December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Remailer Status
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Is there any overall status on remailer use. Remailers up, specific commands, clear vs encrypted traffic, delays, un-acceptable types of mail. -tom

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Privacy Conference - Sept 9 - The Hague
by David Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello all, If I could break in here for a second, I thought that some of the European members of the list may be interested in this. It would be a good opportunity to meet and discuss issues, exchanges notes etc. dave CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT ---------------------------- TECHNOLOGIES OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES OF PROTECTION -------------------------- Sponsored by Privacy International The University of Eindhoven The Electronic Privacy Information Center Friday,September 9, 1994 Nieuws Poort International Press Centre The Hague, The Netherlands The conference will bring together experts in law, privacy, human rights, telecommunications and technology to discuss new technological developments that affect personal privacy. The sessions will be interactive, starting with introductions to the subjects by leading experts, followed by questions and discussion led by the moderators. 8:45 Introduction Simon Davies, Chairman, Privacy International 9:00 Information Infrastructures Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center (US) Stephanie Perrin, Industry Canada 10:00 Euopean Government Information Sharing Networks Jos Dumatier, professor of law and director of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Law and Information Technology (ICRI) at K.U.Leuven 11:00 Cryptography Policy David Banisar, Electronic Privacy Information Center Jan Smiths, University of Eindhoven 12:00 Lunch 1:00 Smart Cards and Anonymous Digital Transactions David Chaum, Digicash 2:00 Wrap up --------------------------------------------------------------------- Registration Fees [] Standard - 220 guilders ($120 US) [] Non-profit organisations/Educational - 75 guilders ($40 US) Information Name: ____________________________________________________________ Organization: ______________________________________________________ Address:_____________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ Phone/Fax:___________________________________________________________ Electronic Mail: ____________________________________________________ Send registration to: Privacy International Washington Office Attn: Conference Registration 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 Make Check/Money Order in US Dollars out to Privacy International Space is limited, please contact us immediately if you wish to attend! For more information, contact: David Banisar 1+202-544-9240(voice) 1+202-547-5482(fax) banisar(a)epic.org (email) -- David Banisar (tc(a)EPIC.org) Electronic Privacy Information Center 666 Penn. Ave, SE Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 202-544-9240 (v) 202-547-5482 (f)

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Re: e$
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408101902.AA27154(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > On what experience or observation do you base these rather extreme > > remarks? > > Plonk. A reply showing true intelligence. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: future existence of free remailers?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408101956.AA04136(a)portola.com> Joichi Ito writes: > Please excuse me if this has already been discussed... but... What about > the trend of busting the sysops of bbs'? The recent Fidonet bust in Italy > seems to support this trend. It sounds to me like any remailers remailing > illegal stuff may get caught in the dragnet. I think that perfect ignorance is a perfect excuse. If the traffic going through your remailer is encrypted, and you do not have the key, and you have no other way of knowing what it is, you can scarcely be held responsible for the contents, so long as you do not knowingly invite illegal use. This is a frequent topic of conversation among Internet access providers (IAPs) who are concerned about the contents of various ALT. groups which are either pornographic or copyright violations or both. The consensus seems to be that you are responsible if EITHER you are aware of the presence of these materials OR you are ignorant of any specific materials but you know that people have subscribed to your service in order to gain access to these materials. There have been no test cases, as far as I know, but I have read opinions ascribed to lawyers. IAPs would seem to be providing the same sort of service as remailers and in fact if operating remailers were a viable business they would be in an ideal position to provide the service. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: e$
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408101902.AA27154(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > On what experience or observation do you base these rather extreme > > remarks? > > Plonk. Ah. I finally figured it out. You've been drinking too much cheap wine? -- Jim Dixon

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Re: RemailerNet
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408110150.SAA15634(a)ucsd.edu> Lance Cottrell writes: > > jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk writes: > >Compiling a list of remailers, sure. But if you let the user control > >how messages are chained, you are inviting real traffic analysis. The > >user should only be able to specify his destination and the level of > >security desired. > > How do you arrange things so that the remailers choose the path, and > that if the first remailer is actually a TLA the destination is not > compromised. I see no means by which any remailer which is not ultimately > trusted (i.e. owned by me) can be allowed to choose the routing of the > message packets. > > Example: I ask for a five link chain. Link one is NSA controlled. The NSA then > chains the message through 4 more NSA remailers, and on the final > destination. The upshot is a total loss of secrecy. Terms are being used loosely. I was responding to a critique of RemailerNet v0.1 (RN0.1). In this systems messages are packetized and the packets routed independently, with the packets reassembled into messages at the 'destination gateway'. User control of packet-level routing would weaken the system. RN0.2 permits the user to nest messages and to direct messages to gateways as destinations. This means that messages may be bounced around in the system, adding some additional security. So the user can control chaining/routing at the message level, but not at the packet level. -- Jim DIxon

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Re: anonymous settlement
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408102324.AA25933(a)ah.com> Eric Hughes writes: > > Also, for anonymous > > payment for such overseas services, anonymous transfer in at least one > > of the two currencies is necessary. > > The last point is certainly not true. If user X communicates with > service A (a gateway) in one country to purchase something from > service B in another country, X can settle accounts with A anonymously > (say in US$) and then A and B can settle accounts with one another > (say in sterling) openly. > > May I point out that that in your example that X and A are performing > an anonymous transfer in dollars, which is one of the two currencies? You are quite right. I misread what you wrote, thinking that you meant that X must pay B anonymously in one of the two currencies. -- Jim Dixon

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Bruce Schneier appearance
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MEETING NOTICE ============== UniForum Chicago holds its monthly general meeting on Tuesday, August 16, 1994 at the College of DuPage and everyone is welcome. This month's speaker is Bruce Schneier, author of APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, (B. Schneier, Wiley Inc., 1993). Quoting the back cover of Bruce's book: "The explosive growth of public and private computer networks has resulted in a tremendous increase in the colume of sensitive and valuable data that is routinely stored and transmitted digitally. From computer messages speeding through global networks to vast sums of money transferred electronically, the greatest challenge in this new digital world is keeping this formation out of the hands of unauthorized users who prey on vulnerable computer systems. "In APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, data security expert Bruce Schneier details how programmers can use cryptography--the technique of enciphering and deciphering messages--to maintain the privacy of computer data. Covering the latest developments in practical cryptographic techniques, the book shows programmers who design computer applications, networks, and storage systems how security can be built into the computer software and systems we use every day. The meeting will be held at: College of DuPage Building M, Room 150 22nd & Lambert Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Take 355 to Butterfield Rd. Butterfield West to Lambert Rd. Lambert Rd. North to 22nd St. West on 22nd Street to Lot 10 entrance South into Lot 10 Park in Lot 10 and walk to Building M Meeting Room is 150 For further information, call Mike Potter at 708 960-0133 x15.

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Re: RemailerNet
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408110212.TAA17672(a)ucsd.edu> Lance Cottrell writes: > >If anyone cared enough, what they would do is (a) put up enough remailers > >so that they were, say, a steady 80% of those announcing in the alt.x > >group; (b) provide a good, reliable service nearly all of the time; and > >(c) drive the other 20% out of business with a steady disinformation > >campaign (rumors, complaints, etc) and other more aggressive tactics. > >The FBI types running (a) and (b) would be well funded and they would > >be the sort of steady, unimaginative people who run small businesses > >well. The CIA field agents masterminding (c) would be very well > >funded network freaks, some of them ex-hackers. They could operate > >outside the USA and pay little or no attention to US laws. Pity the > >poor 20% in the face of such attacks. > > > >Any traffic sent through this remailer network would have only a tiny > >chance of getting through without being compromised. If you picked > >5 remailers, the chances of all being non-FBI would be about .2^5, > >3 in 10,000. The other 9,997 messages would be copied immediately > >to Langley. > > I fear that you have the math wrong. The odds that the path would be compromised > (that is all five nodes are FBI) is 1-(.8^5) = .67 Actually, the odds are better than this, .8^5, about 0.33. You will be compromised "only" 1/3 of the time. But if you are sending regular messages to another party, then traffic analysis will quickly show that you are communicating, because even if the boys at Langley are really dumb, you won't make send more than two or three messages without having all the cherries lining up. You will be protected if you have encrypted your messages, but using a remailer network offers little additional protection. > If I understand your system one compromised node is a total loss for that > message. No, as I have said elsewhere, I think that an 'empowered user' of RN0.2 can communicate with another empowered user through a completely compromised network with little risk, so long as there are many other such users. This is because the compromised gateways will not be able to tell when and whether either of the users is actually communicating. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Are Remailers Liable for What They Remail?
by Patrick Juola 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry sez: UUNET, among others, considers itself to be a common carrier. My understanding is that, legally speaking, "considering [oneself] to be a common carrier" amounts to exactly nil -- that it requires a special act of some governing body to declare you to be a common carrier. One might just as well consider oneself to be an accredited diplomat and therefore to have diplomatic immunity. Any of the real lawyers on the net care to comment? kitten

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