December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Prime magnitude and keys...a ?
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim choate <ravage(a)bga.com> wrote: | No, again it will allow you to find the secret key, it will not | provide any information about the factors of that number. It might | be used for that but as you have pointed out, it takes a long time. Okay, obviously neither you or Perry know what you're talking about, or you are too busy flaming each other to express your thoughts coherently. Finding the secret key WILL allow you to factor the modulus (assuming you know the public key). Therefore, solving for the secret exponent is equivilent to factoring. This has been discussed before. I thought you have been on the list long enuff to remember it, but it is obviously necessary to restate the explanation for those who haven't seen it before. Assume we have: Two (unknown) prime numbers p and q, a known modulus n, where n is the product of p and q, and known public key exponent e. Now, suppose someone discovers the corresponding secret key d. Now assuming the case where de=(p-1)(q-1)+1, we have two equations with two unknowns: pq = n de = (p-1)(q-1) + 1 Solving for p and q is simply a matter of solving simeltaneous equations. First, we rewrite the second equation: de = pq - p - q + 2 Now we substitute the known values for de and pq and do some simple algebra: p = n - de + 2 - q Substitute p in the original equation: q(n-de+2-q) = n q(n-de+2) - qq = n -qq + q(n-de+2) - n = 0 qq - q(n-de+2) + n = 0 Now solve for q using the quadratic formula. q=((n-de+2)+((n-de+2)^2-4)^(.5))/2 P can then be found (of course) by dividing n by the now-known value for q. Now, there is the possibility that (p-1)(q-1)+1 will not equal d*e. However, d*e will always be equal to k(p-1)(q-1)+1 where k is an interger. Given PGP's fondness for using 17 for d, and since e < (p-1)(q-1) then de < 17(p-1)(q-1), therefore k<17. It would therefore be fairly easy to find k, since it could only be one of sixteen possible values. Furthermore, (and more importantly), it is not necessary to know the prime factorization to generate key pairs. It is only necessary to know a valid number of the form k(p-1)(q-1). You can find an inverse key for any public key just by finding its multiplicative inverse modulo k(p-1)(q-1) (k, p, & q do not need to be known.) Therefore, if you find one keypair, you can find them all.

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"Thomas A Douglas", do you mind?
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Whoever it is on illuminati.io.com forging mail to cslaw with a return address of cypherpunks, kindly fuck off, and remember you're not the only person from io.com who reads this group. This sort of trivial forgery is easy to track down if anyone could be bothered. G > The original message was received at Fri, 17 Jun 1994 13:45:53 -0500 > from illuminati.io.com [198.4.60.10] > ----- The following addresses had delivery problems ----- > <cslaw(a)pericles.com> (transient failure) > Return-Path: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Received: from (illuminati.io.com [198.4.60.10]) by wuarchive.wustl.edu (8.6.8.1/8.6.4) with SMTP id NAA20107 for <cslaw(a)pericles.com>; Fri, 17 Jun 1994 13:45:53 -0500 > Date: Fri, 17 Jun 1994 13:45:53 -0500 > From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com ^ Not funny. > Message-Id: <199406171845.NAA20107(a)wuarchive.wustl.edu> > Subject: Green card information, please. > Apparently-To: <cslaw(a)pericles.com> > I am interested in your services. Please send me more information. Thank you. > ----- > Thomas A. Douglas > "Just another bump on the Information Superhighway." Perhaps he forgot to remove his sig file, on the other hand there is no-one obviously called Douglas on illuminati.

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Re: Another Cellular Victim
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was on a trip out of town a while back... as soon as I crossed into another cellular network boundary, I got a call from the provider's sales droid, telling me how to use their service. They _are_ tracking individual phone movement, IMHO. pgf

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Position Escrow System
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded without comment, for now: AP, Washington. In an interview on Cable News Network's "Weekend Events," Attorney General Janet Reno said the recent O.J. Simpson case demonstrate the need for the Administration's "position escrow system," PES. With position escrow, she said, each citizen would emit unique identifying code in the radio spectrum, whose signals could be triangulated and then stored in a data base of positions versus time. "This will allow us to track criminals, suspects, fugitives, terrorists, child support deadbeats, and father rapers," she said. Under the Administration proposal, positions would be escrowed by "reputable" escrow agents, such as the Department of Internal Security and the local authorities. Release of the escrow information would require a court order, or at least a pretty good reason. National security concerns could of course override the escrow. "Would you want terrorists able to move freely through your city?," Reno asked. She acknowledged that the United States is engaged in high-level consultations with other nations, including North Korea, Cuba, France, and Iran, to coordinate with their own citizen tracking programs. Asked if this plan is not too Orwellian for Americans, Reno replied: "The average citizen-unit has nothing to fear from PES if he has nothing to hide. If, however, he is stopping off at bars on his way home from work, and his National HealthPlan contract forbids alcohol consumption, then we'll nail him." The Position Escrow System does not require legislative approval, as it has been made part of existing Executive Branch actions. Initial testing of PES is now underway in Waco, Texas. ***end AP story*** -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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totally secure email?
by khijol!erc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Howdy! I'm trying to totally secure email as soon as it comes into a site, before it hits me mailbox. I don't have root access, though. :( What I've tried is to do a "|pgp -feat ecarp|rmail erc%khijol(a)apple.com", but pgp just produces empty files! If I execute it by hand, it works. Anyone know either (1) why it isn't working wnd how to fix it, or (2) suggect a better alternative? For political reasons, my email must be encrypted as soon as it hits the site before it gets dropped in my mailbox, or the sysadmin will read it (snoopy bugger) and find out I'm looking for a job elsewhere. Thanks for all your help!! - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG/VE3 ecarp(a)netcom.com, Ed.Carp(a)linux.org "What's the sense of trying hard to find your dreams without someone to share it with, tell me, what does it mean?" -- Whitney Houston, "Run To You" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLgMnySS9AwzY9LDxAQF81AP9FIZnm0r0BoIl85dQgbedwpoSIEjlhoUJ jTM/bXiNW07udBzmsS6Egb2HeuNOy4Hai+sw52rk4IhuBYVhi+z6OooQVLnsu5Qo arxcfaqGEfW7peg45FcyAO2MEuJURIsjk26bKsUR+RRHm7y2BqnKKq7NnqZjDWAe YNk8YOUQK/Y= =IyWZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: totally secure email?
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> For political reasons, my email must be encrypted as soon as it hits > the site before it gets dropped in my mailbox, or the sysadmi n will > read it (snoopy bugger) and find out I'm looking for a job elsewhere. Get teh unix program "procmail", source available on any comp.sources.misc archive, or, probably, at ftp.informatik.rwth-aachen.de /pub/unix/procmail.tar.Z. This program lets you do things like sort your mail into different mailboxes as soon as it comes in. It's also really easy to use it as a hook for other programs or shell scripts to operate on mail as soon as it comes in. It shouldn't be very hard to do what you want, but there are a couple of things to be aware of here: 1) Your sysadmin can assuredly get around this too if he wants, and get at your mail even before procmail does. As a general rule of thumb, the sysadmin can do anything. But getting aroudn this would definitely be more dificult then simply reading your /spool/mail file. 2) You obviously don't want to leave your private key in your unix account, as the sysadmin could just use it to decrypt all your mail and read it. Obvious of course, but sometimes it's easy to overlook the obvious. Of course the best solution would be to have your correspondents send you PGP encrypted mail, but I guess the best solution isn't always available.

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Re: Another Cellular Victim
by Tommy the Tourist 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >They report that he was tracked via his cellphone use. What this country > >needs is a good anonymous cellphone net. > Really. And what's more: when the Colombian drug lord was located > via his cellular use, the story was that the NSA had to bring special > equipment into the country to do the tracking. That doesn't wash here. > It looks like at least some switches in Amerika are already equipped > to read out locations for individual phones. They probably don't even > have to wait for you to make a call - they can call you, or even use > the phone's automatic pings. No NSA equipment needed. A simple scanner and some software can be used to track which cell you are in. They didn't have to triangulate OJ's position or anything, they only needed to know which cell he was in, and the direction he was traveling. The rest is simple. (you can find such software on hack/phreak BBSes already. The only personal information needed is the telephone # of the cell phone) ------------ To respond to the sender of this message, send mail to remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu, starting your message with the following 7 lines: :: Response-Key: ideaclipper ====Encrypted-Sender-Begin==== MI@```$YS^P;+]AB?X9TW6\8WR:.P&2'N\0Q?\$?[X!7/,SN6`JBJ$D//!Z"Z FS)`S)G0<=-J!/44-Q$^WK"37[MUZNKYYE)[BS7ZNSJSP<LH*RSD` ====Encrypted-Sender-End====

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Re: DSS
by nobody＠rebma.rebma.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dan Harmon wrote: >What do they know that we do not? Makes you wonder about all of PKP's >claims. Has PKP ever sued anyone over their patents or have they just >threatened? Very curious. They have just threatened.

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Re: O(f(x))
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The way *I* learned it was like this: g(x) = o(f(x)) means that > g(x)/f(x) -> 0 (as x goes to some specified limit) g(x) = O(f(x)) > means that |g(x)/f(x)| is bounded (as x goes to some limit) > > In other words: a function that is o(f(x)) is of lower order than > f(x), while a function that is O(f(x)) is of no higher order than > f(x). Well, close anyway. Okay, here's straight out of my Discrete math textbook: "A useful way to check whether f [is a member of] O(g), is to look at the limit: Lim(as n->infinity) (f(n)/g(n)) In other words, we look at the _asymptotic_ behavior of f and g. If this limit exists (in practice it usually does) and is a finite number (possibly 0), we can conclude taht f [is a member of] O(g). If this limit is infinity, then f [is not a member of] O9g). For example, 7n**3 + 100n -3 [is a member of] O(n**3), because the limit of the ratio of these functions, as n->infinity, is the finite number 7. In fact, if the limit is a _nonzero_ number, as in this case, then O(f)=O(g). Okay, end of the quote. What all this stuff is used for is just comparing the running time of different algorithms. If you've got an algorithm whose running time varies with size of input n, according to the function 7n**3 + 100n -3, then this is _basically_ the same as if it varied according to n**3. Now, according to the definition of "big -oh notation ", which is what this is called, we could also say that function was an element of O(n**4), or O(n**20), or even O(3**n). So what big-oh notation really means is that function f is basically the same as, or better then, function g. But in practice we pick the "quickest" simple function g. So we call the functions (5n**4 + 4) (32n**4 +43n) and (n**4 +n**3 +n**2) elements of O(n**4). Which means that algorithms whose running times were described by those functions are all about the same speed, and are all about the same speed as n**4 too. Furthermore, any function which is O(n**k) for any k, is called _polynomial_. A polynomial algorithm is slow. Better is one which is an element of O(n log(n)), or even O(n), which is called _linear_. There ends the lesson. :)

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Andy Grove on Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In between the helocopter coverage of OJ, which looked like outtakes from "Speed" in slo-mo, I happened to catch a repeat showing of the "Larry King Live" discussion with Al Gore, Andy Grove, the head of the FCC, and a journalist. The transcript was posted here, so I won't try to check on the details. Just my impressions, having worked with Grove. I say impressions because its important we understand how views come to be held, how strongly they are held, whether they can be changed, etc. In the case of Grove's comment that Clipper is just an extension into the digital real of existing wiretap "rights," I think I can see why he has this view--I don't agree with it, of course, but his view is probably the dominant view. Something we need to understand. To wit, * If asked whether digital transmission should "exempt" someone from wiretaps, most people would say "No, of course not." (There are subtle issues here, of course. More on this later.) * If asked a different question, about whether users should be compelled to use a government encryption and key escrow system, the answer for most Americans is different: "No, of course not." (Actually, same answer, different question.) If I were trying to convince Grove of the "Cypherpunks position," I would of course make these arguments about mandatory escrow, about the parallels to "diary escrow" (after all, cops can search papers with search warrants, so doesn't this mean that the digital age needs "diary and papers escrow"?) and other such travesties. I think it might take an hour of discussion, but eventually a light bulb would go off in his head and he'd see that the price paid with these "escrow" systems--especially if _mandatory_, as most of think is the real agenda--is simply too high for a nominally free society to put up with. (I had these hour-long debates with Grove, Moore, and Barrett when I was at Intel, and sometimes I won. Often I lost. I won't be having any opportunities to argue the Clipper issue with them, of course.) I'm citing this because it helps to explain the dichotomous reaction to Clipper. If the question about Clipper is phrased as an issue of privacy, do Americans have the right to keep conversations private, etc., then the answer is overwhelmingly (80%, as in Time-CNN poll) pro-privacy. If, however, the question is phrased in terms of "legitimate law enforcement needs" and whether suspected terrorists and pedophiles have a sacred right to use "fortress-like crypto," then I suspect the answer will shift in the other direction rather dramatically. With egg all over their face on Clipper, I see the Administration now launching a new campaign, a campaign being led by Donn Parker, Dorothy Denning, Andy Grove, and others. In this campaign, the second approach mentioned above will be dominant: a focus on pedophiles who "encrypt their list of victims," a focus on "terrorists who form virtual networks around the world," and a focus on "money launderers who use crypto anarchy to spread their poison." Their is little chance that we Cypherpunks will get the opportunity to make our case in the public...the hour it might take me to convince Grove, as an example, is about 59 minutes more than the "sound bite" any of us will be given. Is it hopeless? For public relations, probably yes. Fortunately, the power of strong crypto lies in its use. The leverage effect. As Phil Karn put it: "Don't get mad, get even. Write code." --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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