December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Sliderules, Logs, and Prodigies
by frantz＠netcom.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

At 10:30 AM 11/1/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Sliderules were just becoming common when I was in high school.... > >Seriously, only a very few of us had and used sliderules...mine was a big >synthetic K & E (Keuffel and Esser, as I recall). The raging "DOS vs. Mac" >or "RISC vs. CISC" debate of that age was "aluminum" (the yellow Dietzgens) >vs. the old standby, "bamboo." Plus some oddball circular sliderules. Slide rules are still, IMHO, the best calculator to keep in a car for calculating gas mileage. They are rugged, have no batteries, are not attractive to thieves, and have sufficient accuracy for the problem. They also teach the logarithm relation, which is valuable for understanding the physical universe. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Tired of Dole/Clinton? | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | Vote 3rd party. I'm | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | Voting for Harry Browne | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Stanford Patents
by Kent Briggs 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Has anyone heard anything from the Schlafly vs PKP case? There were supposed to be patent validity hearings on Wednesday. I don't know if they are still going on, Roger hasn't updated his web page yet. Kent Briggs

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ITAR restricts Financial Cryptography
by frantz＠netcom.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Just in case anyone still thinks that the ITAR doesn't interfere with the use of cryptography to protect financial systems from fraud, here is a data point. >From Robert Hettinga's e$pam list quoting the set-discuss list: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Lewis, Tony" <tlewis(a)visa.com> To: "'set-announce'" <set-announce(a)commerce.net>, "'set-discuss'" <set-discuss(a)commerce.net> Subject: Reference code availability update Date: Thu, 31 Oct 1996 21:06:34 -0800 Encoding: 14 TEXT Sender: owner-set-talk(a)commerce.NET Precedence: bulk +----------------------------------------------------+ Addressed to: set-discuss(a)commerce.net +----------------------------------------------------+ At the SET Open Vendor Meeting, MasterCard and Visa announced that a SET reference implementation would be made available. Unfortunately, producing the reference code has taken longer than we planned. Our current plan is to have it ready by the end of November, 1996. Because of U.S. export regulations, it will not be possible for us to post the reference code for download. Individuals and companies that want a copy of the reference code will need to request it. The procedures for making such a request will be announced here in approximately one week. _________________________________________________________________ Tony Lewis (tlewis(a)visa.com) Chief Systems Architect, Internet Commerce Visa International Service Association ------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message was sent by set-discuss(a)commerce.net. For a complete listing of available commands, please send mail to 'majordomo(a)commerce.net' with 'help' (no quotations) contained within the body of your message. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | Tired of Dole/Clinton? | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | Vote 3rd party. I'm | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | Voting for Harry Browne | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Development of an Open and Flexible Payment System
by Gary Howland 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Information on our payment system is now available: Development of an Open and Flexible Payment System Abstract: The Internet is in need of a simple, open, flexible and secure payment system. Many payment systems that currently exist are either proprietary, insecure, inflexible or all three. This paper examines the types of payment system in use today, the payment system requirements of Systemics Ltd., an overview of the Systemics Open Transaction (SOX(tm)) payments system that was developed, and a summary of how this system met the requirements. The SOX payment system is currently in live use for a bond trading system, and a reference implementation will shortly be made available on the Internet. http://www.systemics.com/docs/sox/overview.html

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NSA Report on Anonymous E-Cash
by John Young 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

We've put the NSA report, "How To Make A Mint: The Cryptography of Anonymous Electronic Cash, June, 1996" at: http://jya.com/nsamint.htm (84 kb) It argues the dangers of anonymous cash and how to combat it. Thanks to the authors, Laurie Law, Susan Sabett and Jerry Solinas, NSA; Thomas Vartanian, Fried, Frank; and anonymous others.

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Moneychangers and Shylocks
by Timothy C. May 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

There've been a couple of "you must be trolling us" responses to my point about the First World spending money in the Third World not being exploitation ("and we give them worthless trinkets like penicillin, schools, and roads"). I happen to believe economic development is a positive good. Were I living in a shantytown or favelo on the outskirts of some Third World town, I would want at least the _chance_ of eventually having running water, electricity, health care, and opportunity for me and my family, Arguing that native peoples were better off before the arrival of Europeans is fatuous nonsense--you can't go home again. Further, many of the leftist critiques of "moneylending as exploitation" are similar to past (and current) demonizations of moneychangers, moneylenders, shylocks, and other assorted stereotypes. I don't favor nationalistic lending and borrowing policies, which, for example, involve some central government borrowing money, sending the borrowed funds to personal Swiss bank accounts, and then sticking the nominal taxpayers with the debt. Nothing I have said here endorses this. But much lending is useful. It's the way factories get built, the way things get done. Much of the criticism of "moneylenders" is closely related, if you think about it, to criticism of "money launderers." Cypherpunks should relish the rise of new mechanisms for money laundering, moneylending, tax evasion, etc. I took the "Wired" quote about Walter Wriston "sounding like a cypherpunk" to represent this new view, in explicit contrast to his earlier views when he headed Citibank and they had a more statist approach. Your mileage may vary, but tired homilies about lending being exploitation are not very useful in this day and age. --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: New Bihman-Shamir Fault Analysis Paper
by Martin Minow 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

There is an inherent conflict between two claims that are central to the fault-analysis paper(s): "the secret key [is] stored in a tamperproof cryptographic device" and "the cryptographic key is stored in an asymmetric type of memory, in which induced faults ..." If the device is truly tamperproof, the attacker should not be able to induce faults. Even given susceptable "consumer- quality" devices, it would be trivial to store the cryptographic keys in a redundant memory configuration, such as ECC "error-correcting code" memory that can self-correct a range of failures and detect a much wider range. It would also seem reasonable to protect the cryptographic core (algorithms and data) with a digital signature that would "crash" the device, rather than proceed with incorrect key information. My naive reading of the attack suggests that storing the cryptographic key together with its one's complement would minimize the chance that an attacker can exploit asymmetric fault inducement. Finally, I'm curious whether this attack would work on masked ROM or fusable-link (one-time programmable) PROMs (not EPROMs that have no reprogramming window). These are more likely to be used in production devices than EEPROMs, if only for cost-savings. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by azur＠netcom.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>> Are there any current import restrictions for products on can legally >> manufacture, sell, and use in the United States? > >Sure. Firearms. The Gun Control Act of 1968 bans the importation of ... [snip] > >What does all that have to do with crypto? It is the *same* issue. In the >government's view, crypto is a danger to their future plans, just as >firearms are. Do you think it is a coincidence that crypto is listed as a >munition? Think about it for just a moment. Crypto is a weapon in the >hands of the people. And that's what Cypherpunks is all about. > >Starting from import restrictions, you will see restrictions on size of >keys (=maximum rounds in the magazine, now set at 10, proposed to be >lowered to six), who may own it (no felons, people convicted of certain >misdemeanors), who may sell it and how it can be purchased (must provide >identification, sales will be logged). I guess you can figure out the rest. > >--Lucky Yes, but crypto is one of the first intangible 'munitions'. It is much easier to constrain physical items than data. That is why anonimity, especially financial transaction anonymity, is so aboherant to LE. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Hacker Opportunities (Let's Make Lots Of Money) I've got the brains, you've got the tricks Let's make lots of money You've got the code, I've got the hooks Let's make lots of ... I've had enough of scheming and messing `round with jerks My crypto code's compiled, I'm afraid it doesn't work I'm looking for a partner, someone who gets things fixed Ask yourself this question: do you want to be rich? I've got the hacks, you've got the keys Let's make lots of money You've got the code, I've got the hooks Let's make lots of money You can tell I'm educated, I studied at CalTech Doctored in mathematics, I could've been set I can program a computer, choose the perfect time If you've got the inclination, I have got the crime Ooooh, there's a lot of opportunities If you know when to take them, you know There's a lot of opportunities If there aren't, you can make them (Make or break them) I've got the brains, you've got the tricks Let's make lots of money Let's make lots of ... You can see I'm single-minded, I know what I could be How do you feel about it? Come, take a walk with me I'm looking for a partner regardless of expense Think about it seriously, you know it makes sense Let's (Got the brains) Make (Got the tricks) Let's make lots of money (Money) Let's (You've got the code) Make (I've got the hacks) Let's make lots of money (Money) I've got the brains (Got the hooks) You've got the code (Got the keys) Let's make lots of money (Money) Money!

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Re: White House crypto proposal -- too little, too late
by azur＠netcom.com 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

>Are there any current import restrictions for products on can legally >manufacture, sell, and use in the United States? > >Thanks. Yes, all products which may create RF radiation (e.g., personal computers) are required to pass FCC certifications (e.g., Part 15). Also, telephone equipment (e.g., modems) must pass other Part 15 provisions before they may be sold in the U.S. to interconnect with our public switched network. PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Lamarr Labs | Voice: 1-702-658-2654 7075 West Gowan Road | Fax: 1-702-658-2673 Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Internet and Wireless Development Vote Liberatrian!

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Re: WWII & Japan (fwd)
by Jim Choate 18 Dec '03

18 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > Again they knew something was up, just not where. > > You may well be right, but there are seemingly serious > historians who claim otherwise. Since you have studied > the subject for 30 years I would be interested in your > comments on the book 'Infamy' by John Toland (1982). I like Toland a lot. I do not accept what he says without reservation. > I remember being very taken by his arguments when I > read it. He has extensively studied the protocols from > the post war hearings and military court proceedings > dealing with the subject (and they were plentiful) > interviewed many of the involved persons years after. The war trials for the Japanese were compromised by a variety of political intrigues. Ranging from political issues regarding the best way to govern the war torn country (ie can't kill too many of them or the Japanese will simply pick up weapons again with an estimated 1,000,000 US dead as a result) to the biological weapons that were developed which were quite useful for the Allies sans the Soviets. > According to Toland: > > The US president, selected members of his cabinette and a > few admirals and generals knew - from Magic and the 'winds' > execute, radio traffic analysis, diplomatic sources, double > agents - exactly when and where the Japaneese were going to > attack, but didn't warn Hawaii, fearing that too efficient > counter-measures by the Oahu military might make the attack > abort and so not convince the isolationists. The unexpected > tactical capabilities of the Japaneese armada then made a > cover-up all the more important. Hawaii appears in *NO* MAGIC transmissions of that time period. If you, Toland, or anyone else can give specifig MAGIC intercepts I would be greatly appreciative. The MAGIC intercepts did mention Borneo, The Ka Peninsula, and the Phillipines (where the B-17's were headed that were destroyed at Pearl). The radio traffic analysis, ship movement analysis, etc. did not point to a specific target (how could they considering the breath of the Japanese opening attacks all over the Pacific) only that the Japanese were serious. The isolationists were never convinced (eg Lindbergh) that war was the right thing to do. There was nothing unexpected about the tactics. There were two previous test of shallow water torpedo attacks, both successful. The first was by the British and the second was by the US at Pearl (how is that for irony?) which was attended by Japanese observers. The heads of state and military did not seriously believe Hawaii was a realistic target and therefore looked elsewhere. Sun Tzu says the first target in war is your opponents mind, the Japanese took it to heart. Jim Choate

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