December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Anderson & Kuhn's "Improved DFA" paper
by stewarts＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HP just announced their big new plans for international exportable crypto using tamperproof PCM-CIA smartcards with multiple tamperproof GAK plugins. Anderson&Kuhn just announced the latest in a series of attacks on "tamperproof" hardware crypto modules by Israeli, UK, and US cryptographers. Obviously it must be a conspiracy :-) It's also an opportunity for some well-timed press releases. Clipper 1's reputation was severely damaged by Matt's attack. Anybody know if HP's giving out samples, and if there are real or test GAK plugins for them? HP URL http://www.dmo.hp.com/gsy/security/icf/main.html The paper was posted to coderpunks, and it's on ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/dfa Here's the intro: --------------------------------------------------------------------- Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk # (If this is posted to cypherpunks, I'm currently lurking from fcpunx, # so please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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BIS E-money Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to IG, we've put a copy of the BIS report on E-money at: http://jya.com/bis_emoney.html Here's a blurb from the intro: Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money October 1996 Since the end of 1995 the central banks of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries have been studying the development of electronic money and the various policy issues which it raises. Much of this work has been carried out by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) or by monetary policy experts from G-10 central banks. Electronic money was discussed by BIS member central banks at meetings in Basle in July and September 1996. In August, the BIS published a report on the Security of Electronic Money prepared by the CPSS and the Group of Computer Experts. This report provides a definition of electronic money and a description of its key features. It discusses the factors influencing the development of e-money products. Finally, it reviews the policy issues raised by e-money developments, as seen from a central bank perspective, and discusses the possible policy responses. --

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New Paper: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite
by Craig H. Rowland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All, I have released a new paper entitled: Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite This paper demonstrates several methods of encoding secret data into the headers of the TCP/IP protocol. Main topics of interest include: - Encoding data into IP headers. - Encoding data into TCP headers. Specific areas of focus allow encoding of data into the IP identification fields and TCP sequence number fields for clandestine transmission of data to a remote host. Packets of data appear normal to network sniffers and packet filters, yet can contain hidden messages in either plaintext or ciphertext. Other methods revealed include a new technique where forged packets can be "bounced" off any Internet connected site to establish a communication path that appears to originate from the "bounced" host. Additionally, several methods are discussed regarding bypassing of packet filters with encoded data for communication with hosts inside a protected network. This paper contains actual demonstrations as well as source code for Linux 2.x systems to allow encoded transmissions between sites to be tested. If you are interested in reading this paper, please visit my website: http://www.psionic.com/papers.html This site has VERY limited bandwidth so please be patient if it is slow. Thank you for your time.. -- Craig

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:09 PM 11/20/96 -0800, Hal Finney wrote: >What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues >realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working >on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", >a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. "A Fire Upon the Deep", Vernor Vinge presents one time pads as the most valuable item in intersteller commerce. Crypto also plays an important role during the final battle. He also has a new take on exceeding the speed (of light) limit, and a well drawn group-mind species. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: The Limey PUNK needs TERMINATED
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I saw what happened. It's very sad. George P.S. Nobody can threaten another site or another invidual and keep one's humanity for too long. I often regret angry emotions, as we all do. The saddening thing is when threats get _too_ far. I cannot control anybody's behaviour, nor have endless energy to explain things. I am but an ignorant little cog in the Wheels most of the time, and need an atmosphere of trust like everybody. I can see truth buried under a lot of people's rudeness, and I can see violence buried in a lot of people's politeness. Silence is sometimes the best policy. I do not enforce it on anybody. I take a vow of silence when saying anything makes things worse.

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anonymous proxy server in 100 lines of Perl (fwd)
by Martin Hamilton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure this could be squeezed onto one line. Sheesh - comments even! :-) Martin ------- Forwarded Message From: Randal Schwartz <merlyn(a)stonehenge.com> To: libwww-perl(a)ics.UCI.EDU Subject: anonymous proxy server in 100 lines of Perl Date: 20 Nov 1996 20:21:43 -0700 No cookies. No referer. No From. All we need is a dozen of these around the planet. :-) Gisle, thanks. You truly are "the wizard of aas". :-) And yes, this is the code for the next Web Techniques magazine column. #!/home/merlyn/bin/perl -Tw use strict; $ENV{PATH} = join ":", qw(/usr/ucb /bin /usr/bin); $|++; ## Copyright (c) 1996 by Randal L. Schwartz ## This program is free software; you can redistribute it ## and/or modify it under the same terms as Perl itself. ## Anonymous HTTP proxy (handles http:, gopher:, ftp:) ## requires LWP 5.04 or later my $HOST = "localhost"; my $PORT = "8008"; sub prefix { my $now = localtime; join "", map { "[$now] [${$}] $_\n" } split /\n/, join "", @_; } $SIG{__WARN__} = sub { warn prefix @_ }; $SIG{__DIE__} = sub { die prefix @_ }; $SIG{CLD} = $SIG{CHLD} = sub { wait; }; my $AGENT; # global user agent (for efficiency) BEGIN { use LWP::UserAgent; @MyAgent::ISA = qw(LWP::UserAgent); # set inheritance $AGENT = MyAgent->new; $AGENT->agent("anon/0.07"); $AGENT->env_proxy; } sub MyAgent::redirect_ok { 0 } # redirects should pass through { ### MAIN ### use HTTP::Daemon; my $master = new HTTP::Daemon LocalAddr => $HOST, LocalPort => $PORT; warn "set your proxy to <URL:", $master->url, ">"; my $slave; &handle_connection($slave) while $slave = $master->accept; exit 0; } ### END MAIN ### sub handle_connection { my $connection = shift; # HTTP::Daemon::ClientConn my $pid = fork; if ($pid) { # spawn OK, and I'm the parent close $connection; return; } ## spawn failed, or I'm a good child my $request = $connection->get_request; if (defined($request)) { my $response = &fetch_request($request); $connection->send_response($response); close $connection; } exit 0 if defined $pid; # exit if I'm a good child with a good parent } sub fetch_request { my $request = shift; # HTTP::Request use HTTP::Response; my $url = $request->url; warn "fetching $url"; if ($url->scheme !~ /^(http|gopher|ftp)$/) { my $res = HTTP::Response->new(403, "Forbidden"); $res->content("bad scheme: @{[$url->scheme]}\n"); $res; } elsif (not $url->rel->netloc) { my $res = HTTP::Response->new(403, "Forbidden"); $res->content("relative URL not permitted\n"); $res; } else { &fetch_validated_request($request); } } sub fetch_validated_request { my $request = shift; # HTTP::Request ## uses global $AGENT ## warn "orig request: <<<", $request->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $request->remove_header(qw(User-Agent From Referer Cookie)); ## warn "anon request: <<<", $request->headers_as_string, ">>>"; my $response = $AGENT->request($request); ## warn "orig response: <<<", $response->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $response->remove_header(qw(Set-Cookie)); ## warn "anon response: <<<", $response->headers_as_string, ">>>"; $response; } ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Draft OECD crypto guidelines on WWW
by Robin Whittle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have obtained the OECD draft crypto guidelines from: http://www.quintessenz.at/Netzteil/OECD/index.html where they are a Word 6 file. I have converted them to HTML and put them at: http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr/crypto/oecd_dr.htm This is probably not the absolute latest draft, but it is the best I can get. I think there is a lot of good material here, but they still seem wedded to the idea of key-recovery or some other means of governments accessing plaintext or keys. They seem to assume there will always be a copy of the key around the place somewhere. In general, in the future cryptographic exchanges will use fresh key-pairs for each session, so not even the user can get a copy of the private key. Maybe key-recovery techniques are designed to cope with this, but the question is why would anyone want to use such a system other than that the government (and some corporations aligned with the government) want them to? There is no reason why ordinary or criminal users should be interested in key recovery/escrow, or weakened key-spaces - what they need is simple to use, totally secure, end-to-end encryption. The whole aim is to make a bulletproof secure pipe that doesn't depend on any other data, technology or administrative actions. The draft guidelines have my comments at the start, including a suggested rewording of paragraph 88 which currently states that crypto systems *should* provide for lawful access to the plaintext/key. The OECD people do not seem to have considered the fact that criminals will wrap their material in a crypto system they can trust before putting it through the government mandated system that they don't trust. My comments include a more detailed discussion of this argument, particularly in the situation where criminals are communicating with non-criminals. In a nutshell, how is all the cost, risk, doubt and complication of key escrow/recovery etc. justified by its benefits for serious crime prevention/deterrence, when the great majority of criminals and a large number of ordinary private and commercial users will be applying their own strong encryption first? Does anyone know of writing that specifically tackles this question? This is a separate question from those about whether governments can be trusted, or about absolute rights to privacy etc. It is simply a cost/benefit analysis. To me the benefits for reducing serious crime seem slim indeed and the costs - not least the general feeling that people may be using daily a system specifically designed for tapping their communications - seem to be very high. - Robin . Robin Whittle . . http://www.ozemail.com.au/~firstpr firstpr(a)ozemail.com.au . . 11 Miller St. Heidelberg Heights 3081 Melbourne Australia . . Ph +61-3-9459-2889 Fax +61-3-9458-1736 . . Consumer advocacy in telecommunications, especially privacy . . . . First Principles - Research and expression - music, . . music industry, telecommunications . . human factors in technology adoption. . . . Real World Interfaces - Hardware and software, especially . . for music .

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Any RC4 attacks?
by Jim & Carla Rogers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Schneier claims that RC4 has not yet fallen to crypanalytic attack. Assuming that a sufficient length key is used (>= 128 bits), have there been any successful attacks? Jim Rogers

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Patent Fight Could Add to Cost of Inter
by Alan Pugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By KATHLEEN SAMPEY Associated Press Writer NEW YORK (AP) _ A little-known patent could raise the cost of doing business over the Internet for companies selling software, video or other digital products delivered online. E-Data Corp. of Secaucus, N.J., is suing 17 companies, including McGraw-Hill and CompuServe, to collect licensing fees on the patent, which protects downloading of encrypted digital information. A court hearing is scheduled Dec. 6 in New York on the company's claims. Analysts said the patent will not significantly restrain Internet commerce, but would raise the cost of doing business on the Internet and cause headaches for small start-up companies. Some companies, including Adobe Systems and VocalTec, have grudgingly paid the licensing fee. Others intend to fight it. ``We believe it's important to draw a line in the sand and make them prove infringement,'' said CompuServe spokeswoman Gail Whitcomb. ``We think their claim is way too broad.'' Arnold Freilich, E-Data's president, said the company bought rights to the patent in 1994. He won't disclose how much the company has made from it, but said it covers digital products such as text, software, images, music and video transmitted through phone lines to customers. Companies that take orders for products over the Internet, then ship them by mail would not be affected. The patent was first issued in 1985 to Charles Freeny Jr. Freeny, an electrical engineer, held the digital encryption patent until 1989. Unable to make money on it, he sold it for about $100,000 to a company called Avedas Corp. ``I didn't foresee the Internet,'' he said. Avedas couldn't make money from it either and has since gone out of business. By 1994, when E-Data bought the patent for $290,000, the World Wide Web had come of age, and so had the possibility of enforcing the patent, which expires in 2003. Peter Tracy remembers making the acquaintance of U.S. Patent No. 4,528,643. His East Haven, Conn.-based company, MicroPatent, operates a Web site where users can search and download patent and trademark information for 25 cents a page. On March 22, he received a packet from E-Data saying his company might be infringing on the patent. He could either pay a fee based on the percentage of his Web site profits, or be sued. ``I felt like I had been sucked into (a) bottomless pit,'' he said. MicroPatent agreed to pay the licensing fee, which Tracy will not disclose. The cost of the annual fees range from 1 percent to 5 percent of sales under $1 million, according to David Fink, E-Data's attorney. For sales over $1 million, the rate is determined on an individual basis, he said. Several cases already have been dismissed because either defendants paid the fees or they were found not to be in violation, he said. Cases against Dun & Bradstreet, Decision Support and Meca Software were dismissed. Company representatives either could not be reached or refused comment. IBM spokesman Fred McNeese declined comment on questions about E-Data or the licensing fees. But companies such as McGraw-Hill are anticipating the December court hearing. ``We fail to see anything that we do in our businesses that infringes on this patent,'' said McGraw-Hill spokesman Steven Weiss. ``We've asked them continually what we've been doing, and E-Data has not told us _ aside from accusing us. ``We have no plans to pay them anything,'' he said. But Freilich said the patent is specific in its description of encrypted digital data, which is how many companies have sold such information since 1994. For example, a customer orders a digital product over the Internet, and pays for it through the Internet with a credit card. These types of transactions are not all that new, as in CompuServe's case. But once the product has been downloaded to the customer's terminal, an encryption code is provided by the seller to unlock the encryption, thereby allowing the customer to use the product. It is this added step that Freilich said the patent describes. Today's network organization also makes the patent enforceable, he said. In 1985 when the patent was granted, there was no such thing as an addressable computer or the Web. ``The technology has brought us to the point where anyone's computer terminal is addressable, where encryption is commonplace and that has led to the enforcement of this patent,'' Freilich said. Scott Smith, analyst at Jupiter Communications, predicted the case would not dampen Web commerce. ``I think it's a blip on the radar,'' he said. ``It may hurt some of the start ups. But larger companies face this kind of thing all the time. They'll be able to shake it off.'' While some may accuse E-Data of trying to stifle Internet commerce, Fink sees his client's efforts merely as a means to cash in on a legitimate, far-sighted investment. ``Besides,'' he said, ``3 cents on the dollar will not put any company out of business.'' AP-DS-11-19-96 2327EST * * * END OF DELIVERY * * *

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Magic passwodr in BIOS?
by Kamil Golombek 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, yesterday I've read about so called "magic password" in AWARD BIOS. It was a surprise for me and I wasn't very happy that the way how to bypass this is so easy. But nevermind, I heve two questions about it. First, is there any way how to disabled "magic password" 589589 in AWARD BIOS? Second, does anobody know another "magic passwords" to various BIOSes? Thanks for your answers! ZERO

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