December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[CRYPTO] OTP
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. May carries a turd in his wallet for identification purposes. _ _/| \'o.0' =(___)= Timmy C. May U

5 13

Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney wrote: > > On the Wired "brain tennis" debate, http://www.braintennis.com/, Kawika > Daguio of the American Bankers Association wrote: > > > The real danger of cyberspace is that it could be the tragedy of > > the commons in waiting. Technology alone won't provide participants > > sufficient security for e-commerce to flourish. Law, tradition, and good > > reputations and technology give rise to trust. Trust cannot be established > > solely though technical protocols. And trust is not irrelevant. > > What do you think he means about a "tragedy of the commons"? > I wonder if he just meant that there would be too many "commoners" trying > to engage in commerce, so you couldn't know who to trust? Be assured that those already in control of commerce in this country and others have already written new laws 'in their head' concerning the future of eca$h. I predict that these laws will be for our 'protection,' but will have the curious effect of limiting the control of eca$h to the already rich and powerful. Some groups such as the Anguila Antagonists may be able to wrest a certain number of digital dollars from the grip of the system currently in place, but above a certain point, they will eaten up, either passively or aggressively (crushed or bought off). If 'outsiders' begin to make too large a dent in the main players' piece of the action, then we can expect to see events similar to the Junk Bonds fiasco, with the 'bad guys' set-up and knocked down like bowling pins. We can expect automatic taxation at the time of all eca$h transactions, as well as strict laws against anonymity in the transfer of eca$h. Freelance cryptographers are going to be outlaws, by decree of law. It is quite simply a matter of money (power and control being merely prerequisites for controlling money). TruthMonger

1 0

Re: Anonymous Nymserver: anon.nymserver.com
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart wrote: > > However, if you want to spread Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt, > at least keep your facts straight; it does a much better job. The straight facts are that you can't trust your best friend not to bop your old-lady, given ample opportunity, and to put even more trust in a stranger is foolish. > > PGP 2.0-->2.3a were released outside of the U.S. and imported into > >the country. > > The use of PGP=>2.5 suddenly became a 'non-issue' for use in the U.S. > >because they use both the algorithm and sub-routines developed by the > >NSA and the Military. > > The new algorithm was the International Drug Entrapment Agency algorithm, > introduced in PGP 2.0 to replace the previous non-NSA-crackable algorithm, > Bass-O-Matic. Pay no attention to the comments in the source about fnords, > /* these aren't the subroutines you're looking fnord */ and follow the money. > PGP 2.5 became a non-issue because RSAREF takes care of the patent problem - > which is largely because the widespread use of PGP really did spread the > RSA algorithm's popularity, and giving away free licenses was about the only > way for RSA Inc. to regain any control over it at all. Are you saying that the patent on the RSA algorithm wasn't enforceable? > If you want to do > a better job of FUD, you could talk about the under-the-table relationship > between MIT and RSA or the RSA and NSA (they're only different by one letter!) > or notice that the CAPSTONE implementations of Clipper used algorithms > patented by PKP... The relationship between MIT and the NSA and the Military isn't very far under the table. The spooks funded MIT's RSA development, and they are not noted for funding projects for the good of the common man. To suggest that they would fund a form of cryptography that didn't have their own back-door for sounds implausible. TruthMonger

2 2

Re: Wassenaar Arrangement and "sensitive dual-use items"
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 AM 3/11/97 +0900, Hayashi_Tsuyoshi wrote: >Although I have not seen it, there should be the Japanese >translated version of the W.A. While it is true that MITI has halted all exports of crypto products since late September, citing their obligations under the Wassenaar "arrangement", numerous high level meetings conducted by Japanese industry heavyweights with MITI produced neither a copy of the arrangement nor any written MITI guidelines. MITI reserves the right to decided on a case by case basis. So far, every single export application has been denied. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

1 0

Everything You Need to Succeed in MLM!
by MLM-Powerhouse＠cash-in-now.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So You Want To Succeed in Network Marketing? YES! Do You Have All The Tools You Need To Succeed? NO! Finally A Program That Gives You Everything You Need To Succeed In Network Marketing! Promote Any MLM with -- ** FREE 400 MLM Opportunity Seeker Leads Every Month (Highest Quality) ** FREE Voicemail 800# (Unlimited Usage) ** FREE Fax On Demand Box ** FREE Fax Blasting Every Month (1000/month to MLM'ers) ** FREE Web Page ** FREE Postcards ** FREE 9.5 cpm Long Distance ** FREE Conference Calling Service ** FREE Bulk E-Mail Software ** FREE Pager ** 50% Off Advertising in USA Today!! & Much More! All of these services are FREE every month!!! Tell me, who can't use these services? If you're a networker, you need them! Plus, I'll show you how you can make an income of $3000 every month with only 42 people in your downline, whether you sponsor them or receive them from spillover! You can't lose!! Also, if you follow my system you will be in profit your 1st month. Position yourself now! Let's work together! For More Information: 24 Hour Opportunity Line 1-800-598-2726. CALL NOW!!

1 0

Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 08:15:15 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Cato forum on wiretapping and Digital Telephony (3/24/97) [I find that Cato's forums are always worth attending. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 10:15:21 -0500 (EST) From: Solveig Bernstein <sberns(a)cato.org> To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: a cato forum Declan, could you post this to fightcensorship or otherwise forward it around? ******************************************************************** This forum will be held at noon on March 24 at the Cato Institute at 1000 Mass. Ave. N.W., Washington, DC. To register, please call Heather Antilla at 202.842.3490 or email to hantila(a)cato.org. ******************************************************************** Wiretapping in the Digital Age: Reassessing CALEA Barry Steinhardt Alan McDonald ACLU FBI Jim Dempsey Albert Gidari Center for Democracy and Technology Perkins Coie CALEA, the "Communications Assistance in Law Enforcement Act," requires phone companies to retrofit their networks to facilitate wiretapping by law enforcement. Are laws like CALEA appropriate for our constitutional republic, or are the economic costs and dangers to privacy too great? Should Congress have delegated to the FBI so much power to implement CALEA? Have the FBI's demands under the statute been reasonable? Solveig Bernstein, Esq. (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Assistant Director of Telecommunications & Technology Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

1 0

re: True colours
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ray Arachelian <sunder(a)brainlink.com> writes: > On Mon, 10 Mar 1997 paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk wrote: > > > > > What evidence do you have that Dr. Vulis is KGB loving? - As far as I > > > > saw his message only confirmed that he knew that the KGB had employed > > > > a number of good cryptographers, without personal knowledge I cannot I also had the honor of meeting a few of them in person, and exchanging e-mails with others. They're much nicer people than the NSA shills. > > > > confirm or deny this therefore I see no basis in logic for calling > > > > him a master of disinformation... > > > > > > Since when do you know Vulis so well that your personal knowledge can be > > > used to confirm what he is or isn't? Or are you yet another Vulistentacl > > > > Please learn to read, I stated that I did not have enough information > > to confirm or deny this. > > Exactly, and my point is this: if you don't know, why do you feel the > need to point out that you lack the knowledge to determine whether or > not Vulis is KGB loving? If you don't know, why bother stating this, > then claiming you see no basis in calling him a master of disinformation? I will neither confirm nor deny the fact that I'm a KGB colonel. :-) --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

1 0

DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design andVerification, Sept. 3-5, 1997
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 12 Mar 1997 14:11:04 -0500 From: ho(a)earth.hpc.org (Hilarie Orman) To: ipsec(a)tis.com Subject: DIMACS Workshop on Cryptographic Protocol Design and Verification, Sept. 3-5, 1997 Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk Here's a more complete announcement for the workshop. Hilarie ============================================================================= DIMACS Workshop on Formal Verification of Security Protocols Sept. 3-5, 1997 Organizers: Hilarie Orman, DARPA and Catherine Meadows, Naval Research Laboratory As we come to rely more and more upon computer networks to perform vital functions, the need for cryptographic protocols that can enforce a variety of security properties has become more and more important. Thus it is no surprise that in recent years a number of new protocols have been proposed for such applications as electronic credit card transactions, Web browsing, and so forth. Since it is notoriously difficult to design cryptographic protocols correctly, this increased reliance on them to provide security has become cause for some concern. This is especially the case since many of the new protocols are extremely complex. In answer to these needs, research has been intensifying in the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol verification. Recently this work has matured enough so that it is starting to see application to real-life protocols. The goal of this workshop is to facilitate this process by bringing together those were are involved in the design and standardization of cryptographic protocols, and those who are developing and using formal methods techniques for the verification of such protocols. To this end we plan to alternate papers with panels soliciting new paths for research. We are particularly interested in paper and panel proposals addressing new protocols with respect to their formal and informal analysis. Other topics of interest include, but are not limited to - Progress in belief logics - Use of theorem provers and model checkers in verifying crypto protocols - Interaction between protocols and cryptographic modes of operation - Methods for unifying documentation and formal, verifiable specification - Methods for incorporating formal methods into crypto protocol design - Verification of cryptographic API systems - Formal definition of correctness of a cryptographic protocol - Arithmetic capability required for proofs of security for number theoretic systems - Formal definitions of cryptographic protocol requirements - Design methodologies - Emerging needs and new uses for cryptographic protocols - Multiparty protocols, in particular design and verification methods We encourage attendees to bring tools for demonstration. Information about availability of facilities for demonstration will be posted later. To submit a paper to the workshop, submit a one or two page abstract, in Postscript or ASCII to both organizers at the email addresses given below by June 16, 1997. Authors will be notified of acceptance or rejection of abstracts by July 1. Full papers will be due by August 1. Copies of papers will be distributed at the workshop. We also plan to publish a proceedings. Participation in the workshop is *not* limited to those giving presentations. If you would like to attend the workshop, a registration form is available at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic/reg_form.html. Information on accommodations and travel arrangements is available at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/accommodations.html and http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/general/travel.html. Information on the workshop in general is at http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/Cryptographic. Organizers Hilarie Orman Catherine Meadows DARPA ITO Naval Research Laboratory 3701 N. Fairfax Drive Code 5543 Arlington VA 22203-1714 Washington, DC 20375 phone: (703)696-2234 phone: (202)-767-3490 email: horman(a)darpa.mil email:meadows@itd.nrl.navy.mil --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

1 0

Re: Ecash Brain Tennis
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From owner-freedom-knights(a)kachina.jetcafe.org Tue Mar 11 21:48:54 1997 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Wed, 12 Mar 97 08:25:31 EST for dlv Received: from kachina.jetcafe.org by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA20396 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Tue, 11 Mar 97 21:48:54 -0500 Received: (from majordomo@localhost) by kachina.jetcafe.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) id SAA04707 for freedom-knights-outgoing; Tue, 11 Mar 1997 18:48:46 -0800 (PST) X-Authentication-Warning: kachina.jetcafe.org: majordomo set sender to owner-freedom-knights using -f Message-Id: <3.0.1.32.19970311164810.007b6350(a)flex.com> X-Sender: jai(a)flex.com (Unverified) X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.1 (32) Date: Tue, 11 Mar 1997 16:48:10 -1000 To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org From: "Dr. Jai Maharaj" <jai(a)mantra.com> Subject: Re: Ecash Brain Tennis Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: owner-freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Precedence: bulk Reply-To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) posted: > > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > [...] > Decrypt "tragedy of the commons" as "anarchy" for the cleartext > alarm being transmitted. One is reminded of: "When compared with the suppression of anarchy every other question sinks into insignificance. The anarchist is the enemy of humanity, the enemy of all mankind, and his is a deeper degree of criminality than any other. No immigrant is allowed to come to our shores if he is an anarchist; and no paper published here or abroad should be permitted circulation in this country if it propagates anarchist opinions." - President Theodore Roosevelt Jai Maharaj jai(a)mantra.com Om Shanti

1 0

Re: Mail Volume??
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Cynthia H. Brown" <cynthb(a)sonetis.com> writes: > Perhaps many of the 1400-odd subscribers belonged to unused accounts, or > accounts on dead systems. With fewer names to process, this should speed > up the distribution significantly. FWIW, onthe few occasions when I e-mailed the 1400 addresses directly, I got hundreds of bounces from nonexistent addresses. I guess the 1400 silent supporters of moderation were another one of John Gilmore's lies. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

2 1