December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

David E. Smith / Known Flamer
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David E. Smith wrote: > My understanding was that the moderator is supposed to ONLY > filter out ads and utterly-content-free messages. That seems to be a very common misunderstanding--one which will remain without question on the censored list, since they have chosen to remain behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain. > (Mind you, I took the smart out and subbed to cp-unedited, > so I'm in no place to judge.) You're in a far better place to judge than those who have chosen to remain spoon-fed their world-view. > Aha, a good point to be brought up: Sandy, are you autofiltering > anyone based on user name, or on certain keywords? Seems to > defeat the purpose of having a _human_ moderator. > You realize, of course, that your question is moot, since this post of yours was already thrown in the crapper/flame-list. It seems that questioning the process is a 'flame'. Toto

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Re: Complying with the EAR [was: More Circumventing the ITAR]
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:14 AM 1/29/97 -0700, Michael Paul Johnson wrote: >On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Mark Rosen wrote: > >> I'm curious as to exactly what the ITAR/EAR/Whatever says specifically >> about "unrestricted FTP sites." My program, Kremlin, is available for > >You should check the exact text yourself, but the way I read the EAR, you >are not "exporting" strong cryptographic software without a license (exept >to Canada, which needs no license) if you do things "such as" >(1) have the guests to your site acknowledge that the EAR restricts >export, (2) have the guests affirm that they can legally get the software >(proper citizenship or residency & location), and (3) "check the address >of the destination computer to see if it is in the USA" or Canada. The >last one, I interpret rather loosely to mean that if the guest's email >address domain isn't one commonly used in the USA or Canada, then I deny >access. We all know that not all .com addresses are North American, but >chances are really good that if the address ends in .ru, then the >destination machine is probably not in North America. This is not a >perfect way to prevent export, of course, but it is what the regulations >say, as I read them. For a pointer to the regulations and to my access >request form and crypto site, see http://www.sni.net/~mpj/crypto.htm ... An easy crack to that would be to request access from a hotmail, or similair, account. This account would show up as being on US soil while the account holder would not necessarily be so. In this way, someone with an account ending in your .ru would get through because h[is/er] e-mail request originated from inside the U.S.

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy: >> >> 1. it is unconstitutional to put a crypto genie in a bottle >> in the first place. >> 2. it is unconstitutional to make laws against ringing crypto bells. > >We do not disagree except neither of the metaphors I gave suggest >anything about the "putting in the bag" part of the deal. In no >way does either suggest a right, power or even ability of anyone >to limit any freedom. They are mute on the subject. Their sole >meaning is that one CAN'T undo what is already done. In the >instant case, that means the wide-spread availability of strong >crypto. ability to use strong crypto is not "either or" but a matter of degree. the question is not "is strong crypto available", but, "how much harder would the NSA's peeping be if ITAR was relaxed? the real question is, do we have the right to use strong crypto, or don't we? if we don't then the government has the authority to regulate it to its heart's content, *regardless* of whether those laws are effective or not. cpunks seem to think that a govt can only have *effective* laws. but there is obviously no such constraint. I think we need to approach it from the point of view that we have the *right* to use strong crypto, and see if the supreme court agrees. hence I'm very interested in the bernstein etc. cases, which may be the ultimate breakthrough eventually.. there is no end to the blathering about genies, cats, or bells that can sway the govt, but a single supreme court decision can have a revolutionary effect. again I still think the genie/cat/bell metaphor is a disservice to the cause, but feel free to defy me. just one crackpot's opinion, YMMV

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RE: Machine readable form (was:RE: [DES] DES Key Recovery Project, Progress Report #7)
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Phil Karn You have to admit that it is far more consistent to treat both the book and the floppy as a munition than to take the position DoS eventually took. Even if the more consistent position is a far more restrictive one that has even less chance of surviving a court challenge. ........................................................... In terms of consistency, if the government reserved the right to control printed source code (in the future), and books and floppys containing it are considered munitions, then cryptographers, who have it in their heads, would also be considered munitions. They would have to be prohibited from leaving the country and constrained not only from using the internet, but from any kind of communications medium. Ian Goldberg would not be allowed to visit Anguilla or participate in any more contests. :>) .. Blanc

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:15 AM 1/30/97 -0800, jim bell wrote: >What you're presented (included in its entirety below) is what I've come to >call an "AP story problem." I've worked through many of those myself; >their main problem is that they don't carefully describe why _each_ person >in the "play" you've described would be motivated to do what it's claim he >does, and why he DOES NOT do other things to fix the situation he's in. >Remember, I'm not merely talking about the main character, but also the ones >who are (apparently?) incidental. > >For just one example, you said: "conventional bodyguards could be >included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledgethat they will be >buried with the tyrant." > >What motivates these people? Are they hostages? If they're hostages, then >presumably that means they're motivated to seek the death of anyone who is >holding them. What about their relatives; don't they have any sympathy for >those who are taken? Why don't they donate to AP to see the lead guy dead? As I stated in the bottom, the children would be privaledged. They would merely be told that it is a great honor. It could very well be. Assuming that the tyrant did not die, these children would live in comparable luxery. They would be at risk only if the tyrant was. By keeping the children at hand, the parents would balk at taking action against the tyrant, not only their own action, but also that of others. The children would merely be there to thwart the attempts of others. The "Tiger Teams" would have to get through security on their own, takers on this offer would be very few unless the bounty were great, the defenses were weak, or the thrill level were high. An encounter with a bloodless thrill seaker might go like this "I hacked your system, here's proof, now pay up", remember, for some, it is the proof that a thing can be done that is the greatest thrill. Also, the tyrant would feel bound to keep h[is/er] word to avoid others deciding to take the challenge for the smaller sum. Remember also that 10% controls 90%, this means that each potential tyrant has on average 9% of the wealth, while the remaining 90% has about 1/90th of the remaining 10%. To match the wealth of the tyrant, these people would have to get together 90% of their numbers and commit everything. If 100 people were in the total population, and 1000 dollars in circulation, 10 people would be tyrants with about 90 dollars apiece, the remaining 90 people would each have 100/90 dollars, or 1.11 dollars each. It would take 81 of them together to match the wealth of one. With that many, they might as well attack outright because they would now include practically all of the population. If the tyrant had more than 9 of the peasants close to him, he would be at risk by conventional means. The real threat would not be the people, of limited means, using the system. But rather other tyrants using the system.

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Re: Workaround for filtering/cybersitter
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:43 PM 1/29/97 -0500, Mark Rogaski wrote: >If I had experience with Netscape plugins and spare time, I'd >try it myself. But here's my proposed solution. > >A plugin in Netscape intercepts all requests, encrypt the URL >with a pubkey algorithm, encode the string base64, send it as GET input to >a proxy server. > >The proxy server decodes and decrypts the URL, gets the requested page, >and returns it. This beats out URL-based filtering. > >Still need to figure out the specifics of key-exchange. If we use >40-bit encryption, it's exportable, and it still works in our threat >model (ie. we don't care if the watchers figure out the URL a few hours >later). > >To beat out dropping packets with unacceptable pattern in them, we >could use an SSL-based server as the proxy. > >The plugin could even have a nice little on/off switch and a list >list of available proxies. ... The above paragraph would be a problem, unless you wanted to update the program with a great regualrity. Each time the offending government got the software and blocked all of those sites, the software would be worthless. This would be no big deal if you could guarantee some means of someone getting the software, which would certainly be illegal, again and again. Better to have the user key in the proxy that h[is/er] cousin/uncle/best friend/boss/client/guest told h[im/er] about. Here is a similar idea. Have your plug-in replace the part of Netscape that checks the URL with INTERNIC or similar. Have the system accept your address for the proxy and send the requested URL to it, the server then FTP's the contents of the page (and if server time is readily available, its sub-pages), places them in a temporary directory on itself and allows your computer to see it there thinking that it is on a totally different machine. This way the proxy owner would not have to stay on top of the latest restricted material. The main problem would be that the system would absorb twice as much time, once for the download to itself, and once to show it to you. This is not terribly different to Netscape's caching of recently visited pages in memory on the off-chance that you will return. If you changed passwords at the same time that you changed addresses, and reported them together, the government wouldn't be able to keep up. When the government did its sweep of objectionable words, it would come to this site that would have no such data. Only by having the access password, would they be able to reveal that site as a proxy. If they knew the password then they would already know that that was a proxy site because they would have been given both the password and the address at the same time. You then try to maintain several different addressess at a time, each with a different password. As the Government blocks one, change its password and its address. The software would be either two-piece, assuming a dedicated client plug-in, or one-piece. The pieces would be as follows. The proxy, this software would be as small as possible and would only be a front end. Ideally this software should fit on one 3.5" disk. The address to this machine would be the address handed out. In the one-part scenario, this would be implemented as a web-page with a CGI script for the address. The user types in the request and this bot fetches it, placing it in a special directory for the use of this script, this directory would probably be erased after the allotted space was filled, though not before, (you don't stay logged in to the remote machine when using Netscape so erasing on hang-up would mean continually reloading the data.) The proxy would then refresh your client with the requested information. In the two piece scenario, this proxy would interact with the plug-in in much the same way, forgoing the CGI script. The client, the plug-in, if present, would take over the Location field and have a set up menu to type in the proxy's URL and password. In that way the user would see h[im/er]self as accessing the web page directly. Certainly more user friendly, once the client were configured, though not quite as flexible. In this system the government could make both accessing the proxy and possession of the client illegal. It would also be a problem for persons who use a machine to which they have no control. If the setup were un changeable or reset after power-down, this system would require the user to continually re set up the client. The proxy could be as simple as an opening screen with a field for the password and the URL. The proxy should re-link all external links into its own system so that the system can be transparent after the initial page. In other words, the links should be replaced with a second HTML document with the password and search-criteria inside in much the same way that search-engines relay your request to itself, in the URL. This would be a simple script that changed all occurances of "A HREF="HTTP://This.is.the/real/site.html"" to "A HREF="internal/directory.html Query?=HTTP://This.is.the/real/site.html+password""

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Re: Workaround for filtering/cybersitter
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:28 PM 1/30/97 -0600, William H. Geiger III wrote: ... >I would also want to make the ISP's liable for their users accessing this info. That way I >can intimidate them into doing all the work for me. (You can see >this approach in several areas of US law enforcemant. Arrest bartenders for >serving minors, arrest store clerks for selling cigaretts to minors, shut down of BBS for >users posting "dirty pictures", going after ISP's for pirated >software and other copyright infringments by their users.) ... I live in Oklahoma. Here at least, bartenders don't sell beer to minors, they sell it to persons who are clearly older. Older friends of the minors, and minors who finished puberty early. The bartenders only protection is to close up shop, depriving everyone of a drink. The same is true of tobacco products. About 8 months ago I had a girl who I barely knew, except that she was obviously in Junior High, recognize me, ask me if I was 18, to which I replied yes, and ask me to buy her a carton of cigerettes, to which I declined. Not for any law imeding me, but I consider suicide a right, but I will not help someone kill themselves. This girl, more than likely already hooked on the drug, had probably used this technique numerous times before without a glitch. The same would be true of blockingon-line content. If it were done right.

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(no subject)
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12251227

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job opportunities
by Lee Tien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have no idea whether members of this list are interested in these kinds of jobs, but hey, can't hurt to ask. For the next 3 months (until April 30), Farallon Communications is trying to focus on filling several key engineering positions in the Netopia and LAN groups. (Netopia is a product line of ISDN devices) My wife works at Farallon in product marketing for Netopia stuff. They started out as a Macintosh networking company and have gone "Internet." Firmware Engineers: 3 for Netopia and 1 for LAN Hardware Engineers: 1 for Netopia and 1 for LAN There is some flexibility for the firmware positions to work either in Alameda or San Jose. I'm not sure about the job descriptions; I just looked at http://www.farallon.com/corp/jobs/index.html and this might accurately describe some of the positions mentioned above: Sr. Staff Engineer (WAN) -- San Jose and Alameda 4 Openings Senior member of the software development team responsible for architecture, design and implementation of embedded systems firmware on new and existing WAN products. Hands-on design position requiring a BSCS or a BSEE with advanced degree preferred. The ideal candidate will have 10+ years networking or telecommunications development experience and expert knowledge of multi-protocol routing and bridging. Expertise in networking layer technologies/protocols and data compression required. Lee Tien

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Intelligence Update (fwd)
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Update on Bugging Devices >================================================= > >0.902 - 0.928 ghz - Popular Commercial FH/DS Devices >1.710 - 1.755 ghz - DEA Audio/Video Bugs (over 1400 bugs purchased in 1995) >1.710 - 1.755 ghz - DOJ Audio/Video Bugs (.25 to .50 watts) >1.710 - 1.850 ghz - Treasury Video Surveillance Systems >2.400 - 2.484 ghz - Popular Commercial FH/DS Devices >4.635 - 4.660 ghz - Treasury Video Surveillance Systems > >Most recently purchased gvt microwave surveillance gear seems to be running >between 900mhz to 5ghz, with a few systems operating on the 7/8 ghz bands. > >Also, keep in mind that the pros love to use ultra low power devices which >use the power lines as the transmission medium/antenna (9khz to 300 mhz). >Devices typically operate below 10mw, often below 1mw. The devices >typically use Wide FM and use voice inversion encryption... VERY easy to >demodulate. > >Note: According to a recently obtained DOJ surveillance training manual: > >"The typical range for the 28 ghz devices is six miles, the typical range >of the 2.4 ghz is thirty miles, and the typical range for the 1.7ghz is 44 >miles." > >"... frequency modulated applications should operate below 3 ghz to take >advantage of the favorable frequency propagation characteristics of that >part of the spectrum." > >"...Frequency Hopping and Direct Sequence Devices spead spectrum devices >should operate above 1.5 ghz, this will prevent the emissions from being >detected by electronic countermeasures." > >The most popular surveillance reciever used covers 9khz (for CC/VLF) up to >9ghz, so be sure to cover AT LEAST those bands. > >================================================= > >All TSCM people have heard about AID devices, but few know the actual freq >they use, or what they look like. > >The devices are VERY popular with the law enforcement crowd, private >investigators and corporate security types. The equipment is VERY overpriced, >and the fairly easy to detect. > >AID bills itself as "The World's Largest Manufacturer of Electronic >Intelligence Equipment and Specialized Protective Systems" > >AID was founded in 1970, and was sold in 92/93 to Westinghouse (Westinghouse is >currently selling TONS of equipment to the DEA and State dept) > >AID - Westinghouse/Audio Intelligence Devices, Inc. Bug Freqs > >135 MHz - 150 MHz Special Order/Secondary Band >150 MHz - 174 MHz Standard/Primary Band (Most Popular) >216 MHz - 220 MHz Special Order >400 MHz - 470 MHz UHF Repeaters > > 21 MHz - 80 MHz Very Low Power WFM (.5mw - 10mw) Special Order Only > 36 MHz - 39 MHz Very Low Power WFM (.5mw - 50mw) ***Very Dangerous*** > 80 kHz - 200 kHz "Line Carrier" Microphone Systems ***Very Dangerous*** > 30 kHz - 700 kHz Spread Spectrum Current Carrier Devices > >1700MHz - 1900MHz 25-250mw Video and audio bugs (Mostly DEA/DOJ stuff) >2400MHz - 2484MHz 25-250mw Video and audio bugs > >If the signal is "scrambled" it is nothing more than simple voice inversion, >a circuit to "de-scramble" costs around $20. > >Note: AID devices are often re-tuned for outband channels... so be careful. > >The area of spectrum from 15MHz to 500MHz is the primary threat, 500MHz to 3GHz >is the secondary threat, a "line carrier" threat is from 30kHz to 750kHz. > >If the person planting the bug suspects that a TSCM inspection may be >conducted then AID suggests a frequency between 30MHz to 50MHz, >sensitivity of rcvr should be better than .18uv/-122dbm. The mode is >usually wideband FM. > >Also, keep in mind that AID devices are frequently used for illegal buggings, >so be familiar with their realistic specs, expect power outputs well under >50mw, and expect to see the AC power circuits being used as the antenna. > >Note: Mike Langley at NIA advises that AID/NIA/Westinghouse is totally >shutting down all TSCM training, at that they have cancelled the production >of all TSCM products effective 1 Jan 97. > >================================================= > >Several devices were recently found at a DOE facility on Long Island, >details are a bit sketchy, but initial information indicates that a >defecting middle-eastern FIS agent provided a list of locations within >several DOE facilties that were being targeted.TSCM inspection (not >performed by DOE) located several devices. Facility/lab working on designs >for triggering mechanisms... very interesting incident. > >================================================= > >HDS - Household Data Services > 50.000 - 750.000 kHz Carrier Current Audio System >120.000 - 400.000 kHz Carrier Current Audio System >138.000 - 174.000 MHz Wireless microphone/Body Wires (8KR Series .1 to 30 mw) >150.000 - 174.000 MHz Wireless microphone/Body Wires (ATX Series .1 to 30 mw) >174.000 - 230.000 MHz Wireless microphone/Body Wires >350.000 - 440.000 MHz Audio/Video Transmitters (360-440 popular) >470.000 - 608.000 MHz Audio/Video Transmitters >570.000 - 928.000 MHz Audio/Video Transmitters (Spread Spectrum Popular) > 1,000 - 1,500 MHz Low Power Audio/Video Transmitter (10-100mw max) > 1,425 - 1,450 MHz Low Power Audio/Video Transmitter (10-100mw max) > 1,700 - 2,700 MHz Audio/Video Transmitters 2.4-2.5 hot (10-100mw max) > 1,710 - 1,900 MHz Audio/Video Transmitters (10-100mw max) ** HOT ** > 6,425 - 7,125 MHz Low Power Audio/Video Transmitter (10-100mw max) > 8,100 - 8,700 MHz Audio/Video Transmitter, 8.2/8.5 popular (10-100mw max) >10,200 - 10,700 MHz Audio/Video Transmitter, 10.5 popular (10-100mw max) >17,700 - 19,700 MHz Low Power Audio/Video Transmitter (10-100mw max) >20,000 - 24,600 MHz Low Power Audio/Video Transmitter (10-100mw max) > >================================================= > >Sony - Wireless Microphones and Body Wires >470.000 - 489.000 MHz 2.5mw - 20mw, WFM (110kHz), Ultra low power >770.000 - 782.000 MHz 2.5mw - 10mw, Ultra low power - Chnl 64 >782.000 - 794.000 MHz 2.5mw - 10mw, Ultra low power - Chnl 66 >794.000 - 806.000 MHz 2.5mw - 10mw, Ultra low power - Chnl 68 >770.000 - 810.000 MHz 2.5mw - 20mw, WFM (110kHz), Ultra low power >902.000 - 928.000 MHz 2.5mw - 20mw, WFM (110kHz), Ultra low power >947.000 - 954.000 MHz 2.5mw - 20mw, WFM (110kHz), Ultra low power > 60.000 - 970.000 MHz 2.5mw - 10mw, WFM (300kHz) Audio Transmitter > >Note: These little low power devices have an adjustable freq deviation >which can be adjusted to as high as +/- 225khz... System also uses a >matched receiver. Entire system xmitter and cvr sell for under $2500. > >Imagine a 3mw transmitter operating at 782mhz (snuggled up to the audio of >the local TV xmitter) using a 100khz cue channel subcarrier. Life >expectancy at least 350 hours (using lithium cells). Reasonable range at >least 1500 feet indoors. > >================================================= > >Finished putting the final touches on a new page >concerning Mace and Personal Protection Sprays. > >Drop by and let me know what you think. > > http://www.tscm.com/mace > > >The ASP - Armament Systems and Procedures Web page is >now also online, the address follows: > > http://www.tscm.com/asp/ > >================================================= > >BMS manufactures a line of pro-grade products used primarly for the >Broadcast and Television markets, but their prices are cheap, very small, >low power, and a serious threat to our clients. > >Most of their voice/video/telem products (ie:BMT25-S) operates from >900mhz-4ghz, and are easily detectable at 10mw and 100mw. > >The major threat is from the X-Band, and Ku-Band devices which they sell >that operate up to 13.5ghz. > >Keep in mind the devices are as small as 1.0in x 1.0in x 3.3in, and can be >run from a 12vdc battery for days, if not weeks. > >Most of the devices utilize a variable frequency audio dual sub-carrier >between 4 to 9 mhz. > >They sell small omni directional, and highly directional antenna as well. > >================================================= > >Intel on Microwave surveillance system (made by AST in MD ??) > >Stock Devices >1.2 to 2.2 ghz >3.7 to 4.2 ghz >5.9 to 6.45 ghz > >Special Order Devices (1.4 ghz bands) >1.2 to 2.8 ghz - Justice just bought a bunch of these >2.2 to 3.8 ghz >3.2 to 4.8 ghz - State Department item >4.2 to 5.8 ghz >5.2 to 6.8 ghz > >Tech material mentions product available to 8.5/8.8 ghz > >All funtions (including freq) are software controlled, > >Direct Sequence output, 60 mhz window for spread spectrum > >Device designed to transmit FDM baseband signals from a PBX backplane using >QAM 64 or 256 modulation. > >The box I examined measured 1 * 3.5 * 3 and took power from 8 to 16 vdc (12 >pref). > >Output power fixed at 100mw > >================================================= > >Recently I did some work designing an experimental spread sprectrum >wireless microphone. > >The goal of the project was to see just how small, and how cheaply a >realistic device could be built. > >Initial goal was a device that would use the 47 CFR 15.247 for the ISM band >from 902 to 928 mhz and an enhancement (jumper change) mode to extend the >upper frequency range to 954 mhz. > >The device would have to have a range of at least 150 feet in a hotel >building and/or office building (parking lot monitoring). > >The device must be small enough to be "dropped in a pocket," concealed in >the seam of a drape, and placed into furniture. > >Device must use consumer (radio shack) batteries. > >Device must cost less $100 in materials to build > >I felt the above specs would reflect a realistic device. > >--------------- > >1) Battery used was 2ea EPX-76 cells which gave 2.5 to 3 hours of usable >audio, sub-ed a DL123A lithium which upped the time to over 4 days (and >still counting) > >2) Microphone was two surface mount Seimens hearing aid elements. > >3) Spread Spectrum controller was a surface mount WL-9010 from Wireless >Logic, the chip is a compact stand alone transmitter. > >4) Used a Mitsubishi codec chip commonly used in cellular telephone with a >noise cancelling circuit (this is why two microphones were used). > >5) Small pot was used to adjust the output power between .15mw to 65mw > >6) All components used where SMT versions, hot flow was used for assembly > >7) Entire circuit was assembled on a .30 by .25 inches square double sided >printed circuit board. > >8) PCB soldered directly to battery cap > >9) .5 inch long paper clip used as antenna > >10) Currently working on a telephone line version. > >11) Range at 50mw (legal power limit) tested usable and clear at 260 feet >(device placed in hotel room, and monitored in the parking lot) > >12) Device WAS NOT detectable with an AVCOM 65 until the antenna was within >8 inches of the device (until a hump started to slightly appear). > > >What doe this tell us? > >Spread spectrum devices can be real small, cheaply made, and low power >using off the shelf products. > >Watch that area between 800 mhz and 1 gig > >================================================= > >We are interested in purchasing old catalogs, training materials, and technical >documentation used by Audio Intelligence Devices, HDS, and other >surveillance companies. > >Specifically we are looking for: > > Old product catalogs > Sales materials picked up at trade shows (IE: NATIA) > Training Manuals from National Intelligence Academy > Textbooks from National Intelligence Academy > Product Owners Manuals > Product Service Manuals > >We are also interested in purchasing "generations" of materials, so if you >have ten years worth of old catalogs from the '70s were interested. > >Let us know what you've got, and we'll work out cash payment arrangements. > >The materials will be used for project that starts in January and will run >for at least six months. > >If you have materials from other technical intelligence schools or >surveillance we could also be interested. > >================================================= > >I recently had a chance to examine a new device made by Delft >Industries. > >It is very similar to the X-Band units I've examined, >except that the frequencies were higher and mods were much >more subtle. > >Small PCB was cemented into the rear of the unit, underneath the regular >PCB (black rubber covered 1.5 cm * 4cm * .8cm). > >Unit consited of a two microphones, compander circuits, >power supply/regulator, and modulator circuit. > >Compander circuit operated dual circuits around 120hz to 15khz. > >No external mods to case, only very small variation in power drain, >no internal battery, several large surface mount caps... > >Entire unit double sided surface mount PCB, looks like 4 layers, >2/3 digital circuitry, 1/3 analog and RF circuitry. > >The only mods to the alarm PCB was the cutting of several traces >on the back of the PCB (near the emitter circuit). > >The doppler alarm operated between 24 ghz and 24.25 ghz, intelligence >seems to be a 480k bit digital data stream using the alarm >signal as the carrier (QAM mod). > >Looks like one version of the product will also allow someone >to deactivate a specific sensor remotely upon on command. > >According to the factory, the units are being shipped into >Canada and Mexico in quanity, then transported into the >US in small quantities. > >Heavy usage in Texas, New Orleans, Florida, California, >and Pennsylvania. > >Device have already been offered for sale in several >"spy shops" in New York, and Miami. > >- Be Careful Out There > >======================================================== > >You may find it interesting to revist our web site in >the near future, during the last few months the site has > undergone incredible growth, copius additions, and changes.. > > http://www.tscm.com/ > >On January 2, 1997 we rolled out several new >product lines which increased the number of TSCM products >on our web page to over 1,000 TSCM and technical security >products. > >At the present time we have over 12,500 pages of >printed documents available for download. > >If you haven't reviewed it yet, be advised that we now >have a TDR tutorial page available online. > > http://www.tscm.com/riserbond.html > > >We've also updated the materials we have online >regarding the REI OSC-5000 > > http://www.tscm.com/reioscor.html > > > =============================================================== > >DOJ just took delivery of a large number of video transmitter modules > >Operating freqs between 8ghz and 11 ghz (PLL field programmable) > >10mw rf output (max), nominal 8.5mw > >power draw below 35ma > >baseband video trans, not SS > >all modules have audio inputs (solder tab), standard audio subcarrier, >audio section may be disabled to conserve power. > >Min. effective (flat array ant) range indicated as 2700 feet line of sight, >and 1500 rural. > >I would estimate the range to be below 500 ft with a unity gain antenna. > >A number of the units came preinstalled in fake squirel and >birds nests with a low light auto iris CCD camera (unk manuf, suspect >Kodak). I've seen similar units used by the DEA (installed under tree >bark). > >Both unity gain ant config (stub), and biconical flat pack. > >Power requirements seem to correlate to 9vdc lithium batteries. > >>From what I can see on the physical specs, looks like the transmitter, and >camera combined are 2/3 the size of a standard 9vdc battery. > >The document indicates gvt paid $874 per module (Xmit module only), >document also mentions req code for the "domestic counterterrorism" >program. > >I wonder if these are the "tree frogs" that the boys at Quantico were >trying to get bids on, back in September? > >It's only a matter of a few months before these devices start getting >"lost in the field " and start re-appearing in the private sector. > > =============================================================== > >I've heard from several engineers at TI that an unidentified gvt law >enforcement agency has them working on a super compact thermal imaging >system and video transmitter for covert surveillance. System utilizes an >electronic LCD chopper instead of the regular mechanical chopper. Device >contains integral microwave tranmitter (unk freq). From what I can gather, >these are going to be used for conducting long term thermal surveillance of >areas... I will advise as I obtain further intel. > > =============================================================== > >Just finished reading the 1997 Hewlett Packards optoelectronics designers >guide, and found several items of interest. > >Most of us are familiar with the low power 900nm I/R devices. > >But did you know that they also make CHEAP LED's for communications >that operate from 700nm to 1510nm?? > >700, 710, 875, 905, 940, 1100, and 1510nm are the most common products in >the HEMT line. > >Can be modulated (open air) from 0 to 750khz with no problem, and higher speeds >with some minor distortion. > >just a heads up > > =============================================================== > >We are taking delivery of the first 95S radio's and third generation MSS >units from Boeing... We are expecting initial shipments to customers mid to >end of Feb. > >The 95S is a stand alone wideband receiver designed for SIGINT and TSCM, >weighs in at just under 8 lbs (complete). Radio will retail for around >6,000 and 7,500 dollars (US) depending on config. > >While the unit is fully self contained, we will have a VME version avail >(we have them now). Coverage is a clean from 5khz to 8ghz (yes 8ghz), and >sensitivity is superior to anything Watkins Johnson makes. > >Reciever is being built into the new MSS-3500 briefcase system, which will >allow automated spectrum monitoring of 40ghz of spectrum in 8/9ghz >segments. > > =============================================================== > >Just finished playing with a nasty little Radio Shack (CM-421) >single channel VHF microphone. > >While the product is designed for use in the 160-220 range, it's designed >so that to be recrystalized and usable anywhere in the world. > >The product can be easily retuned from 90-300Mhz (by the book), power >output is variable via a pot from 5mw to 50mw. > >Current drain is around 40ma at 50mw, and much lower for 5mw output. > >Product is extremely stable, with adjustable deviations (to +/1 100khz) > >Integral tietack microphone > >Radio Shack will sell the xmitter only for around >50 bucks (I bought several to eval) > > =============================================================== > >Recently had access to some of the new fiber optic devices out there and >wanted to post some of the techniques by which they can be detected. > > >Subject device optics are made by Corning Glass, and consists of three >components. The "electronics" are manufactured by E-systems in Dallas, TX. > > >The entire installation kit fits into two 18 * 22 * 7 briefcases made by >SKB, the first case contains a battery powered automatic fusion >splicer/LID, equipment to test the installation, and a tool kit. The second >case contains the microphones, spools of "cable", optical modules, >controllers, and battery packs > > >1. "Front-End Microphone" is a small glass cylinder roughly 2.5mm wide x >5mm long with a small 1.5mm long pinhole tube on one end, and a 3 to 12 ft >50/125 fiber tail on the other. This part of the system is designed to be >installed "pinhole" style. Pigtail cable is routed to and fusion spliced >into a "Runner Cable". The microphone contains small barbs to keep it in >position with out the use of adhesives. A small 2.5mm needle drill bit is >used to drill the hole. > >2. The "Runner Cable" is a 50um/125um fiber optic bundle, typically 3 to 8 >fibers are combined to allow a single runner to support 6-8 devices. This >cable is flat and measures roughly 125um high, and .75 to 1mm wide. Cable >has a min. bend radius of 4cm, and is field terminated with a small >automated fusion splicer to the "Front-End Microphone". This cable can be >left loose or secured with an adhesive. Installation kit contains a small >flexible installation tube to assist in installing below carpet or behind >wood panelling. > >3. The "Repeater" consists of a disguised box roughly 15cm x 5cm x 5cm, >with an optional battery pack/power supply/trickle charger (15cm x 10cm x >5cm) or the device can be powered directly off of AC Mains. The repeater >can be easily installed and hidden in a cinder block or concrete on an >outside wall. It looks like the device is for long term installations, it >is totally sealed and the electronics have conformal coatings/potting. > >Device appears to emit a RF digital signal using 64/128/256 QAM Spread >Spectrum modulation on programmable frequencies between 1.5ghz and 8.5 ghz. >Modulator is contained into a "flat-pack" style antenna module. A 512kbps >baseband signal is supplied to the antenna (bit stream can go as high as >2mbps, the one I examined was set for 512). > >Note: The "repeater" supplies the antenna with a baseband signal, control >codes, and power. The modulator/transmitter is contained in the antenna. > >The device uses an RF guard channel that is used to deactivate all >emissions (Go Mute) upon remote command. > >The "repeater" utilizes 8 fiber outputs (it has 8 field replacable optical >modules), and one min. SMA connector for the baseband output. Suspect the >device can also be be uploaded with transmision times. It also contains >sufficent memory (32mb) to hold a good 4 hours or more of compressed audio. > >Repeater can also transmit (Spread Spectrum) over telco or power lines with >a small adapter (I was not able to secure the frequencies, but I suspect >somewhere between 200khz and 3 mhz). > > >Device Operation: > >System uses a 50/125 Raw fiber optic distribution system, the fiber is >coated, but not jacketed or buffered in any way. The fiber has a frequency >response between 1230 to 1550/1710? single mode. I suspect it is standard >single mode (1500nm) fiber strand. > >The "Repeater" contains a low power single mode solid state light source, a >duplexer/splitter (prism), and a light reciever. The light beam is >transmitted into the fiber, travels to the "Front-End" where it is is >reflected against an angled vibrating membrane. The membrane causes a >slight frequency shift in the light beam, which is reflected back to the >"Repeater" where it is "picked" off with a prism and solid state detector. >(typical fiber optic microphone). > > >Counter-Measures: > >There is NO METAL in the microphone or fiber distribution system, and they >CANNOT be detected by a Non-Lin (no non-linear junctions). Nor can they be >detected with metal detectors, and no electro-magnetic field is present on >the "Front End". > >The "Repeater" section is fairly to detect with a non lin, but since it is >supposed installed into the outside wall it tends not to be practical. The >ideal way to detect is to sweep the exterior of the building for RF >emissions. Also, the unit tends to run VERY hot (110-135 degrees), and >should be visible as a thermal anomally. > >Also, the system can be detected by looking for minute amounts of light >"leaking" from both the microphone, fusion couplings, and fiber >distribution system. > >The pinhole for the microphone can be detected with a IR visual search >around 440 to 450nm (you'll need a light source with at least 500,00 candle >power, the Blue Light Ultra works well, or an Omnichrome). > >Once a suspect pinhole is found it can be tested for IR with a conventional >Spectrum Analyser with a IR front end (the Tektronix SA-42 or SA-46 works >well). There is always a small amount or IR leakage with this system. > >Once the microphone is detected it is a fairly simple matter to trace the >line back to the controller module or "Repeater" > >Keep in mind that the system is designed to use 3 to 8 microphones. > > >I am going to get a look at an OC-12 clamp-on fiber optic tapping system in >a few weeks and will advise. > > =============================================================== > > >As always, >Please treat this information as highly confidential and >please do not redistribute, Thank You > > >Regards, > >-jma > > =============================================================== > Train, Observe, Detect, Protect, Defend, Repel > =============================================================== > James M. Atkinson > Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM > 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ > Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk(a)tscm.com > =============================================================== > The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and the Most > Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet > =============================================================== >

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