December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Transport Mixes
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting suggestion, though I think putting the bags in bins marked "W.A.S.T.E." may do just about as well :-) Aside from Tim's observation that the Enemy can often detect hashish, bombs, etc., greatly reducing the utility of the system, it's also a system designed for couriers to take bags back to hotel rooms and steal the Newtons from them before routing them on their way. On a slightly mroe serious note, I have seen some transport remailer systems operating, though without the crypto hardware involvement. I had a project that absolutely, positively had to get computers to Colorado overnight, but our building's shipping department insisted on using their regular arrangements anyway. The local carrier in New Jersey assembled my boxes and anything else going to Denver in big crates, shipped them by and air-freight company to another local carrier in Denver, who unpacked the crates and delivered it locally. I wasn't surprised when I got there that the equipment hadn't arrived - what surprised me was that they didn't have a record that said that my package number 12345 was in crate number 67890 which had/hadn't arrived. "No, we just pack them, and when they get to Denver they'll open the crates and see what's in each one. You gotta problem wi' dat?" (Since we weren't interested in anonymity, and were interested in reliability, any future packages went FedEx so we could track them.) I once talked with a guy who did his more private mail transactions through a Mexican postal worker in Tiajuana; any mail that came to the PO box would get put in bigger envelopes and mailed to his real address, and he'd send the guy another $10 to cover the next package; when he wanted to send mail privately, he'd mail it to the PO box along with $10, and the guy would mail it to the real address. Bill

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IRS Spam
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the latest tally of IRS Inspection spam headers with the number of recipients in parentheses: 6 directly, 4 via 3 lists so far. IRS MESSAGE 1 -- Message-Id: <199707171625.MAA02707(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (1) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:25:26 -0400 IRS MESSAGE 2 -- Message-Id: <199707171628.MAA02724(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (1) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:28:11 -0400 IRS MESSAGE 3 -- Message-Id: <199707171629.MAA02733(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (2) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:29:08 -0400 IRS MESSAGE 4 -- Message-Id: <199707171630.MAA02739(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (3) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:30:03 -0400 IRS MESSAGE 5 -- Message-Id: <199707171631.MAA02749(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (1) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:31:08 -0400 IRS MESSAGE 6 -- Message-Id: <199707171633.MAA02778(a)net.insp.irs.gov> (2) Date: Thu, 17 Jul 1997 12:33:43 -0400 Note that the date/time within the Id is four hours later than those of the message, probably due to send box settings. Also, the first hop of all messages to Treasury's initial mail gate occurs 18h:17m - 18h:18m after the date/time of the message (see full headers). ---------- Full headers at: http://jya.com/irs-headers.txt The $.25m spam at: http://jya.com/irs-spam.htm

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Re: Arizona State Email Non-Privacy Policy
by rparratt＠london.micrognosis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NetSurfer <jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> wrote: > Surprise. It is their equipment to do with as they please and if you > don't want to follow along with their conditions of access... In the > gov't it is literally against the law and considered theft of government > resources (cpu time, equipment (pc, terminal etc.), electricity...) to use > government equipment for private purposes. > I'm sure this is the case in law, but to take an analogy, this is like banning employees from *receiving* private telephone calls. (Email has zero marginal cost to most institutions, as does a telephone connection). While I am sure there are a few employers who do ban staff from taking calls at work, I'd think of them in the "Gradgrind and Gradgrind plc" class and not expect them to keep their staff long. In fact, I know of few employers who in practice object to reasonable use of the phones to *make* personal calls. (The government is an exception, although the UK defence ministry just worked out that 25% or so of their phone bill was to private numbers, which may herald a crackdown). ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Richard Parratt * The reason why so many people play soccer Still in London, * is so they don't have to watch it being rparratt(a)london.micrognosis.com * played. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Keepers of the keys
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 12:04:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Joe Shea <joeshea(a)netcom.com> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Cc: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: FC: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises" Declan, what would you think if the actual keepers of the keys, so to speak, were the courts, such as the Administratoive Office of the US Courts? That would at least seem to reduce a lot of the possible privacy concerns. One has the sense that once they get into the hands of the varius agencies, they'll get back out. Best, Joe Shea Editor-in-Chief The American Reporter joeshea(a)netcom.com http://www.newshare.com:9999

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FWD>This is currently being
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date 8/30/94 Subject FWD>This is currently being From Dave Banisar To Crypto List >From CPSR FWD>This is currently being pos -------------------------------------- From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir(a)panix.com> Message-Id: <199408300318.AA07665(a)panix2.panix.com> Subject: This is currently being posted to Usenet. To: vtw-announce(a)vtw.org Date: Mon, 29 Aug 1994 23:18:18 -0400 (EDT) [updated August 29, 1994 shabbir] ********************************************************************* DISTRIBUTE WIDELY ********************************************************************* Table of contents: Status of the bills Five things you can do RIGHT now to stop Digital Telephony Records of legislators supporting/opposing/wavering on DT Digital Telephony bill FAQ The VTW Press Release Sample Letter To The Editor Who are we and how can you contact us? ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- STATUS OF THE BILLS (updated 8/10/94) Aug 18, 94 HR 4922 reported back to committee (write to Rep. Jack Brooks!) Aug 11, 94 Sen. Leahy & Rep. Edwards hold a joint hearing on the bills in Wash. DC at 1pm in Rayburn 2237. Aug 10, 94 HR 4922 referred to Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights Aug 10, 94 SB 2375 referred to Subcomm. on Technology and the Law Aug 9, 94 Rep. Hyde officially cosponsors HR 4922 Aug 9, 94 HR 4922 referred to House Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 SB 2375 referred to Senate Judiciary Committee Aug 9, 94 Identical House and Senate bills are announced by their respective sponsors, Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) EFF states the legislation is "not necessary". VTW will be monitoring this legislation in the same way that we monitored the Cantwell bill, with the blow by blow, day to day updates that cost us significant long distance bills. :-) We're not asking for money though. Don't send us money; we don't want it and it causes us bookkeeping work. Call/write your legislator instead and relay to them the sample communiques below. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- FIVE THINGS YOU CAN DO *RIGHT* NOW (in their order of importance) 1. Write to the House Judiciary Committee Chairman, Jack Brooks (D-TX) and ask him to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. (HR 4922) 2. Fax/mail a copy of the VTW press release to your local newspaper, tv station, call-in show (everything from NPR to Rush Limbaugh), etc. 3. Write to your legislator (especially if s/he is on the Judiciary Committee (House or Senate) and ask that they oppose the Digital Telephony bills. (SB 2375/HR 4922) 4. Forward a copy of this FAQ to three friends who don't know about it. Or, print it out and place it on a bulletin board at work, at school, hand it out, etc. 5. Write a letter to the editor of your local newspaper, opposing the Digital Telephony bill. 1. CALL/WRITE TO REP. JACK BROOKS, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. CHAIRMAN Sample phone Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks Phone: (202) 225-6565 Dear Mr. Brooks, The recent Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375) disturb me greatly. The FBI has not yet made their case that justifies building wiretap functionality into the telephones of 250 million people to justify the privacy intrusion. Please oppose HR 4922 and SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ Sample fax/letter Communique: Rep. Jack Brooks 2449 RHOB Washington, DC 20515 Phone: (202) 225-6565 Fax: (202) 225-1584 The Honorable Jack Brooks, Please oppose Senator Leahy's and Representative Edwards' Digital Telephony bills (HR 4922 & SB 2375). This legislation asks us, the American public, to trade our privacy to ensure law enforcement's future ability to continue to perform wiretaps. Unfortunately, the FBI has yet to make its case to the public to prove that it is unable to administer significant numbers of wiretaps. Telecommunications technology is very new and the change of pace in it is very rapid. The Digital Telephony bills are premature and should not be considered until: -the standards bodies are appointed and include privacy rights groups (not just the Electronic Frontier Foundation) at both the technical and policy levels -the standards are defined and accepted by the three stakeholders (law enforcement, common carriers, and privacy rights groups) -an adequate oversight agency has been given the authority previously allocated to the FCC -the technology has advanced to a point where the effect of such a broad ruling on the undustry can be ascertained. Please oppose HR 4922 & SB 2375. Sincerely, _______________________ If you want to help make legislators responsible for their actions, report this information back to vtw(a)vtw.org. We'll add their position to our database. 2. Take the press release attached and fax/mail/email it to local tv stations, radio stations, callin shows, newspapers, etc. Drop a note to vtw(a)vtw.org, where we'll track the coverage. 3. Forward this file to your friends and coworkers. Use it when you phone call-in shows; educate everyone you know. This is literally a "net" effort. Few people outside of the Internet know about this legislation; they would be horrified to discover its existence. Help educate them. 4. Call/write your legislator and ask them to oppose the Digital Telephony bill. Use the sample communiques above. To find your own legislator, contact the League of Women Voters in your area. 5. Write a letter to your local newspaper's editorial page about the Digital Telephony bill. We have attached a sample editorial page letter that you might base your letter upon. Feel free to use significant license. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LIST OF LEGISLATORS SUPPORTING/OPPOSING/WAVERING ON DIGITAL TELEPHONY -REPRESENTATIVES All addresses are Washington, D.C. 20515 Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax ==== == ======================== ============== ============== 16 CA Edwards, Donald (D) 1-202-225-3072 1-202-225-9460 2307 RHOB House sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill 6 IL Hyde, Henry J. (R) 1-202-225-4561 1-202-226-1240 2110 RHOB Cosponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill -SENATORS P ST Name and Address Phone Fax = == ======================== ============== ============== D VT Leahy, Patrick J. 1-202-224-4242 na 433 RSOB Washington, D.C. 20510 Senate sponsor of the 1994 Digital Telephony bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL FAQ What are the (DT) Digital Telephony bills and where did they come from? The DT bills were initially introduced by the Bush administration presumably at the request of the FBI. The initial proposals were very unpopular and met with great opposition, preventing them from moving through Congress. The current incarnations of the legislation (SB 2375 & HR 4922) have several features, but basically require the same thing: common carriers must be able to provide law enforcement officers with court orders access to personal communications. (eg, if the FBI presents a court order for a wiretap on your phone calls to NYNEX, NYNEX should be able to provide the FBI with the ability to intercept your communications under the terms of the court order.) To do this will require changes in the telephone equipment we use today. Since this will obviously cost money, the bill appropriates $500 million in Federal money to these carriers to compensate them for the changes. Does this include bulletin boards and Internet sites like Netcom, America OnLine? No, the legislation specifically identifies common carriers. Information Services, such as these above, are not common carriers. How will this affect me? Imagine there's a giant socket on the side of the phone company's equipment that says "FOR FBI USE ONLY" in giant red letters. Imagine if the fine for not implementing that socket was $10,000 per day for the phone company. How many communications carriers do you think will make any noise about the privacy of their customers' communications? Now imagine that you were asked to pay the bill for this. The proposed budget for implementing this functionality is $500 million dollars for 1995-1998. Just how many wiretaps per year are there? In 1992 there were less than 1,000 wiretaps performed. It is important to note that the legislation is targeted towards wiretaps that the government says they cannot implement. Since there is thus far no published evidence of unimplementable wiretaps, turning the nation's phone system into a giant eavesdropping device to prevent a problem which has not yet been documented or become widespread, sacrifies too much privacy for too little gain. Is there ever a legitimate need for law enforcement to conduct wiretaps? Yes, according to the 1992 Government Accounting Office's "Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Communications (Wiretap Report)", there were 919 wiretaps authorized in 1992 (there were no requests denied). There were 607 individuals convicted as a result of these wiretaps. Although this is not an excessive amount, it is not ignorable either. However 607 convictions is infinitesmally small when one considers the number of people convicted yearly in the US. Furthermore, the report does not specify if any wiretaps were unimplementable because of advancing technology. The FBI maintains that advancing technology will prevent this, though this has not yet been documented. VTW feels that until the the FBI makes their case to the public, this bill should not be considered as legislation. Why should I be worried about this bill? THE BILL IS VAGUE REGARDING STANDARDS SETTING The bill requires industry standards groups to be formed to work with law enforcement to create technical standards for this functionality. There are a number of problems with this. First is that these standards bodies may not have even been appointed yet, giving incredible power to a presently unnamed group that will be responsible for appointing those bodies. Secondly, these standards bodies do not currently include any public input. There is a delicate balance involved in wiretapping vs. a citizen's privacy. The standards bodies that are proposed do not have any provisions for public input. Public-interest and/or privacy groups should be included at every level (including the technical level) in order to ensure that this balance is found. Without such input, the standards are likely to sacrifice privacy while giving more functionality than is needed by law enforcement to do its job. THE STANDARDS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THE LEGISLATION IS PROPOSED The DT legislation is vague regarding the standards for wiretapping functionality. Many of the questions and problems we have with this legislation stem from the vagueness of the details regarding the standards. The standards body should be appointed (with representatives from law enforcement, industry, and the public at both the technical and high level) and the standards accepted before the legislation is proposed. THE BILL PUTS GREAT POWER INTO STANDARDS AND COMMITTEES THAT DO NOT EXIST YET By empowering standards bodies that do not exist, and mandating standards that do not yet exist, great power is given to those individuals who can appoint the members of the standards bodies. Furthermore, no process is mandated for the appointment of the members of these standards bodies. THE BILL DOES NOT APPOINT AN ADEQUATE OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY In many situations the (FCC) Federal Communications Commission is appointed to be the final arbiter if industry standard bodies cannot agree on technical standards. The FCC currently serves the interest of industry in regulating the communication carriers. Because the Commission serves the interest of both groups, there is a conflict of interest. A different ageny should be appointed and given the FCC's oversight authority. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IS NOT MATURE Telecommunications is a very new technology. Within the last twenty years, we have seen amazing advances in the technology. Ordering the implementation of such a broad privacy- sensitive function will have far-reaching effects on the future of the technology. This legislation should wait until the technology is more stable. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PRESS RELEASE [Please fax this to your local newspaper] Voter's Telecommunications Watch invites fellow citizens to join its media awareness campaign by emailing or faxing this press release to one of two media institutions. East of the Mississippi: Burlington Times email: _________ fax: ___________ West of the Mississippi: San Jose Mercury-News email: _________ fax: ___________ VTW is also experimenting with a fax/email chain letter. The document "An Open Letter on Digital Telephony" is currently circulating the Internet. VTW has also prepared an FAQ for Digital Telephony. Point your gopher to panix.com (port 70) and check under the VTW main menu entry, or use the URL: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE NEW YORK, NY -- 08/22/94 -- Contrary to popular belief, not all online civil libertarians support the Government's attempts to ensure the FBI can wiretap every citizen. Voter's Telecommunications Watch (VTW), a New York-based online activism group, working in conjunction with the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and other privacy advocates, is working to energize and focus the grassroots opposition to the recently introduced Leahy-Edwards Digital Telephony Bill (H.R. 4922, S. 2375). The Digital Telephony Bill would require telecommunications service providers to design all their equipment to allow FBI agents and other government officials to wiretap any telephone conversation -- only if there is a court order permitting it, of course, the FBI promises. Adding this feature to the telecommunications system is costly -- so costly that the bill appropriates $500 million taxpayer dollars to reimburse phone companies for their "reasonable" expenses. "It's objectionable for the FBI to try to make us pay for invading our own privacy," says Alexis Rosen, co-founder of Public Access Networks Corporation, a regional public Internet provider. According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, there were 183 wiretaps in 1993 that would have been facilitated by the digital telephony mandates. "Should we really spend half a billion dollars for a couple of hundred wiretaps that compromise the privacy of two hundred million Americans?" asks Simona Nass, President of the Society for Electronic Access, a New York-based organization devoted to issues of civil liberties and public access. VTW is spearheading a drive to defeat the bill. Using the Internet to keep millions of electronically-connected citizens informed, VTW workers have put together summaries and analyses of the legislation and are tracking the bill's movements through the byzantine halls of Congress. Using this informations, citizens can inundate their representatives at optimum moments. VTW is tracking each influential legislators' position on the Digital Telephony initiative, and periodically publishes a scorecard summary of their positions, party, districts and contact information. To access VTW's anti-Digital Telephony effort, join the VTW electronic mailing list by sending Internet e-mail to vtw-list-request(a)panix.com. Information is also available via Internet Gopher in the VTW area of gopher.panix.com (port 70). For further information, contact Steven Cherry at 718-596-2851. PRESS CONTACT: Steven Cherry (718) 596-2851(voice mail) stc(a)acm.org (electronic mail) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- SAMPLE LETTER TO THE EDITOR [Note, this is Steven Cherry's "Open Letter" on Digital Telephony. Please do not submit it to the New York Times. -Shabbir] An Open Letter Regarding Digital Telephony Digital Telephony, embodied in bills entered into Congress by Sen. Leahy (S.B. 2375) and Rep. Edwards (HR. 4922), would require that telecommunications carriers alter their equipment so as to allow wiretaps and similar surveillance to be performed at the companies' offices, or the offices of law enforcement. In a word, to make telecommunications equipment, "wiretap friendly"; to make a wiretap order executable "at the press of a button." With the help of some civil liberties activists, the bill admirably distinguishes between common carriers and information services. Only the former are subject to its provisions. But the distinction, while clear in the abstract, is hard to make in practice. The mom-and-pop neighborhood bulletin board service or Internet provider is excluded, but even if it is providing store-and-forward message-passing for an individual or other small provider? Indeed, the very definition of common carrier in the proposed legislation is problematic, as the definition relies on that used in the Communications Act of 1934, when just now that Act is being overhauled finally, after sixty years. The bill's authors have sensibly and cleverly left out of the legislation all the details of implementation. It is impossible to object to the bill on the grounds of being unworkable. It is also difficult to object on grounds of the risks to individual privacy, insofar as the risks are largely unquantifiable by virtue of being largely unknown. The very clever lack of any practical detail, however, leads the prudent citizen to question the public expenditure of $500,000,000 -- the figure is likely far too high, or far too low. Indeed, all we know is it is unlikely to be correct, and we therefore object to it as being unrealistic to the needs of the enterprise. In point of fact, one other thing is known about this figure -- it is but a fraction of the total expenditures resulting from the mandates of the bill. The balance will be borne by the common carriers, who, in turn, will either have to raise rates, reduce services, or restrict investment and expansion of their business at the very moment in the history of telecommunications that calls for them to do just the opposite. Indeed, the very forces of technological change that caused law enforcement to request this bill demand that it be defeated. We would like to return to the issue of increased risks for a moment. While unquantifiable, they are equally undeniable. The more facile the system, the more it will be overused and error-ridden. We must of course balance risk with reward. Who would refuse an extra paycheck for fear of getting a papercut? We must ask, what are the rewards of digital telephony? The FBI Director has variously stated the number of cases where a wiretapping was subverted by a digital switch or signal, offering contradictory figures from a low of 80 to a high of 183. The Director has not said all of them, or even any of them, were cases where a conviction was not obtained, or where a conviction could have been obtained with the wiretap, or could only have been attained with a wiretap. Of course, only these last possible instances really lend any justification to digital telephony. It is quite clear that digital technology offers more challenges to law enforcement than digital switches and signals. The object of a wiretap can easily use unbreakable encryption to protect the privacy of his or her communications. While the transmission of a message would be intercepted, the content would still evade the eyes and ears of law enforcement. Indeed, any, or all, of these 80 or 183 cases could have been subsequently frustrated by encryption even had digital telephony solved the initial digital barrier. Let us state the potential rewards as generously as possible -- or even more generously than possible. There were approximately 1000 wiretaps in 1993. Let us imagine, contrary to actual fact, all of these to be subverted by digital technology. Let us imagine the number to double in coming years. (Any or all of which could remain private through encryption.) 2000 cases. Weighed against these are the 200 million Americans whose security and privacy are compromised by digital telephony. Well, what if the number of wiretaps doubles again, and again and again? Don't 20,000 or 30,000 wiretaps, hypothetically, justify? Perhaps. But what kind of society needs so many police listening in on the private lives of so many people? At what point do we regret the lack of a public policy debate on mass wiretapping of the American citizenry? We do not live in a police state nor will we. And so we are back to supposing a massive technological effort at great expense to achieve a modest wiretapping program of small, perhaps almost nonexistent, benefit. To sum up, it is as if the entire city of population 25,000, were to have its telephone system restructured, its citizen's phone privacy compromised, all to make effective a wiretap on a single alleged drug peddler or gangster, which wiretap may or may not help in convicting the offender, if indeed he or she is guilty. All at a cost of $62,500 to the taxpayers, and more to the local telephone companies and their ratepayers. For all these reasons, the unclarity, the expense, the risks to privacy, and the lack of substantive benefits, separately and together, we oppose this bill. Steven Cherry stc(a)acm.org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTACT INFORMATION The Voters Telecomm Watch is a volunteer organization dedicated to monitoring federal legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. We are based primarily out of New York, though we have volunteers throughout the US. Voters Telecomm Watch keeps scorecards on legislators' positions on legislation that affects telecommunications and civil liberties. If you have updates to a legislator's positions, from either: -public testimony, -reply letters from the legislator, -stated positions from their office, please contact vtw(a)vtw.org so they can be added to this list. Voice mail: (718) 596-2851 General questions: vtw(a)vtw.org Mailing List Requests: vtw-list-request(a)vtw.org Press Contact: stc(a)vtw.org Gopher URL: gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/11/vtw WWW URL: We're working on it. :-) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Civil crypto anarchy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by nobody(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at () on Sun, 28 Aug 2:32 AM >So basically the protocols are interesting in an >academic way, and we could sit here and discuss the >possibilities, but then I suppose a discussion about >atomic bombs will likely be of greater impact on our >future than crypto anarchy will. Out of your several thoughful comments this one strikes some sparks. Terror of nuclear weapons is universal. Nothing about crypto anarchy is terrifying (yet). A link between the two is not fanciful because of the challenge to those who hold secrets posed by crypto anarchy. One singularity of the nuclear arsenal was that few people actually know its capability. Its secrecy is a part of the threat. The same is true of the more general national security apparatus, most of whose power derives from privileged knowledge of weapon-systems capabilities. By extension of state power, under the rubric of national security, to other areas of government, often under the guise of intelligence and law enforcement needs, we have a society where a small number of economic, scientific, political, military and law enforcement persons hold privileged secrets and a very large citizenry who does not. Because of suspected abuse of privilege, these keepers of secrets are no longer trusted. Electoral politics, once thought to offer means to throw the scoundrels out, now feeds this suspicion, rather than relieving it, because little of entrenched power structures are changed by the voting process. The public process merely cosmetizes the means for exploiting the the secret privileges of the few. The crypto and related technological and civil issues discussed on this list might be viewed as exploring how to redirect the science and technology, heretofore used sustain a national security-driven economy, toward creating the apparatus for a more just and benefical civil society, one less fraught with military, police and economic insecurity and fear of the tools of privileged secrecy. Mastering cryptography and devising ways to put it to remunerative use are honorable and constructive alternatives to enduring unresponsive government. If successful they will set examples, and provide tools, for others to diminish state dependency. However, there is still the task of proving that crypto anarchy is not itself a play for power by those who write and master its cryptographic code. But better to test that in the public arena rather remain hidden and protected by state secrecy. Fierce opposition should be expected, not least by demonizing crypto anarchy. It will probably begin within the crypto anarchy enterprise under the guise of skeptical criticism and provocative baiting. It is worth recalling that classical black anarchy, the secret, lethal version as distinguished from open black flag type, is used by despots to justify their ruthless measures. Black anarchists, as agents of despots, mingle with avowed flag-wavers to spy and provoke acts that lead to repressive crackdowns. Black anarchists never announce themselves as such but may freely admit to being "anarchistic" as a wild-eyed subterfuge. Inept provocations sometimes reveal them but the most able are never detected. John

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Re: mondex
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Lackey wrote: >Does anyone know how open the Mondex architecture is? Is it in any way >possible to set up a competing system with your own card manufacture >and issuing bodies for currencies which can be used in deployed Mondex >POS terminals without too much hassle? >[...] Wesley Felter <wesf(a)mail.utexas.edu> wrote: >As I understand it, Mondex is a completely closed system. Everything that >you don't absolutely need to know is undocumented. Since you can settle >offline, the potential for fraud is frightening; unless I'm getting the >benefit of these, um, weaknesses in the system, I don't want there to be >any. The lack of privacy seems to be somewhat of a smokescreen; since you >can settle offline, they don't have a really accurate way of tracking >transactions except at the interface between e$ and other forms of money >or goods (like their POS terminals and ATMs). > >Can you hack Mondex? They say you can't... David Jones,a computer science professor at McMaster University and president of Electronic Frontier Canada, has written an interesting article on the subject of Mondex security: >Here's my latest article published online in "The Convergence". >Please visit the web page version because it has lots of hyperlinks >to related documents, including some never before published on the Net >(e.g., Australian bank report on Mondex security) > > http://theconvergence.com/columns/djones/07121997/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Mondex: A House of Smart-Cards? With e-cash, privacy is illusory and security is questionable by David Jones Mondex International has already conceded that its electronic 'cash' isn't really as private as they once claimed. Now critics are questioning whether their security is all it's cracked up to be. If crooks managed to create counterfeit cyber-cash, and if Mondex failed to detect it quickly enough, the deposits backing up the electronic currency could be drained dry, leaving customers out of pocket -- unable to redeem the 'value' on their cards. Do participating banks have any contingency plans for what Mondex calls its 'meltdown scenario'? [...] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- Martin Janzen janzen(a)idacom.hp.com

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Re: Clipper in the news...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Just to give you an idea how far word of our favorite >technological innovation has spread, from this month's (Fall Collection) >issue of Vogue magazine: > > "...As for Orwell's telescreen, it's been replaced by the >personal computer. Networks like Prodigy have been warning users that >they will censor 'objectionable' messages, and the government is >threatening to install the Clipper Chip in computers, allowing it to >eavesdrop on digital transmissions. How to cope?" [P. 172] > > ...and I thought that Karl Lagerfeld's lineup was bad enough... > >mjr. I can see the advertisement for Cosmopolitan magazine... "I was talking to very buff beach volley ball player on my Clipper phone. (He's just a friend, really!) We talked about the strength of the Malibu sun, what to do when sand gets in your sun block and whether California roll sushi was really invented there. Then I tossed in some Navy blue words that will make those NSA spooks blush coral red. I'm just a flirt... but I guess you could say, I'm that COSMOPOLITAN girl."

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Re: DSPs
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408292302.QAA02577(a)comsec.com> Eric Blossom writes: > > The Motorola DSP96002 does an integer multiply in 2 or 3 clocks, so a > > 33 MHz device does 11 million multiplies (and moves) a second. The > > chip costs about $50. > > The 96002 is a floating point part. Last time I checked it cost > several hundred dollars. I suspect that you were refering to the > 56001/2 family (which does cost something like $50). I checked the 56001 data book, but it does 24 bit integer multiplies, not 32, so I didn't quote them. The figures I gave are for a 32-bit integer multiply, right out of the 96002 data book. I haven't checked 96002 prices for a couple of years. When I last checked it was something like 200 pounds ($300) in small quantities. It has now been outclassed by the C40 and several other very good DSP chips and time has passed, so I think that in production quantities the price would at least be under the $100 mark. -- Jim Dixon

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Betsi
by p.v.mcmahon.rea0803＠oasis.icl.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI - PGP-based experimental service for verification of software integrity from Bellcore. I haven't seen this announcement turn up on the usual Usenet groups (yet), and thought that it may be of interest to people here. [Apologies in advance if it's a superfluous forwarding ...] - pvm Date: Mon, 29 Aug 1994 13:27:19 -0400 From: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System A N N O U N C I N G ! ! ! ! ! Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System. Betsi addresses a security concern of software distribution in the Internet. Currently, there is no way to know that software obtained by anonymous ftp has not been modified since it was posted. Also, malicious software can be posted without the offender leaving a trace. Betsi is an experimental prototype that is meant to provide some degree of assurance about the integrity of software and the identity of its author. The current version of Betsi is an experiment. The long-term goals are: - help software vendors distribute programs and patches - provide accountability by linking the author of a program to a real person whose identity is verified off-line - allow users to run software obtained on the Internet with less danger of viruses and Trojan horses - use cryptographically strong techniques to preserve file integrity - scale well in the Internet community - minimize effort on the part of the users - use existing infrastructure and standards Betsi is a free, experimental service. It requires use of PGP to verify signatures from Betsi. Betsi's public key is widely available. It can be obtained from numerous public key servers by requesting the key for certify or Betsi. It also appears in a paper that was submitted for publication, in the help file (described in a moment) and at the end of this message. For additional information on Betsi send mail to certify(a)bellcore.com with subject, help. A copy of the paper describing Betsi can be obtained by anonymous ftp from thumper.bellcore.com in the directory /pub/certify. A copy of the public key for Betsi can also be found there. It is recommended that the key be obtained from at least two different places and compared. Betsi's public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi5I0LwAAAEEAJZi970w+Lb7onAmrnExWKrgUFbjJku29qVRlBY6/UtUH+fW s7MtAEUKIhktJ0cDpE+5Tbi6Lev2RXmXhT1hEjwxSwVFOMJmOuMZxlj+586IKigC vVjF+hCFKQWRXsleM/axVbpH+pNUmWcK6QMdBDFlzS/9pxdAiBPcEwSgd4ahAAUR tBxCZXRzaSA8Y2VydGlmeUBiZWxsY29yZS5jb20+iQB1AgUQLkjREpti/eSkC5bZ AQFzNwL8CVk6J8jhHukKKjrkdZX5VZMwuvgs7+ZIVR8fY+vpEBs6EbWAQpmm4ekV C4D6UOYCRxARpQN09M1aE9qSz6XKkYQjs9Ul/xRLtazDAuYOAkRxO3mnrFa2u6Tc +qXcZame =68fV -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Fingerprint: 5F 34 26 5F 2A 48 6B 07 90 C9 98 C5 32 C3 44 0C

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