December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Moderation, Tim, Sandy, me, etc * Reputation Capital
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Z.B. wrote: > On Wed, 5 Feb 1997, Name Withheld by Request wrote: > > John Gilmore said: > > >Perhaps at that point I should have shut down the list, as Lucky is > > >now suggesting. "Asking the list what to do" was clearly not a useful > > >option. Sandy cared enough about the community to make some concrete > > Not a useful option? Why not? If there aren't any ideas left in this > > community, I'm with Lucky. Pull the plug. On the below: Remember in "I, Mudd" where the Captain said to Rodney the Robot: "I'm lying - everything I say is a lie". And the robot collapses because it is not programmed to handle such blatant acts of sabotage of reality. Humans OTOH, and particular those who do odd jobs for the CIA (you know, the ones who make those little "excursions" to Nepal and Burma), have no problem with this, since their reality doesn't even intersect with that of typical mailing list readers. What is Tim May really mad about? What he says he's mad about? I don't think so. The scam ran past him and he fell off of the truck. Tsk tsk. > I've been meaning to ask this for a while...but why *don't* we just pull > the plug, at least for just a few days? > Unsubscribe everyone from all the lists, wait a bit, and then send a > message to all of the subscribers with full info on each of the lists > (cp, cp-unedited,cp-flames) and see what happens when they resubscribe. > I bet that most of the people who don't post and don't care one way or > the other wouldn't bother to resubscribe, so we'd have a higher ratio of > people who mind if the list is moderated vs. those who'd be happy either

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Re: New X-Ray Imager
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:18 AM 2/4/97 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >Steve Schear wrote: >> New X-ray gun trades privacy for safety >> Reported by Andy C >> Seen in The Nando Times on 13 August 1996 >> "I'm incredibly concerned," said John Henry Hingson, a past president of the >> National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, meeting here this past >> week. "The entire nation could become a victim of illegal searches and >> seizures and the law is powerless to protect them from these police abuses." >> But in these nervous times following the the crash of TWA Fight 800 and >> bombings at the Olympics, Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center, many >> Americans are now willing to trade some of their privacy and civil liberties >> for greater security. >> A poll last week by the Los Angeles Times found that a majority of people -- >> 58 percent -- said they would curtail some civil liberties if it would help >> thwart terrorism. Thirteen percent said it would depend on what rights were >> at stake. The poll didn't ask people to single out any rights. > >The L.A. Times quotes this "poll" all the time, and in fact probably >just made it up. Why do I know that? Because they ran a "letter" >from a "teacher" in the valley somewhere about a year ago which said >exactly this same thing. The "teacher" ran a poll of her students >and they agreed to give up the rights without even knowing which >rights they were giving up. Wouldn't it be nice if, in a new poll, they asked the following question: "Do you believe that the people who ask you, in other polls, whether or not 'you'd be willing to give up a little freedom to thwart terrorism' have any proof it's possible to, in the long run, 'thwart terrorism' by sacrificing freedom?" Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: John's: In anarchy -everyone responsible
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:05 PM 2/4/97 +0000, Attila T. Hun wrote: >on or about 970204:0312 Greg Broiles <gbroiles(a)netbox.com> said: >+ Is the desire for an anarchic community at odds with a desire for >+ good use of resources? Actually, it is quite possible that an "anarchic community" is _more_ efficient in the use of resources than some sort of organized community. It is explained, for example, that the reason there are so many different kinds of life on earth is that there are so many ecological niches to fill. > In a "popular" anarchy, Jim Bell's assassination politics make > perfectly good sense; but, a "popular" anarchy is not an _anarchy_. I guess I don't understand the distinction you are trying to make, between a "popular anarchy" and an "anarchy." Maybe you were trying to distinguish between "dictatorship of the few (or one)" and "dictatorship of the many (perhaps a majority)" but it didn't come out very understandably. Put simply, "anarchy is not the lack of order. It is the lack of _orders_." > anarchy is only possible in an ideal world where _everyone_ > assumes not only responsibility for themselves, but for the common > good. no malice, no greed, no need for assassination politics.... No, that's traditional thinking and that's wrong. See AP part 8. Freud believed (as "everyone" else believed, even myself, before AP) that anarchy was inherently unstable. But it ISN'T, if the tools of AP are used to stabilize it. And no, no altruism is necessary for AP to work as well; no individuals are being asked to sacrifice themselves for the common good. Rather, they are given the opportunity to work to achieve a reward offered, cumulatively, by a number of citizens. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Cypherpunks FOIA request
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 1/18/97, I sent freedom of information act requests to the FBI (main and San Francisco offices), CIA, NSA, and Secret Service, asking them for copies of information in their files relating to or referring to the cypherpunks list, the cypherpunks meetings, and copies of any messages sent from or to "cypherpunks(a)toad.com". To date, I have received three responses: one from the SF office of the FBI, indicating that they have no records responsive to my request; one from the NSA, indicating that they are processing my request, and one from the Secret Service, asking for a copy of my signature. (I've got no clue why they want that; unless I screwed up, I believe my initial request was signed.) Copies of my requests and the responses are available online at <http://www.io.com/~gbroiles/cp-foia/>. I'm not sure what I think about the response from the SF FBI branch - it seems unlikely that they'd never have paid any attention to the list, given the media coverage in Wired and other places. On the other hand, maybe the FBI doesn't read Wired. :) While they're not supposed to be monitoring noncriminal domestic activity, I figured they'd at least have something about the Mykotronix stuff. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBMvhHPf37pMWUJFlhAQGBSAf/XIdNAMrxn3flb6O7Q1TZYL1xd/RHAAZv YsuuXs/n6Dih/SnJVqc35tF5/33N0gK0xWhyPCBWdIitVCgHpt+214WEOg3IWBqO KGcnbXg/YMs4xN50zLgpV+Xoim4rjfwCROqNNWvrBqwo6RicAyJbLRoRGE+KdDkx WSslCzxsVYzRHzzkF48rhbYAXqU2vUesG0t8Alg17R/2w4TvjAzlQ3PpclUukB8U VglMVB+dicn+5B2zITt1WG21xMmSHQea5rpwKpDxZdjBvBKXLhgH8L1Hdl6nu3zI sqDEENxeV+bI5UdSzemQDy+TDQoy7BSN7Tby8JgwXE9x3AitY2A05g== =S1Zy -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:40 PM 1/27/97 -0500, Phillip M. Hallam-Baker wrote: > > >jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote in article <5ch9f2$cuu(a)life.ai.mit.edu>... > >> Look, I've proposed what I consider to be a remarkably consistent method to >> prevent the kind of political tyranny that you criticize, and I don't see >> any recognition of this fact. > >Thats because its a whacko solution that has no credibility >or consistency. I'm still waiting for you to explain what you believe to be the "problem" for which we are searching a solution. Is the problem that there is slavery? Or do you think the only problem is that the slaves are unhappy? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Key Security Question
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:41 AM 1/31/97 -0800, Z.B. wrote: >My computer went into the shop a few days ago, and I was unable to take >my PGP keys off it before it went in. What are the security risks here? >If the repairman chooses to snoop through the files, what would he be >able to do with my key pair? Will I need to revoke the key and make a >new one, or will I be relatively safe since he doesn't have my >passphrase? Depends on how guessable your passphrase is. If you use something that would fall to a dictionary attack, then you are vulnerable. (Providing that they actually looked for your keyring and made a copy.) If you had nyms on your keyring, then those nyms can be associated with your "true name" with no passphrase required. (Unless you keep your keyring encrypted. Private Idaho supports encrypted keyrings, but little else does.) If you are really concerned about it, you could learn to do your own computer repairs. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAwUBMvObZeQCP3v30CeZAQHwCgf+Oks1qT2Hc9pRU4jy+YU/q3WidHVhJmf2 QxjdEFeRPyX3rt+7ThCN4wnGdh7W2Ya8SYGwmgGgU7pucJ9vgC0JACU20RvRgsQk 5USpS3+Ua9QVNs/NpKGDDANlsurPMi9y12rIqrDbmPmcnW7HDfrfByLVy0HvfqKE ctJsOOz391rbjM+HiNXzMUiiWLBelVA9CrsG/UtSd243vymwD/J2dJiq3s0CMPln Tl1rSy1IVsMqNuQ65ALV9qsz6GJtK8Wu1nSk1IwR8Ge2ZSq6VCqkV/hY8+r5KPOM V0XMIblviEc87xmiJ8BMuNNJpOvhGzFZQ1TV9vwdec3pfyeV/HeHjw== =2if1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- | If you're not part of the solution, You're part of the precipitate. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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RE: Fighting the cybercensor
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:26 PM 1/30/97 -0800, Sean Roach wrote: >At 11:15 AM 1/30/97 -0800, jim bell wrote: >>What you're presented (included in its entirety below) is what I've come to >>call an "AP story problem." I've worked through many of those myself; >>their main problem is that they don't carefully describe why _each_ person >>in the "play" you've described would be motivated to do what it's claim he >>does, and why he DOES NOT do other things to fix the situation he's in. >>Remember, I'm not merely talking about the main character, but also the ones >>who are (apparently?) incidental. >> >>For just one example, you said: "conventional bodyguards could be >>included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledgethat they will be >>buried with the tyrant." >> >>What motivates these people? Are they hostages? If they're hostages, then >>presumably that means they're motivated to seek the death of anyone who is >>holding them. What about their relatives; don't they have any sympathy for >>those who are taken? Why don't they donate to AP to see the lead guy dead? > >As I stated in the bottom, the children would be privaledged. Who says? What if the public doesn't agree? Might it not be better to sacrifice a few children to keep other children alive? > They would >merely be told that it is a great honor. It could very well be. Assuming >that the tyrant did not die, these children would live in comparable luxery. How much would this cost? Who would pay? Where would the money come from? Is this "solution" practical for everybody, or just the top guy? >They would be at risk only if the tyrant was. By keeping the children at >hand, the parents would balk at taking action against the tyrant, not only >their own action, but also that of others. The children would merely be >there to thwart the attempts of others. Suppose that didn't work. Who would kill the kids if the tyrant died? Who would risk death himself to do this? Etc. Hint: Unfortunately, you don't seem to be pursuing the implications of what you are hypothesizing. This is typical. Go back and do what I originally suggested: Look at the motivations of EACH person in the "play" and decide why he will play along with the game. This includes not merely the people you want to focus on, but also anyone else. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Key Security Question
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:41 AM 1/31/97 -0800, Z.B. wrote: >My computer went into the shop a few days ago, and I was unable to take >my PGP keys off it before it went in. What are the security risks here? >If the repairman chooses to snoop through the files, what would he be >able to do with my key pair? Will I need to revoke the key and make a >new one, or will I be relatively safe since he doesn't have my >passphrase? Depends on how guessable your passphrase is. If you use something that would fall to a dictionary attack, then you are vulnerable. (Providing that they actually looked for your keyring and made a copy.) If you had nyms on your keyring, then those nyms can be associated with your "true name" with no passphrase required. (Unless you keep your keyring encrypted. Private Idaho supports encrypted keyrings, but little else does.) If you are really concerned about it, you could learn to do your own computer repairs. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAwUBMvObZeQCP3v30CeZAQHwCgf+Oks1qT2Hc9pRU4jy+YU/q3WidHVhJmf2 QxjdEFeRPyX3rt+7ThCN4wnGdh7W2Ya8SYGwmgGgU7pucJ9vgC0JACU20RvRgsQk 5USpS3+Ua9QVNs/NpKGDDANlsurPMi9y12rIqrDbmPmcnW7HDfrfByLVy0HvfqKE ctJsOOz391rbjM+HiNXzMUiiWLBelVA9CrsG/UtSd243vymwD/J2dJiq3s0CMPln Tl1rSy1IVsMqNuQ65ALV9qsz6GJtK8Wu1nSk1IwR8Ge2ZSq6VCqkV/hY8+r5KPOM V0XMIblviEc87xmiJ8BMuNNJpOvhGzFZQ1TV9vwdec3pfyeV/HeHjw== =2if1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --- | If you're not part of the solution, You're part of the precipitate. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.ctrl-alt-del.com/~alan/ |alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com|

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Re: "Secret" Postal Device stolen
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>>Postal Service offers $25,000 reward for stolen . . . something I got the impression the author was struggling very hard not to say "I swear I'm not making this up" "But I can't say that - it's Dave Barry's line" :-) At 09:39 AM 2/1/97 -0500, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Mail Storage Box keys? I was also guessing keys - truck keys are a less subtle target than box storage keys, and telling every thug in the country that mail trucks are an easy target, just take the keys from the carrier, seems almost worth sounding really stupid in public to avoid. They did say that it wasn't something they carried in their pockets, but do mail carriers hang their keys on their belts? My wife's guess was that they didn't want to admit they carry Mace or equivalent, though everybody knows it. I also enjoyed the description of one of the weapons as a "steering wheel locking device" "The Club - Police recommend it!" # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: Key Security Question
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> My computer went into the shop a few days ago, and I was unable to take >> my PGP keys off it before it went in. What are the security risks here? >> If the repairman chooses to snoop through the files, what would he be >> able to do with my key pair? Will I need to revoke the key and make a >> new one, or will I be relatively safe since he doesn't have my >> passphrase? Passphrases are MD5-hashed into 128-bit IDEA keys and used to encrypt the secret key; there's a "pgpcrack" program out there that does dictionary-style searches to find if you've got wimpy passphrases. So if your passphrases is "secret", you lose, but if it's "fjhw;doifvjuc-[09efiu v` 2 4rnhc;ljoipcvjpoiewujfgv;loik" you're probably pretty safe, unless that's written on the yellow sticky you left on the side of the PC. On the other hand, if the "repairman" replaced your pgp executable with version 2.6.3kgb, which uses your hashed passphrase as the session key, you're hosed. Or if he installed a keystroke sniffer, or added a small radio transmitter to your keyboard, or whatever. Depends on your threat model. If you need to be paranoid, they've already gotten you.... # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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