December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Photocopying mnoney
by rees＠cs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. Could anyone tell me an Online source of information that explains stuff about how money is scanned by machines, etc? Please send e-mail. Thaks. ---Dave (rees(a)cs.bu.edu)

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Destroying data
by Philippe_D_Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, data-killers! After reading recent posts about how to keep data (and PC disk drives) out of others' hands (shredders, double-layer encryption schemes for 'revealing' a bogus plaintext while keeping the real data hidden, etc), I had an evil thought.... >:) Thermit grenades are pretty simple; all they do is provide a means of initiating the "thermite reaction." (Look it up in a chemistry text.) Equal parts aluminum powder and iron oxide (rust), finely ground and ignited by (say) a burning magnesium strip, produce the same effect and would quite satisfactorily destroy a disk drive in a matter of seconds. Likewise the PC, desk, floor - quite possibly setting the whole building on fire - "collateral damage," I guess. Don't screw around with this stuff in your basement, people - it is a _very_ fast, _very_ hot reaction that produces a slug of superheated molten metal. For the truly paranoid among you, however, it might be a viable last-ditch ploy to foil the Gestapo. Do be careful. ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement.

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What is the maximum # of bits a key could ever need to be?
by Robert J Woodhead 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This occurred to me this morning in the inner sanctum of inspired cogitation, aka the shower. "What is the maximum # of bit a public-key would ever need to be, given no breakthroughs in factoring?" I came up with an answer, but it depends on some numbers that I don't have handy; perhaps other people on the list can fill in the blanks. First, we need an equation that tell us how difficult it is, in # of operations, to factor a number of N bits. eg: N_ops(N) = # of operations it will take. Then all we need to do is find the N for which N_ops(N) is greater than U_Duration * U_Particles * (1 / P_time) Where U_Duration is the expected duration of the universe, U_Particles is the number of particles in the universe (I am assuming that every particle can be used as a processor; the programming I leave as an exercise to the alert reader), and P_Time is the Planck time (damned if I can remember it) in seconds, which ought to be a good upper bound for clock speed on the Universal CPU. A most likely useless number, but it would be interesting to know what it comes out to. Best, R

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Re: Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
by mlshew＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was asked in private mail how the show went. I'll write up a proper summary later, but for now, rest assured that it was a most excellent report. There were a few technical inaccuracies here and there, (~"Clipper is the most secure encryption device they've come up with yet"), but for the most part, if you were out to give a ten minute explanation of the facts of life in regards to encryption to people who would never read _Wired_, and actually spread useful and non-hostile memes, you'd have a hard time outdoing that segment of the 700 club. They interviewed a number of people, including a spokesman from NIST, EFF, and Dorothy Denning herself. The guy summarizing the situation at the end mentioned how the government claims these regulations are just for child molestors, terrorists, and criminals, but that after any regulatory sytem is in place, there's nothing to keep them from redefining who the criminals are, and so monitor anyone they like. I'll write up a better summary in a few days. (Remember: 10pm and 2am on the Family Channel. I'd recommend watching it if you still can.) -Mark Shewmaker

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Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >... Tim continues ... >> >>Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns >>and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun. >> > >I don't know if there is a Cypherpunk's cause. I doubt there's a movement, >but that's separate from my holding a belief that crypto and nyms and >digital cash and privacy and emergent social structures are crucial to a >preferable form of human survival. > I would have to disagree somewhat with this statement. I think that there are a loose set of opinions and goals shared between most of us. We may have out paranoids (personally, I always got a kick out of LD's rants... some of them even put us back "on track" when we were straying (as have many of Tim's posts)). Most of us share ideas, mostly relating to wanting widespread use and acceptance of strong cryptography. There are many differing opinions here, but this reflects the fact that we are not some kind of genetic experiment gone bad ;-) writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >With the net, we have a wonderous tool and opportunity. But the world isn't >a safe place. Every time I put a finger or toe into the lovely pacific >ocean I'm keenly aware of quickly entering the food chain at a much lower >point. These are times of challenge, to develop new tools and fresh >perspectives. But many elements of human nature remain the same. > Very true. writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >I thank the Cypherpunks for writing code. I don't (anymore): I write words, >make videos and build organizations. We do need the code. We also need to >push at the edges of our understanding of social dynamics. > I agree... Code is good, but one of the most important resources we have are people who can explain just what it is that we are doing here to the "outside" world, and to reaise the level of the public's awarness, if not understanding. writes Jamie Dinkelacker: > >And S.Boxx >clearly illustrated that puerile visciousness, wounded animal frenzy, and >pathetic behavior are also here in this new world. One of the brave ones, >s/he isn't. And Cypherpunks' creations even protect the likes of S.Boxx. >Reminiscent of Voltaire, yes? > Strangely ironic, we hate what we protect. I think it's important to note that there will always be people like S.Boxx out there... lunatic ravings and patheticly malformed logic. There are also a great deal of good things that have come out of the remailers and spoofing (not so much spoofing, but posts to places like alt.whistlblowing, et al. through the remailers and anon.penet.fi) I think that the good outweighs the bad in this instance, at least. > >James Dinkelacker (True name) >-- >................................ >Jamie Dinkelacker Palo Alto CA (almost a true name) >Jamie(a)netcom.com 415.941.4782 > > Truly, -nate -- +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Nate Sammons email: nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | Finger nate(a)monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key | #include <std.disclaimer> | Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected --> Monitoring Forbidden +--------+ Always remember "Brazil"

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PGP vs PEM discussion
by Brad Huntting 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perhaps someone on cypherpunks can help with this... To: pem-dev(a)tis.com Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view? From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey(a)mitre.org> Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500 Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate the PGP point of view for public key management and compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view? Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion? I am seeking such a person for a presentation and panel discussion at an international conference. I need names ASAP! Please feel free to forward this message to appropriate newsgroups. Regards, -Rob- SHIREY(a)MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397 Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202 7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia 22102-3481 USA

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Mail delivery question
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a somewhat dumb question about mail delivery. This has a CP connection because it relates to a remailer enhancement I am working on. When I receive mail from cypherpunks, this is a typical set of headers for an incoming message: From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Wed Oct 20 23:57:11 1993 Received: from nova.unix.portal.com by jobe.shell.portal.com (4.1/1.34) id AA14713; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:57:11 PDT Received: by nova.unix.portal.com (5.65b/4.1 1.505) id AA18779; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:57:09 -0700 Received: by toad.com id AA20355; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:47:55 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA20115; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:21 PDT Return-Path: <jamie(a)netcom.com> Received: from netcom.netcom.com ([192.100.81.100]) by toad.com id AA20111; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:19 PDT Received: from netcom3.netcom.com by netcom.netcom.com (5.65/SMI-4.1/Netcom) id AA27104; Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:51 -0700 Date: Wed, 20 Oct 93 23:43:51 -0700 Message-Id: <9310210643.AA27104(a)netcom.netcom.com> X-Mailer: Eudora To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: jamie(a)netcom.com (Jamie Dinkelacker) Subject: Re: Something Silly, Something Serious Status: RO Now, my question is, when this mail is delivered to the Unix system which I use, how does the local software know to deliver it to hfinney? My name does not seem to appear in the header at all. In particular, the "To:" address is not hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, as I would have expected, but rather cypherpunks(a)toad.com. I suppose there is some other information that is passed along with the message when it is delivered to portal.com, information which tells my user name. It would be nice if this information were available to scripts which would process the incoming mail. Could someone explain how this delivery process works? Thanks - Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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pem-dev requests "Articulation of PGP point of view?"
by henry strickland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If someone wants to answer this, it may help the people on the Privacy Enhanced Mailer Developer <pem-dev@tis-com> list add the capability for the web-of-trust model of key distribution. I think this is a chance to preach to the unconverted-but-convertable. Notice one wants a speaker, one merely a posting. Who's articulate? strick Forwarded message: # From pem-dev-request(a)magellan.TIS.COM Thu Oct 21 08:40:42 1993 # Message-Id: <9310211453.AA22593(a)smiley.mitre.org.sit> # X-Sender: shirey(a)128.29.140.20 # Mime-Version: 1.0 # Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" # Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500 # To: pem-dev(a)tis.com # From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey(a)mitre.org> # Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view? # # Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate # the PGP point of view for public key management and # compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view? # # Is there, perhaps, someone who has written on this # subject or spoken publicly in an organized fashion? # # I am seeking such a person for a presentation and # panel discussion at an international conference. # # I need names ASAP! # # Please feel free to forward this message to # appropriate newsgroups. # # # Regards, -Rob- # SHIREY(a)MITRE.ORG * tel 703.883.7210 * fax 703.883.1397 # Robert W. Shirey, The MITRE Corporation, Mail Stop Z202 # 7525 Colshire Drive, McLean, Virginia 22102-3481 USA # Forwarded message: # From pem-dev-request(a)magellan.TIS.COM Thu Oct 21 09:41:29 1993 # Date: Thu, 21 Oct 93 16:27:16 +0100 # From: Ruediger Grimm <grimm(a)darmstadt.gmd.de> # Message-Id: <9310211527.AA19289(a)ipsi.darmstadt.gmd.de> # To: shirey(a)mitre.org # Subject: Re: Articulation of PGP point of view? # Cc: pem-dev(a)tis.com # # > Date: Thu, 21 Oct 1993 10:54:43 -0500 # > To: pem-dev(a)tis.com # > From: "Robert W. Shirey" <shirey(a)mitre.org> # > Subject: Articulation of PGP point of view? # > # > Is there anyone who has, or is able to, articulate # > the PGP point of view for public key management and # > compentently contrast it to the PEM point of view? # > # # How much I would like to read the output of this! # Does such a statement exist? This list is certainly # a thankful forum of interested readers. # # Ruediger #

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MATH: factoring, # of bits
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >First, we need an equation that tell us how difficult it is, in # of >operations, to factor a number of N bits. eg: N_ops(N) = # of >operations it will take. I think the fastest method that anyone admits to, by Odzyklo (spelling?), has an order of magnitude defined by: e^(sqrt(ln(x) ln(ln(x)))) I've been dusting off my Mathematica skills working on the crypto techniques Matt posts :-) so it looks like this in Mathematica: f[x_] := N[Exp[Sqrt[Log[x] Log[Log[x]]]]] x in bits difficulty 200 2.27 E11 384 5.54 E16 <- PGP casual 512 6.69 E19 <- PGP commercial 664 1.18 E23 1000 1.75 E29 1024 4.42 E29 <- PGP military 1500 8.11 E36 2000 3.11 E43 3000 5.49 E54 4000 2.44 E64 6000 7.06 E80 8000 8.99 E94 I don't know how many seconds until the end of the universe, but I think you'll be covered using an 8000 bit key :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMbFXYOA7OpLWtYzAQEwrwP9G60hCktxcj7MwkOV2H7QPQ1+i+j5ceTK DEcj74ZFZdsp1vouMxtsN+zvqkdy1+DTzNUuXusWKhogDLFEPTuASZD3tcFgkoUT Uk0B805mJi/gfiBa7+CBWHgjF0T7NSZe1lTjqfru1u+XeU/7iAq+erU0ojydL/xi tqBAZZg3gEs= =wkBt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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why an envelope
by pmetzger＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Enough people have asked that I'll explain why envelopes are seperated from headers in mail. Lets say I'm sending mail with the following header To: foo, bar, baz Mail gets stored and forwarded many times during its delivery process on a large internet. If at every stage the only hint the mailer had for delivery was the header address, every mailer along the way would have to generate three copies of the mail in order to guarantee delivery. Kind of nutty, eh? Thats why there is a seperate envelope. When you generate the mail, three seperate copies will be produced with seperate envelopes indicating the mail whould be sent to "foo", "bar", and "baz", and the mailers in between don't look at the headers at all. This is a slight simplification because envelopes can contain multiple addresses -- but thats when you are sending one message to many people via a common path -- the mailer at the last step where the mail can take a common path is expected to break the envelope up before sending it further along. Perry

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