December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Strong Encryption for International Versions of Netscape
by Scott Weisman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: November 17, 1996 ANNOUNCING STRONG ENCRYPTION FOR INTERNATIONAL VERSIONS OF NETSCAPE JERUSALEM, Israel -- SecureScape Technologies announces the alpha release of its first product, SecureScape. This revolutionary program offers international users of Netscape Navigator the same strong encryption as that enjoyed by users in North America. All software encryption products developed in the United States are subject to export restrictions. Such exported software is subject to an arbitrary 40-bit key length, compared to the 128-bit (or greater) key length commonly found in domestic software. This weakened software is in certain ways inferior to no encryption at all, since it gives users a false sense of security. The Executive Order by President Clinton on November 15, which modifies U.S. Government policy on export restrictions, still requires requests for export permits to be considered on a case by case basis. Furthermore, it is very likely that strong encryption products will be granted export permits conditional on key-escrow or other compromise arrangements, because the Executive Order states, "the export of encryption software . . . must be controlled . . . such software shall not be considered or treated as 'technology'." Implying that encryption software is still considered a form of munitions. The irony, of course, is that strong encryption has been widely and easily available outside of the U.S. for years. SecureScape was developed using the freely available SSLeay library, developed by Eric Young of Australia. SecureScape Technologies was founded by Scott Weisman, a software developer residing in Jerusalem, to develop and market Internet security products. The company is seeking investors interested in a strategic partnership. The SecureScape home page is located at <http://www.SecureScape.com/secscape/>. SecureScape currently works with Netscape versions 1.1 or later on the Windows 95 and Windows NT platforms. CONTACT: Scott Weisman P.O.B. 31194 Jerusalem 91311 ISRAEL sweisman(a)SecureScape.com © 1996 Scott Weisman - All Rights Reserved. Netscape and Netscape Navigator are trademarks of Netscape Communications Corporation. Microsoft, Windows, and Windows NT are trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. SecureScape uses software developed by Eric Young (eay(a)mincom.oz.au)

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Unsubscriving Briefly
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm unsubscriving from the list for a few days (weeks?) until the noise level drops down a bit. I'll check it periodically on the Web and I'm pretty sure that if something happens that shakes the world of cryptography to its very foundations, someone will probably send me some email about it. Please continue to party while I am away. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Please take me off the list
by Tom Van de Wiele 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sir Please take me off the list. Thanks Tom Van de Wiele -- tomvdw(a)glo.be

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Re: [NOISE] aga isn't on cypherpunks... (and I'm glad)
by Sven 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> I have a suggestion... How 'bout if everybody on this list dropped >> a procmail configuration that mailed aga(a)dhp.com and postmaster(a)dhp.com >> a copy of every message that originated from aga(a)dhp.com? Do you think >> he would start to "get it" then? Why are these people so uptight? Sven MOSER016.JPG |__ |--> SVEN: a.k.a. Chris Blanc Internet consulting/Web design [ http://www.loop.com/~sven/ ] Some only sample the dark wine of life's blood...

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Re: MSIE 128 Bit
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM (dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com) wrote: : Steve Shelby <sshelby(a)feist.com> writes: : > : > Microsoft has a 128 bit version of their Explorer available. : > : > You have to jump through a few hoops, but they have it. : How about maiking available on a European mirror site with no questions asked? ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/incoming/0-microsoft/ has one 128 bit version. -- Alex de Joode http://www.replay.com/people/adejoode I have a linux emulator for Win95: it's called "loadlin" ... *g*

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RE: The Utility of Privacy
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Hal Finney You suggest that the main motivation which someone might have for protecting privacy is that they are engaged in some illicit activities: page 45: "Why should I really care if someone sees this? I have nothing to hide." ..................................................... This statement from David Brin impressed me with the consistency of a certain way of thinking that some people have: "I think that having a minimum standard of living is good, therefore everyone should be coerced to contribute to the general welfare." On the other hand, "I myself have nothing to hide, therefore no one should be concerned (read: permitted) to do so." The issue for them in regard of what everyone should/should not do, is whether anything is logical as far as they themselves can see - and the logic revolves around what they themselves think is right; the extent of their own vision is considered sufficient to determine the parameters of everyone else's life & actions, and therefore sufficient cause to have their measures imposed over all. But this letter of Hal's brought up an important point: that even if a person has nothing to hide, it is not the openness or closedness of information which is of concern, but the *responses of others* to that information. When an individual wants to live a free & open life, they expose themselves to dangers. In order to be free to roam, they must have a way to protect themselve from all manner of destructive influences - the weather, predatory animals, vicious strangers, etc. There must be a way to protect what is one's own in order to preserve it. If it was easier for everyone to defend themselves against attacks on their person or reputation, maybe there would not be as much concern about privacy. Perhaps if a person could "get away" from others, could continue to have a normal life without too much disruption, once some exciting bit of info was out in public, if they could maintain command over the effects upon their life despite living in a fishbowl, then no one would worry quite as much (although the principle of personal control over one's property remains the same). But in the meantime, we have but few ways to protect ourselves under the centralized arrangement for protection (police, defense agencies). Anyone in a government position is aware of how their public expressions can result in public outcries against them; the secret agencies protect their information files because of what "the enemy" would *do* if they found out about these - even if the agency itself does not consider its activities immoral. If Information is like munition, privacy is like defense - it is a form of self defense. .. Blanc

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:39 PM 11/17/1996, Simon Spero wrote: >On Fri, 15 Nov 1996, Rich Graves wrote: >>Peter Hendrickson wrote: >>> There are times when one wishes to speak anonymously, yet speak >>> as a member of a group. >> You either need to trust a shared server to know and then blind your >> identity, or trust the people with whom you share a secret key not to >> give that key to non-group members. > Why not use blinding for obtaining the certificate? > Create a number up public/private key pairs, blind them, then do the > cut-and-choose thing with the security officer. He signs the blinded key, > then returns it. Unblind the remaining pubic key, and you've got a public > key with the appropriate signature on it. Okay, this would work. But, it requires that all (or at least many) of the Members of Parliament cooperate. If not, then the security officer will be able to make very good guesses about who is speaking. Parliamentarians may not cooperate for a variety of reasons. They may not wish to be attacked by terrorists for the words of others. They may believe that cowardice is not to be encouraged. They may not believe in anonymity. It might be too hard for them. What I would like to see is a method which relies only on published public keys and no other cooperation from the people who are (more or less) being used as shields. This may be impossible. (A number of people have posted references to other ways of doing this. I have yet to track down the references they gave so I don't know if any of them fit the bill.) Peter

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Re: Computer CPU chips with built-in crypto?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Martin Minow <minow(a)apple.com> > I'm not sure if I can answer this but, at last week's SF cypherpunks > meeting, an Intel engineer asked whether there might be any interest > in a computer chip with some sort of encryption mechanism built > into the chip. As I understand it, this chip would process an > encrypted instruction stream. I.e., it could not execute a program > unless the "key" for that program was first loaded into the chip. > > An interesting idea: does anyone have more information? This sounds like something which might be used in a set-top-box or "information appliance" application where pay-per-use programs would be loaded from a CDROM or network connection. People have been dreaming about pay per use software for many years. It is a similar idea to the "mini application" concept which would replace the monolithic super-apps, the Microsoft Words and the giant do-everything web-browsers/newsreaders/mail-clients, with small, single function utilities. This is part of the idea behind Apple's OpenDoc and Microsoft's OLE. In the same way, instead of buying a big program for hundreds of dollars, you'd just download and use the functionality you needed for a small fee. Yet in practice it is not clear whether either of these trends will have any market success. Monolithic applications seem to be doing very well, with more integration being the trend, not less. And the whole idea of introducing metering to a market which is used to paying just once for access is one which is bound to meet resistance. Look at AOL which is going to single-charge unlimited access to the net. So in both cases the trend looks to be going in the opposite direction. Another possible application for the built in encryption is software piracy protection. You'd unlock software for your CPU but it would not run on anybody else's without a different key code. Here again there is not much benefit to the end user, unless software prices come down dramatically when this device is used. But otherwise the computer manufacturers are selling computers which have features which will limit the powers of the buyers, and having to sell them more expensively to boot because of the special chip. In these days of razor thin profit margins in the PC business it is hard to see how this will sell. Hal

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[NOISE] Want to know about this "aga" character? Read the Grubor FAQ!
by Alan Bostick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case you aren't clued in enough to know, "aga(a)dhp.com" is none other than John Grubor, well-known Usenet Kook Of The Month winner for November, 1995. He *cannot* be reasoned with. Don't even try. He makes Dimitri Vulis appear sane, calm, and rational. Read the Grubor FAQ, http://kendaco.telebyte.com/dharland/Grubor.FAQ.html for more details. Alan "pseudonum of the LYING FORGER PETER VOROBIEFF!!!!1!" Bostick -- Alan Bostick | You know those chemicals women have in them, | when they've got PMS? Well, men have those very mailto:abostick@netcom.com | same chemicals in them *all the time*. news:alt.grelb | Margaret Atwood, THE ROBBER BRIDE http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~abostick

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Re: Censor John Gilmore -- EFF is a disgrace!
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Multiple CC's trimmed, I don't think anyone at msn.com cares...] > #From Phrack 49, file p49-09 published this month: ... > File 09 of 16 > by Dr.Dimitri Vulis (KOTM) > A Content-Blind Cancelbot for Usenet (CBCB) ... > And what follows, is Dr. Dimitri, defender of freedom of expression, > champion of the anti-censors on the net, posting code to the world to > engage in exactly those activities that everyone has been ranting about > as being so utterly "horrifying (forged cancellations etc)" as it > were. You call yourself on cypherpunks, and you blithely assume that a Phrack author actually signs his real name? Either I thought you guys were *real* hackers and you aren't, or this is a very funny troll. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet "Better to be safe than to be sorry" is a remark of value only when these are the actual alternatives.

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The free market will ever be the only real path to free speech, because, > in essence, it is free speech. > Free speech does not, however, require that all speech be universally > broadcast to each and every citizen on the planet free of charge. That's > "subsidized speech." Given that the free market rule is "he who has the money makes the rules", please explain how anything less than "subsidized speech" (as you put it) is anything close to free speech? [For those who's assumptions rule their perception: I am *not* arguing that all speech should be subsidized. I am merely pointing out that the organization that is spending the money to broadcast is controlling the speech, hence it is *not* free speech in terms of freedom or cost.] ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet If you want to get rid of somebody, just tell them something for their own good.

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You ought to REALLY look at this...
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ladies and Gentlemen, I hereby quote a rather remarkable letter, which I pass on to whom it may concern. I consider it an _honour_ to have received such a letter, even though the material expressed in the letter is a serious assault on the entire Western Value System, and possibly Civilisation itself, no joke. At first I did not believe such a *terrorist* letter could have EVER been written. And I could never believe myself to be the recipient of it either. But now I strongly recommend you read it carefully and think about it... For your OWN benefit, I believe more than mine... With thanks for your attention George A. Stathis P.S. If you take a deep breath, see my (amusing?) comments in the end. :) >Hops: 0 >Posted-Date: Sun, 17 Nov 1996 20:13:15 -0200 (GMT) >X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net >Date: Sun, 17 Nov 1996 10:18:36 -0800 >To: "George A. Stathis" <hyperlex(a)hol.gr> >From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> >Subject: Stathis on "Don't Hire" List >Content-Length: 1426 > >At 9:00 AM -0200 11/17/96, George A. Stathis wrote: > >>It is not ethical to send such strong negative _injunctions_ to masses >>of people and also to strangers (the 1900-strong members of the cyberphunks >>list for instance). Because, you may or may not have strong reasons for >>believing you are justified in such invalidation, but more than a 1000 >>people are now _told_ by (self-appointed) "experts" such as yourself what >>and whom to ignore or to believe. (Like sheep led to the slaughter)... > >"Not ethical"? > >But we will do it anyway. Moreover, some of us maintain lists of "Do Not >Hire" persons. Few high tech or Silicon Valley software companies will hire >such folks. > >Congratulations, Stathis, as you are now on such a list. > > > >"The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM >that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." >[NYT, 1996-10-02] >We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. >---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- >Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, >tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero >W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, >Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. >"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." Comments? (1) Well, first of all, Tim May is doing a disservice to the companies who use his services. They will end up hiring only morons and controllable relics of human creativity; Which is why there a WORLD-SHORTAGE of SUPER- PROGRAMMERS at the moment, as reported e.g. by Byte-magazine. (2) If I were a _clever_ American employer, I'd use Tim's 'black list', in order to HIRE precisely those people whom he considers 'unemployable'... (3) Now I don't want to boast about who I am, but it's strangely ironical that I _am_ one such "Super-Programmer" (fluent in PROLOG. Assembly, 'C' and also... English -a computer-lingo as it happens). In the eighties I was also a painter (of pictures, not walls), and other things... As a 'New Age' kind of person, I used to admire America for rewarding and promoting human _talent_, as opposed to human mediocrity, subservience (the "Yes-Man" attitude), and Evil in the Soul. (as often happened in old-whore Europe; especially in Greece)... :-) Nowadays, however, when 'people' like Tim May, are able to dictate to your admirable High-Technology firms, *what* kind of people to hire and what not to hire, I can see... very gloomy prospects for American Research, _if_ this type of monstrocity (as his letter) is prevails for too long... :-) Originally, lists of "unemployable" people, which I had heard of, crossed my mind as 'probably justified'. As an EMPLOYER MYSELF, with a small but strong software-house, here in Athens, with at least one important Market Success, I do have some experience, you know, of what kind of people *are* and what kind of people are *not* 'employable'. I once knew a very good but very egotistic Assembly Language programmer. When he stopped working with me he stole large sections of my source-code. As a result, I find it hard to trust 'employees' ever since... (4) I would therefore request a list of 'unemployable' people in order to choose possible collaborators, in my work. They should be highly proficient in PROLOG code, as well as ASSEMBLY and 'C', and should also be sociable, witty and independent-minded. Clashing with personalities like Tim May's may be considered an added advantage. (5) Just for the record, I spoke on the phone with an important partner, told him what happened, and was told by him that Tim May's letter is the kind of scum-fascism no serious European Company would ever give credit to... However, Tim's letter appears not so much to address me personally, as much as the hordes of gullible, insecure, employment-hungry young Americans, who are often _terrorised_ into complete SILENCE, since the _slightest_ amount of free speech in their own natural (or Net-) surroundings, causes Fascist PUnk-Thugs like TIm May to threaten them with unemployability. Although Tim May's letter in itself constitutes terroristic harrasment, threat to libery (via threat of unemployability), and so on, I consider these labels to be irrelevant in this case, and legal arguments highly irrelevant. When Nazi Germany deported Einstein it took much less elaborate procedures than flawed 'unemployability lists'. Perhaps hiring Mafia men to finish us off would be a much more efficient tactic in this respect. :-) With Dismay, but also... Inspiration :-) Geore A. Stathis P.S. I also cross-posted this DELIBERATELY, this time to the cypherpunks list, in order to give more COURAGE to those poor list-members whose standard of living suffers the terror and threat of Unemployment, just in case they know who is responsible for their future sufferings.

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Re: Giving Kill Files a Workout...
by Dave Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri Vulis writes about unwanted noise: > They feel compelled to silence it altogether. They claim altruistically > that they don't want the noise to bother anyone else, such as the clueless > newbies who keep subscribing to this mailing list and don't know how to > use mail filters. (Sandy Sanford's concern for them was soooo touching...) Misplaced altruism is one of the primary causes of social injustice, authoritarian regimes, and security measures. It is not possible to be "altruistic" until one realizes that one doesn't know what true "altruism" is. ------ Dave Hayes - Altadena CA, USA - dave(a)jetcafe.org Freedom Knight of Usenet - http://www.jetcafe.org/~dave/usenet Don't follow in the footsteps of the ancients, seek what they sought.

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Cpunks Frog Forwards discontinuation
by Damaged Justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will be discontinuing my "Cpunks Frog Forwards" filtering service within one week of the announcement of Perry Metzger's new crypto list, and possibly sooner if my patience runs out, because 1) I have too many other things to take care of in my life, 2) there really isn't as great a need for it anymore due to the number and variety of other filtering services, and 3) my sanity is being stretched to its limits having to wade through the mountains of bullshit that now infest my inbox, even with procmail's kindly assistance. Perry was right: Cypherpunks has become a sewer. As Robert Anton Wilson said, "Only a sewer accepts everything." Here is a list of the other filtering services I am currently aware of: o Alan Clegg runs an UNMODERATED cypherpunks digest, which only reduces the the volume of separate messages. Subscribe by mailing to majordomo(a)gateway.com (Standard majordomo list -- send "help" in the body for information.) o Eric Blossom runs a commercial "Cypherpunks Lite" for a modest fee, approximately 20.00US/year. Mail eb(a)comsec.com for more info. For a sample, read the archive at ftp://ftp.crl.com/users/co/comsec/cp-lite o Ray Arachelian runs a free filtering service, sticking mostly to news and technical stuff with a few other tidbits thrown in. Mail sunder(a)dorsai.dorsai.org for more info, or to be added. See you all on the other side. "Cypherpunks write code." -- I let go of the law, and people become honest / I let go of economics, and people become prosperous / I let go of religion, and people become serene / I let go of all desire for the common good, and the good becomes common as grass. .oOo. [Tao Te Ching, Chapter 57, Stephen Mitchell translation]

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Emergency powers
by Charles Platt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Of course, Michael Froomkin is right in everything he says about presidential emergency powers. But an unconstitutional abuse of power is surely not acceptable merely because it has become a routine method for accomplishing everyday legislative tasks. First, it allows significant possibility for future abuse; and second, if the Constitution is routinely circumvented, this diminishes its general power (as any law loses its power when it is routinely flouted). The situation is all the more troubling because it receives so little publicity, outside of militant "extremist" groups (i.e. those that are crazy enough to believe that presidential power should be limited in accordance with the law of the land). When a president can take almost action under the excuse that it's a "national emergency" (when in fact there is no emergency), and he doesn't have to answer questions till later, and most citizens are unaware of this, we have a potentially dangerous situation. They key word here is "potentially." Michael Froomkin seems relatively sanguine because the potential for great harm has not been realized. I am not so easily reassured. --Charles Platt

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ALERT! 123,000 announced job cuts
by John Jackson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DOWNSIZED? - RIGHTSIZED? - RESTRUCTURED? HOW CAN YOU PROTECT YOURSELF FROM THIS EVERYDAY OCCURRENCE? ---> AT&T = 123,000 announced job cuts ---> GENERAL MOTORS = 122,000 announced job cuts ---> IBM = 400,000 announced job cuts ---> JOE's PRINT SHOP = 2 announced job cuts Are you dodging the arrows of Corporate America? Do you know someone (a family member, a friend, maybe even yourself) who has lost a job during the past six months? Has this person secured another job that is paying the same salary and benefits as the job they lost? There was once a time when people held a job for 20 to 30 years and retired with a secure pension. Those days are gone! So what can the average person do to protect him or herself financially in the unfortunate, but all too common, event of losing a job? Financial advisors have been telling us for years that we should diversify our investments. If this concept makes sense, should we not also diversify our sources of INCOME? Does it make sense to leave yourself vulnerable by expecting all of your income to come from one source? Rexall, an international company that was founded in 1903, is flourishing today as a very successful publicly traded company. You have no doubt heard of Rexall and are familiar with the more than 7,000 Rexall drug stores around the country. In fact, more than 87% of adult Americans today recognize the name Rexall and associate it with trust and integrity. Rexall's six divisions are all very profitable and growing at staggering rates. So what does this have to do with you? Rexall has developed an entrepreneurial arm of its company that helps individuals build a substantial secondary income stream without the hassles of ordinary business. No huge investments, no inventory, no employees, NO RISK. This is not some fly-by- night operation. This is REXALL! One of the most well known and respected corporate names in America. My partner, Todd Smith, has helped hundreds of people diversify their income and create substantial passive income streams through the entrepreneurial arm of the Rexall Companies. Todd himself has earned over one million dollars in EACH of the last three years in this simple, no-stress, home-based business. He knows what he is doing and how to help point people, like you, in the right direction. If you would like to learn how we can help you create a financial hedge against a possible downturn in your present employment, or simply to develop an additional source of passive income, call me today. Todd has created an informational audio tape that explains our entire business and how you can participate in it. If you are making all the money you want, have your retirement completely paid for, enjoy your job and can see working it until you retire, then CONGRATULATIONS. You are one-in-a-thousand. On the other hand, if you are like most Americans that are not happy with their current financial situation, it would be worth the phone call and some time listening to Todd's tape. What have you got to lose? If you DON'T call, you have a lot to lose. Call (303)-480-5841 right now and ask for this free tape to be rushed to you without any obligation whatsoever. PS: The message on this Tape is timely, addresses the societal and economic forces that WILL change our lives in the coming new century, and explains precisely why entirely new methods of doing business are necessary and are evolving. Your thinking about money, business, success and your own future will be challenged by this message! (303) 480-5841 - 24 hours ASK FOR TODD's TAPE J. Jackson Associates Income Diversification Strategies Parker, Colorado U.S.A.

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Experience Microsoft Site Builder Workshop Live!
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Microsoft Site Builder Workshop Live! ( apprx 2.5 hours ) via Real Audio at http://ww3.audionet.com/events/microsoft/ what you need: The RealAudio Player At least a 28.8Kbps connection to the Internet A screen resolution size of 800 x 600 pixels :: Archived On November 13th From The INFOMART In Dallas, TX

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Re: RFC: A UNIX crypt(3) replacement
by Joshua E. Hill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have gotten a lot of e-mail that has said basicly the same things: 1) Don't try to redo UNIX crypt(3), S-KEY (Secure Shell, etc.) is better. Well... This is most certainly the case. And if I could force the people in my user base to use one of these alternatives, I would. Unfortunately, I cannot. A fair number of the people who use the systems that I administer log on through dumb terminals. If I can't successfully teach them not to hit the "Ctrl-S" key, how am I going to teach them to do IDEA encryption in their heads? Or MD4 hashes for that matter? The fact is that if I tried to use S/KEY everyone would print out their key list for the month, and then promptly loose it, and regenerate a new one. Gee... Wouldn't that be secure. I have to stay with the one password system. 2) If your administer was worth his weight in spit, you would have a shadow password system, and the preexisting crypt(3) function would be good enough for you. Actually, I _am_ the administrator, and I am worth my weight in spit. Rather, I do use a shadow password suite. However, as security professionals, you must know that it is not whether an attacker can break into your system, but how long it takes. Once there, it is not whether the attacker can gain root, it is how long it takes (how many of the holes have been patched, and how many are even known about). And then to the password file. It is not whether the attacker can crack _all_ the passwords, it is how long it takes. With this algorithm, I hope to increase the last of these values. 3) The algorithm is too complex (or too simple) The algorithm that I proposed makes use of a NMAC as a basic cryptographic primitive. The security analysis of the algorithm should follow the same lines as a hash; that is: if the basic operator is secure, then the chaining of the operator is secure. The NMAC is provably as secure as the key used and the underlying hash function. I did everything that I could to maintain simplicity throughout the algorithm's design. I realize that a simple algorithm is easier to analyze and check for security. A fair bit of the complexity is to make it so that the algorithm is actually a NMAC. 4) Why don't you use FreeBSD's MD5 based crypt(8) replacement? I didn't like FreeBSD's MD5 drop in, because it lacked any security analysis, and complexity of the algorithm prevented any serious attempt at said analysis. It also uses MD5, which has not held up well to the ravages of time. The recent papers on easier ways to find collisions in MD5 did _not_ give me an attack of the warm-and-fuzzies. I would like to make use of an algorithm that is still thought to be secure. Joshua -----------------------------Joshua E. Hill----------------------------- | Thoreau's Law: | | If you see a man approaching you with the obvious intention | | of doing you good, you should run for your life. | -------jehill@<gauss.elee|galaxy.csc|w6bhz|tuba.aix>.calpoly.edu--------

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re: San Jose Mercury News declares encryption battle over
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale how long have you been awake? Take a gander at Wei Dei's Crypto++, Peter Gutman's cryptlib, and the half dozen other public domain multi algo source libs available at your finger tips. Anyone with a compiler on just about any platform has access to implementations of blowfish, idea, des, gost, the gamut. So Dale, get coding. diGriz

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Re: RFC: A UNIX crypt(3) replacement
by Joshua E. Hill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> This is backwards logic; when security begins to hender in the > functionality of the system, the security needs to be gotten rid of. hmmm... Now that _completely_ depends on the system. Now for the system I administer, the level of security really isn't _that_ high (on the grand scale of things). It is, however, high enough that I inconvenience the users with a pro-active password guesser, and passwords that expire occasionally. I suppose that this is a _minor_ inconvenience, but it raises the level of security a very large amount. On a less mundane system (one run by the government, say), security is only _slightly_ less important than being able to use the system in the first place. :) On this type of system almost any inconvenience is worth the cost. > > You have previously said that the passwd file should not be available > > for public consumption. Though this is certainly true, it does not > > hurt that even if the passwd file is available, nothing particularly > > useful can be done with it. > Hince you use pseudorandom password generators and crack. If you count on > somebody not being able to preform an opperation quickly, they'll usually > prove you wrong. whoa... didn't you just say: > when security begins to hender in the > functionality of the system, the security needs to be gotten rid of. I think that psedu-random password generators would almost certainly "hinder in the functionality of the system"... :-) I want to make it so that users can use passwords > 8 characters, and I want to use something a bit better than FreeBSD's solution. Whether or not this is necessarily the One True Way (TM) to security, it will increase security. I'm not saying "Hey everyone. Here is a spiffy new password system that will make your entire system completely secure!" I'm saying "Could everyone please look at this algorithm that I'm thinking of using. Could you please comment on it, so that I can make it better." That's it. All questions on whether or not passwords should shadowed, crackable, not crackable, or consisting only of the letter "e", aside. Is this algorithm secure, and if not, why not. Joshua > --Deviant > The Macintosh is Xerox technology at its best. I very much like your signature... very nice... -----------------------------Joshua E. Hill----------------------------- | Allen's Law: | | Almost anything is easier to get into than out of. | -------jehill@<gauss.elee|galaxy.csc|w6bhz|tuba.aix>.calpoly.edu--------

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Re: HP announcing some International Cryptography stuff on Monday
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:49 PM 11/15/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >It sounds ominous to me. Another backroom deal, probably for some form of >key recovery strategy, aka GAK. I'd bet GAK too. RSADSI has been working on GAK protocols, so these ones might actually work. I feel as pessimistic about this one as Lucky usually is. At 12:05 PM 11/15/96 -0800, John Gilmore wrote: >Are they the next Big Company to knuckle under to the Feds? Their >pcmcia-with-local-country-surveillance-chip-socket initiative never >seemed to go anywhere. Since I am inherently optimistic, one ray of light may be that the San Jose Mercury News was mentioning the ability to export the system, and then when the necessary licenses (US and foreign) were obtained, turn on the encryption. I guess from this that the encryption is in hardware. Now, software/hardware interfaces are usually fairly simple, so what we have here is a software system with a crypto hook. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: ideal secure personal computer system
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:24 AM 11/16/96 -0600, Igor Chudov @ home wrote: >Bill Frantz wrote: >> Protection against strangers walking up to your machine and using it is >> nice, and easy to do. Protection against viruses which install Trojan >> horses in your system would also be nice, but is very hard to do in systems >> where programs run with all the privileges of their users. Examples >> include (in alpha order): DOS, MacOS, Unix, and Windows (including NT). > >I wonder what are the operating systems where programs may be run with >_less_ privileges than the user who starts them? Is VMS one of such >systems? Ah, you touch on 20+ years of my professional life. KeyKOS is such a system as is EROS, a similar system being developed at University of Pennsylvania. See: http://www.cis.upenn.edu:80/~eros/ http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~KeyKOS/ http://www.agorics.com/agorics/allkey.html - For KeyKOS documentation. In general these systems provide an execution environment where programs only have access to the resources they need. Think of it as a Unix chroot jail which is specifically designed for each program. Then add controlled communication links back to the user's terminal and you get the idea. Unless a program has a need to write the system file, it won't have the privilege, even if it's user does have the privilege. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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RE: ideal secure personal computer system
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:51 PM 11/16/96 -0800, John Fricker wrote: >In WinNT a program may impersonate a user such as Guest. Also, trojan horses >are ineffective in NT as typical users do not have write permission to system >binaries. I assume that administrators only run programs from trusted libraries and do not include their current directory in their path. They never run programs that aren't directly related to systems administration etc. etc. etc. The typical Trojan horest sits around until someone with the proper authority runs it. That is not the way NT is used at one large commercial operation I am somewhat familar with. (I'm being obscure to protect the guilty.) I think there are very few NT (or Unix) systems which are administrated with a safe level of paranoia. I would like to see more compartmentalization in the system. (Note that even if it only runs with a user's privileges, a Trojan horse will have no problem stealing e.g. that user's PGP secret key ring. Not everything of value is in system files. Question, can a user-level Trojan horse insert itself as a keyboard monitor and get the PGP pass phrase as well?) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The lottery is a tax on | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | those who can't do math. | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | - Who 1st said this? | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Off the subjects.
by twilley＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I am anxious to find an E-mail list forum dealing with financial matters. Possibly, there exists a forum to find a forum. Here in New Jersey there are rumors running about; that 401K's, and other corporation contribution plans are corporate assets: both their contribution, and the monies deducted from your pay, as well as, any other contributions you may have made. In the event of reorganization, in any form, including bankruptcy, these monies are available for redistribution to creditors. Meaning, not us. If true, it's a bit frightening; all and all. Thanks, Twilley.

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DSA over Elliptic Curves
by janke＠unixg.ubc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone implemented this yet? I am going to and was wondering what good sizes for q (the prime corresponding to the 160 bit prime in DSA) and p (the prime corresponding to the 512-1024 bit prime in DSA) would be? Leonard

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: ph(a)netcom.com (Peter Hendrickson) > At 1:39 PM 11/17/1996, Simon Spero wrote: > > Create a number up public/private key pairs, blind them, then do the > > cut-and-choose thing with the security officer. He signs the blinded key, > > then returns it. Unblind the remaining pubic key, and you've got a public > > key with the appropriate signature on it. > > Okay, this would work. But, it requires that all (or at least many) of the > Members of Parliament cooperate. If not, then the security officer will > be able to make very good guesses about who is speaking. > > Parliamentarians may not cooperate for a variety of reasons. They may > not wish to be attacked by terrorists for the words of others. They > may believe that cowardice is not to be encouraged. They may not believe > in anonymity. It might be too hard for them. > > What I would like to see is a method which relies only on published > public keys and no other cooperation from the people who are (more > or less) being used as shields. This may be impossible. The 4th method of Chaum's, from Eurocrypt 91, somewhat satisfies this, as does a method from the Eurocrypt 94 paper. Each person can choose his own public key g**x for a discrete log system. However, the problem is that all members of the group have to choose the same prime p as the modulus, and generator g, for their discrete logs. The issue of using a common modulus in discrete log systems has been somewhat controversial. I think when the government first proposed DSS they planned to do something like this, one modulus with everyone having different secret x values with corresponding public keys y = g**x mod p. This has the advantage that public keys are smaller since everyone uses the same g and p. So all you need is one value for your public key. Without this you have to have g, y, and p be your public key so it is 3 times bigger. The problem is that the way the main discrete log algorithms work, once you have broken one discrete log for a certain g and p you can break all the others very easily. So the particular g,p pair which is chosen for everyone to share becomes one very big, fat target to try to apply discrete log algorithms. Now this is not necessarily as bad as it seems. Unlike the case with RSA, there is no secret information which could be leaked to make solving these discrete logs easier. Nobody knows how to do it. So the only way it can be done is by a massive operation roughly similar to factoring an RSA modulus the size of p. Choosing p of 1000 or 2000 bits should still make it effectively impossible for anyone to do this. The numbers are simply far too large. Still the consensus of opinion with discrete logs is that the advantages of slightly smaller keys have not been great enough to justify the risk involved in having eveyone share a modulus, even though that risk is seemingly insignificant. On the other hand maybe for cases like this the additional advantages to common moduli would be enough to tilt the argument in the other direction. Hal

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Political influence [was: Re: A Disservice to Mr. Bell]
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 18 20:54:31 1996 > > ....The only mainstream party to have been in > any measure influenced by libertarian ideas is the Republicans ... I suppose that's why Clinton called himself a "libertarian" when it comes to gay rights. (Calling yourself something and actually *being* that something are, of course, different things.) Phill, you need to listen more and talk less about libertarian politics, I first heard about various wild-sounding now "mainstream" ideas when talking with Libertarians. These ideas are now promoted by members of both parties, especially during the election campaign season. For one thing, we were probably the first party to have a policy against government restrictions on the peaceful use of cryptography. JMR Regards, Jim Ray Please note new 2000bit PGPkey & new address <jmr(a)shopmiami.com> This key will be valid through election day 2000. PGP id.A7D63DA9 98 1F 39 BA 93 86 B4 F5 57 52 64 0E DA BA 2C 71 DNRC Minister of Encryption Advocacy -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEPAwUBMpETWzUhsGSn1j2pAQGYQgfMCQSQsEEjekyjOaQTptq3ZGmh4eTbPwdT Ow6LGMOzNTBaONJlypERAm7S00NAf9/ri6liFL2xR/A51t47PPIg48WO4xYHbB2S UefMasDZ2q+jT1s9ukUgHL1EgXCJVggAsaN1mSphYlNgVrRoT0zga59MB3ynFVsH hM4NVJEPCv8waE9WohSLUm6Mp2fvA1zLtGmHdf6fR/R38Yw5aVOTA3ha/hV/zPmH MQIsN+WV16f4KXAL/0V56y1mnuPJ0TumUJwJNc/lNxhiSdlI9t5l3ywe7Aw1D1xo TQO4ARkBSN8+/C/g6R9wfEZ+YoAN42NzNpdcATmCgXhwYg== =hhPT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:23 PM 11/17/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >At 11:43 AM -0800 11/17/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: > For the specific example Peter cites, of a member of Parliament who doesn't > like the possibility of anonymity....well, he wouldn't be part of the > DC-Net would he? Generally, there are no cryptographic solutions that will > encompass the case where some member wants to speak anonymously, but no one > else does. If a message originates from "someone in Parliament," but only > one member of Parliament is set up to speak anonymously, then of course by > simple elimination he is the speaker. As before, this is beyond any > cryptographic solution. It turns out - amazingly enough - that this is not true! Hal Finney mentioned on Friday a paper by Chaum and Heyst entitled "Group Signatures." It was presented at EuroCrypt '91. I scanned this paper today and it has four schemes, the last of which requires no participation of a trusted party or the other people one wishes to hide amongst. So long as everybody has published their public key, the rogue Member of Parliament can sign messages without revealing his identity, yet demonstrating that he is in fact a Member of Parliament. (Thanks Hal!) It uses a zero-knowledge proof. Hal said earlier that it was not clear to him that this could be turned into a non-interactive proof. It isn't clear to me, either. Whatever the case, I consider the problem solved. It would be nice if it were non-interactive, but the rogue MP need only demonstrate his identity to ten or so publicly trusted parties to have enough basis to make statements that the world will consider to be credible. > There may be easier to implement approaches, such as the ones people have > proposed involving distribution of "voting tokens" (blinded, for anonymity). > Anonymous voting is, in fact, formally equivalent (with some hand-waving > about some details) to the problem of untraceable speaking. The example > Peter cited, of a MP wanting to "speak anonymously" is equivalent to > wanting his vote--on Northern Ireland, for example--to be anonymous. I would say that it is slightly different in that anonymous voting requires that you guarantee that each voter votes only once. Clearly these are similar problems. Tangentially, I would really enjoy the privilege of verifiable anonymous voting using my computer. As it is now, I have no way of telling whether my vote counts or not. The entire process is handled by people I don't know and have no particular reason to trust. > A simple form of this is "blackballing." Members have white and black > balls, and place one of the balls in an urn. Properly implemented, this > gives anonymity. I always wondered where that term came from. Chaum and Heyst's protocol above could be used for blackballing in cases where only one black ball can make the decision. For instance, some clubs have a rule that any current member can "blackball" prospective members. (Sounds harsh? Not as harsh as learning that a *majority* of the club didn't like you!) Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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TRW sells your credit data to British firm
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Assoc. Press 11/14/96: A British retailer and credit checker said Thursday it was buying Experian Corp., a former subsidiary of TRW and one of the biggest credit-rating business in the United States, for $1.7 billion. The deal is part of an effort by Great Universal Stores PLC, which owns the Burberry retail chain and is Britain's largest catalog retailer, to position itself as a global supplier of credit and marketing information. [I wonder what recourse I have if GUS gets my credit data wrong? Or decides to share it with MI6? -bd] Great Universal, known more commonly as GUS, said it would pay $900 million in cash and borrow the rest of the price for Orange, Calif.-based Experian, which TRW sold in September. GUS plans to merge Experian into its credit information business, CCN. Experian chairman D. Van Skilling said the two companies have many customers in common and will be able to provide them easier access to credit information around the world. [...] Experian is one of the largest providers of credit reports on consumers with information on 93 percent of U.S. households and 12 million businesses. Experian says its database may be the broadest and most current in the country. The company also helps businesses identify potential customers. Great Universal entered the credit information business in 1980 and now has customers throughout Europe and has operations in Asia, South Africa, and the United States. TRW completed the sale of Experian for $1.01 billion less than two months ago. An investor group led by Bain Capital Inc. and Thomas H. Lee Co., both of Boston, bought the company. TRW kept a 16 percent stake in Experian. [I wonder who the "investor group" is comprised of? I wonder why TRW would sell something for $1B that is apparently valued at $1.7B? Reminds me of the local paper which was sold for $X to an investor group that included Sen. Howard Baker and (Pres. candidate) Lamar Alexander. The investor group then resold the paper for $2X or $3X. What business accumen! -bd]

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Re: Members of Parliament Problem
by ph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:32 PM 11/17/1996, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >At 1:23 PM 11/17/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >>At 11:43 AM -0800 11/17/96, Peter Hendrickson wrote: >> For the specific example Peter cites, of a member of Parliament who doesn't >> like the possibility of anonymity....well, he wouldn't be part of the >> DC-Net would he? Generally, there are no cryptographic solutions that will >> encompass the case where some member wants to speak anonymously, but no one >> else does. If a message originates from "someone in Parliament," but only >> one member of Parliament is set up to speak anonymously, then of course by >> simple elimination he is the speaker. As before, this is beyond any >> cryptographic solution. > It turns out - amazingly enough - that this is not true! It turns out - not so amazingly - that Tim is right! See Hal Finney's post of about this time. It turns out that the other Members of Parliament do have to cooperate. Sorry about that. Peter Hendrickson ph(a)netcom.com

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HP's crypto technology
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was poking about on the hp web server, trying to get some more hints about the technology they are pushing: <URL: http://www-dmo.external.hp.com/gsy/press/sevcik.html> > Date: 7/11/96 > > Rich Sevcik, vice president and general manager of the Systems > Technology Group, testified to a U.S. Senate subcommittee June 12 on > the importance of cryptography to Hewlett-Packard's ability to compete > in the international marketplace and to the nation's high-technology > competitiveness. > > [...] > > In conclusion, he introduced HP's technology called the International > Cryptography Framework (ICF). Products based on ICF would contain a > suite of cryptography capabilities of various strengths and types, > all non-functional. A customer then could enable the desired types and > strengths of cryptography in conformance with export and host government > regulations by obtaining a stamp-size smart card (known as a "policy > card"), programmed to turn on the particular cryptography capability > allowed. This would protect the right of each nation to establish an > independent policy governing cryptography in digital communication and > storage. Sevcik showed the subcommittee members a prototype cryptography > unit and several policy cards. He said HP plans to have an initial > ICF product available later this year as part of a total smart card > system solution offered due to an alliance with Informix and GEMPLUS, > with other ICF-based products planned for next year. > > U.S. export license authorities are finishing their review of this > first-phase implementation of ICF. "We have been extremely pleased with > the responsiveness and cooperation of these agencies in the review of > our technology," Sevcik said. "We have every reason to believe that > the cryptographic unit and host systems will be granted liberal export > authorization consistent with our expectations for ICF." <URL: http://www.hp.com/csopress/95sep26.html> > Press Release > > HP Announces Alliance with Gemplus and Informix to Deliver Personal > Information Cards for Consumers > > U.S. Government Reviewing Industry-backed HP International Cryptography > Framework > > September 26, 1995 > > PALO ALTO, Calif., Sept. 26, 1995 -- Hewlett-Packard Company, Gemplus > and Informix today announced the formation of an alliance to develop a > secure infrastructure that will enable corporations to speed new services > to consumers via a credit-card-sized personal information card. > > These cards will carry several thousand times the amount of data carried > by currently available smart cards. Additionally, the data on these cards > will be fully encrypted for secure international communication, so the > card will be able to be used anywhere in the world. HP believes that > the U.S. government will authorize the export to commercial enterprises > of products in Phase I(1) of HP's international cryptography framework > standard -- one of the underlying technologies in the infrastructure > that will enable the international use of personal information cards. The > framework is based on HP's open cryptographic structure. > > [...]

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. nym.alias.net is back up. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 18 Nov 96 6:48:35 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca * ********** 14:29 99.94% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com - ********** 5:32 99.81% replay remailer(a)replay.com - **++****** 9:22 99.69% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net - ***#***--# 24:20 99.57% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net - +**+ ++** 37:22 99.46% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++-++- 2:11:49 99.16% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com - -.- * +-- 1:53:39 98.71% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++++* 35:42 98.50% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de - ++--+-++ 2:19:11 98.29% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net +*-- 1:16:19 98.24% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com - + ++++++++ 42:33 98.05% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com - -+..+++++- 2:00:45 96.31% nym config(a)nym.alias.net #* *#*# :42 95.87% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .--------- 9:21:36 92.07% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com - -++-- 3:39:00 69.30% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com ## 7:06:33 41.67% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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No Subject
by Piotr Kunio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsunscribe

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No Subject
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>While I don't believe many people in government are "evil" or have "bad >intentions," I'm a strong believer that _systemic_ or _institutional_ evil >is possible. Thus, the wide opposition to mandatory key escrow, just as >civil libertarians of all stripes would oppose mandatory tatooing of >national I.D. barcodes on arms, or the mandatory retro-fitting of all homes >with special curtains containing a police-accessible "transparency mode." And the vision of 1984 looms ever closer. Pity you guys guessed....your activites have put us 12 years behind schedule to date, and we're not happy about that. --NSA

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Re: The Utility of Privacy
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:03 PM 11/17/1996, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sun, 17 Nov 1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: >> Are there similar sources of information calculating privacy risk? I >> don't think so. > >Ah, so let's ignore the risks, on the grounds that we have no idea what >they might be, or their magnitude. That's clever. I like that. The risks are not being ignored. What is there to fear? >> Informally, I don't know anybody who has suffered due to a loss of >> privacy. > >Your circle of associations must be limited. Examples? >> My question remains unanswered, probably because privacy isn't worth >> the effort. > >And no one can answer that question but you. Privacy is a personal >decision. I'm sure there are many out there who will suffer no harm even >if their SSN is published in the Wall Street Journal. The experience of others has value. >Why, however, fail to take out insurance when the cost is so low? Really >it doesn't take much in the way of effort or money to assure one's >privacy. (Hint: It's getting cheaper every day in some ways). > >Answer: Nearly all of the cost of privacy is concentrated in set up cost. >Maintaince costs are minimal once set up has been made. Yet getting over >that first hurdle is the biggest leap. Good. We are getting somewhere.

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Re: Does John Gilmore...
by George A. Stathis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:04 ìì 17/11/1996 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >> Given that the free market rule is "he who has the money makes the >> rules", please explain how anything less than "subsidized speech" (as >> you put it) is anything close to free speech? >> >> [For those who's assumptions rule their perception: I am *not* arguing >> that all speech should be subsidized. I am merely pointing out that >> the organization that is spending the money to broadcast is >> controlling the speech, hence it is *not* free speech in terms of >> freedom or cost.] >Again, you confuse free speech with free broadcast. Well, I propose a solution to this problem: I don't mind paying fees in fact, if the prices are reasonable. For instance THIS text was _paid_ for, since I pay my Internet provider a certain amount of money every month. It would be unthinkable, however, that my Internet Provider would mess around with THIS text, or with ANY opinion of mine (I am sure you agree). Now, a mailing list has _some_ similarities to the services of an Internet provider, except (usually) the _cost_. I am sure Mr. Gilmore would be more than happy to be _paid_ for the (faulty) services he provides (to his list-members), since e.g. 1900 members times $1 per 2 months (shall we say) would earn him (shall we say) 950 dollars a month; Not much perhaps in some countries, but enough in most places as compensation for the services he provides. The problem with Mr. Gilmore (apart from being an asshole) is really that he is rather a thick-minded proponent of censorship of his list's 'eccentric' members, that such subtleties don't even cross his mind. >Forward complaints to : European Association of Envelope Manufactures >Finger for Public Key Gutenbergstrasse 21;Postfach;CH-3001;Bern >Vote Monarchist Switzerland "Heaven is a place policed by the English, cheered-up by the the Greeks, and organized by the Germans. Hell is a place organized by the Greeks, policed by the Germans, and cheered-up by the English." ...And what have the noble Swiss got to with this shit? They are the bankers for both! :-) Regards George

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The report estimated no such thing..its an urban myth. Give me a citation for the statistic from the report. On Sun, 17 Nov 1996, blanc wrote: > From: Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM [cut] > dv: I don't think John Gilmore's sexual practices are *that* bizarre. > The Kinsey report estimates that 10% of the population shares his > practices. > > bw: I guess you think you're talking to someone who gives a flip.

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Re: [Fwd: National Emergency]
by Bob Faw 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:15 PM 11/17/96 -0700, you wrote: >This information may be of interest to you. Forwarded with permission. > >--RJ Dawnne Gee Why Dawnne, this is only logical--considering that the new "WEB-access TV" set announced this week has been declared a "weapon" for export purposes by our government. When our leaders consider public information to be a threat to national security, we're in a whole lot more trouble than most folks realize. bob faw p.s. Go to bed, dude, it's getting late. ;-) bob ----------------------------------|------------------------------------- B. D. "Bob" Faw |NewMedia Editor, Columnist, Webmaster Poet, Scholar, WordSmith, Engineer|"American Wine on the Web" http://www.eee.org/bobfaw/ | (a complete Internet wine magazine) bob_faw(a)eee.org | http://www.2way.com/food/wine/ bfaw(a)cello.gina.calstate.edu| newbie(a)pobox.com author(a)pobox.com |Senior Writer, "Faultline" TV Series ----------------------------------|------------------------------------- Webmaster, "The Journal of International Information Management" (JIIM) http://bpa1.aic.csusb.edu/pages/students/info479/bfaw/jiim/ ----------------------------------|-------------------------------------

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BayLISA: Randal Schwartz, Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker (fwd)
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This should be QUITE entertaining. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 17 Nov 1996 19:03:17 -0500 From: Laura de Leon <deleon(a)cat.hpl.hp.com> Newsgroups: ba.announce Subject: BayLISA: Randal Schwartz, Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker The BayLISA group meets monthly to discuss topics of interest to systems and network administrators. The meetings are free and open to the public. BayLISA holds monthly meetings on the third Thursday of each month at 7:30 PM PST. We meet at Cisco building J in San Jose, on Tasman Drive near First street. (This is across the street from the room we met in at Cisco last month). See www.baylisa.org for more information. The meetings are also broadcast via MBONE. NOTE: AS OF OCTOBER, WE HAVE MOVED TO CISCO. This is a new location. Thanks very much to Synopsys for hosting us. Schedule -------- November 21 Randal Schwartz: Just Another Convicted Perl Hacker This talk will describe how the speaker became a felon in the process of doing his job as a systems administrator in the well-publicized Oregon v. Schwartz case (victim: Intel). It will include some points about Oregon's current law and the implications of this case on the computer community. There will be a special focus on how to make sure this doesn't happen to you. There will be copies of Randal's new PERL book available if you would like to get one signed. BayLISA Board Elections & member meeting before the regular meeting At 7:00, Elections for the BayLISA board will be held. We encourage all members to vote. If you aren't a member, this is a good time to join (see our Web site) December 19 Our Holiday meeting-- Join us to share goodies and computer horror stories, as well as descriptions of stupid computer tricks. There will be a prize for best story. This is a very informal meeting, and will not be broadcast on the MBONE. January 16 Brent Chapman, Containment Zones (firewalls to keep people in) February 20 Standards efforts and how they will effect you March 20 Paul Vixie [Schedule subject to change] For further information on BayLISA, check out our web site: http://www.baylisa.org/ To get further information on the meeting location, you can also ftp it from ftp.baylisa.org:/location For any other information, please send email to: info(a)baylisa.org If you have any questions, please contact me or the info alias listed above.

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FC97 Final Call for Papers
by R.Hirschfeld＠cwi.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Financial Cryptography '97 February 24-28 1997, Anguilla, BWI FINAL CALL FOR PAPERS General Information: Financial Cryptography '97 (FC97) is a new conference on the security of digital financial transactions. The first meeting will be held on the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies on February 24-28, 1997. FC97 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general, including Anonymous Payments Fungibility Authentication Home Banking Communication Security Identification Conditional Access Implementations Copyright Protection Loss Tolerance Credit/Debit Cards Loyalty Mechanisms Currency Exchange Legal Aspects Digital Cash Micropayments Digital Receipts Network Payments Digital Signatures Privacy Issues Economic Implications Regulatory Issues Electronic Funds Transfer Smart Cards Electronic Purses Standards Electronic Voting Tamper Resistance Electronic Wallets Transferability Instructions for Authors: Send a cover letter and 9 copies of an extended abstract to be received by November 29, 1996 to the Program Chair at the address given below. The extended abstract should start with the title and an abstract followed by a succinct statement appropriate for a non-specialist reader specifying the subject addressed, its background, the main achievements, and their significance to financial data security. Submissions are limited to 15 single-spaced pages of 12pt type. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be sent to authors no later than January 17, 1997. Authors of accepted papers must guarantee that their paper will be presented at the conference. Proceedings: Proceedings of the conference will be published online in the Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce. Instructions and deadlines for submission of final papers will be sent along with notification of acceptance. Stipends: A very limited number of stipends may be available to those unable to obtain funding to attend the conference. Students whose papers are accepted and who will present the paper themselves are encouraged to apply if such assistance is needed. Requests for stipends should be addressed to one of the General Chairs. Registration: Conference registration and information on travel, hotels, and Anguilla itself is available at URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/. Workshop: A workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC97, to be held during the week preceding the conference. For further information, please contact one of the General Chairs. Send Submissions to: Rafael Hirschfeld FC97 Program Chair CWI Kruislaan 413 1098 SJ Amsterdam The Netherlands email: ray(a)cwi.nl phone: +31 20 592 4169 fax: +31 20 592 4199 Program Committee: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arjen Lenstra, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Mark Manasse, Digital Equipment Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, USA Kevin McCurley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA Sholom Rosen, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Israel Sendrovic, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, USA General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright, Boston, MA, USA email: rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI email: vince(a)offshore.com.ai Conference, Exhibits, and Sponsorship Manager: Julie Rackliffe, Boston, MA, USA email: rackliffe(a)tcm.org Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA email: iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. Those interested in becoming a sponsor of FC97 or in purchasing exhibit space, please contact the Exhibits and Sponsorship Manager. A copy of this call for papers as well as other information about the conference will be available at URL http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC97.

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Re: Cypherpunks, Inc?
by Remo Pini 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: azur(a)netcom.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Mon Nov 18 14:00:17 1996 > Now why don't the cypherpunks put together something like the item > below? In fact, why don't we form some sort of Guild, trademark the term > cypherpunks (I'll volunteer) and offer cracking and security products > (like the one below) or services? A product security endorsement from > Cypherpunks Inc. could carry a lot of weight :-) "We", do, check out the cryptocd at www.rpini.com. - ------< fate favors the prepared mind >------ Remo Pini rp(a)rpini.com PGP: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html - ----< words are what reality is made of >---- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv Comment: http://www.rpini.com/crypto/crypto.html iQEVAwUBMpBd4hFhy5sz+bTpAQFqewf/aJ/xx/hxZn1o/nMKJcLjauCpfcZmxX12 aGD2fJw8PncAzmZAnyxP0/ymK21+mdry1wZPsJXLtqrwJqT8nxPqEXXtfh19MHm9 HB1pDo0nYSOWfP7ENq3lNe995FGEvQ6EMiyy/7PxulcY+0T53Q78CTk6GD0KgPxd rqmfmxvqNuKERzCONhtirkiwkm2NjFT2ytd7H3VTFSUv7wIHGp2dFiiscC2csP2I XUlVlQ7w6TUGkO498qSY3wB+ZLHMYYkU21rvKgCTz4AZqmTLRWgZar5g3qlug1uS RA1r/GB3vfa6KuTcOGowt26FvROEsHu3ZSrZzOry8U0LMo2tgIcNtA== =vtPA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FC97 Final Call for Papers
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: R.Hirschfeld(a)cwi.nl Precedence: Bulk Date: Mon, 18 Nov 1996 11:46:13 +0100 From: R.Hirschfeld(a)cwi.nl To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: FC97 Final Call for Papers Financial Cryptography '97 February 24-28 1997, Anguilla, BWI FINAL CALL FOR PAPERS General Information: Financial Cryptography '97 (FC97) is a new conference on the security of digital financial transactions. The first meeting will be held on the island of Anguilla in the British West Indies on February 24-28, 1997. FC97 aims to bring together persons involved in both the financial and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce in general, including Anonymous Payments Fungibility Authentication Home Banking Communication Security Identification Conditional Access Implementations Copyright Protection Loss Tolerance Credit/Debit Cards Loyalty Mechanisms Currency Exchange Legal Aspects Digital Cash Micropayments Digital Receipts Network Payments Digital Signatures Privacy Issues Economic Implications Regulatory Issues Electronic Funds Transfer Smart Cards Electronic Purses Standards Electronic Voting Tamper Resistance Electronic Wallets Transferability Instructions for Authors: Send a cover letter and 9 copies of an extended abstract to be received by November 29, 1996 to the Program Chair at the address given below. The extended abstract should start with the title and an abstract followed by a succinct statement appropriate for a non-specialist reader specifying the subject addressed, its background, the main achievements, and their significance to financial data security. Submissions are limited to 15 single-spaced pages of 12pt type. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be sent to authors no later than January 17, 1997. Authors of accepted papers must guarantee that their paper will be presented at the conference. Proceedings: Proceedings of the conference will be published online in the Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce. Instructions and deadlines for submission of final papers will be sent along with notification of acceptance. Stipends: A very limited number of stipends may be available to those unable to obtain funding to attend the conference. Students whose papers are accepted and who will present the paper themselves are encouraged to apply if such assistance is needed. Requests for stipends should be addressed to one of the General Chairs. Registration: Conference registration and information on travel, hotels, and Anguilla itself is available at URL http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/. Workshop: A workshop, intended for anyone with commercial software development experience who wants hands-on familiarity with the issues and technology of financial cryptography, is planned in conjunction with FC97, to be held during the week preceding the conference. For further information, please contact one of the General Chairs. Send Submissions to: Rafael Hirschfeld FC97 Program Chair CWI Kruislaan 413 1098 SJ Amsterdam The Netherlands email: ray(a)cwi.nl phone: +31 20 592 4169 fax: +31 20 592 4199 Program Committee: Matthew Franklin, AT&T Laboratories--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA Michael Froomkin, U. Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL, USA Rafael Hirschfeld, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Arjen Lenstra, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Mark Manasse, Digital Equipment Corporation, Palo Alto, CA, USA Kevin McCurley, Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA Charles Merrill, McCarter & English, Newark, NJ, USA Clifford Neuman, Information Sciences Institute, Marina del Rey, CA, USA Sholom Rosen, Citibank, New York, NY, USA Israel Sendrovic, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY, USA General Chairs: Robert Hettinga, Shipwright, Boston, MA, USA email: rah(a)shipwright.com Vincent Cate, Offshore Information Services, Anguilla, BWI email: vince(a)offshore.com.ai Conference, Exhibits, and Sponsorship Manager: Julie Rackliffe, Boston, MA, USA email: rackliffe(a)tcm.org Workshop Leader: Ian Goldberg, Berkeley, CA, USA email: iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu Financial Cryptography '97 is held in cooperation with the International Association for Cryptologic Research. Those interested in becoming a sponsor of FC97 or in purchasing exhibit space, please contact the Exhibits and Sponsorship Manager. A copy of this call for papers as well as other information about the conference will be available at URL http://www.cwi.nl/conferences/FC97. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "The cost of anything is the foregone alternative" -- Walter Johnson The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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DOO_dad
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several pieces on the export of encryption regs, the crypto czar, Motorola's crypto modem, PGP's buy of PrivNet, and Keytronic's finger-ID keyboard. Professor Denning opines that the HP doodad will include GAK. ----- http://jya.com/doodad.txt DOO_dad ---------- The NYT has a long report today on a pedophile computer racket run from a prison. With details on how investigators were able to break through hard drive security and use DejaNews to track a suspect. A prison computer business was used to cloak the kiddy pixels. Red flags the Internet's lurid prospects compared to the virtues of do-me-dads like the Times. see: www.nytimes.com

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Squirrel goes Mixmaster-only
by Johannes Kroeger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello remailer users! I'm sorry, but my ISP complained that the huge mail traffic for squirrel overloaded their servers. Effective immediately, my remailer accepts only Mixmaster packets and is not listed in Raph's type-1 statistics anymore. The operation of the nym server at weasel.owl.de is not affected. Regards, Johannes - -- Johannes Kroeger <jkroeger(a)squirrel.owl.de> Send me mail with subject "send pgp-key" to get my PGP key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 iQEVAgUBMpBs1bwPSJ4oQv5pAQF3Agf/UYmh1P7DM0Wqy9Dzoq/e0jZdvcTDHpNH 2MFohAmU1rYn0tKCRW1jUDkG8ULAmfM4HY+aSdKwoihndLL4wTRkhzcl2qePVx6L 69ZEs7EpTLpdiFuTAvIvAD8AInqRZY1WgKII9jk7gccU379gl8nxDZtlIyA89jrG 795R8QWysQs5zfyQ4VtS2s94ZchFJD+Wp5u6fsVhzklsjxwb43EdVZ4/dPUFo7nO azctBYNpWdJBW2Rf81zQDE2OPPs+2kXcvDXU/cg64gtGVGf+8okysEr2fEqdVkFe yQsFvpNngaClUSu6xxMIJXiTy3WlbEYXceQE6hUGStq/PkhqKxkqYQ== =nAT3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Utility of Privacy
by nobody＠cypherpunks.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:13 PM 11/17/1996, Huge Cajones Remailer wrote: > Examples? How about the draft? The privacy protected child has options the others do not. Legal risk okay - beats getting shot. diGriz

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RE: NT insecurity
by Kenneth L. Hamer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Really? Could you provide a reference for this assertion? What is the name of the "password file"? Where is it located on the disk? I'd be very interested to try this out on one of my test systems, especially if it is true. But my experiences with corrupted registry hives leads me to believe you are incorrect. NT usually does nothing so nice when it's registry is corrupted. That's why we keep "emergency repair disks" around 8-). - Ken >---------- >From: Adamsc@io-online.com[SMTP:Adamsc@io-online.com] >Sent: Monday, November 11, 1996 9:36 PM >To: cypherpunks >Subject: BoS: NT insecurity > >Given the recent comments about insecure machines, I thought it was >interesting to note that you can clear *every* password on an NT box by >using >a diskeditor to corrupt the password file (Boot off of a floppy and use >NTFSDOS if you have to). It'll reboot several times and then you'll be >allowed to login. > ># Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | >http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp ># <cadams(a)acucobol.com> | send mail with subject "send PGPKEY" >"That's our advantage at Microsoft; we set the standards and we can >change them." > --- Karen Hargrove, Microsoft (quoted in the Feb 1993 Unix Review >editorial) > >

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Re: Command confirmation request (057CCA)
by csa＠netmaine.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ok

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TIS + HP
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A blurb in the Wash Post today says that the HP roll-out this morning will include TIS's "trusted third party" product. "One essential ingredient in the equation: technology developed by TIS. TIS is so far the only company that has received permission to export encryption technology overseas that exceeds the government's existing threshold." Guess we'll know shortly who else in the System is to be Trusted with Information -- other than Thirds, Fourths and other Dots and Steves.

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POC_ket
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WaJo reports today on IBM's tiny pocket computer that transmits data through the body -- to another body or to a device such as a telephone. Invented by Tom Zimmerman, formerly of the Media Lab, it can tell "anything you touch who you are." Being shown at Comdex. The body as a token. How to crack a human? Grab and squeeze out a pass phrase. ----- http://jya.com/pocket.txt POC_ket

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Re: [REBUTTAL] Censorship on cypherpunks?, from The Netly N
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If you do not send it to me by e-mail, I will never see it. > Why are you so paranoid that someone is reading your e-mail? > I never do anything criminal, so I could give a shit less if > everybody reads all of my fucking mail. I was trying hard not to get into this thread as it is basically just one long flamewar that is getting out of control but I have to comment here: There need be no reason for paranoia. I don`t call it paranoia, I call it constant vigilance, to demonize it is a statist position and tries to ostricise those who protect their privacy. Whether you do anything criminal or not is not the point. Indeed I would say that 90-95% of encryption usage is for perfectly legal purposes, and only about 0.1% of encrypted material is concerned with unethical acts rather than illegal acts. The point is you should retain the right to protect your privacy. Sure, it`s not illegal to put forward anarchist arguments in mail today, but do you really want your company boss knowing about it? I personally don`t work - I`m a student so it doesn`t matter to me, but whether it is right that your employement and political views should affect each other they do, so you should be able to protect yourself with technology... Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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