December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ecash Press Release
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE > > >I have a gut feel that this DigiCash(TM) system is going to become a >*really big deal*. Real electronic cash, portable software-only solution, >free client-side software: sounds like a winning combination. I'm >excited. > >Jim_Miller(a)suite.com Yeah. What he said. I'm not sure, but does this mean we now have the once-mythical Internet Mercantile Protocol??? cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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ecash Press Release
by DigiCash Information 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DIGICASH PRESS RELEASE World's first electronic cash payment over computer networks. ============================================================= FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE (Release Date: May 27, 1994) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Payment from any personal computer to any other workstation, over email or Internet, has been demonstrated for the first time, using electronic cash technology. "You can pay for access to a database, buy software or a newsletter by email, play a computer game over the net, receive $5 owed you by a friend, or just order a pizza. The possibilities are truly unlimited" according to David Chaum, Managing Director of DigiCash TM, who announced and demonstrated the product during his keynote address at the first conference on the World Wide Web, in Geneva this week. Electronic cash has the privacy of paper cash, while achieving the high security required for electronic network environments exclusively through innovations in public key cryptography. "It's the first software only solution. In the past we've pioneered such cash for chip cards and electronic wallets, always with a tamper-resistant chip for storing the value--now all you have to do is download the software and you're up and running" continues Dr. Chaum. The product works with Microsoft(R) Windows TM, Macintosh TM, and most UNIX TM platforms. It was shown integrated with Mosaic, the most popular software for people accessing databases, email, or other services on the Internet and World Wide Web. The graphic user interface allows intuitive "dragging and dropping" of icons representing stacks of coins, receipts, record books, etc. The company will be supplying the technology through other firms who will release the products, under various cooperation and trial programs. The user software, which allows both paying and receiving payment, will be distributed free of charge. The product was developed by DigiCash TM Corporation's wholly owned Dutch subsidiary, DigiCash TM BV. It is related to the firm's earlier released product for road pricing, which has been licensed to Amtech TM Corporation, of Dallas, Texas, worldwide leader in automatic road toll collection. This system allows privacy protected payments for road use at full highway speed from a smart card reader affixed to the inside of a vehicle. Also related is the approach of the EU supported CAFE project, of which Dr. Chaum is Chairman, which uses tamper-resistant chips inserted into electronic wallets. The underlying 'blind signature' technology was described in the article "Achieving Electronic Privacy," by David Chaum, Scientific American, August 1992. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For more information contact: DigiCash bv info(a)digicash.nl Kruislaan 419 tel +31 20 665 2611 1098 VA Amsterdam fax +31 20 668 5486 The Netherlands ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Matthew Gream Consent Technologies Sydney, (02) 821-2043 M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au

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2.3 keys changed in 2.6 keys???
by ER CRAMER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few people said that there public key was changed from a 2.3a key to a 2.6 PGP key. This can not be. The one reason that there is 2.6 in the armored file is because the keyserver uses PGP 2.6 ... If you outlaw Privacy, only the Outlaws will have Privacy! Eelco Cramer <crame001(a)hio.tem.nhl.nl> ------ --------------------------------------------------

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Re: dispersed DES
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Good point about the source of the appended bytes. The reason I think it might >be more secure is that the length of the appended segment is less than the >length of the key on each pass, so it would seem to be the equivalent of a >one-time pad for those relying on the appended bytes to get the key. That is my >only basis for not worrying about wekening effects. Any holes? > >dct(a)newt.cs.byu.edu Let me see if I understand your scheme: you prepend 4 unpredictable bytes to the data before running through each single des cycle. What do you do with the 4 bytes from each cycle that are shifted into the end of the datastream? Is the datastram vulnerable to independent search there, too? Assuming the 4 bytes really are unpredictable, and assuming you deal with both "ends" of the stream, there doesn't seem to be an *obvious* attack that allows independent search for each of the 2 or 3 des keys. There was a paper in Eurocrypt this year (that I haven't seen yet) that discusses some not-so-obvious properties of multi-cipher modes that may reveal another attack, however. If you don't think you've weakened 3-des, now the question is whether you've strengthened it (or otherwise improved it). Your method doesn't seem to increase the complexity of a brute force attack on the 112 (or 168) bits of 3-des key material. In fact, you may have actually increased the number of bits of key material (if the decryptor has to know extra secret bytes in order to recover the ends of messages) that the good guy has to manage without increasing the work factor for the bad guy. 3 des is plenty strong, and if you don't trust or otherwise don't want to use 3-des, it's not clear that this offers an improvement. -matt

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WNSTORM NOT on wuarchive...
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If any of you managed to get it off wuarchive, great.. if not, sorry... I've just looked and some sysadmin removed it... I haven't seen it in the msdos directories either so that's a big problem... I do however have the permission of someone to use theri ftp site, however, I cannot publically post the site name at his request. If you want it, email me and I'll tell you the site name, but please don't post it to the list.

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Banks and Tax Havens on the net (long)
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>grep -i bank /alex/ch/switch/nic/registry/CH.domains BIRAG.CH Banken- und Industrie-Rechenzentrum AG, Guemligen DSK.CH Datenbank Schweizerischer Kulturgueter, Bern SBC.CH Schweizerischer Bankverein, Basel UBS.ARCOM.CH Union Bank Switzerland, Zuerich ZKB.CH Zuercher Kantonalbank, Zuerich GREENNET.CH Swiss Volksbank, Bern SBCCH.CH Swiss Bank Corporation, Basel Interesting. There are Swiss banks on the Internet. So we can update /alex/edu/washington/u/stein2/pub/user-supported/phantom/cpunk/swiss.banks with a few Internet domains. See below. If I run "whois" on Panama, Antigua, or Grenada (a few tax havens) I get something interesting. The output of these is at the bottom of this file. As Jim Hart mentions below, there is a book called "Tax Havens" by Hoyt L. Barber that was published in 1993 by McGraw-Hill. Probably any local bookstore can order it for you. I recommend the book. I will keep this file as: /alex/edu/cmu/cs/nectar/furmint/security/banks Which is also: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/banks If people send me other interesting and related info, I will add it to this file. -- Vince vac(a)cs.cmu.edu ****************************************************************************** Update of /alex/edu/washington/u/stein2/pub/user-supported/phantom/cpunk/swiss.banks ****************************************************************************** Zuercher Kantonalbank Net: zkb.ch Tel: 41 1 275 71 11 Addr: Neue Hard 9 8005 Zuerich, Switzerland Union Bank of Switzerland Net: ubs.arcom.ch Adr: Bahnhofstrasse 45 8021 Zurich, Switzerland Tel: 29-4411 Swiss Bank Corporation Net: sbcch.ch Tel: 23-2323 Addr: Aeschenborstadt 1 4002 Basel, Switzerland Swiss Credit Bank Paradeplatez 8 8021 Zurich, Switzerland Telephone: 29-2811 Foreign Commerce BAnk Dept 284 Bellariastrasse 82 8022 Zurich, Switzerland Telephone: (01) 45.66.88 Foreign Commerce BAnk Dept 42 3 Rue de Marche CH-1211 Geneva 3 Rive, Switzerland Telephone: (01) 21.42.33 Bank Indiana Suisse Attn: F.C. Mishari 50 Ave. de La Gare 1001 Lausanne, Switzerland Telephone: 20.47.41 Bank Leu Postfach 8022 Zurich, Switzerland Cambio & Valorenbank Postfach 535 8021 Zurich, Switzerland Ueberseebank, A. G. Limmatquai 2 8024 Zurich, Switzerland ****************************************************************************** /alex/edu/washington/u/stein2/pub/user-supported/phantom/cpunk/tax.havens ****************************************************************************** Date: Wed Nov 24 21:21:06 1993 From: Jim Hart <hart(a)chaos.bsu.edu> <hart/daemon> Subject: Tax Havens on the Net --------------------- Tax Havens on the Net --------------------- compiled by James R. Hart sources: Internet Connectivity List -- Larry Landweber, U.Wisc. ftp.cs.wisc.edu ../connectivity_table Version 9, August 1993 Hoyt L. Barber, _Tax Havens_, McGraw-Hill 1993 Codes used to indicate sites in each country with access to the Global Multiprotocol Open Internet: BITNET b: minimal, one to five domestic BITNET sites B: widespread, more than five domestic BITNET sites IP INTERNET I: = operational, accesible from entire IP Internet i: = operational, not accesible via the NSFNET backbone UUCP u: minimal, one to five domestic UUCP sites U: widespread, more than five domestic UUCP sites FIDONET f: minimal, one to five domestic FIDONET sites F: widespread, more than five domestic FIDONET sites OSI o: minimal, one to five domestic X.400 sites O: widespread, more than five domestic X.400 sites ------------------------ and without further ado: ------------------------ Aruba net access: ---f- languages: Papiamento, English, Dutch, Spanish currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate (numbered accounts not permitted) preferred legal entities: Aruba Exempt Company, NV (Dutch legal tradition, bearer shares allowed) taxes: no income tax on AEC or shareholders, no witholding of any kind tax treaties: none? Austria net access: BIOUFO language: German currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: limited liability company, stock orporation taxes: corporate tax. no bank interest tax. 20% divident ax. tax treaties: many, OECD model, primarily personal and orporate income contact: Price Waterhouse, Austria Barbados net access: --u-- language: English currency controls: some (none for offshore banks & nsurance) preferred legal entities: company, public company, offshore bank, exempt insurance company, foreign sales corporation , international business company taxes: income tax offshore banks and international business companies 2.5%, exempt insurance companies and foreign sales corporations none tax treaties: double-tax treaties with 5 major countries (incl. U.K. & U.S.) Bermuda net access: --uf-- language: English currency controls: none for nonresidents bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entities: local (conduct business in Bermuda, must be 60% Bermuda owned), exempt (only conducts business outside Bermuda) -- min. capitalization US$12,000 -- extensive background check on the principles taxes: no income, profit, sales, value added, witholding, or capital gains taxes tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. U.S. can be provided with tax information concerning civil & criminal tax cases Costa Rica net access: bIuf- language: Spanish currency controls: only on local currency, applies only to citizens or legal entities bank secrecy: good legal entities: individual enterprise/limited liability collective company limited partnership limited-liability company stock corporation (aka chartered company): most common taxes: 15% on dividents for some nonresident shareholders, moderate corporate income, payroll, imort, real estate taxes. Exporters exempt from most taxes. tax treaties: no double-tax treaties. Caribbean Basin Initiative exchange-of-information agreeement signed but not yet ratified (as of 1/93). Hong Kong net access: BI-F- languages: Cantonese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: limited-liability corporation (English common law Companies Ordinance) taxes: 16.5% domestic source corporate income, 15% domestic employment wages, 15% on domestic property rental income tax treaties: no double-tax agreements n.b.: treaty to return Hong Kong to Communist China in 1997 Ireland net access: BIUFO language: English currency controls: none? bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entity: noresident company (private corporation w/limited liability, must conduct operations outside Ireland) taxes: only on Irish operations tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: those with Irish grandparents can obtain second citizenship Leichtenstein net access: ---f- languages: German, Alemanni currency controls: none bank secrecy: excellent preferred legal entities: allows any type found anywhere in the world (!) establishment (limited liability, unlimited duration) company limited by shares foundations and trusts taxes: none for income outside Leichtenstein. Net worth tax of 0.01% on capital and reserves (min. 1,000 Swiss francs), local resident taxes tax treaties: not party directly or indirectly to any exchange-of-information agreements double-tax treaty exists only with Austria n.b.: bankers won't assist law enforcement officials with drug, fraud, theft, or tax investigations. They might assist in money laundering and insider trading investigations, informing the customer first. Luxembourg net access: bIUFO languages: Letzeburgesh, French, German, English bank secrecy: moderate preferred legal entity: holding company taxes: holding companies pays only 10% registration fee on issued shares and 0.20% annual capital tax on issued capital bonds. tax treaties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Malta net access: --u-- languages: Maltese, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: offshore notrading, trading, banking (overseas, subsidiary, local), insurance, trusts taxes: nontrading exempt, trading very low tax treties: many double-tax treaties n.b.: EC member Netherlands net access: BIUFO language: Dutch currency controls: ?? bank secrecy: poor preferred legal entities: private or public NV (can have bearer shares) taxes: complex, high (many loopholes for large offshore companies) tax treaties: many Panama net access: b-uFO languages: Spanish, English curency controls: none bank secrecy: good; numbered accounts permissable preferred legal entity: corporation taxes: none on income generated outside Panama tax treaties: only on shipping income Singapore net access: bIuF- languages: Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate; numbered accounts available preferred legal entities: private limited company taxes: none on dividends, foreign deposit interest, or income derived from outside Singapore. tax treaties: many Switzerland net access: BIUFO languages: French, German, Italian, Romansch currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate to good; numbered accounts available preferred legal entity: AG (stock company under Laws of Obligation) taxes: 3.6-9.8% worldwide income tax for operating companies, 35% witholding tax on interest and dividends tax treaties: many double-tax treaties Vanuata net access: --u-- languages: Melanesian, French, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: moderate? preferred legal entities: holding, trading, agency, mgmt. service, contracting taxes: no income or capital gains taxes tax treaties: none Western Samoa net access: --u-- languages: Samoan, English currency controls: none bank secrecy: good preferred legal entities: international company, offshore bank, insurance company taxes: none for companies under offshore acts tax treaties: none If you like having this information, let me know. Also let me know what other kinds of information you need on tax havens and net access; I'd love to be of service. If you have corrections to or additional information for the Tax Havens on the Net list, I'd be happy to add it with full attribution (or full privacy, as you prefer). To preserve your privacy, feel free to use anonymous remailers and encryption. My PGP key enclosed below. James R. Hart hart(a)chaos.bsu.edu -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.2 mQCNAiz0Br4AAAEEAJohFjXdkx6i2Mq6nJXdJN+VGupeKwuu1SAiRvsBK7TQ1ajY d3wEFohbwaHGn3iq7A1//koipvzE5S/C6pPxIAHFeoYOUzeI/cWmh6vsuaF3/lVm K9lx/L7PyaF8rvd4FOmLqkvs1xk/24S9ZQaBb3cjhLV571NaiPCIc3SPJUKXAAUT tCJKYW1lcyBSLiBIYXJ0IDxoYXJ0QGNoYW9zLmJzdS5lZHU+ =z2UE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ****************************************************************************** whois on a number of interesting countries ****************************************************************************** Panama (Republic of) top-level domain (PA3-DOM) PANAMANIAN ACADEMIC NATIONAL NETWORK (PANNET) UNIVERSIDAD TECNOLOGICA DE PANAMA P.O. BOX 6-2894 PANAMA 6A Domain Name: PA Domain Status: On Hold Pending Server Activation Administrative Contact: Lopez, Victor (VL7) VLOPEZ(a)NS.PA (507) 64-1771 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Lezcano, Julio (JL78) JLEZCANO%UTPVM1.BITNET(a)UGA.CC.UGA.EDU (507) 64-1771 Record last updated on 25-May-94. Domain servers in listed order: NS.PA 168.77.8.2 NS.USMA.PA 168.77.100.2 NS.CR 163.178.8.2 ICM1.ICP.NET 192.94.207.66 ****************************************************************************** Antigua and Barbuda top-level domain (AG-DOM1) University of Puerto Rico Central Administration Building P.O. Box 364984G San Juan P.R. 00936 Domain Name: AG Administrative Contact: Junquera, Belinda (BJ2) b_junquera(a)UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU (809) 250-0000 ext. 5400 (FAX) (809) 763-6760 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Ramos, Felix G. (FGR) f_ramos(a)UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU (809) 250-0000 ext. 5454 (FAX) (809) 763-6760 Record last updated on 28-Apr-94. Domain servers in listed order: UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU 136.145.1.4 Top Level domain for Antigua ****************************************************************************** Grenada (Republic of) top-level domain (GD1-DOM) University of Puerto Rico Central Administration Building P.O. Box 364984G San Juan P.R. 00936 Domain Name: GD Administrative Contact: Junquera, Belinda (BJ2) b_junquera(a)UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU (809) 250-0000 ext. 5400 (FAX) (809) 763-6760 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Ramos, Felix G. (FGR) f_ramos(a)UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU (809) 250-0000 ext. 5454 (FAX) (809) 763-6760 Record last updated on 28-Apr-94. Domain servers in listed order: UPR1.UPR.CLU.EDU 136.145.1.4 Top Level domain for the Republic of Grenada ******************************************************************************

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Malformed Signatures?
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reason Number 7 why I knew i wouldn't cozy to PGP 2.6 - After tinkering around, I decided to see what would happen if I implemented PGP 2.6 using my existing 2.3a keyrings. After performimg a "pgp -kc paul" PGP 2.6 declares my signatories: (Malformed or obsolete signature format) and asks if I would like it to: Remove bad signatures (Y/n)? Does this mean what I think it means? - paul just a tad miffed

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(Fwd) Internet electronic checking
by whitaker＠dpair.csd.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This was forwarded to me by a friend in the UK. I don't know whether this guy knows about digital cash. I will forward Mr. Mullally the DigiCash announcement, and ask him onto the list. It's not anonymous, but uses crypto. It's good to see more attention being paid to commerce mechanisms on the net. -Russell --- Forwarded mail from igeldard(a)capital.demon.co.uk --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Path: capital.demon.co.uk!demon!uknet!EU.net!howland.reston.ans.net! news.cac.psu.edu!news.pop.psu.edu!psuvax1!news.cc.swarthmore.edu! netnews.upenn.edu!msuinfo!news From: mullally(a)studentm.msu.edu (Sean Mullally) Newsgroups: alt.cyberspace Subject: Internet electronic checking Date: 25 May 1994 00:28:11 GMT Organization: msu Lines: 101 Message-ID: <2ru62r$n7q(a)msuinfo.cl.msu.edu> Reply-To: mullally(a)studentm.msu.edu NNTP-Posting-Host: via-annex4-6.cl.msu.edu X-Newsreader: WinVN 0.90.4 * Net Check FAQ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- a concept by Sean Mullally (mullally(a)studentm.msu.edu) Telecommunications student, Michigan State University ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- What is a net check? Simply put, net checking is to standard paper bank checks what email is to the postal service. It is a way for internet users to perform person-to-person electronic monetary transactions. The closest thing to it today is to give a credit card number on which the amount of the transaction is charged. This has two obvious disadvantages. First, the payer must trust the recepiant not to overcharge the account. Second, the recepiant must be set up to accept credit cards. This rules out the average user. Net checks are a more secure, more practical protocal for person-to-person transactions. Is this going to mean I have to pay for my Internet use? No, this will allow you to send money instantly to any fellow internet user for whatever reason you or he want. How does it work? It is fundementaly the same as writing a paper check. You send a net check to your recepiant via internet email. The recepiant then "cashes the check" by forwarding it via email to his financial institution, with instructions on where to put the money. The recipiant's bank then transfers the funds from the payer's account at his bank. What good is it? A net check provides a way for users of the internet to engage in person-to-person monetary transactions with out the hassle of (not to mention the time requirements of) "snail-mailing" paper checks. No really, technically, how does it work? OK, heres the details. Every time you send a net check, you send a copy to your recipiant and a copy to your bank. Both copies are encrypted with public key encription to make sure only the right people recieve them. They also have digital signatures, so both the bank and your recipiant are sure you are indeed the sender. Upon reciept, the recipiant (or his daemon) submits the check to his bank via email to be cashed. If the payer and recideant have the same bank, the money is transfered then, if not, the banks use the existing mechanism used today to transfer the funds for standard checks. A net check is basicly a text email message with 5 parts which is then encrypted with a public key method and given a digital signature. The 5 parts are as follows: 1. SENDERS ID The senders full legal name, email address, and possibly his account number at his bank 2. RECEPIANTS ID The senders full legal name and email address. 3. $ AMOUNT OF CHECK (This should be obvious) 4. SEQUENCE NUMBER OF CHECK Same as standard checks. 101,102,103,104...ect Each net check has a unique sequential number, and each number has one corrosponding check. 5. SECURITY ARGUMENT. This is what makes the system work. The security argument is a very large random number. Upon recieving their copy of your check, the bank uses this number to varify the authenticity of checks trying to be cashed. It would look something like this: ------------------------------------------------------- From: smith(a)puter.org (Tomas Smith) 143-3234-52214-3 Seq: 104 To: jones(a)hayes.com (Fred Jones) Amount: US$75.00 Sec-arg:1243865710710298749127849123874921048721097421 ------------------------------------------------------- Is this system secure? If impleminted properly, this system should be secure. Lets consider various attempts at fraud. Someone you never wrote a check to tries to make up a check from you and cash it. This one is easy, if he uses a sequental number you have already used the check is rejected. If he uses a sequential number you have used on a check that is outstanding, the bank has a copy of the check and will not pay out to anyone put who it is written to, for the amount it is written. He cannot use a sequential number that you have not reached, since the bank must recieve a copy of the check from you for it to be accepted. Also he cannot forge a check copy to your bank in your name, thanks to the digital signature technology that will be used with all copies of the check. Thus the system is as secure as the digital signature algorithim that is used. The intended recipiant cannot recieve more than intended since you have authorized the bank only to pay out X amount to this person. And since the bank will honor one and only one check with a given sequential number, the recipiant cannot submit multiple copies. Like many any secure system, it's weakest point it the human interface. Assuming good public key encryption and digital signature schemes, this system could be make nearly fraud proof. Anything else? Yea, if you have any ideas or suggestions email me and let me know. I'm trying to get some discussion going on what would be a good format for this. --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- --- End of forwarded mail from igeldard(a)capital.demon.co.uk -- Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)csd.sgi.com Silicon Graphics Inc. Technical Assistance Center / Centre D'Assistance Technique / Tekunikaru Ashisutansu Sentaa Mountain View CA (415) 390-2250 ================================================================ #include <std_disclaimer.h>

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Clipper escrowed keys. Where's the backup copy?
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With all the talk about the problems with escrowed keys (and there are plenty of problems) has anybody considered that there must be a backup set of the keys somewhere? I can't believe that the gov't would spend all the time, effort and money and let the only copy of the keys be accidentally (or on purpose if I get a chance) to destroy the key database. Therefore, there must be a backup set somewhere. Who is guarding these? Where are they? Who has access? Has anybody heard anything about this? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP fingerprint = C9 95 0F C4 E9 DD 8E 73 DD 99 4E F5 EB 7A B6 1D | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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creating a v2.6 of PGP for the REST of us!
by Paul K. Strong 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If patches are going to be produced for PGP 2.3a for those of us outside the USA who wish to send PGP encrypted data to USA users of v2.6, will the patches also enable a key from a patched 2.3a to be put onto a USA key-server that only accepts v2.6 keys - will the keys be labelled as v2.6? I take it Pr0duct Cypher's patch doesn't include this? Maybe instead of many people producing different patches (some of which will be good and some bad) a new version (labelled as v2.6euro?) should be released from outside the USA that is derived from 2.3a code; therefore producing a version that is no different in _appearance_ to MIT's v2.6. The point being that an 'ALL-NEW-SUPER-DUPER' version may attract more attention outside the USA than, as some may view it, 'just a pointless patch' would do. Also, some ftp sites and bulletin boards outside the USA don't like carrying software that was illegally exported. A special non-USA version of 2.6 would allow everyone to be happy and compatible. Wouldn't this create a unified world of compatible PGP users? *************************************************************************** * Paul Strong Witty one-liner coming soon! * * * * pauls(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk Finger for PGP v2.3a public key * ***************************************************************************

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