December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A Special Invitation to TV1 Users:
by TV1 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The best things in life are still free-and some of them get even better! Once upon a time, you registered to use TV1, the only personalizable TV listings site on the Internet. If you've been back to the site during the past week, you would have noticed gargantuan, earth-shattering additions to our humble old listings Web site. TV1 has been incorporated into The GIST, a full service home entertainment guide providing in-depth coverage of what's worth watching on TV and the Internet, as well as original features on everything from today's hottest television shows (with audio clips of stars) to reviews of the latest home entertainment hardware. If you've been to TV1/TheGIST lately, we hope you've been enjoying our service, and hope that you don't mind the fact that our graphic improvements now require at least a Netscape 2.0 or Explorer 3.0 browser. Stick with us, and you'll be seeing even more great enhancements during the next month. If you're one of those deprived Web surfers who hasn't seen the site in a few weeks, c'mon back--and see what you've been missing. Our new URL is www.theGist.com or you can still reach us at www.TV1.com. Thanks. We look forward to helping you with your home entertainment choices tonight, and every night. Your wannabee hosts, - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMkrm7SoZzwIn1bdtAQGILAF8DsqSWOeABIYPgOcXwyk6FLores03wa15 LGDwf//VqW+dwIj4XyNvPqGD/CpdE27L =2Ss2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hallam-Baker demands more repudiations or he'll write!
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:27 PM 9/26/96 -0500, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 26 Sep 96 at 10:49, Brian Davis wrote: > >> If by "operation effectiveness" you mean some people will be killed, >> I agree. I also agree with the fire/water comment (maybe in more >> ways than one!); my comment related to my belief that AP-supporters >> shouldn't complain about especially draconian measures taken against >> them by governments, given their modus operandi. > >I don't think that any of them will complain because they understand >the nature of it. I think that Jim Bell (forgive me Jim...:) view >that there will be only limited retaliation from government is not >guaranteed at all. As I said somewhere previously, the whole thing >will depend on how the authorities view AP as (non-) attackable. > >Here is the post I wrote earlier: > >------- earlier post ------- > >jim bell recently wrote: > >> Local police action against an AP organization would, of course, be >> deterred by the prospect of naming anybody who would go after it, >> and soliciting donations against them. > >I don't agree here. It would all be a matter of timing, unless the >number of AP servers would be sprouting out faster than police forces >would be able to destroy them. You have to realize that if the money >is seized, noboby will be willing to make a hit since the odds of >being paid are not too good. Just play the game "Command and Conquer" >for a while and you'll see. Money is fuel. Don't run off of it! Uh, okay, I didn't mean to suggest that attacks would be entirely eliminated. (The term "deterred" really needed to be quantified there, even for a native English speaker.) But my main point was that (as evidenced by Brian Davis' unwillingness to acknowledge that the people who run the system will engage in illegality to stop AP) there is a certain hesitancy on the part of the "ruling class" to abandon at least the facade of legality that they often promote. > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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New alias server weasel.owl.de
by Johannes Kroeger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm running the Squirrel Remailer <mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> for some weeks now and finally managed to install a "newnym" style alias server (like nym.alias.net) with the hostname weasel.owl.de. Here is the PGP key: Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2047/B77F2491 1996/09/07 <config(a)weasel.owl.de>/<send(a)weasel.owl.de> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3ia mQENAzIxkrUAAAEH/1mg2l5pTFPwdJZp79M3g+aflsoRFd1QIebXktcg2SIcWc+K nBU0kHRPx53A3SHnUjtAj9ZOOL9LbmSaR6uwYw3voPnOF7cXsyMlG0dNjkJMzCZM UAWAaTB5OcUl2oUrbO+Ceasg94LrDjXCqWf6zxRNgb00SOOopKf+NBtm25wwX1wQ LawWkQeLLMhphCLYwbeLqrMexj9eNsKIxmmEHmD5//crkIa8GVlSatdOV3TDxeNv GOflltDnGXdGxkAu9ck7Wa7ixQwrTr5IxF5jaxTquUyz+qqni/y1/F4dr7brk7Fz VWaqBzlA54Q1oHAM9ptyJKgz+vNFPF2asbd/JJEABRG0Kzxjb25maWdAd2Vhc2Vs Lm93bC5kZT4vPHNlbmRAd2Vhc2VsLm93bC5kZT6JARUCBRAyRtqzvA9InihC/mkB ASScB/99663wchJb55cyiGkxzIvxF8HULc+PCUxY7Dd/+RF+N5vJlW9tG1cInF3+ LmMu9iIdEBj7FOnvSh65gGwiIEasVoFLcA4fXzaGC7Nds6OvwzmURbW4GhmDIPTt OPzUYc3vlyF3/iExRVL/aomL4aKMgMnRIagPkj2wT0G4YVuVvb6pAQ9Z/qDjgIok QEN+yy4NOlwCZQJ4V3TJ/35Fq8dKXkA7eyy4eEK97+VzJOK3ApldEqM71LE7jDtk JjbUBmTOfm0NQDbRlEUnfoSyF9yt/MCE7ranSQ2z0hRrw+z6i4XsxAQljPyE1CLD YX3nIIUhXumsBwSMPPZ7nfiuNFcaiQEVAgUQMkZ6FzxdmrG3fySRAQF0CAf8CMle kOnkwvriif+PdlKnf8rjRtL2H5fk3wg7LmdvpkRzGvJaEtGnToRALEWPujAEY9wg YUnDpMiLWkPEVN1cQz690bvzQdyGVb0x4gDsFbivUIuHA55k9c+9cV08tp+4VqB3 0IQ92p16HfCcLz7Ac+oYPXbLpOceG51mEZLCzu9xeEpk6CbsfQ+GMXXcahqRvJ7Y X1dwCwzHG+toPhC9a3+uLggeh72HJW2dI4ExIHYaKhIK5lO874B6G5XEWpdjnqUl MXIyoaEtYhUaoeEdBE49jKnyTtuQ8DDy+6xOrOE3F3Sc++8F2zNrY/ZJsLsUb5RG EI5u/40s+ASl56KVVw== =Ld7v -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- The following lines should be added to Raph's remailer list: $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; (weasel squirrel) Weasel.owl.de has MX records, but no IP address. You can finger addresses at squirrel.owl.de when it is connected to the Internet. My connection for email is via a UUCP link that is polled every 90 minutes, so do not expect quick turnaround of remailed messages. Please read the help file before using the remailer. You can get it by sending mail to <help(a)weasel.owl.de>. Reports of problems, bugs, abuse etc. should be sent to <admin(a)weasel.owl.de>. C'punks, please mail questions and comments directly to me, as I'm not subscribed to the cypherpunks list. - -- Johannes Kroeger <jkroeger(a)squirrel.owl.de> Send me mail with subject "send pgp-key" to get my PGP key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQEVAgUBMkrY3bwPSJ4oQv5pAQGx1ggAxdcMtxQt1K45bijxqPxMQ+ajlIy3TeRB Y5bxSyr1Q0cTMbKx4ausilrzmaPNLpRU8drMuSk7dbRW4ca9Qs/5kiWhtvIluv70 ex2CgcSjJRLtbq3fEPxcRdOGVU0cxYusS9XP5QJSUJv+nHo5k3qWr7L3Ayk8kKhh lU4NJ535u+WX4v+/70d6Xk/9NF7JtN9sSfxjK7bY9vszMFtihXRCQ8fFoDKzjy84 Mgl1zOfeAJv7snhWt2k/CBsKRlFNsMCLSBDg9ADOqs9O+40KoY2+lpewRXvFLp4y VQv4f7wCcbxtnqTgFPeezEWIfO7xBbkhIUIOyETDzo8JeR7EZzEVYw== =N3Y/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Medical Data
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:28 AM 9/25/96 -0500, Phil Fraering <pgf(a)acadian.net> wrote: >Of course, one area where the doctor will continue to hold a patient's >records, instead of the patient, due to the nature of the current system: > >Prescription medication. >Of course, with the really big problems with this stuff, drug >interactions, there's still no system for a doctor to find out what you're >on thanks to another doctor. Which is why it's very important to always >use the same pharmacist. Pharmacists in the US use a nationwide system that keeps track of who's using what. Issues in a system like this include insurance-paid pharmaceutical plans and also tracking politically-questionable pharmaceutical purchasers. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # <A HREF="http://idiom.com/~wcs"> # You can get PGP software outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto

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ssh - How widely used?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know if there are MS-Dos or Mac versions of the ssh client? How much is ssh used? I've not seen much discussion of it but poking around an ISP yielded this: Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbi- trary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. and Usage: ssh [options] host [command] Options: -l user Log in using this user name. -n Redirect input from /dev/null. -a Disable authentication agent forwarding. -x Disable X11 connection forwarding. -i file Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity). -t Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given. -v Verbose; display verbose debugging messages. -q Quiet; don't display any warning messages. -f Fork into background after authentication. -e char Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~). -c cipher Select encryption algorithm: ``idea'' (default, secure), ``des'', ``3des'', ``tss'', ``arcfour'' (fast, suitable for bulk transfers), ``none'' (no encryption - for debugging only). -p port Connect to this port. Server must be on the same port. -L listen-port:host:port Forward local port to remote address -R listen-port:host:port Forward remote port to local address These cause ssh to listen for connections on a port, and forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port. -C Enable compression. -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file. Looks like a nice little implementation. Comments anyone? -- I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist unicorn(a)schloss.li

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Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas
by Chris Adams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet plug pulled on Colombia's guerrillas 3:05pm EDT, 9/26/96 BOGOTA, Colombia - A Colombian guerrilla group currently involved in a bloody offensive in the mountains and jungles, suffered a setback in its propaganda battle when its new-tech voice on the Internet was mysteriously silenced. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has periodically paralyzed half the country with road blocks, found its route to the information superhighway barred. The Communist insurgents, who rose up in arms in 1964, embraced new technology last year in their fight to overthrow the government by launching a home page on the Internet. But in unexplained circumstances, which a spokeswoman for the Mexico City-based Internet provider Teesnet said may or may not be linked to external pressures, the plug was pulled on the service Monday -- a day after being publicized in Colombia's leading daily, El Tiempo. The FARC's Mexico City-based international spokesman Marco LeDon CalarcDa admitted the loss of the Internet page was a serious reversal but vowed the computer-age conflict was far from over. "This is an attack on freedom of expression because we were not doing anything illegal. I cannot say exactly how it happened but the hand of the Colombian government is in this," he said. "The FARC is used to difficulties and this is just the latest challenge. One way or another we will get back on to the Internet." The Colombian guerrillas used their worldwide web site to publish their political magazine Resistencia, whose distribution is banned in Colombia, and to offer explanations about their latest armed actions. FARC, labeled narcoguerrillas since the 1980s when U.S. ambassador Lewis Tambs highlighted the group's alleged connections with Colombia's drugs trade, have been dubbed Cyberspace guerrillas since their appearance on the Internet. "Cyberspace guerrillas may seem a fun name but I think it is pejorative and belittles what we're doing," said LeDon CalarcDa. "We are looking to topple the government and set up a new Colombia. "Using weapons naturally comes within the logic of the armed struggle. Just fighting through the Internet would be like shooting rubber bullets. Not using it would be like continuing to fight the army with a 12-bore shotgun," he said. In the four weeks since the FARC unleashed its latest offensive with an attack on a jungle base in southern Putumayo province, more than 150 soldiers, police and civilians have died.

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Re: ssh - How widely used?
by Dana W. Albrecht 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: > Does anyone know if there are MS-Dos or Mac versions of the ssh client? There is no MS-DOS client. The authors claim that, "a Macintosh version is in the works, and first versions are expected to be available in August/September 1996." There are Windoze and OS/2 clients. > How much is ssh used? >From the FAQ: 6.2 How widespread is use of ssh? As with every piece of freely available software, this is difficult to find out. The best current estimates are that at least 1000 insitutions in 40 countries use it. This estimate is based on The number of people on the ssh mailing list, around 600, from 40 different countries and several hundred domains. Each week, the ssh home pages are accessed from roughly 5000 different machines, many of them web caches; also, these machines often are different from week to week. > I've not seen much discussion of it but poking around an ISP yielded this: > > Ssh (Secure Shell) a program for logging into a remote > machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. > It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide > secure encrypted communications between two untrusted > hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbi- > trary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure > channel. [ Snip ] > Looks like a nice little implementation. > > Comments anyone? For further information about it, see: http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/ There is also a mailing list. Subscription requests should be directed to majordomo(a)clinet.fi with "subscribe ssh" in the message body. I think that it's technically a great program. However, I have heard some pretty unpleasant stories about legal issues using it in a commercial environment. Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)corsair.com

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PGP interfaces for MS Internet Mail
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know of any PGP programs that interface well with Microsofts Internet Mail (not Exchange mail) Thanks

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Public domain SHA-1 in C
by Steve Reid 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've written an implementation of SHA-1 in C. Public domain, so you can hack it to your hearts content and/or use it however you want. You can download it from http://www.edmweb.com/steve/sha1.c It's not hard to use. Allocate a SHA1_CTX, initialize it with SHA1Init() run over the data with SHA1Update() and finally extract the result using SHA1Final(). Or just compile the program as-is and use it to hash files. It's reasonably fast (the 80 core SHA operations look good) but I'm certain that there's room for improvement. Tested under FreeBSD 2.1.0-RELEASE on an i486SX. The three test vectors from FIPS PUB 180-1 hash correctly. ===================================================================== | Steve Reid - SysAdmin & Pres, EDM Web (http://www.edmweb.com/) | | Email: steve(a)edmweb.com Home Page: http://www.edmweb.com/steve/ | | PGP (2048/9F317269) Fingerprint: 11C89D1CD67287E68C09EC52443F8830 | | -- Disclaimer: JMHO, YMMV, TANSTAAFL, IANAL. -- | ===================================================================:) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMksSsNtVWdufMXJpAQFV3AgApaK+upwWtBJZUwq5Pr4cpvjWQcxFHxv6 XEoZmwgwzR94lpjdEK5GPXt7U9HTp+xiwiaeQ7Hjg+iuR/qtofwZlZhQ5EmyBl2M 8rnFSRgwR4NH1y2PwAxQKSo2SaHU8JZ3X3D6Yk1WXAqk90vN8dzQAIa8B409IuhM tBPixrS6d0KsySSOHQkWO7Mqij43wZOnrgikJF3IDCvSf0us8gGC9wZjdIax3Rgr soswtQvT6QpZDZ/+39UiA2RSMFuER/S3NbZZSJdfIGK1XzUeU2MUC4NmURlc/ntz 3B1pd+jovxuHW1D/TQ2jHSIdg1Yol/zeu1OeuuhL37QOQAVkupgVUA== =B73M -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CWD -- Wiretap In the Night
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 26 Sep 1996 16:32:01 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: CWD -- Wiretap In the Night CyberWire Dispatch // September // Copyright (c) 1996 // Jacking in from the "Smoked Filled Room" Port: Washington, DC -- Federal provisions funding the digital telephony bill and roving wiretaps, surgically removed earlier this year from an anti-terrorism bill, have quietly been wedged into a $600 billion omnibus spending bill. The bill creates a Justice Department "telecommunications carrier compliance fund" to pay for the provisions called for in the digital telephony bill, formally known as the Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). In reality, this is a slush fund. Congress originally budgeted $500 million for CALEA, far short of the billions actually needed to build in instant wiretap capabilities into America's telephone, cable, cellular and PCS networks. This bill now approves a slush fund of pooled dollars from the budgets of "any agency" with "law enforcement, national security or intelligence responsibilities." That means the FBI, CIA, NSA and DEA, among others, will now have a vested interest in how the majority of your communications are tapped. The spending bill also provides for "multipoint wiretaps." This is the tricked up code phase for what amounts to roving wiretaps. Where the FBI can only tap one phone at a time in conjunction with an investigation, it now wants the ability to "follow" a conversation from phone to phone; meaning that if your neighbor is under investigation and happens to use your phone for some reason, your phone gets tapped. It also means that the FBI can tap public pay phones... think about that next time you call 1-800-COLLECT. In addition, all the public and congressional accountability provisions for how CALEA money was spent, which were in the original House version (H.R. 3814), got torpedoed in the Senate Appropriations Committee. Provisions stripped out by the Senate: -- GONE: Money isn't to be spent unless an implementation plan is sent to each member of the Judiciary Committee and Appropriations committees. -- GONE: Requirement that the FBI provide public details of how its new wiretap plan exceeds or differs from current capabilities. -- GONE: Report on the "actual and maximum number of simultaneous surveillance/intercepts" the FBI expects. The FBI ran into a fire storm earlier this year when it botched its long overdue report that said it wanted the capability to tap one out of every 100 phones *simultaneously*. Now, thanks to this funding bill, rather than having to defend that request, it doesn't have to say shit. -- GONE: Complete estimate of the full costs of deploying and developing the digital wiretapping plan. -- GONE: An annual report to Congress "specifically detailing" how all taxpayer money -- YOUR money -- is spent to carry out these new wiretap provisions. "No matter what side you come down on this (digital wiretapping) issue, the stakes for democracy are that we need to have public accountability," said Jerry Berman, executive director of the Center for Democracy and Technology. Although it appeared that no one in congress had the balls to take on the issue, one stalwart has stepped forward, Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.). He has succeeded in getting some of the accountability provisions back into the bill, according to a Barr staffer. But the fight couldn't have been an easy one. The FBI has worked congress relentlessly in an effort to skirt the original reporting and implementation requirements as outlined in CALEA. Further, Barr isn't exactly on the FBI's Christmas card list. Last year it was primarily Barr who scotched the funding for CALEA during the 104th Congress' first session. But Barr has won again. He has, with backing from the Senate, succeeded in *putting back* the requirement that the FBI must justify all CALEA expenditures to the Judiciary Committee. Further, the implementation plan, "though somewhat modified" will "still have some punch," Barr's staffer assured me. That includes making the FBI report on its expected capacities and capabilities for digital wiretapping. In other words, the FBI won't be able to "cook the books" on the wiretap figures in secret. Barr also was successful in making the Justice Department submit an annual report detailing its CALEA spending to Congress. However, the funding for digital wiretaps remains. Stuffing the funding measures into a huge omnibus spending bill almost certainly assures its passage. Congress is twitchy now, anxious to leave. They are chomping at the bit, sensing the end of the 104th Congress' tortured run as the legislative calender is due to run out sometime early next week. Then they will all literally race from Capitol Hill at the final gavel, heading for the parking lot, jumping in their cars like stock car drivers as they make a made dash for National Airport to return to their home districts in an effort to campaign for another term in the loopy world of national politics. Congress is "going to try to sneak this (spending bill) through the back door in the middle of the night," says Leslie Hagan, legislative director for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. She calls this a "worst case scenario" that is "particularly dangerous" because the "deliberative legislative process is short-circuited." Such matters as wiretapping deserve to be aired in the full sunlight of congressional hearings, not stuffed into an 11th hour spending bill. This is legislative cowardice. Sadly, it will most likely succeed. And through this all, the Net sits mute. Unlike a few months ago, on the shameful day the Net cried "wolf" over these same provisions, mindlessly flooding congressional switchboards and any Email box within keyboard reach, despite the fact that the funding provisions had been already been stripped from the anti-terrorism bill, there has been no hue-and-cry about these most recent moves. Yes, some groups, such as the ACLU, EPIC and the Center for Democracy and Technology have been working the congressional back channels, buzzing around the frenzied legislators like crazed gnats. But why haven't we heard about all this before now? Why has this bill come down to the wire without the now expected flurry of "alerts" "bulletins" and other assorted red-flag waving by our esteemed Net guardians? Barr's had his ass hanging in the wind, fighting FBI Director Louis "Teflon" Freeh; he could have used some political cover from the cyberspace community. Yet, if he'd gone to that digital well, he'd have found only the echo of his own voice. And while the efforts of Rep. Barr are encouraging, it's anything from a done deal. "As long as the door is cracked... there is room for mischief," said Barr's staffer. Meaning, until the bill is reported and voted on, some snapperhead congressman could fuck up the process yet again. We all caught a bit of a reprieve here, but I wouldn't sleep well. This community still has a lot to learn about the Washington boneyard. Personally, I'm a little tired of getting beat up at every turn. Muscle up, folks, the fight doesn't get any easier. Meeks out... ------------ Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> contributed to this report. ###

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