December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Utility of Privacy
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 Nov 96 at 6:31, Duncan Frissell wrote: > Owning gold in America in 1930 vs 1933 Hi Duncan. Do you have any documentation or historical references to the reason they gave for forbidding ownership of gold? Just curious... How about gold backed Magic Money tokens? :) Ciao jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Lucky your no punk...
by cyberhawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> writes: > Beginning Monday, 11/25/96, I will bounce all email from the various > (non-)subscribers polluting this list with garbage back to the > authors. Furthermore, I will attach documents describing basic > Internet rules of conduct to each bounce. > > I would encourage other Cypherpunks to do the same. Lucky: Are you an elitist cypherpunk? It sounds like you've out grown the designation of punk. Punk: 1. worthless or unimportant person. 2. a petty hoodlum -adj, 3. poor in quality. You are hereby promoted. You are now a cypher-corporal in the elite crypto army. God Speed my boy. We'll keep a candle lite for you son if you someday choose to return to the great un-washed masses. Chow-baby, Rocky J. Squirrel

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Re: Reputation based hiring (was REQUESTING INFORMATION)
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:02 ìì 19/11/1996 -0500, Clay Olbon II wrote: >I won't comment on who I will or won't hire. I will state that I believe ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >that what a person posts is a relevant issue when it comes time to make a ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >hiring decision. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Very important admission here: WATCH out what you say, folks, from now on. Say it _real_ nice, or else you WON'T GET HIRED!!! No "abuse", from now on... :-) aha, aha, aha! NOW I understand the insecurity and the fear of young *unemployed* Americans. NOW I understand... :-) >If someone thinks that another should not be hired for >whatever reason, I support their right to hold that belief and even to >publicize it. Likewise. But ONLY publicly, in contrast to you (hiding it)... ><rant against cypherpunks deleted> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ There was NO rant "against cypherpunks" as such. You could label my text a 'rant', by all means, but I note with interest your attempt to turn it "against cypherpunks" (Setting a new target to what was only a... friendly-clay-bullet, dear Clay). :-) I would never hire you. What I need is people with a VISION; NOT people with IMPAIRED VISION, distorting things so unreliably. I need TRUE VISIONARIES able to work creatively in High Technology. People like Philip Kahn (Hurrah) and Richard Branson (Hurrah, Bravo); even Bill Gates himself, were SELF-MADE visionaries. In contrast... people "threatening others with unemployability files", are CLAY MEDIOCRITIES. Your reputation is correct, given the kind of people you are 'selling'. (Slaves in fact, just like in the SLAVE TRADE times... -High I.Q. slaves). I would suggest, Clay, that you are indeed doing a good Job. But if you are a... "Cypherpunk" then... I am the Emperor of Mars! :-) >I won't follow you into the gutter on this one. That horse has been dead ^^^^^^ >for days (and it is beginning to smell really bad). > Clay ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ You know Clay, if only you knew what TREASURE you have giveth me today :-) I never even knew this existed locked up inside a... Smelly Clay Gutter... Many thanks anyway George P.S. (deleted) ********************* CORPORATE GUTTER FOLLOWS: *********************** >I would say you are a decent, honest, fearless man trying to do a job which RANT DELETED >with _serious_ issues of 'unemployability'., FURTHERMORE people are NEVER >guilty before PROVEN so. Guilt or Innocence is NOT a matter of 'opinion', RANT DELETED >the guy's back. WHAT is going on? I've been harrassed and threatended TOO, >just because of defending him or supporting people's rights to a fair trial? RANT DELETED >I have no disagreement with your down-to-earth explanations. But... >Sooner or later your 'sheep-leader' Mr. Gilmore will start blocking access >to MORE geniouses (other than Voulis, who I think _could_ be one) to your >list, and then encryption will be entrusted to morons who can at ANY moment >have their coding systems BROKEN!!! RANT DELETED >unemployability (as indeed happened in the letter quoted below) it's an >alarming sign that the _criteria_ for employability are no longer your >own decent down-to-earth criteria (honesty, intelligence, trust-worthiness) RANT DELETED >It's only recently that the type of fascist harrassment like "We'll put >you on our U-list", has reached such ABUSE, MISUSE, and ALARMING FREQUENCY. RANT DELETED >You are, most probably, a real person with very real responsibilites. >In this case, I appreciate you a lot, and hopefully my complaints have >reached the right man's ear. RANT DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDELETED. huh?

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"Don't Hire Lists" of FASCIST SCUM Tim May
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:18 ðì 17/11/1996 -0800, Timothy C. May <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: (in response to a rather civilised condemnation of censorship I had written as defense of someone _else_, a person whom I don't even know)... >"Not ethical"? > >But we will do it anyway. Moreover, some of us maintain lists of "Do Not >Hire" persons. Few high tech or Silicon Valley software companies will hire >such folks. > >Congratulations, Stathis, as you are now on such a list. First of all, I question your right to have 'authority', not only for this, but for dictating to "Cypherpunks" what persons to trust or to distrust. BECAUSE you are NOT a "cypherpunk". You are a CypherScumBag-Fascist. People sent me PRIVATE letters asking how to converse in encrypted E-mail due to FEARS that people like YOU, ASSHOLE, are monitoring them. THIS is why you got me angry. I URINATE upon your Unemployability files. I got BALLS meaning I got my OWN job. And I can tear you apart in front of everybody NOW, because it took me a fucking long time NOT to need to remain SILENT in front of FASCIST ASSHOLES LIKE you. DIE, Scum! Well, my friends and I have been compiling OPEN lists of *Fascist Scum*, _undesirable_ among...parties and wild sexy holidays in Greek Islands. :-) For example in _my_ island of Kythera (birthplace of Goddess Venus) where I also have a house, often relaxing there to flee the 'rat-race' madness. (whenever I can steal some time from running my _own_ business in Athens). In any case... ************************************************************************** Congratulations, Master Tim, you've earned yourself the No[1] place in our own... _legal_ blacklist of Fascist Scum who are Undesirables in... Greek Islands. If you ever come to Greece we'll *ruin* your holidays... :-) ************************************************************************** ROTFL!!! (seriously now...) "Unemployability lists" are *illegal* in _Europe_ anyway, you know. They are specifically illegal in the "Human Rights and Protection of Private Records of Information" Acts, of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT... The only _legal_ 'unemployability files' in _Europe_ are those involving penal convictions, as well as _true_ records of previous employment. And if someone can _prove_ in a European court that someone else's slanderous activity ruined their prospects of employment, you go to jail, poor Tim... In Europe, freedom of opinion and style of self-expression OUTSIDE WORK, are irrelevant, actually.. Even inside a company they're relevant if and only if they damage the profits or the reputation or other company assets. (And good programmers are tolerated for being wild eccentrics, _anyway_). HOWEVER... This is *nothing*, compared to what _will_ happen in a few years time, when SUCH so-called 'UNEMPLOYABLE PERSONS FILES' are gonna be taken to Publicity and also to (European) Justice. We'll convict you to pay such a great FINE for malicious harm to individuals all over the world, that you will CRAWL inside a hole somewhere in your United States and never, ************************************************************ ever, ever, attempt to leave the shitty polluted hole of yours anymore. You will be screaming for help from the ACLU, and hiring bodyguards! :-). Of course, _Mafia-like Fascist McCarthian Scum_ like yourself laugh with 'human rights laws'... (Especially European Laws)... So, if THIS didn't scare ya, there is MORE for you AT HOME: *************************************************************************** The hordes of U.S. University Graduates, left unemployed by the year 2005 or 2010, will LITERALLY FRY YA alive, scumbag Tim, chop off your head and pin it on a lamp-post, IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY, because they'd be *very* angry with fascist scum like you, undermining their (already widespread) serious unemployment, which is likely to cause many deaths in RIOTS and TURMOIL... *************************************************************************** As for me... :-) I imagine myself waking up in my Greek island house one day, reading the NEWS: "Lynch Mob in the States torture and murder controversial holders of 'unemployability lists', blaming them for their own unemployment"; Wow! And as I sip my (100% _real_) orange juice with cheerful REAL people, in a beach-bar near my island-house, I will sigh; starting to tell my friends a story(!) about WHAT this strange news is about, and WHO was this Fascist American "Tim May", murdered by mobs of angry young American unemployed... (MY CONDOLENCES). In fact... Long before THIS day is over, poor old Tim, you will start having REAL nightmares at night: Because NOBODY can protect you, NOW, when you crawl YOUR streets at night; streets already UNSAFE, you know. And THIS lack of safety is part of your DEPLORABLE standard of living over there: NOT the money; what money BUYS! So... Don't *ever* threaten again ANY European, with your "U-lists", especially Europeans who have their OWN businesses, and who can also write _much_ better software code (in 'PROLOG' & 'Assembler') than you, dumb-old-Tim! You are ALREADY obsolete, disposable, pseudo-human NOISE; Trash from your own past, when Senator McCarthy's 'unemployability threats' sent the U.S. back to the Middle Ages. You are welcome to get BACK to those Middle Ages, if you like; So as to follow the drain-pipe-highway of OTHERS like you... >We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. We got computers, we're TRANSCENDING your technology, we'll smash you one day LEGALLY (if your compatriots don't murder you ILLEGALLY, long before then)... Tim May, May you (already) "live" in an "interesting time" (Chinese Curse). ("live"?... for how long? :-) ) With *much* delight about your self-chosen TROUBLES, George Alexander Stathis (Hellenic Software Producer, and PROLOG/ASM programmer) (my web page is now being prepared with the help of a friend, who lives in Kalamata and started his OWN Web site there.

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Re: Playing Cards - Caution!
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:57 AM 11/19/1996, Alan Bostick wrote: > Thirty-two bits of randomness in a space that is 225 bits wide leave > room for an awful lot of order. The maximum entropy after one riffle shuffle is actually about 48 bits, assuming the deck was split in half. That is, n! / k! (n-k)! = 52! / 2 * 26! ~= 4.9592 * 10^14. log_2 4.9592 * 10^14 = 48 bits. (Think of one half of the deck of k cards fitting into n possible holes. The order of each half of the deck is guaranteed, so this can be thought of as the number of ways k balls fit into n holes. What about the other half of the deck? They just fall into the empty holes.) Assume the split introduces about 4 more bits, and we get 52 bits of possible shuffles. However, in practice a riffle shuffle may be more predictable. It is possible that 32 bits of entropy are introduced with each riffle shuffle, but it is not obviously true. For a cryptographic application, the standard is higher than for almost any other. So, if it is not clear that something is the case, probably it shouldn't be used. >> A model is presented which Diaconis believes is similar to how people >> shuffle in real life. What is troubling from a cryptographic point of >> view is that there is little empirical evidence to back this up. What >> is more, Diaconis mentions that there is some variation in shufflers. >> A neat shuffler will be less random. (Side note: The Economist claims >> Diaconis can execute 8 perfect shuffles in less than a minute. This >> means the deck is returned to its original order!) > Mathematics does not rely on empirical evidence. ;-) That's true, but the application of mathematics certainly does depend on empirical evidence. I would be very surprised if Diaconis made a mistake with the math. I think the math is what primarily interests him. From his book I did not see a lot of evidence that a great deal of empirical research on card shuffling had been performed. Rather, a few mathematicians here and there appear to have tried out the model and decided that it more or less works. For the standards we should apply, those of a cryptographic application, this is not good enough. >> The study of randomness in cards looks much harder to me now. Also, >> flaws which may be exploitable for financial reasons when real money >> is on the table may have to be substantially more dramatic than the >> flaws required to exploit, for instance, an alleged one-time pad. > Do bear in mind that, unless you distill its entropy through hashing, > a randomly-ordered deck of cards is going to show a lot of seemingly > non-random properties if you try to use it as a one-time pad. Most > obviously, because each card in the deck is dealt once and only once, > there must of necessity be correlations between cards dealt early in > the deck and cards dealt later. (Card-counters at blackjack tables > make their money by exploiting these correlations.) I solved this problem in my original message on the subject. You use the order of the cards to represent your message. Then you use a fully shuffled deck to mix up the mapping of the cards to numbers. If the deck is truly randomly ordered, the scheme I proposed is a true one time pad. (If I made an error, I would like to hear about it!) Tangentially, I would be reluctant to rely on a one time pad whose key was produced by a hash function. We assume that the hash function is cryptographically secure, but if we can assume that, we might as well assume that some cryptosystem is secure. One time pads are supposed to avoid those types of assumptions. > The randomness of rolling dice is much more easy to interpret than that > of dealt cards. I agree completely. In practice, you pretty much have to have a computer to make use of the original schemes I proposed. The literature on card shuffling is quite interesting. A number of people over many years have worked on this. It looks to me like there's lots more interesting work to be done. Many readers of this list would probably find Diaconis's book interesting. There might even be a number of new attacks possible on card games. If 7 riffle shuffles does not, in fact, bring the deck to complete entropy it means that a number of combinations of cards are unlikely. Is the distribution of pokers hands perfectly even? They may not be. Solving this problem in the general case appears to be very hard. But, some progress could be made by modeling real shuffling and looking for patterns in the relationships between the cards electronically. Conceivably, poker hands are not as random as people believe. While the cards you have in your hand may be random, their relationship to other cards may not. This is like a pseudo random number generator. If you don't notice the pattern, you will believe you are looking at a random number stream, but in fact you are not. However, the entire subject is orthogonal to my goals right now. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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WinSock Remailer Resuming Operation
by Joey Grasty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Y'all: I'm pleased to announce that the WinSock Remailer is resuming operation tonight at 11:00 PM EST from winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net. All messages to the remailer must be PGP encrypted. The public key for this remailer is: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQBtAzKL9KEAAAEDANpSkWhtxPQXO4A/igS1TKsrHpBIgLd07sgKHmcwGsnPcI5K h2/T1rm3E8lRw5zKWd5MDs7b9Ku7+/V1SjEs2XmpiX1aJ7oN2LJvQ9OO5Z01CwUA 7LFnSfcOrGCnk0ADrQAFEbQuV2luU29jayBSZW1haWxlciA8d2luc29ja0ByaWdl bC5jeWJlcnBhc3MubmV0PokAdQMFEDKL9PjDgztlfPQWWQEBlYYC/iv5zt+v8E/N puymUHLHavlBr9XuP7XVECW3trUxSRdCqnVp1el7fHIQNaN0hw+DW9KutOuumm+u ZzwStZ94dimBYlmSedZ4t4f6DAOK0WZ6wosi/tV5IGlgCdIQA7o2W4kAdQMFEDKL 9M4OrGCnk0ADrQEBWCYDAIlhADaxwBSb2Edz9A5oqAq6YddIVSJdUwuIiN5TvKPa oRXdpkpEYRi1JOUPNy+vLCF21c9LLUYcKMxMvIJPGq6OSBy6VzCdaiOS/yBz7fsH 9I4X5IwoNnf0/Mm+di5zlA== =/UGi - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Here's the info for the remailer-list: $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; I'll be adding "post" to this list after I get a more thorough testing of the NNTP code that I added for authentication. "latent" is also pending. The remailer will run every 60 seconds from 12:00 AM to 8:00 AM every day and whenever I am online. Cyberpass automatically spools the messages when I am not connected. Those of you that want to run your own remailer may obtain a copy of the remailer from links from the WinSock Remailer Home Page at: http://www.cyberpass.net/~winsock/ Currently, the remailer runs only under Windows 3.1, but a version for Windows NT and 95 will be available shortly. Note: alt.religion.scientology and alt.clearing.technology are blocked. I'm not interested in run-ins with either supporters or detractors of the Church of Scientology. Binary and picture groups are also blocked, but only because I don't have the bandwidth to support them. I invite people who want remailers to post to these groups to download the remailer and operate it for themselves. Regards, Joey Grasty Jim Ray WinSock Remailer Operators -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMpJaEQ6sYKeTQAOtAQEhZwMAqPnQG0a6Vm4HSx111ha1VulP7ClWqRba 66v/Ff5hLssO+nWbnEKb3VQ/sJEEdQzGQk2lMGeradxQBt0YANiymGkpNR66uAGg a5rtisLAfmwJNJSGhvJtPaMd4r7HnSG3 =EN8y -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security (fwd)
by Z.B. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This was on the Defcon list...apologies if it's already been posted today.] Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <-------finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127 ----- If you need to know how to set up a mail filter or defend against emailbombs, send me a message with the words "get helpfile" (without the " marks) in the SUBJECT: header, *NOT THE BODY OF THE MESSAGE!* I have several useful FAQs and documents available. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 19 Nov 1996 21:17:49 +0000 From: Simon Gardner <simon(a)access.org.uk> To: aaa-list(a)access.org.uk Cc: dc-stuff(a)dis.org Subject: Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security Researchers have found a way to attack tough codes, says Michael McCormack. A team of Cambridge and German researchers have used ordinary hacking methods and £150 worth of electronics equipment to crack the "world's most secure computer chip", used in automated teller machines worldwide. They say their technique could be used to reprogram a wide variety of supposedly secure smartcard applications, including the Mondex "money on a card" bankcard, GSM phones, and satellite TV descramblers. Dr Ross Anderson, of Cambridge University Computer Laboratory, working with German researcher Markus Kuhn, used methods pioneered by Sky-TV hackers to crack the Dallas chip, described by the manufacturer as having "the most sophisticated security features available in any microcontroller" and used in most of Britain's cash machines. The chip decodes the information read from bankcards and authorises the bank machine to process transactions ordered by the owner. It is also used by the Mondex system to verify the amount of electronic money available to the cardholder. Anderson and Kuhn used cheap and easily built electronic equipment to send wrong instructions to the chip, observing how it encrypted bad data. By sending such errors through all parts of the encryption system, they could work out its key. "You will have to have backup security" "Once you know that, you can instruct it to put some zeros on the end of your Mondex balance, start unscrambling your satellite feed, anything you like," Anderson said. "Breaking the average smartcard can be done by anyone with a modicum of technical knowledge by the methods we have described. The expense is negligible but it is time-consuming." Their discovery could spell the end of the Mondex system, which relies entirely on the security of the smartcards for its integrity. "I don't think you will be able to have floating systems like Mondex any more, where all the information is held on the smartcards," said Anderson. "You will have to have backup security with authorisation calls and auditing, just like ordinary credit cards. The smartcards are no longer reliable on their own." John Beric, head of security at Mondex, said security was a moving target, and he was unconcerned by the findings. "I welcome Dr Anderson's work, because it's a benchmark that establishes the difficulty of breaking the system," he said. "I take some comfort that it's taken a Cambridge academic and a very bright student to do this." Beric said Mondex had a scheme for continually improving its security by transparently introducing new smartcard chips every two years. "It's not static, we're ahead of the criminal now, and we believe the technology is there to ensure that we stay ahead." Anderson said his latest research indicated that two of the world's most widely used systems for encoding sensitive financial information - the RSA and DES encryption standards used by most banks - could also be cracked easily." [The London Telegraph, 19th November 1996]

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:17 ìì 19/11/1996 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: [snip] >Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures >Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern >Vote Monarchist Switzerland ^^^^^^^^^^ Monarchiste et... Cypher-punk, n'est pas? :-) Alors, pour vous Monsieur, je dis: Liberte Egalite Fraternite. Peut'etre votre... Rois trouve le medecin contre la... Decapitation. <plonk> Alors, combien d'argent vou voulais pour mon droit dans votre "mailing list", Excellence? Dit mois, Dit! Je vous... pris !!! ROTFL Vive le Rois Georges :-) P.S. All the nutcases gather here at once? No wonder they're 'unemployable'.

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My PGP Key
by The Deviant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'd just like to say, to everyone with my PGP key, that the one you have should be removed, it is no longer valid (lost in disk crash). Also, I've finally gotten around to finding why PGP stopped running for so long on my machine, and it works now, so here's my new key. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzKSSsQAAAEH/1QbvzR/tN+L759w0oGhqOzp+FputqlVx0Rr7+rWxzULd5Qs +MXZjMh+187RA7Q2GwNIijOEL27nUqpAmMT8Rb5dc0k0T4ubDCD7/phN31eoUkDy iV/TnwajrfyEmiFX2Rz1iVc9Zg8VC+x4Uho9pEO9l7cc6PaCFhKXb+hJn/q6ZiCA GaQPu7wtL+bKu+aENFa+eCXOnCN1UsiTaNIfOYDlB5G+6XzE3yY8pN6kK0uDyfb3 C+ScCcxd7tEaFnn9w9I4Hp6GqNtwoL8RfCHPj9ojvODoLCa5TgQ0aT+LlGsDryhR 5T0vI7tPhuzw4h0hHcVZogIjakQkMJ0SHegg8BUABRG0JVRoZSBEZXZpYW50IDxk ZXZpYW50QHBvb2gtY29ybmVyLmNvbT4= =gbdI - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --Deviant When we write programs that "learn", it turns out we do and they don't. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMpJkjTCdEh3oIPAVAQFNogf9FR+TarEEGpVvL/id/cP1mNiB9YsT5t09 8+OWNgIUYid2DIejVWBkNkbdcAmLxYMaqlOmAzqQxizaDqDIjFstNOPwLEmELv1B XXWv7BqRtI3yKkGs8ntamTbtV7cER1SknBIr5xnfbyDbltMcitApwZ7ixSywc8YQ o8qq/mEmftDIgoiFcK65Cj/IsMuW+jQIxu+7xH9l3ivoi5H79/lgLTKbPtH9ISdv e35Y1zIbfsblgyeveJwOVXTBYQd8TFvLylBxDyk+Oh9icpdkt/Qk5277BICw4l1z KmCkQ1spbumUcd0h2qnZijJPrQWiBqHZYGs/2MAl7pUGbx3gIR3d5w== =ECKT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: [NOISE] aga isn't on cypherpunks... (and I'm glad)
by pclow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > That is your last warning, Mike. If you start harasing my postmaster, > I will have your fucking ass in Federal Court before you can blink. Errrr..... what has Paul's oversexed donkey got to do with this list or the Federal Court? Sorry, I'm not in the US and my knowledge of US culture is very limited. ---------- From: paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk[SMTP:paul@fatmans.demon.co.uk] Sent: Monday, November 18, 1996 11:58 PM To: aga Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: [NOISE] aga isn't on cypherpunks... (and I'm glad) > > That is your last warning, Mike. If you start harasing my postmaster, > I will have your fucking ass in Federal Court before you can blink. >

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The NSA Responds
by se7en 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The NSA responded to a series of 14 questions posed to them by the Houston Chronicle regarding their involvement and interest in cryptography. While this article is not recent, it is still very interesting. Because of the size, I have not posted it here. It can be found at: http://www.dis.org/se7en/ and click the on "The NSA" The question list is: 1. Has the NSA ever imposed or attempted to impose a weakness on any cryptographic code to see if it can thus be broken? 2. Has the NSA ever imposed or attempted to impose a weakness on the DES or DSS? 3. Is the NSA aware of any weaknesses in the DES or the DSS? The RSA? 4. Has the NSA ever taken advantage of any weaknesses in the DES or the DSS? 5. Did the NSA play a role in designing the DSS? Why, in the NSA's analysis, was it seen as desirable to create the DSS when the apparently more robust RSA already stood as a de facto standard? 6. What national interests are served by limiting the power of cyptographic schemes used by the public? 7. What national interests are served by limiting the export of cryptographic technology? 8. What national interests are at risk, if any, if secure cryptography is widely available? 9. What does the NSA see as its legitimate interests in the area of cryptography? Public cryptography? 10. How did NSA enter into negotiations with the Software Publishers Association regarding the export of products utilizing cryptographic techniques? How was this group chosen, and to what purpose? What statute or elected representative authorized the NSA to engage in the discussions? 11. What is the status of these negotiations? 12. What is the status of export controls on products uing cryptographic techniques? How would you respond to those who point to the fact that the expot of RSA from the U.S. is controlled, but that its import into the U.S. is not? 13. What issues would you like to discuss that I have not addressed? 14. What question or questions would you like to pose of your critics? se7en

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Dogpile
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While Rome is burning, and with apologies in advance for the lack of vitriol in this post, I would like to point out a new and effective means of searching the Web and Usenet. Check out Dogpile (with which I have no affiliation).

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Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Wed Nov 20 22:12:52 1996 Hal wrote: <snip> > I can't see the U.S. allowing Libya and similar countries to create > policy > tokens. The whole point of this exercise is to prevent these countries > from being able to use strong crypto. So they will certainly not be on > the approved list. I think Tim was referring to a "Panama" or "'80s Iraq" situation, rather than a stable enemy state like Libya. Unless the hardware has some way of making itself have a short lifetime, there will be problems when U.S. policy changes or when one is stolen. <snip> > Companies which try to sell computers with these > chips > in them risk getting a "big brother inside" (to use Tim's very effective > slogan) reputation. I think this initiative is going nowhere. Amen. Sometimes these policy initiatives seem so ham-handed that the suspicious side of me wonders "what they're really up to." They can't seriously think they can control this any more than they can control the ocean, at least not without an awesome (even for this century) world-wide police-state. JMR P.S. Please, everyone, try not to feed the flamefest-knights, so they will someday (hopefully) go away. Creative killfiling can only do so much. Regards, Jim Ray DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy One of the "legitimate concerns of law enforcement" seems to be that I was born innocent until proven guilty and not the other way around. -- me Please note new 2000bit PGPkey & address <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMpPItzUhsGSn1j2pAQF19QfQhGqLa5BBoxcPdX+FGyY6zCQY5jOQA5y5 HJjB28jQGGmqiNFpXsqh2UB+aRMCYknWmshG3kBOsPqpQBiIRaHpUalYTsDxdnIA bd8rwHvY8uD6aCKdaU1yAE+fXbdLuwClUYL9SbeoLo/84ITRKWNX8LuBCPF5fROS soRrsx1noLW4V9rFvhYRmFXp7czmHGAl2ItOcndNv1xBLFea8BJ3VdbrNWgTO4rc Q2glxaqMYqd1gF3Q2uFz2u5NLlh0Ba+1MZCF9MJQ1yXdL4N0Ucov5pAeiBWCg8Ef h0BkekE6oiE9OUeu3YUZjVb0V4CcUeejUIYPxj/a97RiiA== =mNwN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Invitation to PhD defense
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: perun!news2.panix.com!panix!newsfeed.internetmci.com!news.sprintlink.net!news-peer.sprintlink.net!howland.erols.net!swrinde!ihnp4.ucsd.edu!sdcc12.ucsd.edu!cs!markus From: markus(a)cs.ucsd.edu (Markus Jakobsson) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Invitation to PhD defense Message-ID: <56qnou$5va(a)sdcc12.ucsd.edu> Date: 18 Nov 1996 22:25:34 GMT Organization: CSE Dept., U.C. San Diego Lines: 12 NNTP-Posting-Host: beowulf.ucsd.edu On December 9th, I will defend my thesis, ``Privacy vs. Authenticity'', proposing an efficient and versatile payment system that balances privacy requirements against protection against criminals. If you are in San Diego at this time, I would like to invite you to the defense. For more details, please contact me by email. Markus Jakobsson -- Research: privacy vs. authenticity, digital cash, zero-knowledge. Homepage: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/markus/ Email : markus(a)cs.ucsd.edu

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NYT article on Holocaust
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An article in today's (Tue, Nov 19, 1996) New York Times described how British intelligence had early information of the slaughter of European Jewery through the decryption of German radio messages. (Although not noted in the article, this is presumably Ultra decryption of Enigma). The information was not acted upon, and the article offers a number of reasons, among which was a (not unreasonable) fear that doing so would compromise Ultra. The article also notes that the decryptions were kept so secret that the information was not available at post-WW2 war crimes trials (such as Nurenburg). I suppose that this could offer a counter argument to the NSA FUD "If you only knew what we know." Martin. minow(a)apple.com

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Re: 1996 Codebreakers
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> writes: > I just got a review copy of the new (1996) ed. of Kahn's The > Codebreakers from my local used bookstore. Its a little disapointing, ... > & DH. Nothing on Cypherpunks, little on how privacy can be enhanced. Some folks have a very unrealistic opinion of their own importance. --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

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Re: Playing Cards - Caution!
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:59 PM 11/19/1996, Ian Goldberg wrote: > I studied the "imperfect shuffle" thing in my Randomized Algorithms class > last year. If I remember correctly, an "imperfect shuffle" is something like > this: > Cut the deck into two piles, left and right. The number of cards in > (say) the left pile is distributed binomially. > Drop one card at a time to form the new deck. A card is dropped from the > left or right pile, with probability proportional to the number of cards > remaining in that pile. > - Ian "someone else can figure out the entropy of this..." This is the approach described by Diaconis. I think his book will show you how to calculate the entropy, too. (It's a cool book. The same section shows how to do a magic trick using three riffle shuffles. A member of the audience inserts the mystery card in the deck after the three riffle shuffles. Then the magician spreads the cards on the table and looks for one which does not line up with one of the several interleaved sequences in the deck.) However, it is not obvious to me that this is how it works every time, for sure, guaranteed, no doubt at all, in the real world. Diaconis mentions that the amount of entropy varies very substantially by shuffler. I also judged his experimental data to be limited. Furthermore, I am suspicious of the model itself. A binomial distribution is convenient to use, but I don't think that's how people cut cards in practice. I think that it is a much more "pointy" distribution with lower entropy. When I cut the deck there are less than 4 bits of entropy. But, I have to admit that if I worked my way through the book and learned a little related math, I might be convinced. But, even then I would probably judge it to be too tenuous for security applications. Incidentally, some big names have worked on this problem, like Graham and Shannon. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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Re: [NOISE] U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Tim Scanlon <tfs(a)adsl-122.cais.com> writes: > > This is on the local DC news; > > Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today Did he used any crypto-tools we use? Did he used PGP? Would be fun to hear about... :) jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Tue, 19 Nov 1996, Dave Hayes wrote: > > Black Unicorn writes: > > > Dave Hayes writes: > > > > > Again, you confuse free speech with free broadcast. > > > > Isn't broadcast a subset of speech, especially in this culture? > > > That which is broadcast is certainly speech. > > > Trying to draw some kind of "right to be broadcast" as a result is > > > stupidity or ignorance, or both. > > Then I suppose you want to control all mailing lists, USENET groups, > > and web pages. These are broadcasts, and of course they have no rights > > other than what you seem to want to give them. > If I owned it, of course I would control it. If you really owned it, you would not need to control it. > You are simply exhibiting the symptoms of a spoiled brat because you have > been fortunate enough, thus far, to rely on the benevolance of whoever is > providing you your newsfeed. Methinks you know not to whom you are speaking to. Those that know may see just how the seeds of assumptions are sown in this person's mindset. > The fact that control is not exercised, does not mean it doesn't > exist. In reality control is exercised in many ways. The fact that control exists does not mean it is effective, necessary, or appropriate. Unchecked need to control is merely an outward sign of a lack of inner control, which is a disease most control freaks have. > Thus your attempt to demonize me merely exposes your ire for the system as > it now exists, your fanciful dreams of how it should be aside. I am not attempting to demonize you...you do that to yourself well enough. I have no interest in your support or opposition, other than as a tool to show those who can see where certain specific attitudes come from. > This is where you fail, with the basic inability to distinguish ownership > of intellectual content and the right to compell its broadcast by whomever > might control the medium. I maintain that it is neither appropriate nor in any sense beneficial to apply this kind of draconian control to internet communication in the general sense. > > > Learn the difference. Go to law school before you argue free speech > > > concepts in any detail. > > "Laws" do not cover the net's "multicast" technology. > >Snort< I suppose you live in the only true anarchy? Why is it that when less regulation is desirable, the kneejerk response is to declare that desire anarchistic? Human attempts at creating and imposing "law" are arbitrary, inefficient, and subject to change based on the whim of those who claim to own their implementation. > > Distinguishing communication types so as to control those who use them > > is not going to solve your problem. You are much better off, from a > > practical standpoint, learning to control what you see and hear rather > > than attempting to control others. > I'm not sure what the above babble means. Hence your attempt to control others. > I'm not sure you are either. Hence your inability to understand the concept of "honor". > > One does not need a school to see this, it sits under one's nose like > > a milk moustache. > This is the uneducated man's excuse. "Education" has very little to do with knowledge and a lot more to do with external approval, in the sense you appear to be using it. "Indoctrination" and "Conditioning" are the two terms that best fit your apparent notion. We all know how far those have gotten us in the past 2000 years. One can see this "progress" by looking at the net's attempts to control Mr. Grubor... ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet A king who feared wasps once decreed that they would be abolished. As it happened, they did him no harm. But he was eventually stung to death by scorpions.

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Symantec ask user to post registry(passwords and all) in newsgroup
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: usenet73.supernews.com!news.good.net!news.good.net!www.nntp.primenet.com!nntp.primenet.com!mr.net!news.clark.net!phzzzt!service.symantec.com!usenet From: "Nancy Ives [Symantec]" <nives(a)symantec.com> Newsgroups: symantec.support.win95.nortonutilities.general Subject: Re: Crashing while searching with Reg Editor - continued (For Nancy Ives/Symantec). Date: 20 Nov 1996 00:06:09 GMT Organization: Support Request Lines: 40 Message-ID: <01bbd675$eb9440e0$7357409b(a)nanio.symantec.com> References: <01bbd1a6$ea377560$9e2774cf(a)HALLM999.JH.COM> NNTP-Posting-Host: 155.64.87.115 X-Newsreader: Microsoft Internet News 4.70.1155 Thanks for the input. Could you send me a copy of your Registry? Export the whole thing and attach it to a post. Thanks! -- Nancy Ives Symantec Product Support

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Snare, any info
by Craig S. Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have any info on a piece of software called: Snare It is an encryption program for tcp/ip from windows PC's or so they say from http://www.capres.com Thanks Craig

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Re: "Don't Hire Lists" of FASCIST SCUM Tim May
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 20 Nov 96 at 0:43, George A. Stathis wrote: > In any case... > ************************************************************************** > Congratulations, Master Tim, you've earned yourself the No[1] place in our > own... _legal_ blacklist of Fascist Scum who are Undesirables in... Greek > Islands. If you ever come to Greece we'll *ruin* your holidays... :-) > ************************************************************************** [snip] > HOWEVER... > This is *nothing*, compared to what _will_ happen in a few years time, > when SUCH so-called 'UNEMPLOYABLE PERSONS FILES' are gonna be taken to > Publicity and also to (European) Justice. We'll convict you to pay such > a great FINE for malicious harm to individuals all over the world, that > you will CRAWL inside a hole somewhere in your United States and never, > ************************************************************ > ever, ever, attempt to leave the shitty polluted hole of yours anymore. [snip] > >We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > We got computers, we're TRANSCENDING your technology, we'll smash you one > day LEGALLY (if your compatriots don't murder you ILLEGALLY, long before > then)... Tim May, May you (already) "live" in an "interesting time" (Chinese > Curse). ("live"?... for how long? :-) ) With *much* delight about your > self-chosen TROUBLES, Hey George, have you ever heard a guy named Jim Bell? jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Montreal QC Canada "One of theses centuries, the brutes, private or public, who believe that they can rule their betters by force, will learn the lesson of what happens when brute force encounters mind and force." - Ragnar Danneskjold PGP key at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage
by aga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 19 Nov 1996, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: > Date: Tue, 19 Nov 96 07:42:36 EST > From: "Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM" <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> > Reply-To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org > Subject: Re: Taking out the garbage > > >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com Tue Nov 19 02:39:20 1996 > Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) > via UUCP; Tue, 19 Nov 96 07:38:34 EST > for dlv > Received: from toad.com by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; > id AA05505 for cypherpunks; Tue, 19 Nov 96 02:39:20 -0500 > Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id SAA02766 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Mon, 18 Nov 1996 18:15:31 -0800 (PST) > Received: from netcom6.netcom.com (shamrock(a)netcom6.netcom.com [192.100.81.114]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id SAA02760 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Mon, 18 Nov 1996 18:15:17 -0800 (PST) > Received: (from shamrock@localhost) by netcom6.netcom.com (8.6.13/Netcom) > id SAA04695; Mon, 18 Nov 1996 18:15:16 -0800 > Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 18:15:15 -0800 (PST) > From: Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> > Subject: Taking out the garbage > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Message-Id: <Pine.3.89.9611181823.A3117-0100000@netcom6> > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > Beginning Monday, 11/25/96, I will bounce all email from the various > (non-)subscribers polluting this list with garbage back to the > authors. Furthermore, I will attach documents describing basic > Internet rules of conduct to each bounce. > Somebody tell this stupid motherfucker that there are NO "basic Internet rules of conduct." He who tries to make or enforce any rules DIES! > I would encourage other Cypherpunks to do the same. > Yeah boy, you are a PUNK allright. A "punk" is a wimp-like pussy, and anybody that associates with John Gilmore is suspected of also being a faggot. > [Flames: /dev/null.] > -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred > If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" -aga

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RE: [NOISE] U.S. CIA employee caught spying
by John Fricker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to this mornings AP story, the FBI recovered deleted files from his notebook computer. Apparently, working for the CIA does not imply knowledge of basic computer security. >Jean-Francois Avon (jf_avon(a)citenet.net) said something about Re: [NOISE] U.S. CIA employee caught spying on or about 11/19/96 10:45 PM > >> Tim Scanlon <tfs(a)adsl-122.cais.com> writes: >> > This is on the local DC news; >> > Harold Nicholson age 46, a CIA employee was arrested for spying today > >Did he used any crypto-tools we use? Did he used PGP? Would be fun to hear >about... :) > >jfa >Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada > DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee > Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal > JFA Technologies, R&D consultants > physicists and engineers, LabView programing >PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon >ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 >ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C >End of message --j ----------------------------------- | John Fricker (jfricker(a)vertexgroup.com) | -random notes- | My PGP public key is available by sending me mail with subject "send pgp key". | www.Program.com is a good programmer web site. -----------------------------------

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st
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

s

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Re: Aga the homophobic redneck son of a bitch
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Hey motherfucker, I TOLD YOU to leave out the stupid > cypherpunks header! Just when are you going to learn > to listen?!! You have been around those faggots too much! Listen you cheap ass redneck son of a bitch, your homophobic biggoted attitudes do not impress anyone here. > Faggots have NOTHING to do with Fredom of Speech! Homosexual people have everything to do with liberty and basic freedom, learn how to read and maybe you`d be able to learn something about the subject. > There is a basic understanding in life by ALL GOOD MEN > that Faggots are defective creatures. NOBODY wants to > be seen with or associated with faggots! I`m afraid not actually fool. I am not a homosexual myself but whatever other peoples sexual orientation it has nothing to do with their worth or value in other areas. > John Gilmore is a Faggot, therefore he is defective. > And we question any of his associates. > open and shut case. I think not, I do not think I count myself among John`s "associates" and we no doubt disagree on a number of issues but you may ask whatever questions about me you choose to. You are the one who needs questioning, preferably by a good psychiatrist and failing that a night club bouncer with a baseball bat... Decist and leave, you are hereby killfiled. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Fuck You Dumb Cunt
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> That's a fair question. I don't begrude one's ownership of their > fair share--but I do have serious problems with what we shall > call 'accumulators' if you will. For them I have contempt and no-- > they do not have that right of possession and often such 'work' is > at the expense and on the backs of others. Oh my god, a COMMUNIST!!!! - Call the morality police someone, quick. ;-) Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Fuck You Dumb Cunt
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I believe the posession of property is a priv. to be taken > away if abused. There is no such thing as a 'right' to > property--in fact the very notion seems absurd. In what sense do you believe I am given a "privelige" to own what I do. Your very attitude implies some form of statism, in that you believe some higher authority has the right to remove that which I lawfully accumulated, this is the position taken by those who support the idea of taxation etc. Explain further, if you will, what you mean by this being a privelige. In what cases do you believe I do not have the right to retain my property? Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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CServe Does The Right Thing
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

COMPUSERVE MAY PULL ADMIN UNIT OUT OF GERMANY CompuServe's administrative operations in Germany may be transferred to another country because of proposed German legislation that would make Internet companies block access to pornography, neo-Nazi material or extremist pictures or writing. CompuServe says it does not want to be in the position of having to "censor" the Internet. (New York Times 19 Nov 96 C5)

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Re: Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security (fwd)
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 19 Nov 96 at 15:36, Z.B. wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Tue, 19 Nov 1996 21:17:49 +0000 > From: Simon Gardner <simon(a)access.org.uk> [snip] > Subject: Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security > > Cracks Are Found In Smartcard Security [snip] > Anderson said his latest research indicated that two of the world's most > widely used systems for encoding sensitive financial information - the > RSA and DES encryption standards used by most banks - could also be ^^^^^^^ > cracked easily." ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > [The London Telegraph, 19th November 1996] In what context? (How does that applies to PGP? Did he say that for short keys used to encrypt data directly?) Sorry for my cluelessness. jfa Jean-Francois Avon, Pierrefonds (Montreal) QC Canada DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Finest Limoges porcelain and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants physicists and engineers, LabView programing PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 ID# 5B51964D : 152ACCBCD4A481B0 254011193237822C

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Happy Holidays!!!
by Morence81＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------- Forwarded message: Subj: For the Holidays... Date: 96-11-20 09:26:40 EST From: Morence 81 To: Morence 81 Need a special gift to give your family, loved ones, or your friends from the internet for the Holidays? You can now send them a personalized mouse pad printed by Morence Productions. Simply by mailing a picture of any size to us, we can scan it, using high quality full color scans, and print them perfectly onto the mouse pad. There are absolutely no restrictions on the photos you can send. We guarantee that we can scan it and print it onto the mouse pad for you. Send in a picture of your girlfriend, boyfriend, favorite actor, singer, scenery, movie title, computer game, family portraits..... the possibilities are endless. Want to add words to your picture on the mouse pad? No problem!! Professional computer artists will renderize fascinating 3D words onto the picture to give it a great effect. Please take advantage of our great Holiday prices: 1 personalized mouse pad for just $15.00. Each mouse pad you order after that is only $10.00!!! No limit on the number of mouse pads you order. If you are dissatisfied with the mouse pad(s) after you receive them, simply send them back for a complete refund, no questions asked. Here is all you have to do to get your personalized mouse pads: Send in your pictures that you want to be scanned to us (if there are small multiple pictures that you want to all be printed onto just 1 mouse pad, please explain in your order.) However you explain in your order how you want it printed, it will be done. Remember that the pictures can be any size, they will automatically be resized to print perfectly on the mouse pad. There is no extra cost to get words printed on your mouse pad. They will be placed over the picture. Just let us know in the order what you would like it to say if anything. There is a shipping and handling fee of $1.00 for each mouse pad. The pictures are returned with your purchase. Please make checks or money orders to: John Morence. John Morence c/o Morence Productions 2141 Glendale Galleria #191 Glendale, CA 91210 If you have any questions, please email <mousepad1(a)themall.net> Or feel free to write to our address.

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Re: Cypherpunks State of Emergency
by Matthew J. Miszewski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(snip) > I think it's apparent that the events of Friday, with the other shoe to > drop on Monday (the H-P/Intel/Microsoft/etc. Final Capitulation), signal to > us that we are in a State of Emergency. > > The Presidents of this country are in the habit of declaring such States of > Emergency, often essentially secretly (in that the sheeple know little of > such things, and those who speak of NSDDs and PDDs and EOs are demonized by > the media as "conspiracy nuts" and "militia members"). > > Maybe it's time for us to stop flaming about Vulis and his allies, and > concentrate on the Real War. (snip) I have to agree. One of the most impressive things I have seen as a modern "movement" (yes I realize cpunks are not an organized movement, relax) was the massive public relations job done by several core cpunks around the 1993 Clipper proposal. People with largely divergent opinions found public ground in their opposition to Clipper. Lets do that again. One thing that will help is spreading the use of filtering. Those interested in learning how to filter should be able to ask any of us and we should all respond ASAP. The Noise is horrible in here, but I only hear it in my trash folder. [BTW, Tim, thanks for being willing to withstand the crap you go through. You, and others on this list, have consistantly challenged and changed my assumptions about society, law and privacy. I dont always agree with you. But I am glad you are here.] Matt Miszewski > "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM > that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." > [NYT, 1996-10-02] > We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- > Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, > tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero > W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, > Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. > "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization will have to extend beyond the proposed period. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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COMPUTER THEFT, LOW-TECH STYLE
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: oldbear(a)tiac.net Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 11:12:35 -0500 To: rah(a)shipwright.com From: Somebody Subject: forwarded without comment Mime-Version: 1.0 COMPUTER THEFT, LOW-TECH STYLE A thief broke into a Visa International data processing center in California a couple of weeks ago and stole a personal computer containing information on about 314,000 credit card accounts, including Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Discover and Diners Club, says a Visa spokesman. Some issuers, including Citibank, began calling customers last week and have issued new cards. Others are keeping quiet about the event and monitoring accounts for unusual activity. Authorities speculate that the perpetrator was stolen for the resale value of the hardware, rather than the information it contained. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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FYI - Anderson & Kuhn's new "Improved DFA" paper
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My appologies if this has been posted already. ------- Forwarded Message From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> To: ccc-list(a)newton.cam.ac.uk Message-ID: <E0vOSwQ-0000uc-00(a)heaton.cl.cam.ac.uk> Subject: Research Announcement Sender: owner-ccc-list(a)newton.cam.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Improved Differential Fault Analysis Ross J Anderson, Markus G Kuhn In [1], Biham and Shamir announce an attack on DES based on 200 ciphertexts in which one-bit errors have been induced by environmental stress. Here we show an attack that requires less than ten ciphertexts. Furthermore, our attack is practical in that it uses a fault model that has been implemented in attacks on real smartcards. In [2], Biham and Shamir show how their method can be extended to reverse engineer algorithms whose structure is unknown. Our attack can also be extended to such cases and is more efficient there too. In [3], Boneh, De Millo and Lipton discuss how such techniques can be used to attack RSA. Again, their attack is theoretical only, We show how to do it in practice. Introduction A recent research announcement by Biham and Shamir shows that if DES is implemented in a tamper-resistant package, and this package has the property that by applying ionising radiation (or some other environmental stress) we can cause random one-bit errors in the round keys, then we can break DES. If we can get a series of ciphertexts, each generated from the same plaintext but with a different one-bit random round key error, then we will need about 200 faulty ciphertexts to recover the key. In a further announcement [2], they show how on a similar fault model, the structure of unknown Feistel ciphers can be deduced from an adequate number of faulty ciphertexts. In each case, the critical observation is that errors that occur in the last few round of the cipher leak information about the key, or algorithm structure, respectively. This work is inspired by a paper of Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [3] who assume (as Biham and Shamir do) that one-bit errors can be caused by radiation or other environmental stresses. That paper goes on to show that with this fault model, RSA can be attacked. These results have been widely publicised in the press. A frequently voiced criticism is that the attacks are purely theoretical: no-one has demonstrated that single bit errors can actually be induced in a DES key schedule or an RSA computation in any fielded device. In fact, most smartcards hold keys in EEPROM which also contains much or all of the device's application software. Thus errors induced by ionising radiation would be much more likely to corrupt software, thus leading either to a system crash or to uninformative wrong answers. We show here that much faster, and completely practical, attacks are possible. The trick is to induce small changes in the code rather than trying to cause them in keys or other data. The Improved Attack Methodology In a note posted to relevant Internet newsgroups on the 7th November, one of us pointed out that using clock and power glitches gives a practical way of implementing the Lenstra variant of the Boneh attack. In this announcement, we will expand on the threat model, and also show how attacks using clock and power glitches can give attacks on DES that require many fewer ciphertexts - less than ten rather than the 200 or so previously required. In a paper on tamper resistance due to be published next week, we describe a number of techniques for attacking smartcards and other security processors [5]. This paper was written some time ago (the first results were presented at the Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge, in June) but has been withheld by agreement with the manufacturer of one of the security processors we have attacked, so that banking industry clients had some time to take suitable precautions. Some of the attacks we describe in this paper are new, while others are already known in various small communities (such as hackers and chip testers) and are included for the benefit of the wider crypto and security communities. One of the latter type is that smartcards and other security processors can often be attacked using clock and power glitches. The application of a clock pulse that is much faster than normal, or of a transient in the power supply, can often cause faulty behaviour in a microprocessor, under which the program counter is incremented but the current instruction is executed either incorrectly or not at all. A standard version of this attack is to replace a single 5MHz clock pulse to a smartcard with four 20MHz pulses. We do not claim to have invented this attack; it appears to have originated in the pay-TV hacking community, which has known about it for at least a year. In that context, it has not been used for attacks on cryptographic algorithms, but in order to cause output loops to run for longer than the card's programmer intended, thus dumping key material to the output port. The glitch attack is described more fully in our tampering article, which will appear at next week's Usenix Electronic Commerce Workshop [5]. In this note, we point out that attacks based on faulty instructions are not only proven practical, unlike the as yet undemonstrated fault model of random single bit errors induced by radiation. They also provide a much more powerful attack on many cryptographic algorithms. This holds both when we are seeking to recover a key for a known algorithm such as DES, and when we are trying to reverse engineer an unknown algorithm that has been provided in a smartcard or other tamper resistant processor. Attacking RSA A simplified version of the Boneh-DeMillo-Lipton attack, due to Lenstra, is quoted in [3]: if a smart card computes an RSA signature S on a message M modulo n = pq by computing it modulo p and q separately and then combining them using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and if an error an be induced in (say) the latter computation, then we can factor n at once as p = gcd(n,S^e-M) where e is the public exponent. This is absolutely ideal for a glitch attack. As the card spends most of its time calculating the signature mod p and mod q, and almost any glitch that affects the output will do, we do not have to be at all selective about where in the instruction sequence the glitch is applied. Since only a single signature is needed, the attack can be performed online: a Mafia eftpos terminal applies the glitch, factors the modulus, calculates what the correct signature should be, and sends this on to the bank. Thus the Mafia can harvest RSA secret keys without the customer or his bank noticing anything untoward about the transaction he did at their shop. Given that implementers of the new EMV electronic purse system propose to have only 10,000 different RSA secret keys per issuing bank, the Mafia will soon be able to forge cards for a substantial proportion of the user population. Attacking DES When we can cause an instruction of our choice to fail, then attacking DES is simple. We remove one of the xor operations that are used to combine the round keys with the inputs to the S-boxes from the last two rounds of the cipher, and repeat this for each of these key bytes in turn. The erroneous ciphertext outputs that we receive as a result of this attack will each differ from the genuine ciphertext in the output of usually two, and sometimes three, S-boxes. Using the techniques of differential cryptanalysis, we obtain about five bits of information about the eight keybits that were not xor'ed as a result of the induced fault. So, for example, eight faulty ciphertexts should give us about 40 bits of the key, leaving a trivial keysearch. Thus DES can be attacked with about one correct and eight faulty ciphertexts. But how realistic is it to assume that we will be able to target particular instructions? In most smartcards, the manufacturer supplies a number of routines in ROM. Though sometimes presented as an `operating system', the ROM code is more of a library or toolkit that enables application developers to manage communications and other facilities. Its routines usually include the DES algorithm (or a proprietary algorithm such as Telepass), and by buying the manufacturer's smartcard development toolkit (for typically a few thousand dollars) an attacker can get full documentation plus real specimens for testing. In this case, individual DES instructions can be targeted. When confronted with an unfamiliar implementation, we may have to experiment somewhat (we have to do this anyway with each card in order to find the correct glitch parameters [5]). However the search space is relatively small, and on looking at a few DES implementations it becomes clear that we can usually recognise the effects of removing a single instruction from either of the last two rounds. (In fact, many of these instructions yield almost as much information when removed from the implementation as the key xor instructions do.) We will discuss this at greater length in a later paper. The ROM Overwrite Attack Where the implementation is familiar, there is yet another way to extract keys from the card - the ROM overwrite attack. Single bits in a ROM can be overwritten using a laser cutter, and where the DES implementation is well known, we can find one bit (or a small number of bits) with the property that changing it will enable the key to be extracted easily. The details will depend on the implementation but we might well be able, for example, to make a jump instruction unconditional and thus reduce the number of rounds in the cipher to one or two. Where the algorithm is kept in EEPROM, we can use two microprobing needles to set or reset the target bit [6]. Where we have incomplete information on the implementation, ROM overwriting attacks can be used in other ways. For example, if the DES S-boxes in ROM, we can identify them using an optical microscope and use our laser cutter to make all their bits equal. This turns DES into a linear transfromation over GF(2), and we can extract the key from a single plaintext/ciphertext pair. Although ROM overwrite (unlike the other attacks suggested in this paper) involves access to the chip surface, it can be carried out using tools that are relatively cheap and widely available. So it may be used by attackers who do not have access to the expensive semiconductor test equipment that professional pirates use to extract keys directly from smartcards [5]. Returning to the non-invasive attack model, we can always apply clock and power glitches until simple statistical tests suddenly show a high dependency between the input and output of the encryption function, indicating that we have succeeded in reducing the number of rounds. This may be practical even where the implementation details are unknown. Reverse Engineering an Unknown Block Cipher In [2], Biham and Shamir discuss how to identify the structure of an unknown block cipher in a tamper resistant package (e.g., Skipjack) using one-bit random errors. As before, they identify faults that affected only the last round or rounds; this can be done by looking for ciphertexts at a low Hamming distance from each other. They then identify which output bits correspond to the left and right halves, and next look at which bits in the left half are affected by one bit changes in the last-but-one right half. In the case of a cipher such as DES with S boxes, the structure will quickly become clear and with enough ciphertexts the values of the S-boxes can be reconstructed. They report that with 500 ciphertexts the gross structure can be recovered, and with about 10,000 the S-box entries themselves can be found. Our technique of causing faults in instructions rather than in data bits is more effective here too. We can attack the last instruction, then the second last instruction, and so on. We will give detailed estimates for DES in the final paper. Let us now consider an actual classified algorithm. `Red Pike' was designed by GCHQ for encrypting UK government traffic classified up to `Restricted', and the Department of Health wishes to use it to encrypt medical records. The British Medical Association, advised by one of us (Anderson) instead recommended that an algorithm be chosen that had been in the open literature for at least two years and had withstood attempts to find shortcuts (triple-DES, Blowfish, SAFER K-128, WAKE,...). In order to try and persuade the BMA that Red Pike was sound, the government commissioned a study of it by four academics [7]. This study states that Red Pike `uses the same basic operations as RC5' (p 4) in that the principal operations are add, exclusive or, and left shift. It `has no look-up tables, virtually no key schedule and requires only five lines of code' (p 4). Other hints include that `the influence of each key bit quickly cascades' (p 10) and `each encryption involves of the order of 100 operations' (p 19). We can thus estimate the effort of reverse engineering Red Pike from a tamper resistant hardware implementation by considering the effort needed to mount a similar attack on RC5. Removing the last operation - the addition of key material - yields an output in which the right hand side is different (it is (B xor A) shl A). This suggests, correctly, that the cipher is a balanced Feistel network without a final permutation. Removing the next operation - the shift - makes clear that it was a 32 bit circular shift but without revealing how it was parametrised. Removing the next operation - the xor - is transparent, and the next - the addition of key material in the previous round - yields an output with the values A and B in the above expression. It thus makes the full structure of the data-dependent rotation clear. The attacker can now guess that the algorithm is defined by A = ((A xor B) shl B) op key B = ((B xor A) shl A) op key Reverse engineering RC5's rather complex key schedule (and deducing that `op' is actually +) would require single-stepping back through it separately; but once we know that `op' is +, we can find the round key bits directly by working back through the rounds of encryption. So, apart from its key schedule, RC5 may be about the worst possible algorithm choice for secret-algorithm hardware applications, where some implementations may be vulnerable to glitch attacks. If Red Pike is similar but with a simpler key schedule, then it could be more vulnerable still. However, since the government plans to make Red Pike available eventually in software, this is not a direct criticism of the design or choice of that algorithm. It does all suggest, though, that secret-hardware algorithms should be more complex; large S-boxes kept in EEPROM (that is separate from the program memory) may be a sensible way of pushing up the cost of an attack. Other protective measures that prudent designers would consider include error detection, multiple encryption with voting, and designing the key schedule so that the key material from a small number of rounds is not enough for a break. Conclusion We have improved on the Differential Fault Analysis of Biham and Shamir. Rather than needing about 200 faulty ciphertexts to recover a DES key, we need less than ten. We can factor RSA moduli with a single faulty ciphertext. We can also reverse engineer completely unknown algorithms; this appears to be faster than Biham and Shamir's approach in the case of DES, and is particularly easy with algorithms that have a compact software implementation such as RC5. Finally, our attacks - unlike those of Biham, Shamir, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton - - use a realistic fault model, which has actually been implemented and can be used against fielded systems. Acknowledgement Mike Roe pointed out that the glitch attack on RSA can be done in real time by a Mafia owned eftpos terminal. Bibliography [1] ``A New Cryptanalytic Attack on DES'', E Biham, A Shamir, preprint, 18/10/96 [2] ``Differential Fault Analysis: Identifying the Structure of Unknown Ciphers Sealed in Tamper-Proof Devices'', E Biham, A Shamir, preprint, 10/11/96 [3] ``On the Importance of Checking Computations'' D Boneh, RA DeMillo, RJ Lipton, preprint [4] ``A practical variant of the Bellcore attack'', RJ Anderson, posted to sci.crypt as message ID <55picf$dm3(a)lyra.csx.cam.ac.uk>, 7/11/96 [5] ``Tamper Resistance - A Cautionary Note'', RJ Anderson, MG Kuhn, to appear in Usenix Electronic Commerce workshop, 19/11/96 [6] ``Hardwaresicherheit von Mikrochips in Chipkarten'', Osman Kocar, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit v 20 no 7 (July 96) pp 421--424 [7] ``Red Pike --- An Assessment'', C Mitchell, S Murphy, F Piper, P Wild, Codes and Ciphers Ltd 2/10/96 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: How to slow the animals ...
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:00 AM 11/19/96 +0000, The Deviant wrote: >On Mon, 18 Nov 1996, Ernest Hua wrote: > ... >> 3. Re-order out-going mail (from toad.com) according to size. >> Drop messages from queue if it gets "reordered" too many times. >> > >nononononononono Bad Bad Thing. If you start doing that, we'll start >getting replies before messages _even more than we do now_. I thought so too, at first. As the long post won't be there to reply to, replies can't beat the origional post to the e-mail box. Consider, You replied to a post, until you got this post, you could not reply to it. When you got the origional post, most everyone else did as well. by delaying long posts, replies would be forced to come later. However, if a person writes a long argument to a post, and that is delayed, meantime, someone else writes another response which closely mirrors the first, you have now doubled the responses. I may have done so here in fact. What you say would be true if a message could be put on the "back burner" after half of the receipients received thier copy. Then, the remaining half could get the reply before the post. I believe I may be suffering from something similar to this now as my e-mail address is probably near the bottom of the rolls, due to my subscription being less than a month old.

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Anon
by rod＠wired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in some child porn or commerce pov. Thanks, Rod R o d e r i c k S i m p s o n rod(a)wired.com A s s o c i a t e P r o d u c e r T h e H o t W i r e d N e t w o r k www.braintennis.com www.wiredsource.com

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Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm off straight science fiction these days because the real world is so science fictional that I find it hard to suspend disbelief. I do continue to like military SF though and now straight military fiction. The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and networking. Unfortunately, Since I am involved in "defining" the future in the debates over the effects of the technology, I also can't suspend disbelief and like stories that come to radically different conclusions about that future than I have. This is not old fuddy duddyism (I hope) but arises because the nature of society these days is such that the future has become much more of a consensual act on all our parts and I consider it important to hold fast to my vision of the future and push it so that it comes about. This doesn't encourage suspensions of disbelief. Meanwhile there are plenty of other things to read. Not that I get to read that much fiction these days. The Nets take too much time. DCF

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ACLU sues GA over net ban
by camcc＠abraxis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>X-Sender: ewatkins(a)pop.ipst.edu >Date: Wed, 20 Nov 1996 16:01:30 -0500 >Reply-To: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >Sender: Electronic Frontiers Ga Action Mailing List <ACTION(a)efga.org> >From: Eric James Watkins <eric.watkins(a)IPST.EDU> >Subject: AJC [Atlanta Journal and Constitution] Front page Tuesday final edition >To: ACTION(a)EFGA.ORG > --------------------------------------------------------- >We made the front page!!! I don't have >permission to distribute this. I consider it fair use, and I did suggest >everyone buy a paper earlier. Note: The AJC does not archive these articles. >---------------------------------------- >ACLU sues the state over its ban on some Internet communication > >By Art Kramer >STAFF WRITER > > The ACLU filed suit against the state Tuesday, alleging that a Georgia >law barring the use of pseudonyms and anonymous communication on the >Internet is unconstitutional. > In the first court challenge in an ongoing campaign against >Internet-related laws in 13 states, the American Civil Liberties Union >alleges that when Georgia passed the law affecting the Internet, it >unconstitutionally encroached on the federal power to regulate interstate >commerce. > The suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Atlanta on behalf of >Electronic Frontiers Georgia (EFGA), Rep. Mitchell Kaye (R-Marietta), and 12 >other groups and individuals. > "The right to speak and publish using a virtual 'nom de plume' has its >roots in a long tradition dating back to the very founding of democracy in >this country," said Ann Beeson, staff attorney for the ACLU. > Beeson's use of the Constitution's "commerce clause," the first in an >Internet-related case, could invalidate many state laws affecting the global >computer network, said Trotter Hardy, a professor of law at William and Mary >Law School in Williamsburg, Va. > But Hardy said that approach could backfire by strengthening the case >for federal regulation of the Internet, a result civil libertarians may come >to regret. > State Attorney General Michael Bowers said Tuesday he had not reviewed >the case yet, but that his office typically pursues lawsuits against the >state vigorously. He has 20 days to respond in court. > The ACLU is among a coalition that in February challenged the federal >Communications Decency Act, which bars online content deemed indecent or >"patently offensive." A Philadelphia federal court's decision in June to >block enforcement of the law is on appeal to the Supreme Court. > China, Singapore, Australia, France, Britain and other countries are >debating or enacting curbs on Internet content, and several U.S. states are >considering or already have regulated online material. > The ACLU lawsuit also targets a portion of the Georgia law that the >group contends prohibits online use of trademarked material without >permission. The law went into effect July 1. > That could threaten the use of protected materials such as corporate >logos as links on the World Wide Web, a practice that is now routine, said >EFGA executive director Robert Costner. On EFGA's page, for example, >selecting the BellSouth logo takes the viewer to BellSouth's Web page. > But the law's author, Rep. Don Parsons (R-Marietta), called that >argument preposterous. > "It's just common sense. A link is not an attempt to make a visitor >believe your Web page is someone else's, which is what the law is meant to >prevent," Parsons said. > Kaye, whose use of the Georgia State Seal on his home page angered some >legislators, said he joined the suit to promote open, accessible government. > Kaye said the law has "given Georgia a black eye, sending a message to >the world that we do not understand and are inhospitable to technology." > Parsons said he's been unfairly characterized as an Internet know-nothing. > "I'm an advocate for the Internet's possibilities. To reach its full >potential, users must have real confidence that the sites they visit are >credible, that they are who they say they are. That's all the bill was >supposed to do." > One of the challengers, Avondale Web page designer Bonnie Nadri, said >she already has removed some links from her pages, including the logos of >Coca-Cola, Microsoft and Netscape Communications, because of the law. > The challengers say the wording of the law appears to prohibit >anonymity. Eric Van Pelt, president of the gay support group Atlanta >Veterans Alliance, said his organization joined the suit to shield the >identity of >two gay, active-duty military members of the AVA and to protect their >compliance with the Pentagon's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. > "We made them take an oath of confidentiality to join AVA; we don't want >to expose them to criminal charges just for sending e-mail," said Van Pelt. > RealAudio playback of Tuesday's press conference and the full text of >the lawsuit are available from EFGA.

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Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:33 AM 11/20/96 -0800, John Anonymous MacDonald wrote: >Most "dual-use" items are export-restricted to Lybia. That means US >businesses will have trouble selling any computers or even things like >trucks to Lybia. For crypto tokens not to be available there does not >seem to be a huge deal, in comparison with everything else. Particularly since Libya bought a bunch of "oil drilling rig transport trucks" from Oshkosh Truck Corp in the '70s and hired a bunch of Brits to convert them into tank transporters. Didn't help them against the deadly Toyota pickups of the Chadian Defense Forces though. DCF

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SSLeay Legality FAQ
by cjh＠osa.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Folk, Here's version 1.4 of the SSLeay Legality FAQ. Additions since 1.3 are in the areas of import/export controls in various countries. Enjoy! ---------------------------------- Cut Here ---------------------------------- SSLeay Legality FAQ Version 1.4 Outline: Disclaimer Legality/Patent Rights table Export Considerations Patent Considerations References For more information Credits Disclaimer: This document may contain gross errors, and neither Clifford Heath nor Open Software Associates Limited accept any liability for same. Users should do their own research and receive professional legal advice. With regard to the legalities of using SSLeay, there is a number of geographical considerations, and a number of kinds of legal considerations. Legality/Patent Rights table: I've broken the legal considerations into "legal" (will the govt come after you :-) and "license" (who do you need to pay patent royalties to). Algor: Location: Purpose: Legal: License: Ref: DES world-wide any mostly# public domain RSA US indiv/free only RSAref free RSA RSA US commercial RSAref/BSAFE from RSADSI* RSA DH US ? mostly# Cylink+ DSA/DSS (based on Diffie-Hellman) RC4/2 US any mostly# from RSADSI RSA RC4 elsewhere any mostly# seems safe IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/free mostly# free ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan indiv/commercial mostly# $US15, ASCOM ASCOM IDEA US/Europe/Japan company site mostly# from ASCOM ASCOM IDEA elsewhere any mostly# free SAFER world-wide any mostly# free Safer MD2 world-wide PEM only yes free@ rfc1319 MD5 world-wide any yes free@ rfc1321 SHA world-wide any yes free Any(!) France any only with (almost unobtainable) permit Any(!) Russia any only with permit Notes: * RSADSI's patent on RSA (#4,405,829) runs out on 20 Sep 2000. RSAref is free under certain terms, otherwise can be licensed through Concensus. BSAFE is stronger and has RC4 but requires purchase and royalties: $25K up front, royalties the larger of 2% or $2, royalty prepayment of $5000 per annum required in subsequent years covers 50% of royalties over the following year. + DH by itself cannot be used for digital signatures - the El Gamal extension provides this. CYLINK claim their DH patent covers El Gamal. The US patent #4,200,770 runs out on 29 April 1997. The Canadian patent (#1,121,480) registered 6 April, 1982, runs out in 1999. @ Acknowledgement is required - see the RFC. # Many countries have nominal export controls, including the UK and Australia, but I only know of them being enforced in the USA. MD2/5 and SHA are not subject to export controls anywhere that I know of. Export considerations: The USA has regulations under ITAR (International Trade in Arms Regulations) which categorises "cryptographic and ancillary devices" as munitions. Two classes of export licenses are granted: Distribution Licenses or DL's and Individual Validated Licenses or IVL's. To get an IVL you must say who the customer is and why he needs DES (or 3X DES, etc.). One may then use the IVL to export to the approved end user. Thousands are granted every year and very few applications are rejected. Systems which use cryptography for decryption only, authentication only (e.g. Kerberos authentication as available from Cybersafe and others), or can only be used for protecting financial data (e.g Cybercash etc., as long as it cannot be used for arbitrary messaging) are more-or-less readily granted a DL. DLs have also been granted for some implementations of RC4/40 bits (e.g Netscape). Canada has back-to-back agreements with the USA's ITAR controls, so it's easy to get crypto from the USA to Canada but you can't export from Canada. More information is available from Customs Canada (Revenue Canada) and Department of External Affairs and these URLs: http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/ECL.html - Excerpts from the Export Control List of Canada, and http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html Canada's export controls. Many other countries have export controls (UK, Australia and others), but enforcement is less stringent than in the USA. In Australia, export of cryptographic software is controlled by Customs Regulations 13B (military technology) and 13E (Dual Use Technology). The regulations are administered by the Defence Signals Directorate - mail to "Director, Strategic Trade Policy and Operations, Dept of Defence, Anzac Park West Offices APW1-1-OA1, Canberra, ACT" or fax (06)266-6412 and ask for their "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications". The Australian regulations are also online at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp.pl/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/cer43… Software is defined as "one or more programs fixed in any tangible medium of expression", which explicitly leaves electronic shipment uncontrolled. Don't carry or mail media with SSLeay-based software out of Australia - email or FTP it instead! The UK Gov't is funding a project at Royal Holloway College which contains Key Escrow provisions. Watch for the EC DGXIII introducing European legislation under the banner "European Trusted Services", or visit http://www.modeemi.cs.tut.fi/~avs/eu-crypto.html, ftp://ftp.dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk/pub/Chris.Mitchell/istr_a2.ps, ftp://ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/euroclipper.ps.Z France disallows *import* and use of crypto technology without a permit, and Russia requires a permit for use also. Patent considerations: According to 35 U.S.C. 271 (a), "whoever makes, uses, offers to sell, sells or imports ... infringes the patent." In other words, you better ensure that you *compile out* and patented algorithms unless you intend to license them, even if the code is not executed. In fact, if you are in the USA, merely ftp'ing SSLeay into the USA is a breach of various patents. (Eric, you might consider splitting it into two ftp archives, one for the USA and an additional one for the rest of the world.) References: RSA: http://www.rsa.com/ CYLINK: http://www.cylink.com/products/security/ ASCOM: http://www.ascom.ch/Web/systec Safer: ftp://ftp.isi.ee.ethz.ch/pub/simpl/ For more information: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm - Crypto Law Survey Credits: Thanks to to Eric Young, Rich Salz, Donald Lewine, Holger Reif and Bruce Schneier (author of Applied Cryptography), Peter Trei, Remo Tabanelli, Ben Laurie, Ulf Moeller, Michael Taylor for their contributions. ------------------------------------------------------------ Clifford Heath cjh(a)osa.com.au Open Software Associates Limited 29 Ringwood Street / P O Box 401 Phone +613 9871 1694 Ringwood VIC 3134 AUSTRALIA Fax +613 9871 1711 ------------------------------------------------------------ Deploy Applications across the Internet and Intranets! Visit our Web site at http://www.osa.com

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Social Security workers in bribery plot
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Copyright c 1996 Nando.net Copyright c 1996 From staff and wire reports NEW YORK (Nov 20, 1996 4:42 p.m. EST) - Several Social Security Administration employees have been charged with giving confidential consumer information to credit card thieves in exchange for bribes as low as $10, authorities said on Wednesday. [...] The investigation began in February when investigators for Citicorp's Citibank found that a large number of Citibank credit cards had been sent to customers but never received. But the cards had been activated. [...] The Social Security Administration then conducted security reviews to determine if any employees had accessed files of individuals. Gimlett said the investigation was significant because it demonstrated "the reality that employees of government agencies or corporations who have access to personal information may take advantage of their position of trust to steal personal information and sell it for financial gain." [...]

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No Subject
by Giulio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unsuscribe Cypherpunks Giulio <gexing(a)mbox.vol.it>

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Re: US supporting dissidents? (was Re: Rogue Governments Issuing Policy Tokens)
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:52 PM 11/20/96 -0500, Jeremiah A Blatz wrote: >Trademarks are not copyrights. There is no fair use for trademarks. In >addition, civil suits are not criminal trials. The USG can't throw >your ass in jail for making "big brother inside" stickers, but Intel >can sue your ass off. >In a related note, you may be safe from lible suits... Make you wonder how Mad magazine has gotten away with it all these years... (Maybe we could get Mad to print them! Would make an interesting cover...) ObSpyVSSpy: Mad TV (on Fox) has been running animated Spy V.S. Spy cartoons. (Usually one or two per episode.) Probibly best thing about the show. (I mentioned this because one "prominent Cypherpunk" at Orycon had not known about them.) --- | "Remember: You can't have BSDM without BSD." - alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmermann unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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RE: FUCK YOU punk
by nobody＠zifi.genetics.utah.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: aga on Wed, Nov 20, 1996 15:24 Subject: FUCK YOU punk/was:Taking out the garbage To: freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >If you try to make or enforce any rules and YOU DIE cocksucker! You might want to watch yourself. It would be hard to *not* see this as a direct threat... >Your presents shall be totally eliminated form this InterNet! ^^^^^^^ Yeah, Lucky! You better watch out, or there'll be NO CHRISTMAS!! :-) >Your connection will be TERMINATED at once! Suddenly, agatha is everyone's sysadmin... >fuck you punk, and fuck all of your "rules" Whether stated or not, there _are_ certain guidelines (or rules) we all should follow, just so we aren't *ASSHOLES*... >-aga

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Re: Anon
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:06 PM 11/20/96 -0700, Roderick Simpson wrote: >Who has made the strongest case _against_ anonymity on the Net that you >have ever heard? Someone intelligent and theoretical rather than trapped in >some child porn or commerce pov. > >Thanks, >Rod Recruiting for a future Brain Tennis I take it? The Thursday Computer columnist for the WSJ (whose name escapes me) is a possibility. I don't know how strong he is but he is consistently opposed. I wouldn't recommend L. Detweiler though he is opposed to anonymity. How about Esther Dyson? DCF

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Re: Anon
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned a couple of days ago, science fiction writer David Brin has an argument against not only anonymity, but _privacy_ as well. Where cypherpunks tend to think of privacy as both beneficial and inevitable, Brin sees it as harmful and doomed. He has an article in the December 1996 issue of Wired discussing his ideas. BTW cypherpunk Doug Barnes is also quoted several times in the long article in that issue by Neal Stephenson (Snow Crash, The Diamond Age) about the undersea cables that carry most transnational information traffic. Hal

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Re: Why I Don't Read SF Much Anymore
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The problem with straight SF for me is that computers and networks have > changed the future so much that (in the words of the motto of the SF > Writer's Association) The Future Ain't What It Used to Be. The science > fictional futures of my childhood are now dead as doornails. And I can't > enjoy contemporary SF that doesn't include a healthy dose of computers and > networking. I find this to be largely true as well. The cyberpunk genre does the best job at grappling with the impact of communications tech but it is traditionally dystopian. It would be nice to see a story about better living through crypto. What fiction can people recommend which presents crypto/privacy issues realistically? How about this new book that Neal Stephenson is working on, does anyone know what it's about? His short story, "Hack the Spew", a few months ago (in Wired, I think?) had a strong crypto flavor. Hal

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Re: Stewart Baker on new crypto rules
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> > http://www.steptoe.com/oped.htm > > argues that industry won't accept any system that threatens to cut off > backwards compatibility after 2 years, hence DES export liberalization > will have to extend beyond the proposed period. I take a slightly different moral. Baker (former NSA attorney) writes: > If buying key-recovery encryption means customers must give up all > of their legacy encryption systems, key recovery products will carry a > near-fatal burden in many markets where encryption is now used widely. The > transition to key recovery will have to be gradual or it won't happen > at all. What I see this as is a call to come up with architectures that will allow transparent phase-in of government key access (so-called "key recovery") technology. The current HP proposal fits in very well with this model. The appear to be planning on using standard API's so that applications will be able to switch to using key escrow software without changing the applications themselves, just the OS. Maybe there could be a transition period where both the old and new crypto would both be accepted, then after a period of time the old wouldn't work any more. As Baker goes on to say: > Three years ago, no one in the PC world would have bought an operating > system that didn't run MS-DOS. Three years from now, we'll be happy to buy > an operating system that is backward-compatible with Windows 95 but not > with MS-DOS. And then, at last, we'll throw out all our old DOS programs. This suggests to me that we need to be vigilant in watching for systems that will allow for easy "drop in" of key escrow. Hal

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RE: Mass-market crypto phones
by Mullen Patrick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________________________ From: Clay Olbon II on Thu, Nov 21, 1996 15:20 >A while back, Eric Blossom posted a URL for a mass-market, phone encyrption >device (http://www.comsec.com/) The point of this post is to posit a The above mentioned crypto phone was incredibly expensive, if I remember correctly. What it basically was (Please keep in mind I may be thinking of a different product) a box containing a modem and a crypto-crunching CPU. Phone in one end, processed by said CPU, and send out other end. I have/had a similar idea, but I want to try make it a totally software product (assuming you have the necessary hw requirements on your computer) where you talk in through a microphone (can something be wired so you can use a regular phone plugged into your computer/modem/soundcard???) your CPU crunches code, and spits out the encrypted data. Obviously, the complementing steps would be done on the receiving end. Has anyone ever tried anything like this? >I think we need to keep a couple of goals in mind. The first, is to get >encrypting phones (or phone add-ons) into Wal-mart, K-mart, etc (where >probably most Americans now buy their phones). The prices need to be low >enough that people will want to buy them (<$100?). Is this technically >feasible? The comsec device from the above URL already demonstrates the >needed capability. Is the cost target possible? My guess is soon, given >the lowering costs and increasing capabilities of current processors. Goals sound good. I feel it *definately* has to be below $100. Personally, I use a phone bought at K-Mart that cost $12 _after_ tax... I wouldn't mind paying $50 for a techno gizmo that made my conversations, inane as they may be, private. The price would also have to be low to assure the other end has a similar techno-gizmo, or I would have wasted my money. Anyone else see the *immediate* need for a standard? >The second goal needs to be to push a similar product for cell-phones. If I'm not mistaken (and I've been known to be from time to time :-), cell phones are already encrypted between the phone and cell tower. That way, they are no less private than a regular phone. Of course, you may be referring to further end-to-end encryption built into the phone in addition to this, but as far as they being less secure than a house phone, I'm not sure about that one. >Given that these goals are met, I think widespread use of crypto over phone >lines would become almost inevitable. However, the fun part would be the >introduction of such products. The FUD coming from police, the government, >etc. would be amazing to behold. Agreed! > Clay >******************************************************* >Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com >engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. >**********************************************tanstaafl PM USER ERROR: REPLACE AND STRIKE ANY KEY WHEN READY

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