December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord post"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The winsock remailer does not accept plaintext messages. The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 21 Oct 96 6:48:54 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca *-***-****** 21:15 100.00% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +-*++-****** 35:41 99.99% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com --+++--+-+++ 1:18:22 99.97% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com -##+##**### 5:20 99.95% winsock winsock(a)c2.org ---__----.-- 11:50:31 99.90% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --++--+++++ 2:21:46 99.88% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +-+++-+++ ++ 43:41 99.56% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com * ********** 8:52 99.21% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ._- --+--++ 2:53:38 98.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com +- * *+***** 10:30 98.49% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +-*#+# +*## 7:47 94.62% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com --++++++ 2:07:07 51.53% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ------- 10:39:07 50.37% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Prof Shamir arrested
by Tom Womack 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

A few column inches in the British Independent had Prof Avi Shamir (who I guess is the S in RSA) arrested in Israel, on (I believe) suspicion of involvement in a substantial fraud. Tom We will do what we have always done when we've had our back to the wall; we will turn round and fight.

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Re: Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by hal＠rain.org 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

From: Carl Ellison <cme(a)acm.org> > >> >Steve Shear <azur(a)netcom.com> writes: > > > >[much cut] > >> > >> I've been charged with developing an Internet service which needs to assure > >> its clients of anonymity. However, we fear some clients may abuse the > >> service and we wish to prevent the abusers from re-enrollment if > >> terminated for misbehavior. (In your example, it would be the person(s) > >> trying to discover the service host via flood). > >> > >> My thought was to base enrollment on some sort of 'blinding' of their > >> certified signature (e.g., from Verisign) which produces a unique result > >> for each signature but prevents the service from reconstructing the > >> signature itself (and thereby reveal the client's identity). I'm calling > >> this negative authentication. > > The mistake is to think of using ID certificates (like those from Verisign) > in the first place. They don't mean anything. > > You want an authorization certificate, such as produced by SPKI. You need > to know what a key is authorized to do, not what name is associated with > the key. (Sorry about quoting so much, but I liked Steve Shear's succinct problem statement.) I don't see how authorization certificates solve this problem. How would you determine if someone was qualified to receive an authorization certificate? And what would you do to make them stop using the service if they abuse it, and to stop them from getting new authorization certificates? Thanks, Hal

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European Commission on "Illegal and harmful content on the Internet"
by wfgodot＠iquest.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A recently released European Commission Communication on "Illegal and harmful content on the Internet" may prefigure the nature of coming European Union regulatory initiatives concerning the net. This Communication was in response to a 27 September resolution by the Telecommunication Council on "preventing the dissemination of illegal content on the Internet, in particular child pornography." The document reportedly reflects what will be ongoing work to "present practical measures in time for the next Telecommunications Council on 28 November 1996." The Communication describes its aims as: firstly to describe briefly the different types of illegal and harmful content, secondly to examine the technical context in which action can be taken to deal with illegal and harmful content, and finally to suggest a number of practical measures designed to be rapidly implemented Among the points of interest, it states with emphasis that "additional international cooperation is required to avoid 'safe havens' for documents contrary to general rules of criminal law." With respect to anonymous communications it discusses proposed "measures to close known loopholes and improve traceability and that anonymous remailers record details of identity." As is typical of these agendas, the devil will be in the evolving details of enforcement. It looks like 1997 will be a busy year for proponents of greater state control over internet content both here and abroad. If they can conjure up enough sufficiently compelling bogeymen, it could be a very successful one for them as well. The HTML version of this document can be found at: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/en/internet/content/communic.html> Links to RTF and Word versions along with the accompanying press release and related documents can be found at: <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/internet/html> - -Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: cp850 iQCVAwUBMmaw0tGJlWF+GPx9AQGMLgP+JC5Lyd0NZDukq8AWipUNcDUgb6m16iUN 3smYcPdPYvsUDSWznx7ZQsklQV0oz9u5Ru7s8VoOQfA2wqSoiai3LiUiJg5WkfOg HTAbvVQCeoUaRmkmmbFJSzfqVzGB4VkJRCE4htPmmqYhCwwmMjooTi3bAClySGTD 7YcLjv0pC5w= =4EZY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Washington Post editorial on global Net-censorship (10/21/96)
by Declan McCullagh 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 21 Oct 1996 07:35:27 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Washington Post editorial on global Net-censorship (10/21/96) While the Washington Post may be in thrall to the national security establishment on encryption policy, it has done more to highlight the dangers of Net-censorship than any other newspaper. Check out today's editorial, attached below. Also, the In the Loop column in today's Post reports that the poorly-named "Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom" is hosting a $10,000-a-table banquet called the "1996 Architect of the New Century Award Gala" on November 11. This year's architect? "None other than that champion of democracy and human rights the inimitable Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore." The same fellow I wrote about in a HotWired column recently: http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/96/36/index4a.html The unknown user, who has the email address an511172(a)anon.penet.fi, posted hundreds of messages to the soc.culture.singapore newsgroup under the name of "Lee Kwan Yew," the retired prime minister of Singapore. The messages are short and unimaginative, yet apparently are just enough to piss off the thin-skinned Singaporean officials. One post reads: "We are small and vulnerable. Without regulations, we will be like Hong Kong, oops, fuck, bad example, they are actually doing quite all right. - SM Lee Kwan Yew, Republic of Singapore." I just called the Nixon Center and spoke to Tricia Williams, the assistant to the president. She told me: "You would need to speak to Mr. Sines, the president. I'm not involved in planning that." More later, if he returns my phone call. -Declan **************** CENSORSHIP IN CYBERSPACE Monday, October 21 1996; Page A18 The Washington Post WHEN IT COMES to communication and censorship, the issues don't change much from one medium to the next. The latest reminder comes with a mini-gust of consternation that hit the World Wide Web a few days ago when, after prolonged outcry, the proprietor of a Sweden-based web site called the Gallery Grotesque closed it down. The site had been displaying gruesome images for two years and had attracted alarm most recently by posting several grisly photographs of a murder scene. Those who attempted to visit the web site after it was closed were greeted with a message from the owner that included all the classic reasons for allowing speech even when it's violent or disturbing. The "gallery," the message explained, had been designed to display true images of "a debauched, self-indulgent society"; it had gotten several million "hits," or visitors, over its life; "myriad external pressures" had been brought to bear, and it was now closing "at a time of my own choosing" because "the concept has been fully explored." Finally, to those "repulsed or angered" by the images, it added, "Consider this: The insanity still continues; only the messenger has been quelled." Whatever you make of the issues of judgment or perhaps self-dramatization involved here, the arguments closely resemble the familiar ones about information and its responsible use that have been going on for centuries. Meanwhile, the Internet experiences of such countries as China and Singapore offer a more sobering demonstration that the new technology may not change the landscape of freedom of speech vs. censorship as much as many had hoped. When the Internet with its global reach first became accessible in countries with otherwise tight information control, human rights and pro-democracy activists foresaw a virtual end to isolation for their colleagues in closed societies, just as fax machines had buoyed Chinese student protesters a decade ago. Some talked of a global "archive of banned books" that could be accessed from any point in the world, thus rendering book-banning by individual nations pointless. Unfortunately, governments interested in maintaining censorship quickly have found ways to use the technology to their benefit. Though decentralized and ungovernable, the Internet is also highly transparent: No one can be sure who is watching, and most messages leave tracks. The governments of China, Burma and Singapore have been cited as making use of this characteristic of the medium, announcing heavy penalties on those who access unauthorized sites, and, in Iran particularly, constructing elaborate technological fire walls to allow their citizens to tap some but not all of the Web's information. The fire walls may prove rickety, and, even with the restrictions, activists may discover over time that access to e-mail and the Web brings more advantage than danger. Even so, the lesson remains: Technology may alter the dimensions of the problem of censorship, but it doesn't take the problems away. ###

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Re: OTP
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

> Can you explain to me how your one time pad algorithm is any better than > encryption something with, say, RC4 or any other cipher using a key that > is the same length as the seed for your PRNG? Well for a start there is no possible cryptanalytic (rather than brute force) attack on a one time pad, the system can be mathematically proven to be secure with a very simple bit of statistics. Soemthing like RC4, even if the key were totally random and unpredictable, and had as much, or more state than the message can still be cryptanalysed possibly, although it is unlikely... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: [crypto-philo]OTP or DES?
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

> It is quite easy to take the bits of the des-encrypted message, and > calculate the OTP key nessasary to decrypt the message into your real plan. > It would seem you could build a key to have your message say anything of > equal length. Why then must a true OTP be based on a true RNG? Because one > of the actual possible keys of a real OTP is indeed the encrypted des > message, you can claim that it is an otp and no-one can prove otherwise. > They can say "But we cracked your des key and can decypher this message!" > and you say "nope i used an OTP, that is a false message, here is what it > really says! The fact that by PURE coincidence that OTP could be decrypted > using that particular key means nothing, because a true OTP can generate > that bit sequence. Not quite, It is so unlikely that any DES key would exist to turn a one time pad encrypted message into an intelligible plaintext with no errors, proper linguistic structure etc. that it just wouldn`t wash. I shiver at the idea of calculating the probability (my statistics is a bit rusty) but it is a pretty damn small probability given that the set of all possible DES ciphertexts is a smallish subset of all possible binary values (if memory serves correctly, I may be off the mark here though). This may work with a stream cipher (which is pretty similar to a OTP apart from not being provably secure because the entropy of the key is greater than or equal to that of the message) where you can have any possible binary value as your ciphertext... However, for a block cipher, this would appear to me to be impossible for most ciphertexts. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Question: OTP
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

> This whole thing seems crazier each time I think about it. > basically my question is: given that he picks his key securly does he have > an OTP if the plaintext is shorter than the key? > Bob Yes, if he were just to modular add the key to the plaintext (or XOR them) he would have an OTP if AND ONLY IF the key were real random, however, he doesn`t do this, he uses the key to seed an array or linear congruential generators, which have been cryptanalysed to hell and back. Basically, ALWAYS, and I mean ALWAYS dismiss anyone trying to sell an OTP, they are totally impractical, he`s just using technobabble to get around the fact that his system is actually a stream cipher and is of no value because it has been broken within days of being announced. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Q.E.D. reply to petty MESSger (fwd)
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

> > IPG Sales writes: > > [approx. 300 lines of ramblings deleted] > > Mister, if we printed out your last message on fluffy paper and folded > it together a number of times, then maybe we would end up with something > that a poor woman would call a one-time pad. Period. Clap clap whistle clap....... Aha, wit still survives on the cypherpunks list!!!! Truly inspired. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Don't ask why, thank you.
by C. H. Lim 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Well said ! Users please take note about abuse of system.

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