December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Cellular Telephone Experimenter's Kit (2600 article)
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>This CTEK sounds like a fun toy and I guess I'm glad that it can't be >>used for cellular phone fraud. That would be an illegitimate use. But, >>monitoring cell phone traffic is a crime now, right? Is there a legitimate >>use for the device? Can anyone think of one? > >Several companies make cellular test sets (or optional modules for >more general purpose RF test sets) that perform functions very much >like those of the CTEK package. Since we manufacture cell phones, we >have a perfectly legitimate reason to have a few of those test sets >around here. And I know of no special licensing requirements to buy >them (other than having $20,000 or so in cash). Sure, I know that Qualcomm could easily justify having the toys around the place. But what would I say to the cops/FCC when they came knocking? I was just waiting to get the capital together to set up a phone manufacturing program? Is there any legitimate use for someone not in the business? The best I can come up with is: a wife who wants to track her husbands progress home so she knows when to throw the steaks on the grill. ("He always arrives 12 minutes after the he moves into our cell.") > >Phil

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Re: PGP is the product of the week!
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> 4. Mentioned earlier... "Attack the NSA budget". This can be a win and a >> loose since a smaller budget could lower our countries defenses. It is >> possible that an attack on the budget would get them to lay off without any >> real action needing to be taken. > This isn't truly an issue. The NSA had it's hey-day during the Cold >War. Now that that's over, and the same level of effort can be attuned to >fewer enemies, one would think that they don't NEED a bigger budget. "Fewer" enemies? Yugoslavia is now split into at least 5 pieces. Before we only needed to monitor the line from Moscow to Tito. All the orders came down this line and Yugoslavia did what they were told, more or less. No one in the US had to seriously wonder about the differences between Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia etc... We didn't need to monitor the different governments in the different regions. The ex-SU is now split into too many pieces for me to count. Some of them have nuclear weapons that they don't want to turn over. Others have military ships. Before, it was enought to have a good presence in Moscow. Now you need to be in Kiev, Lvov, Talinn, etc... North Korea, the Mid East and Cuba are the only places that still need the same amount of attention that they needed during the Cold War. This is because they're already maxed out. > > --Jeff >-- >====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ > == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| > == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | >==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | >PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

pcw(a)access.digex.net (Peter Wayner) writes: > "Fewer" enemies? I am of the opinion that most of the Post SU countries will amount to no serious threat. Remember, most of our problem was with Moscow. Most of the SU didn't especially care about us -- they were more concerned with eating dinner that night. As a result, yes, there are a few emerging hot spots, but they aren't _our_ enemies. The Bosnia deal is a local political problem. It is _not_ a threat to US security, much as Clinton would like us to think it is... ;-) > Croatia etc... We didn't need to monitor the different governments in the > different regions. True, but, most of that died. Yugoslavia, for example, is hardly a threat to us. Our problems in the past were mostly with Moscow. Most of the rest of the SU was not an issue. So yes, we have more governments to watch, but fewer enemies. > The ex-SU is now split into too many pieces for me to count. Some of them > have nuclear weapons that they don't want to turn over. Others have military > ships. Yes, they have Nukes. If I did, in their shoes, you're damn right I wouldn't want to give them up! Yes, they bear watching. Hell, even Israel, our military ally, bears watching. That doesn't mean they require the same level of surveillance. > North Korea, the Mid East and Cuba are the only places that still need the > same amount of attention that they needed during the Cold War. This is > because they're already maxed out. NK is a hot spot at the moment. Even if the C/W was still in effect and the SU still in force, NK would probably still be a problem now. The Middle Eastern area still requires a mind-boggling amount of watching. That situation is just too volatile not to watch it. However, I find it hard to buy into the fact that we're going to give 100% to Middle East, and the same 100% to Russia, who not only still can't feed it's people, but has SERIOUS financial problems. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+ -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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remail@c2.org supports X-Anon-To and Request-Remailing-To
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I forgot when I moved the code over from remailer@soda over here to accept X-Anon-To: and Request-Remailing-To: I prefer Anon-Send-To: because it differentiates between Send and Post, such as with Anon-Post-To: Well here's a list of the commands remail(a)c2.org supports: Subject "remailer-info" pipe A instructions.pl X-Ping "--PING--" pipe A pinger.pl # anon block response header Response-Key "" pipe A reply.pl # remailing headers - non-anon Send-To "" pipe A send.pl # remailing headers - anon Anon-To "" pipe A anon-send.pl Request-Remailing-To "" pipe A anon-send.pl X-Anon-To "" pipe A anon-send.pl Anon-Send-To "" pipe A anon-send.pl # posting headers - not anon Post-To "" pipe A post.pl # posting headers - anon Anon-Post-To "" pipe A anon-post.pl Resp-To "" pipe A resp-send.pl Resp-Send-To "" pipe A resp-send.pl Resp-Post-To "" pipe A resp-post.pl Encrypted PGP pipe A pgpmail.pl # * "" pipe ? recurse.pl -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-841-0909 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Differences in key generation
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've recently been asked if there are any differences in key generation techniques between US and non-US encryption programs. For that matter, are there any *basic* differences between foreign and domestic encryption algorithms? (IDEA, LUC, etc..?) I know the question is worded poorly; I'm wondering if there *is* a difference (I haven't ever assumed there was). This is very important and I need a response by midafternoon. :l matt (formerly phantom(a)u.washington.edu)

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Re: WARNING!
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mgream(a)acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) writes: >"ER CRAMER" wrote: >> But what are we talking about here. A 1024 bits >> key should be save for at least the next 10000 years so who cares if a 5000 >> bits key could be save for maybe a 1000000 years!!! After the RSA-129 factoring there was considerable discussion on sci.crypt about how much harder a 1024 bit key would be using current algorithms. There was some disagreement, but it did not seem that a 1024 bit key would be good for 10000 years; as I recall, the time scale was more like a few decades before it would fall to an attack as expensive as RSA-129. Larger keys with 2K bits, OTOH, were good for thousands or millions of years (of course it's hard to extrapolate computer power out that far). Does anyone have more precise numbers? >And if a near polynomial time method is developed for factoring or >breaking RSA (or any other PKCS you care to mention), super large keys >aren't going to matter a hoot. People have been talking as though the only possible improvements to factoring algorithms would be to jump to polynomial or near-polynomial time. Obviously it is equally possible that improvements will occur as they have in the past, reductions to the exponents or constant factors but still an exponential algorithm. In such a scenario it is very plausible that 1K bit keys would be unsafe while keys of a few K would be fine. Hal

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RSA Key Size & QP
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A wild card here is the recent work in quantum computing, done at AT&T and reported in a recent post by Pal Vitanyi. With a specialized quantum computer (not clear yet whether one could economically built it, but it's theoretically possible) one can factor in polynomial time (computational class "QP", or something like that). If cycles on such a computer would be, say, 1,000 times more expensive than on your PC, then cracking the key would be 1,000*O(keysize^c) more expensive than generating it, not 1,000*O(c^keysize). Having a keysize of, say, 8 kbits instead of 1 kbit in this circumstance is not at all overkill; it makes a practical economic difference. Of course if your info is _very_ valuable and the polynomial is of small degree, even a large key size won't help much. If such a device was built, we'd want to switch to a cryptosystem whose inverse is not in QP; but some of our current communications would be compromised. If a QP machine is with even small probability feasible within the next few decades (or whatever your timeline of concern is), it makes sense to use larger key sizes.

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Digital Sigs?
by Cypher1＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read in yesterday's L.A. Times about something called CommerceNet, where sellers and buyers of workstation level equipment can meet and conduct busniess. Near the end of the article, they talked about a proposed method for exchanging "digital signatures" via Moasic (so that buyers and sellers could _know_ that they were who they said they were) and that they were going to "submit it to the Internet Standards body" Is this something new, or am I way gone on this one? Cyph1(a)aol.com

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Windows source for PGP
by peace＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folks: I am looking for the source for a Windows front end for PGP. I know that WINFRONT is available (on special application) in source, but it's written in Visual Basic. I guess that I could get VB and learn it, but I was hoping that someone knew of a C version. It doesn't need to be particularly polished, since I will be making some changes to suit my own format. I know its a lot to ask, but I can hope, can't I. (The path name would help too.) Peace

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difficulty of factoring / commerce net / etc
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My mosaic page has pointers for these topics an many others: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html For these two topics, there is a section on factoring and a pointer to http://www.commerce.net. I have added a lot since it first came out. It can really be used like a FAQ at this point. If you are looking for cypherpunks things, this is a good place to start. Please let me know if you know of any cypherpunk pages I am not yet pointing to. -- Vince

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