December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Blum-Blum-Shub source?
by Urban Nilsson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May said something along the lines of: > > Of course, only Americans are allowed to use these random number > generators, and even they face fines of $500,000 and imprisonment for > up to 5 years for inappopriate use of random numbers. What inappropriate use is that? Inhaling? And what could possibly happen to me as a non-American? If some guys in black suits comes looking for me, I would be very surprised. Perhaps not for long, but never the less surprised... Urban Nilsson | Use 'finger' for PGP2.3a public key. d7urban(a)dtek.chalmers.se |------------------------------------- Chalmers University of Technology |A person is just as big as the things Gothenburg, Sweden |that makes him angry.

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DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As you know, there has been much debate about the Clipper Chip initiative, but relatively little hard information. John Gilmore, member of the board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed FOIA requests to numerous government agencies last April after the Clipper plan was announced. In June 1993, he filed a FOIA lawsuit against the Justice Department ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Gilmore v. FBI, et al, C-93-2117, U.S. District Judge Charles Legge, Northern District of California. As a result of this lawsuit, the Justice Department has agreed to a staggered release of some documents about Clipper and Digital Telephony. The Justice Department and Gilmore signed a joint stipulation and agreement on Friday, April 29, 1994, in which the Justice Department and several other federal agencies agreed to release documents over the next several months: a) DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP") will transmit all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents that it has identified as requiring referrals or consultations to the appropriate agencies or DOJ components by May 31, 1994. OIP will complete processing of all documents that it has identified as not requiring referrals or consultations to other agencies or DOJ components by June 20, 1994. b) DOJ's Justice Management Division ("JMD") will complete processing of all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents, excluding documents which have been referred for processing to other agencies, by July 30, 1994. c) The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which OMB had received as of April 20, 1994 by May 20, 1994. d) The National Security Agency ("NSA") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which it had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 18, 1994. NSA will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by July 18, 1994. e) The National Security Council ("NSC") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which NBC had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 29, 1994. f) The Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and Technology (collectively "Commerce") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which Commerce had received as of April 20, 1994 by August 7, 1994. Commerce will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by August 7, 1994. The documents being processed by the NSC include the Presidential Review Directive and Presidential Decision Directive which started the Clipper initiative. We have been informed that NSC is processing the two final versions as well as 68 draft versions. We have also been informed that documents produced in the course of the OMB legislative clearance process for the Digital Telephony Bill are being processed. This should provide insight into how the government decided to proceed with this bill. We have also been informed that there are approximately 25 documents produced in the course of the government's solicitation of industry views on Clipper. Obviously, we do not know how much useful information will be released. It is probable that the documents will be heavily redacted. Given the recent directives from the President and the Attorney General that all possible discretionary disclosures of information should be made, we hope, optimistically, that these disclosures will prove illuminating. Unfortunately, the FBI is not a party to this agreement. We are in the process of attempting to obtain the release of about 3000 pages of FBI records. FBI has told the Court that it will be approximately 2 years and 8 months before it will even begin processing Gilmore's request, and that actual processing will take about a year, if not more. We believe that this delay is unlawful and cannot be countenanced. The FBI offered to complete its processing a year from when we sign an agreement; we believe they should process these documents in a maximum of six months (which would be a year and a half from our original FOIA request). Note that this processing time only includes their initial response to us; they will undoubtedly withhold many documents and parts of documents which we will contest the withholding of. This will take additional time, probably years. Because we and the FBI have been unable to agree, we have presented this controversy to the Court, and Judge Legge will decide what deadlines to impose on the FBI. The agreement mentioned above does not include NSA except to the extent that NSA is reviewing documents submitted to it by the Department of Justice. We also filed a FOIA request with NSA for all of its documents on Clipper, and have received no response after a year. We have an existing lawsuit against NSA's pattern and practice of delay in responding to FOIA requests. Depending on how that suit develops, we will take some kind of legal action to force them to respond. Lee Tien (Attorney for John Gilmore) and John Gilmore tien(a)well.sf.ca.us gnu(a)toad.com PLEASE REDISTRIBUTE IF YOU LIKE.

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"Find The Dirt On The Internet!"
by goy＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Date: Wed, 4 May 1994 08:00:28 -0700 From: Lee Tien <tien(a)well.sf.ca.us> Subject: DOJ Clipper documents scheduled for summer release under FOIA As you know, there has been much debate about the Clipper Chip initiative, but relatively little hard information. John Gilmore, member of the board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed FOIA requests to numerous government agencies last April after the Clipper plan was announced. In June 1993, he filed a FOIA lawsuit against the Justice Department ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Gilmore v. FBI, et al, C-93-2117, U.S. District Judge Charles Legge, Northern District of California. As a result of this lawsuit, the Justice Department has agreed to a staggered release of some documents about Clipper and Digital Telephony. The Justice Department and Gilmore signed a joint stipulation and agreement on Friday, April 29, 1994, in which the Justice Department and several other federal agencies agreed to release documents over the next several months: a) DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP") will transmit all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents that it has identified as requiring referrals or consultations to the appropriate agencies or DOJ components by May 31, 1994. OIP will complete processing of all documents that it has identified as not requiring referrals or consultations to other agencies or DOJ components by June 20, 1994. b) DOJ's Justice Management Division ("JMD") will complete processing of all documents recovered in its search for responsive documents, excluding documents which have been referred for processing to other agencies, by July 30, 1994. 0) The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which OMB had received as of April 20, 1994 by May 20, 1994. d) The National Security Agency ("NSA") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which it had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 18, 1994. NSA will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by July 18, 1994. e) The National Security Council ("NSC") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which NBC had received as of April 20, 1994 by July 29, 1994. f) The Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and Technology (collectively "Commerce") will respond to all DOJ consultation requests which Commerce had received as of April 20, 1994 by August 7, 1994. Commerce will complete processing of all documents which had been referred to it by DOJ as of April 20, 1994 for direct response to plaintiff by August 7, 1994. The documents being processed by the NSC include the Presidential Review Directive and Presidential Decision Directive which started the Clipper initiative. We have been informed that NSC is processing the two final versions as well as 68 draft versions. We have also been informed that documents produced in the course of the OMB legislative clearance process for the Digital Telephony Bill are being processed. This should provide insight into how the government decided to proceed with this bill. We have also been informed that there are approximately 25 documents produced in the course of the government's solicitation of industry views on Clipper. Obviously, we do not know how much useful information will be released. It is probable that the documents will be heavily redacted. Given the recent directives from the President and the Attorney General that all possible discretionary disclosures of information should be made, we hope, optimistically, that these disclosures will prove illuminating. Unfortunately, the FBI is not a party to this agreement. We are in the process of attempting to obtain the release of about 3000 pages of FBI records. FBI has told the Court that it will be approximately 2 years and 8 months before it will even begin processing Gilmore's request, and that actual processing will take about a year, if not more. We believe that this delay is unlawful and cannot be countenanced. Lee Tien Attorney for John Gilmore tien(a)well.sf.ca.us PLEASE REDISTRIBUTE IF YOU THINK IT'S WORTH IT. (feel free to edit any obvious typos, too) -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994 -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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message to pr0duct cypher
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Keyserver service outage
by Brian A. LaMacchia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The public keyserver running on martigny.ai.mit.edu will be unavailable starting Thursday, May 5, 1994 at approximately 9am EDT. During the coming week, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will begin formally distributing PGP 2.5, a new version of PGP that is based on the RSAREF 2.0 cryptographic toolkit, under license from RSA Data Security, Inc., dated March 16, 1994. When that distribution becomes available, the keyserver will return running PGP 2.5. At that time, the keyserver will no longer accept keys that are identified as having been created by versions of PGP lower than 2.4. (PGP 2.4 is Viacrypt PGP.) --Brian LaMacchia public-key-server-request(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu

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EFF Summary of May 3 1994 Clipper and Digital Telephony Hearings
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

EFF SUMMARIES ============= May 4, 1994 __________________________ Contents: * Senate Subcommittee on Technology and the Law holds Clipper Hearing * House Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation holds hearing on Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals; EFF's Executive Director Jerry Berman and Board Member David Farber testify __________________________ SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE HOLDS CLIPPER HEARING ----------------------------------------- The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law held a hearing on Tuesday (5/3) to examine the Administration's "Clipper Chip" Key Escrow Encryption proposal. Witnesses included Asst. Atty. Gen. Jo Ann Harris (Criminal Justice Division), NIST Deputy Director Raymond Kammer, Whitfield Diffie (of Sun Microsystems), Stephen Walker (President, Trusted Information Systems), and NSA director Vice Adm. J. M. McConnell. The discussion touched on a number of key issues, including the necessity of the Clipper proposal for law enforcement; the privacy interests of network users; the costs associated with implementing the Clipper scheme; export controls; and whether those intending to use communications networks to break the law would actually use Clipper as opposed to other encryption schemes. Although a variety of views were offered, few new developments emerged in this controversial debate. Assistant Attorney General Harris and NIST's Ray Kammer both stated that the Clipper Scheme and Key Escrow system would not provide law enforcement with any new surveillance abilities. Rather, Harris argued, Clipper is analogous to a translator. Harris stated, "All Clipper does is, after a court has authorized interceptions of communications, is that we get the ability to understand the content of legitimately intercepted communications". The Administration continues to maintain that the market would accept the Clipper standard based on the assumption that it is the strongest encryption scheme, regardless of who holds the keys. When pressed by Sen. Leahy on this issue, as well as on the question of whether criminals or terrorist organizations would be willing to use the Clipper standards, neither witness offered any assurances, and admitted that this is still an open question. Senator Leahy expressed skepticism: "I have serious questions about whether any sophisticated criminal or terrorist organization is going to use the one code endorsed by the U.S. Government and for which U.S. Government agents hold the decoding keys. There are a multitude of alternative encryption methods commercially available. If Clipper Chip does become the standard encryption method used by Americans, criminals may be forced to use Clipper to communicate with legitimate outsiders. But this is a big 'IF' ". In what may prove to be a significant development, NIST's Kammer conceded that additional fiscal authorization may be needed to fund the implementation of the Clipper proposal. If this is the case, Congress would be required to consider legislation to authorize funding, and at this point passage of such legislation is at best uncertain. EFF will continue to closely monitor this development, and will pass along information as it develops. Sun Microsystems Diffie urged a slow and careful approach to the Clipper issue, cautioning that a rush to implement Clipper may create a bureaucracy that would be difficult to dislodge at a later time. Diffie stressed the need for international for information security, and cautioned against attempts to use the power of technology to increase the power of government. Diffie added, "Integrity of political speech is the root of legitimate laws in a democratic society. We are in a position where if we do not make it a national priority to make privacy available", this integrity may be compromised. Steve Walker, of Trusted Information Systems, stressed the need for the removal of export control restrictions. He also countered the Administration's contention that very few foreign encryption alternatives exist; noting that his company had found over 340. Walker displayed several of these applications, and noted that because of export controls U.S. manufactures of encryption technology face a significant disadvantage on the world market. Although the Senate Hearing did not produce many new developments, it is significant to note that no members of the Subcommittee expressed outright support for the Clipper Chip proposal. Chairman Leahy, the most vocal panel member at Tuesday's hearing, was also the most skeptical, and as such the fate Clipper proposal is still very much in doubt. *** ------------------------------ HOUSE PANEL CONSIDERS CLIPPER AND DIGITAL TELEPHONY PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------------------- Tuesday proved to be a busy day for Clipper on the Hill, as the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Technology, Environment and Aviation also considered the Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals. Witnesses on the panel included James Kallstrom of the FBI, NSA's Clinton Brooks, NIST Deputy Director Ray Kammer, Dr. Dorothy Denning, Dr. David Faber, EFF Executive Director Jerry Berman (on behalf of DPSWG), and Chmn. Willis Ware of the Congress/NIST System Security and Privacy Advisory Board. The discussion centered mainly on the Clipper issue. Unlike the Senate panel, there seemed to be some support for the Clipper proposal on the House Subcommittee. Rep. Dan Glickman (D-KS), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, declared his "cautious support", for the proposal, and stressed law enforcement's need for strong surveillance abilities. Subcommittee Chairman Valentine (D-NC), as well as Reps. Morella (R-MD) and Rohrabacher (R-CA) all expressed reservations. James Kallstrom urged full support of both the Clipper and Digital Telephony proposals on behalf of all law enforcement, citing the need to counter the increasing sophistication of digital communications technologies. Kallstrom painted a picture of a network populated by criminals, terrorists, and drug dealers which would pose a great danger to public safety, unless law enforcement is given the ability to intercept illegal communications. EFF's Jerry Berman countered this assertion by arguing that Clipper would only solve law enforcement's problems if criminals use it. The only way to do this, Berman added, would be to mandate the Clipper standard, something which the Administration does not claim to want to do. The only solution is for Congress to deny appropriation for Clipper and send the Administration back to the drawing board, Berman argued. Dr. Farber, appearing as an expert witness, stated that solutions to the Clipper issue will not come easily and will not come in one big step. Rather, a carefully considered and open approach is required. While stressing the need for encryption standards on communications networks, Dr. Farber cautioned against "smoke-filled-room standards" of encryption which are, in his view, likely to bead mistrust. Dr. Farber also argued for the removal of export controls on encryption technology. NSA's Clinton Brooks expressed support for Congressional Consideration of the Clipper issue. He argued that Clipper is a sound technological solution to a legitimate law enforcement and National Security dilemma, and that a public debate on its merits would eventually remove the misinformation and mistrust of government, and would prove Clipper to be in the public interest. Dr. Farber offered a strong caution to this, expressing the concern that a future administration may find it necessary to mandate the Clipper standard. Dr. Farber suggested that at the very least Congress weld into law a guarantee that Clipper remain voluntary, that the Judiciary be an escrow holder. He cautioned, in the words of Benjamin Franklin, "They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety" ************** Written testimony & documents from the hearings are available as: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename] gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename] gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper, [filename] http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Clipper/[filename] where [filename] is: berman_eff_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Jerry Berman (EFF) brooks_nsa_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Clint Brooks (NSA) denning_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Dorothy Denning farber_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of David Farber kallstrom_fbi_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of James Kallstrom (FBI) kammer_nist_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Ray Kammer (NIST) ware_csspab_clip-dt.testimony - House testimony of Willis Ware (CSSPAB) clip-dt_hearings.docs - charter, witness list, diagrams. * Senate testimony and spoken testimony from both hearings will be made available from in the same directory when obtained. This material will also be available from the EFF BBS within a day or so, at +1 202 638 6120. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Anonymous Mail via Port 25
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Awhile ago, someone mentioned that at some colleges & universities, the dialup lines don't require you to log in immediately. Rather, they let you specify which system to telnet to, and then you log in there. Telnets are usually limited to machines in the University's domain, but they often don't restrict what ports you can telnet to. So you can telnet to port 25 and send an anonymous mail which would be very difficult to trace. Does anyone know of any such systems? Anywhere in the U.S. or Canada? I'm thinking of using such mail ports for a new anonymous remailer I'm working on, and I want to make tracing the mail as difficult as possible. Please post modem numbers...

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theories about lack of crypto
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sorry if this appears twice; I sent a copy through one of the new anonymous remailers last night and it looks like it didn't make it. Or I messed up somehow ;) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May brings up some interesting and valid points about crypto protocols. I think there are several reasons surrounding the slow pace of crypto protocol (particularly software) development; rather than list them let me explain the difficulties in setting up a "data haven" (as far as I can see): I - Difficulties 1. The usual stuff like finding the time to code and maintain software, including getting access to a workstation (or whatever, some net connected computer given that my home computer is a PC running MSDOS). 2. Say all this code gets written. To really be able to run a data haven, I'd need to own the machine it runs on, to have the power to call all the shots. Yes, maybe my internet provider charges $x per megabyte, but I seriously doubt I'd be allowed to use up 100 Megs of disk space, even if I payed (and charged a bit more for storeage to cover my expenses). Now I can get a SLIP account for about $50 a month where I live, and so if I had a spare computer to devote, I'd be set, sort of. I'd definitely need the machine to be available on a network, otherwise it would be too inconvenient and nobody would use it. Of course, I'd also need an easy to use digital cash system to accept payments. Same thing with top-notch anonymous remailers; to be able to turn off logging, and be in control of a hundred details, I need to own the machine. Same thing with digital banks. Who would use a bank that runs off of an account from an internet provider? Besides, I'd need to own the machine to setup the appropriate security measures, etc. 3. Legal issues. This is the biggest problem. By running a data haven (and this applies to many other cryptographic protocols, particularly ones that guarentee anonymity, etc.) I pretty much open myself up to a legal can of worms. All it takes is one person to store pirated software, one person to send death threats through my "strong" anonymous remailer, one person to forward Clarinet posts to usenet, and I'm potentially in for a battle. Craig Neidorf (phrack) went to court and racked up a legal bill of $100,000, all for the government to drop its case. Consider if somebody posted anonymous soliciting pirated software. Let's say in a year, I set up an anonymous remailer and digital bank, and it really is anonymous. Somebody posts, soliciting the source code for Chicago (just an example), offering $10 million dollars. Some anonymous person sends it off, and receives payment. Neither party is traceable, and both are very happy. Except me. How screwed do you think I'd be facing the legal department of Microsoft? Yeah, the solution is to relocate off-shore; this is not feasible for me. This is only the tip of it since a large number of the more interesting and useful protocols are patented. Sure, maybe the concept of software patents suck, but the fact it, it's legal until a court overturns it. And I don't have the money to mount a legal battle. There is a balance to be struck between offering totally anonymous remailing (for example) and keeping enough logs to keep out of potential legal trouble. The problem is that the balance falls closer to the logging side, which would scare off potential users/customers. II - Incentives Really, what are the incentives for running these services? None as far as I can tell, other than the satisfaction of doing it. Johan Helsingus (Julf of anon.penet.fi) spends hours a day maintaining his site, responding to complaints, etc. He provides a valuable service, which obviously is very popular... all the same, I'll bet when he asked for a donation of $5 per account to help defray costs, he got almost no response. III - Usage Why aren't people using DC-Nets, data havens, etc.? Because I don't think there is a reason to. I'm not saying that it's a waste of time to develop this software; it's just for now it'll be confined to experimental usage, research purposes, or just as a challenge to surmount. I mean, I know what a DC-Net is, but I can't think of a single reason I'd actually use one, other than for the heck of it. IV - Platforms Well, for me, it would be MS-DOS. I love UNIX too, but my home computer is 10 times more convenient to develop for. >it all...remailers appear and then vanish when the students go away or lose >their accounts, features added make past learning useless, and so on. Life All I can say is for the near future, I don't see any of this stuff being done by anybody other than "hobbyists". "The Internet Casino" This sounds great, in fact, I've thought of writing a crypto version of roulette or blackjack... something that would use a bit-committment protocol to committ to a shuffle or sequence of random number, and play you. Afterwards, you could check logs to verify you weren't cheated. Maybe I'll actually find some time this summer to write it, > Later protocols have not fared as well. Why this is so is of great > importance. I'm interested in hearing your theories about this, Tim. I too wish things were different, but I just can't do much about it. I still think we are in a "ease of use" phase. Most people on this list don't even pgp sign their messages, largely because it isn't convenient. It isn't surprising later protocols aren't faring well. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLchxHIOA7OpLWtYzAQGP1QP9HbB+1eHhF5otXP9ShcC7mu5vSDVTeIf2 SNr4u28WOgRRHFP4MQcsvYp7VM0ELNhIdMXpCiThgl2kVj0oomLNboCpW0HNW9jn 4dux0K0hGJqsoxeZhqvNEybIQiVPHg0VFdkwI6q79V+oHynlOOaNZyJXad6ZFwsv xxUlGjLdmK8= =AAzE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Keyserver service outage
by schirado＠lab.cc.wmich.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>During the coming week, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology will >begin formally distributing PGP 2.5, a new version of PGP that is >based on the RSAREF 2.0 cryptographic toolkit, under license from RSA >Data Security, Inc., dated March 16, 1994. When that distribution >becomes available, the keyserver will return running PGP 2.5. At that >time, the keyserver will no longer accept keys that are identified as >having been created by versions of PGP lower than 2.4. (PGP 2.4 is >Viacrypt PGP.) Questions: 1) What involvement, if any, does Phil Zimmermann have in the creation of this "new version of PGP"? 2) Will "PGP 2.5" continue to be freeware; i.e., has RSA changed its stance on licensing? 3) If the answer to 2 is "yes", has the strength of the encryption been compromised in any fashion? 4) Isn't this some sort of transparent "back door" grab by some unknown person(s) as a method of encouraging people to switch by fostering the belief that versions of PGP lower than 2.4 are somehow illegal or otherwise illegitimate? (The last is only semi-sarcastic.) Basically, I think I speak for a hefty chunk of list subscribers when I say: I want to know who's behind this.

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