December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DTI Pointers?
by ozymandias G desiderata 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm taking public speaking so that I can finally get out of college and into the big wide world, and have decided to educate my class on the controversy surrounding the Digital Telephony Initiative. I need hardcopy to make my TA happy, and after an (admittedly quick) browsing of the archives, I wasn't able to find much in the way of hard information. Are there any good pointers, especially to the recent Lehman version of the bill and the controversy that now surrounds the EFF? Thanks in advance for your help, ozymandias G desiderata

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RE: Chomsky quote (thread from hell)
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: James A. Donald The intended effect is to make us feel that such "extreme" freedom of speech is a bit excessive and not really necessary or desirable. . . . Thus he is actually making a misleading and spurious argument *against* freedom of speech at the same time as he is piously declaring himself to be in favor of freedom of speech. ............................................................... James, couldn't he simply be taken at his word - his explicit expression, rather than the implied "catty nastiness". If it was not what he really meant, he would eventually be irritated enough by the full acceptance of his apparent support for liberty to come out and say more precisely what he really wants people to think, so they don't go on allowing freedoms which he is really trying to prevent. Blanc

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Re: HTTP authentication efforts
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:05 PM 9/20/94 -0500, Paul Ferguson wrote: >Howdy guys 'n gals. > >As much as I'd love to rant about Detweiler getting an account on Colorado >Supernet, I must put aside my insidious remarks for the time being. > >Does anyone know, on the off-chance, who is currently working on >HTTP authentication processes for web browsing and Mosiac? > >Pointers appreciated. One pointer, coming up! >Date: Sun, 28 Aug 94 04:30:02 EDT >From: www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com >To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com >Subject: weekly www-buyinfo reminder >X-UIDL: 778077798.009 > >Weekly reminder for the www-buyinfo mailing list. > >Please note that the mailing address for subscribe/unsubscribe is > www-buyinfo-request > ******* >To subscribe: > Send mail to www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com > Body of message (NOT Subject:) subscribe www-buyinfo >To unsubscribe: > Send mail to www-buyinfo-request(a)allegra.att.com > Body of message (NOT Subject:) unsubscribe www-buyinfo >To contribute to the mailing list: > Send mail to www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com > >Mail archives will be located in: > ftp.research.att.com:/dist/www-buyinfo-archive/ >Hypermail archives are located at: > http://www.research.att.com/www-buyinfo/archive/ > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Manufacturing quantum computers
by Sherry Mayo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi all, Regarding the quantum cryptography thread: Some people expressed the view that although the idea may be workable, the manufacturing technology was a long way of being able to produce quantum computers. The quantum dot design proposed by Eckert et al for a quantum "factorisation engine" requires 100000 quantum dots (to factorise RSA-129 or similar) which are each about 10nm across to be fairly densly packed onto a chip. I'm not so sure about this being 'a long way off' in terms of materials technology, and I found the following article on WWW which describes some relevant research into this kind of manufacturing at a US army research centre. I found this on the FedWorld (US Govt, http://www.fedworld.gov/ ) pages.... ============================================================ Part of the "unique ARL (Army Research Lab) facilities" page http://info.arl.army.mil/UAFD/uafd.html ============================================================ Ultralithography Center. This facility provides the Army and DoD with a capability that significantly impacts the development of novel ultra-submicron electronic device technology required by next-generation and future military systems. A multi-million-dollar Leica (Philips) EBPG-5HR electron-beam lithography system, which represents the state of the art in ultra-high-resolution device patterning, is housed in a newly constructed clean room. The Leica EBPG-5HR accomplishes lithography by scanning a finely focused beam of high-energy electrons over an electron-sensitive polymer coating applied to the substrate surface. With an electron beam spot size approaching 10 nm, the Leica EBPG-5HR provides an effective solution to the most demanding lithographic applications, including ultra-small (250 angstrom [= 25nm]) electronic and photonic devices. These devices will provide an enabling foundation for next-generation Army electronic and optoelectronic systems. Devices such as sub-100-nm gate length millimeter-wave high-electron- mobility transistors (HEMTs), novel quantum-effect and mesoscopic (phase-preserving) devices, and quantum-well infrared photo-detectors are patterned with this system. The instrument's high acceleration voltage (100kV) provides a unique capability to pattern closely spaced nanometer-scale device features without feature or sample- related distortion. Automated calibration permits the writing of undistorted patterns over the large sample areas required to fabricate many photonic devices and optoelectronic circuits. ======================================================= Well there you go. Perhaps the technology is nearer than we think. Of course this still doesn't answer the noise problem that critics of the proposed technique think will render it all but useless. However I wanted to make the point that we shouldn't be complacent about the materials technology side of things. Tim May makes the point that he is not selling his shares in intel, and that conventional chip technology is not about to be supplanted. The problem with this IMHO is that these are not two completely different technologies we are talking about. The constantly improving techniques being used to cram more and more onto conventional chips are directly applicable to the manufacture of these proposed quantum dot devices. Just my 2 cents Sherry Sheridan C. Mayo | WWW pages include caving, sci fi and RSC, ANU, Australia | crypto pages. NEW: X-files has its own scmayo(a)rschp2.anu.edu.au | page with gifs/sounds/fanfic etc. Finger for PGP key | http://rschp2.anu.edu.au:8080/local.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLo+G9uFu4n6w1qeBAQGVMgP+Kechf44WUe11qnQG5cD3Ybf+NuNc9jjr ajI7ZXYmZgQb1xdhS7ruy+UOo39zBCPxgKOaCahAniKV9vlNOmHB2pqAr8aYoMWt olhDdZdEWSGrLPAvfh4gVa/T8GI9C2NPc7kusIZujlVHnemBbSSz6FW+dJedR/FE oRKvzzW0IHs= =Ub7K -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Humorous / Chilling FOIA Requests
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by ogd(a)selway.umt.edu (ozymandias G desiderata) on Mon, 03 Oct 11:49 AM > On the same note, do any of you have any humorous / >chilling stories about what you found out when you got >your file? The best I heard is that of a fairly noteworthy 60s radical who asked for his FBI file and was completely demoralized to learn that his FOIA request was the first and only item in his brand new file. No one there cared about him until then -- or so he was told. Since then I have heard that this was a technique used by the LEAs to blow people away and discourage them from getting their real files. Quite illegal, to be sure, but well within approved procedures of the time. Probably still done. John

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Re: Mandatory Email verification
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been vaguely following the thread, which seems to be attempting to close a loophole in port 25. Assuming you succeeded, wouldn't a clever demon hacker simply find another way to forge messages? I have seen that any system a human can devise, another human can eventually break. This leads me to believe that eventually we will have to begin acting on our honor, and provide severe consequences for dishonorable behavior. I haven't finished working out what "honor" means in this social context. Ken

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: fftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.22.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"chaos"} = "<remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk oldpgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"wien"} = "<remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at> cpunk pgp hash nsub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric pgp. post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"leri"} = "<remail(a)leri.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"underdog"} = "<lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"efrias"} = "<efrias(a)csugrad.cs.vt.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 3 Oct 94 6:00:02 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org *+-********* 13:09 99.99% wien remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at ***#+**--#** 19:02 99.99% chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu **####**+##* 2:56 99.99% leri remail(a)leri.edu ***#**#***** 6:38 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *##*#+***#** 4:01 99.99% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com *****-*+- ** 1:40:23 99.99% underdog lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu ***+******** 4:41 99.98% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi *****+-+**** 47:05 99.96% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com *-*#**-**-** 11:04 99.96% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl .-......-- 12:10:26 99.94% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu **# #****#-* 13:42 99.76% efrias efrias(a)csugrad.cs.vt.edu *#***** 4:30 99.79% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -+---*--.-*- 10:13:40 99.58% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ++ +-++++*+ 40:30 99.40% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu -......_.. 9:25:30 99.31% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu -++++- ++++* 33:37 99.15% usura usura(a)xs4all.nl +***..-** ** 1:16:06 98.42% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl .---...---- 24:19:31 84.16% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *****+** 6:06 79.87% Suggested path: chaos;wien;c2 For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Note to remailer operators: this script generates hourly ping messages. If you don't want that, let me know and I will take your mailer off the list, or increase the interval between pings. Raph Levien

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Bomb information ban
by SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Caught from the radio this morning: Toronto (Canada) city council is debating a by-law to ban information on bomb construction. This after one of the council members was mailed a faulty (or fake) pipe-bomb. Rough quote: ~This is different than the gun control issue because there is no valid use for bombs.~ I wonder how much of the libraries' engineering books section they'll have to burn because of this.

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Re: Judge Rejects Delay on FBI Wiretap Data
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subject: Judge Rejects Delay on FBI Wiretap Data >Date: 3 Oct 1994 16:49:03 GMT >============================================================= >PRESS RELEASE >For immediate release >October 3, 1994 >Contact: > Marc Rotenberg, EPIC Director > David Sobel, EPIC Legal Counsel > 202 544 9240 (tel) > JUDGE REJECTS DELAY ON FBI WIRETAP DATA; > "STUNNED" BY BUREAU'S REQUEST >WASHINGTON, D.C.- A federal judge today denied the FBI's request >for a five-year delay in processing documents concerning wiretap >legislation now pending in Congress. > Saying he was "stunned" by the Bureau's attempt to postpone >court proceedings for five years, U.S. District Judge Charles R. >Richey ordered the FBI to release the material or to explain its >reasons for withholding it by November 4. > The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public >interest research group based in Washington, DC, filed the Freedom >of Information Act lawsuit on August 9, the day legislation was >introduced in Congress to authorize the expenditure of $500 >million to make the nation's communications systems easier to >wiretap. The group is seeking the public release of two surveys >cited by FBI Director Louis Freeh in support of the pending >legislation. > The FBI had moved to stay proceedings in the case until June >1999, more than five years after the filing of the initial >request. The Bureau asserted it was confronted with "a backlog of >pending FOIA requests awaiting processing." The FBI revealed that >there are "an estimated 20 pages to be reviewed" but said that the >materials would not be reviewed until "sometime in March 1999." > Judge Richey rejected the FBI's claims in sharp language from >the bench. He told the government's attorney to "call Director >Freeh and tell him I said this matter can be taken care of in an >hour and a half." > In court papers filed late last week, EPIC charged that >the requested materials are far too important to be kept secret. >"The requested surveys were part of the FBI's long-standing >campaign to gain passage of unprecedented legislation requiring >the nation's telecommunications carriers to redesign their >telephone networks to more easily facilitate court-ordered >wiretapping," said the EPIC brief. > Earlier documents obtained through the FOIA in similar >litigation with the FBI revealed no technical obstacles to the >exercise of court-authorized wire surveillance. > The FBI is pushing for quick enactment of the wiretap >legislation in the closing days of the 103rd Congress. A >grassroots campaign to oppose the measure is being coordinated by >EPIC and Voters Telecomm Watch. > The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a project of >Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a membership >organization based in Palo Alto, California, and the Fund for >Constitutional Government, a Washington-based foundation dedicated >to the protection of Constitutional freedoms. 202 544 9240 (tel), >202 547 5482 (fax), info(a)epic.org (e-mail). >============================================================= - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Re: List of reliable remailers
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon, 3 Oct 1994, Istvan von Keszi wrote: > Thanks Raph. This is very helpful for those of us who are code > handicapped. This is very helpful as a general guide. > > Unfortunately, I've found that the information that it provides does not > help me with remailer reliability. I've seen a remailer that supposedly > has a latency of 8 or 9 hours, actually delay 24. > > This makes your script fairly ineffectual. > > You can't do diddly with bad data ... > > Istvan. If you think you can do a better job *gratis*, I'll be more than happy to send you a copy of the remailer code that I run on jpunix.com. Also, I'll bet Raph would send you a copy of the ping code so you can demonstrate the superior service you can provide. If you really don't think you can provide a superior service... well... people that live in glass houses... John Perry - perry(a)jpunix.com P.S. If you don't know what gratis means, drop me an email message and I'll try to explain it to you. - -- PGP 2.61 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLpCdW1OTpEThrthvAQF2bgP9FSuPvxUljINzhINA97VVRaxS/gps5Vw/ NSKub5o93yaGCJoBClYUplxh+Foe9Gqm/+hjJc+pMAaG7HYI2rMRgy7Ro9tyt3Dk QOakuJljmDEKVP2XEq051tH7y1TXI7+FLmnG5y4i2ukRXDVCK0kK5JtP4rY2l8Sa ty3hXYRVKoE= =qddV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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