter-platform compatibility E. Wide availability F. Source code available (except for Viacrypt Digi-Sig) G. Ease of use (best around, but could be better) V. Who uses PGP? What do they use it for? VI. How do you use PGP? Read the fine manual. 2 books coming. A. Getting PGP B. Installing PGP C. Generate your key D. Distribute your public key E. Add keys from your correspondents E. Signing messages F. Encrypting messages (public key method) G. Conventional encryption pgp -c VII. History/development of PGP & Legal Issues A. Why did Philip Zimmermann write pgp? B. Legal Issues C. Version History VIII. What's happening now? A. Legal Actions & Status B. Political Action C. Future Development Plans There will be opportunities to ask questions of the two panelists during and after the presentation. ___________________________________________________________ | | |\ /| | | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-772-1062 | | \/ |o| | PO Box 1151, Longmont CO 80502-1151 USA Jesus is alive! | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org aka mpj(a)netcom.com m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org | | |||/ /_\ | ftp://ftp.csn.net/mpj/README.MPJ CIS: 71331,2332 | | |||\ ( | ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ -. --- ----- ....| | ||| \ \_/ | PGPprint=F2 5E A1 C1 A6 CF EF 71 12 1F 91 92 6A ED AE A9 | |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAgUBLnUoSPX0zg8FAL9FAQE6nAQAmWpomcfCcWslktsuRYPNotY8kJFOwiuL BUrh5L/UbCnM8L9Gh36CF2PGjrwuxDLhlySc70yhAGpBuMijWryTk0mPcJVKDoDm 6Z9v+L0Xs4Ql2kTshYpiJg5DlUd7CKsuREN0r07xJUMybudUXM8NLUG9YGvDz4CX tIGH4nlDAS4= =Qedh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Spatial Databases, Law, and Information Policy conference
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded-by: Lee Tien <tien(a)well.sf.ca.us> Forwarded-by: thardy(a)mail.wm.edu (Trotter Hardy) From: Harlan Onsrud <onsrud(a)mecan1.maine.edu> Date: Thu, 8 Sep 1994 11:10:08 -0400 Subject: Conf on Law, Information Policy and Spatial Databases THE CONFERENCE on LAW and INFORMATION POLICY for SPATIAL DATABASES October 28-29, 1994 Arizona State University College of Law Tempe, Arizona SPONSORS National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis Center for the Study of Law, Science and Technology, Arizona State University College of Law CONFERENCE OVERVIEW Geographic information systems (GIS) and their associated databases are gaining widespread use throughout government and the commercial sector in our communities, the nation, and the world. These automated mapping and analysis systems are allowing the collection, integration and interrogation of vast amounts of data. The data and processing capabilities supplied by the technology will constitute a significant component of the emerging national information infrastructure. This enabling technology holds out the promise of increased efficiency in commerce, improvements in the environment, health, and safety, increased convenience for consumers, increases in participatory government, and improved public and private decision-making generally. However, increased use of detailed databases and processing capabilities also poses threats to the ideals of democracies and rights of individuals - the ideals of freedom, security, privacy, and open and free access to government. As we continue to move toward global economies and international networked environments, the need to reconcile competing social, economic, and political interests in digital geographic data will greatly expand. This conference brings together legal and information policy experts with geographic information system specialists to explore four interrelated aspects of information law critical to the handling of geographic information: namely, (1) intellectual property rights in spatial databases, with particular emphasis on copyright; (2) access rights of citizens to publicly held information, including the policies of government agencies in charging for geographic data; (3) protecting personal privacy in using geographic information systems; and (4) liability in connection with the use, sharing, and distribution of GIS data and analysis results. PRELIMINARY PROGRAM Friday, October 28 Welcome and Introduction (7:45 am - ASU Law School, Pedrick Great Hall) Access to Government's Spatial Information I (8:00 a.m.) Moderator: Robert Reis, NCGIA and School of Law, SUNY-Buffalo Establishing a Legal Setting and Organizational Model for Affordable Access to Government Owned Information Management Technology Hugh Archer, Executive Consultant Plangraphics, Inc., Frankfurt, Kentucky A Case for Commercialization of Government Information Products and Services Lori Peterson Dando, Esquire County Attorney's Office (former), Hastings, MN Spatial Databases and Information Policy: A British Perspective David Rhind, Director Ordnance Survey, United Kingdom Question and Answer Session Intellectual Property Rights in Spatial Databases I (9:00a.m.) Moderator: Helen Sharretts-Sullivan, Office of the General Counsel, Defense Mapping Agency Copyright, Licensing, and Cost Recovery: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis William Holland, Executive Director Wisconsin Land Information Board, Madison, WI Surveyors' Copyright in Plans of Survey: Law and Policy John D. McLaughlin, Geographical Engineering and Norman Siebrasse, College of Law, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton Canada Copyright in Electronic Maps Dennis S. Karjala College of Law, Arizona State University Question and Answer Session Break (Coffee, tea, etc.- College of Law Lobby) (10:00 am) Intellectual Property Rights in Spatial Databases II (10:30 am) Moderator: Elaine Albright, Chair, American Library Association Committee on Telecommunications Rights in Government-generated Data Jessica Litman School of Law, Wayne State University Lessons from the Past: Legal and Medical Databases Anne Wells Branscomb Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University European Community Directive on Databases Pamela Samuelson School of Law, University of Pittsburgh Question and Answer Session Access to Government's Spatial Information II (11:30 a.m.) Moderator: Dorthy Chambers, J.D., Chief, Branch of Information Access Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Land Management A Review of Alaska's Public Information Access Laws Representative Kay Brown Alaska Legislature, Anchorage, Alaska Issues Concerning Access to Electronic Records Barbara Petersen, Staff Attorney Florida Legislature Joint Committee on Information Technology Resources Federal Information Dissemination and Pricing Policy Peter Weiss, Senior Policy Analyst Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. Question and Answer Session Lunch (12:30 pm - Several eating places within walking distance) Access to Government's Spatial Information III (2:00 pm) Moderator: Earl Epstein, J.D., School of Natural Resources, Ohio State University Effects of Data Policies on the Evolution of the National Spatial Data Infrastructure Nancy Tosta, Staff Director U.S. Federal Geographic Data Committee The Public Interest and the Cost of Government Information: Experience Under the Federal FOIA David Sobel, Legal Counsel Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington D.C. Promoting a Free Access, Minimal Cost-recovery, Royalty Arrangement for State Held Geographic Information Systems Keene Matsunaga, Esquire, and Jack Dangermond, President, Environmental Systems Research Institute and Prudence Adler, Assistant Director, Association of Research Libraries Question and Answer Session Access to Government's Spatial Information IV (3:00 p.m.) Moderator: Frederick K. Ganyon, J.D., Deputy Chief, Nautical Charting Division, NOAA The Value of Geographic Information. A review of international policies in cost recovery, privatization and commercialization of information gathering and dissemination. Krysia Rybaczuk and Michael Blakemore Mountjoy Research Centre, University of Durham, United Kingdom Remote Sensing Law: Obstacle or Opportunity for GIS? Joanne Gabrynowicz, Associate Professor - Remote Sensing Law and Policy Department of Space Studies, University of North Dakota Implications of Increased Access to Geographic Information Dr. Ronald Abler, Executive Director Association of American Geographers Question and Answer Session Break (4:00 p.m. - coffee, tea, soft drink - College of Law lobby) Liability for Spatial Data I (4:30 p.m.) Moderator: Daniel Strouse, Director, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology, ASU College of Law Tort and Criminal Liability as a Function of the Right to Control Content Henry Perritt, Professor of Law Villanova University School of Law Local Government Liability for Erroneous Data: Law and Policy in a Changing Environment R. Jerome Anderson, Esquire, and Alan R. Stewart, Esquire Plangraphics, Inc., Frankfurt, Kentucky A Case Study in the Misuse of GIS: Siting a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility in New York State Mark Monmonier, Department of Geography Syracuse University Question and Answer Session Saturday, October 29 Liability for Spatial Data II (8:00 a.m.) Moderator: t.b.a. Liability for GIS Datasets as applied to the Commercial, Non- profit and Other Private Sectors Bishop Dansby, Esquire GIS Law and Policy Institute Exploitation of Intellectual Property: Liability, Retrenchment and a Proposal for Change Edward J. Obloy, General Counsel, and B. Helen Sharretts- Sullivan, Defense Mapping Agency Certification of GIS Databases: Reliance and Liability Implications Lawrence Ayers, Executive Vice President and Cliff Kottman, Exec. Manager of Federal Systems, Intergraph Corporation Spatial Data Analysis in the Formation of Public Policy and its Acceptance as Evidence: A Litigator's Perspective on Geographic Information and Analysis Terry Simmons, PhD, Attorney at Law Reno, Nevada Question and Answer Session Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems I (9:15 a.m.) Moderator: Lawrence Winer, College of Law, ASU In Plain View: Geographic Information Systems and the Problem of Privacy Michael R. Curry Department of Geography, UCLA Privacy and the Intersection of Geographic Information and Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems Sheri Alpert and Kingsley Haynes The Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University Privacy: Alternative Protection Scenarios Dr. David Flaherty Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia Question and Answer Session Break (10:15 - Coffee, tea, juice & rolls - College of Law Lobby) Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems II (10:45 am) Moderator: t.b.a. Fair Information Practices of the Information Industry Steven Metalitz Information Industry Association, Washington DC Marketing Community Perspectives on Protecting Privacy Tom Gordon, President and General Manager Equifax National Decision Systems, San Diego CA European Perspectives on Protection of Privacy Charles D. Raab, Department of Politics University of Edinburgh, Scotland Question and Answer Session Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems III (11:45 a.m.) Moderator: t.b.a. Some Information Age Techno-fallacies and Some Principles for Protecting Privacy Gary Marx, Chair Department of Sociology, University of Colorado-Boulder Protecting Indigenous Peoples' Privacy from "Eyes in the Sky" Wayne Madsen Computer Sciences Corporation, Fairfax, VA Protecting Privacy in Using Geographic Information Systems Harlan J. Onsrud, Jeff Johnson, and Xavier Lopez NCGIA, University of Maine, Orono, Maine Question and Answer Session Closing Announcements (12:45 p.m.) ****************************************************** REGISTRATION FORM Maximum registration will be 250 participants NO ON-SITE REGISTRATION [ ] Full Registration (before October 3) $145 (after October 3) $195 [ ] Student Registration $70 Name: __________________________________ Title: ___________________________________ Affiliation: ______________________________ Address: ________________________________ ________________________________________ ________________________________________ ________________________________________ Phone: __________________________________ FAX: ___________________________________ Email: __________________________________ Make check payable (in US dollars) to: University of Maine and send to: Conference on Law and Information Policy for Spatial Databases NCGIA 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm. 348 University of Maine, Orono, Me 04469-5711 ****************************************************** LOCATION & TRANSPORTATION The conference will take place on October 28 and the morning of October 29, 1994 in the Pedrick Great Hall at the Arizona State University College of Law. The conference has been scheduled to follow immediately GIS/LIS '94 in Phoenix, Arizona. Those attending GIS/LIS and then staying on for this conference should be able to take advantage of reduced airfares because of the Saturday night stay over. The College of Law in Tempe is located approximately ten miles from downtown Phoenix or five miles from the airport. Taxis and hotel shuttles are convenient and moderately priced. For those traveling by car, take the University Avenue exit on Interstate 10 and head east to the ASU campus. The campus is immediately adjacent to Old Town Tempe which contains numerous restaurants and shops within easy walking distance. COOPERATING ORGANIZATIONS American Bar Association Section of Science and Technology American Congress on Surveying and Mapping American Society of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing AM/FM International Association of American Geographers Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Federal Geographic Data Committee Information Industry Association National States Geographic Information Council Urban and Regional Information Systems Association CONFERENCE SUPPORTERS Federal Agencies: Bureau of Land Management Coast and Geodetic Survey Defense Mapping Agency Federal Geographic Data Committee Environmental Systems Research Institute Equifax National Decision Systems Intergraph Corporation FOR FURTHER INFORMATION Conference on Law and Information Policy for Spatial Databases 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm 348 University of Maine, Orono, Maine 04469-5711 Phone: (207) 581-2149 Fax: (207) 581-2206 E-mail: ncgia(a)mecan1.maine.edu ___________________________________________ Harlan J. Onsrud National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis 5711 Boardman Hall, Rm. 348 University of Maine Orono, Maine 04469-5711 Phone (207) 581-2175 FAX (207)581-2206 E-mail: onsrud(a)mecan1.maine.edu

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Re: "Packet Sniffers"
by Oluf Bagger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You should tell the staff at your campuss that a Linux box is no greater threat than any of those PC's used for word processing. A packet sniffer can hide itself as a resident program on a doze box and collect data into a data file. Such a program can be installed by any user on the doze box or even spread as a virus. On a Linux box only root programs have access to the ethernet driver. Any packet sniffer programs can therefore only be installed by root. On a Linux box you only allow access to known users and you have log files stating when users have logged in and out. If the machine have been abused in some way you can trace the problem using the log files. Best Regards, Oluf -------------------------------------------------------------------- Oluf Bagger, Eurochip DTU. tlf: +45 4593 3332 lok. 5722 fax: +45 4593 0216

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RC4
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It occurs to me that if the code has not been posted to sci.crypt, then some cypherpunks reader outside the US/Canada should do so. Bruce

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RC4 Source Code
by Tom Rollins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Strange, I didn't see the RC4 code at my site. Would someone that saved it please E-mail me a copy. Thanks, Tom Rollins <trollins(a)debbie.telos.com>

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